First published in Indian Express, 11 June 2022
India’s diplomatic dilemma over the outrage from the Muslim countries — in the wake of remarks on the Prophet by two BJP leaders, one of whom has been expelled and the other suspended — is unprecedented, but not quite unexpected. This is the culmination of a series of incidents in the country in the last decade when Muslims were targeted and accused of fomenting violence and fanaticism — in the name of love jihad or food and dress. Hate speeches and mob lynching were other traits of this communal frenzy. Yet, the country has not witnessed widespread communal violence or anti-Muslim outrage in the recent past, save a few cases during the anti-CAA agitation.
What apparently infuriated the regimes in the Muslim world, this time, was the text and context of the anti-Islamic slur. Representatives of the BJP made disgraceful references to the Prophet, which the regimes in these Muslim countries, irrespective of the sects in Islam (as the Saudi and Iranian responses clearly indicated), could not cope with. The context was equally important: The comments came from two responsible ruling party officials in the country’s capital. That’s why they attracted attention. Yet, the agencies to monitor such sensitive issues remained calm until Qatar and Kuwait stepped in by summoning the Indian envoys to protest. In response to the outrage, the BJP acted swiftly by suspending Nupur Sharma and expelling Naveen Jindal, both Delhi-based party functionaries. Later, the party also issued a notification reminding its rank and file to be cautious in public remarks on religious issues.
Meanwhile, social media platforms in India and the Gulf are abuzz with disparaging trolls and there are sickening calls for the boycott of Indian goods. There are also calls on social media for the boycott of Arab goods and services in India. But everyone knows that these are impulsive responses. We have seen such responses in the context of tensions with China. There was never any “exodus” of Chinese goods from India though there was a high-voltage campaign for several months against these goods and some Chinese apps were banned.
Campaigners (including a few GCC regimes) demand that Prime Minister Narendra Modi should tender an apology for all that happened. But New Delhi’s stance is categorial and legitimate insofar as the Union government has nothing to do with such unsolicited comments. More importantly, the ruling party did what it was expected to do. Though belatedly, a case was also registered for hurting the sentiments of Muslims. The Gulf regimes have apparently understood the message behind these measures.
Even as the South Block’s engagements with the Muslim countries continue — with damage-control exercises at different levels — there are countermoves to browbeat the Islamic world. Obviously, the ruling party is aware of the implications of this move for the upcoming elections in some states, besides the 2024 general elections. Hence, the party is likely to follow a carrot and stick policy on crucial political issues.
The Modi government knows that its foreign policy strategy — which includes strategic bargaining with regional and international actors — would fetch reasonable dividends. The response to its Ukraine war strategy has convinced South Block that it has adequate manoeuvrability in global affairs. Countries in West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region do not have a fixed position vis-à-vis India. Delhi has vibrant economic and strategic ties with almost all regimes in the region, irrespective of the brand of Islam or their relative ideological depth. That’s precisely the reason these countries are unwilling to join the Islamabad-led chorus or go beyond passing resolutions. India’s signing of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the UAE and the ongoing negotiations for a wider FTA with the GCC could be an eye-opener for the country’s detractors.
Much has been said and written about India’s energy dependence and trade interdependence across the countries in WANA. As much as 40 per cent of oil and an equal share of gas requirements are met through India’s strategic cooperation with the Gulf regimes. India and the WANA regimes know that there is a mutuality of interests in these transactions which cannot be substituted by any other segments of the world system. Equally important is the role of the more than eight million-strong Indian diaspora in the WANA region. The “Gulf remittance” is an important part of the Indian economy, as important as the Indian investment in the GCC and GCC investment in India.
India’s External Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar, has said that the Indian diaspora is “a unique living bridge between India and the world and should be valued accordingly”. He also said that “from time to time, their interests and well-being are a subject of our conversation.” New Delhi should not stop engaging the countries, especially the ones in the WANA region, that host a significant number of them. Therefore, South Block must go beyond a mere damage-control exercise.
