India’s Polar policy has assumed considerable significance with the notification of its Arctic Policy early this year and the passing of the Indian Antarctic Law by the Indian Parliament recently. For many South Asian countries, the Arctic is a distant place. Though the Arctic looks far away, whatever happens in the North Pole will have its impacts on them—by way of climate change or change in the energy circuit.  However, with its ‘latitudinal quest’ India is the only South Asian country that sees itself as a significant player in the Arctic given its deeper engagements with the major Arctic states. Both the Arctic policy and the Indian Antarctic Law are thus clear signals that India is committed to playing a proactive role in Polar affairs – with its own claim that India is a ‘Third Pole’ country with the Himalayas providing a new segment of the world’s most sensitive climate zones.

Of late, both the Arctic and Antarctic regions have become complex and delicate with increasing geopolitical engagements of major powers. With its vast stretches of territory adjoining seas and oceans, India has reasons to get involved in Arctic affairs. The Himalayas function as the ‘Third Pole’ serving as the fortress of India and other smaller South Asian countries, from both geopolitical as well as ecosystem points of view.

When India notified its Arctic policy, it also coincided with several developments in international relations, particularly when the major powers in the Arctic Council have taken an antagonistic position vis-a-vis Russia, its current Chairperson, with the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. India has understood the geopolitical developments under the present Arctic dispensation have many ramifications, with NATO reasserting in the region.  However, India is guarded in its policy responses given the future dynamics of India’s relations with the major stakeholders of the region, such as Russia.

Scientific Dimensions

India has shown considerable interest in the Arctic region because of its scientific engagements and collaborations. Here ‘Science Diplomacy’ is the driver of India’s massive techno-scientific power and its global aspirations. As such India’s Arctic policy is enunciated as a multifaceted regime that is basically seeking to strengthen its scientific research and cooperation. It also underlines the significance of “climate and environmental protection; economic and human development, transportation and connectivity; governance and international cooperation; and national capacity building in the Arctic region.” All this is envisaged in partnership with different stakeholders such as academia, the research community, business, and industry.

Basically, the Arctic strategy is to help India’s coordinated policymaking on the implications of ice melting in the Arctic for “India’s economic, military, and strategic interests related to global shipping routes, energy security, and exploitation of mineral wealth.” The policy underlines how climate change is critical for the agro-climatic conditions of countries like India, whose food security is significantly dependent on ecosystem stability. This applies to other South Asian countries too.

As such, there are several areas of collaboration between Polar studies and the study of the Himalayas, and Arctic research will encourage the scientific community in analysing the melting rates of the Third Pole–the Himalayan glaciers.

Economic Opportunities

India’s Arctic policy is also envisaged to strengthen cooperation with countries of the Arctic region under various fora such as the Arctic Council. But it would be a challenging task for India, to increase its participation in the Arctic Council with its Observer Status, given the complex issues associated with the post-Ukraine situation. India recognizes that the Arctic governance is very delicate in the contemporary geopolitical setting and the region itself is governed by several national domestic laws, bilateral agreements, global treaties, conventions, and customary laws for the indigenous peoples. Thus, the Arctic states’ “respective sovereign jurisdictions as well as areas beyond national jurisdiction” need to be viewed within the framework of international and national regulations. Unfortunately, this is still a contested area.

India being one of thirteen nations holding Observer status in the Arctic Council has concerns when the council activities are put on hold. Obviously, the Ukraine war has had an impact on the geopolitics of the Arctic. The eight-member Arctic Council has five NATO members—Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States and seven of the eight Arctic states declared that they would ‘pause’ the work of the Arctic Council.  They sought to halt all working group meetings as they did in 2014. However, Russia warned that any temporary freeze would “inevitably lead to the accumulation of the risks and challenges to soft security in the region.”

Naturally, India faces a strategic dilemma in the context of Western sanctions on Russia, particularly when it has several pending projects with Moscow. For example, an MoU was signed between NITI Aayog and the Ministry for Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic on 4 September 2019 with a view to boosting “the strategic partnership between India and Russia by strengthening cooperation in trade, economics and investment.” The agreement sought to “prepare a program for the development of the Russian Far East and Arctic region for 2020–25.” Likewise, India and Russia were exploring the possibility of the joint development of hydrocarbons on the Arctic shelf and Russia’s Far East. Reports indicated that they were mainly focused on energy cooperation, and exports of Russian hydrocarbons to India were expanding, with the two countries’ mutual interest in the implementation of joint LNG projects persisting.

Over the years, India’s energy ties with Russia have shown growing significance. When President Vladimir Putin visited India a few years back, Russia and India pledged to collaborate on oil and gas projects in Russia, including Russia’s Arctic shelf, and the shores of Pechora and Okhotsk Seas. Russia was already supplying India with Arctic liquefied natural gas, while in 2017 Rosneft bought a 49% share of India’s Essar Oil Ltd.  These deals were interpreted as part of a “trade-off” in the context of India’s self-assurance in addressing the threat of US sanctions and a signature on agreements to procure Russia’s S-400 air defence system.  Evidently, Moscow’s partnership with New Delhi has made Russia inclined to seek Indian investment in the Arctic and other energy holdings.

Arctic Connectivity

India’s Arctic policy has underlined that the country has a great interest in the realm of transportation and connectivity. It says, “India ranks third in the list of seafarer supplying nations catering to almost ten per cent of global demand. India’s maritime human resources could contribute towards meeting the growing requirements of the Arctic.” It’s very clear from the Artic policy that India is committed to exploring the connectivity corridor between the resource-rich Arctic Region and International North-South Transport Corridor.

India has already initiated discussions with Russia on cooperation in connectivity via the Northern Sea Route and joint energy projects in the Arctic region. The Modi-Putin joint declaration in 2019 referred to the Chennai (India)-Vladivostok (Russia) maritime corridor which is expected to play a major role. Enhancement of the India-Russia joint trade commitment will definitely diversify India’s trade space.

When the Indian Prime Minister extended a $1 billion credit line for businesses interested in Russia’s Far-East region, he saw it as part of strengthening India’s ‘Act Far East’ policy. This gesture is expected to “give new impetus to the development of economic diplomacy,” as Mr. Modi indicated in his speech. Certainly, the Far East region of Russia needs a lot of support and help given its geopolitical vulnerabilities.

India is expecting that ice-free conditions in the Arctic would facilitate the opening of new shipping routes and thereby lowering costs and reshaping global trade. India also knows that the Arctic is a rich storehouse of resources with huge deposits of undiscovered oil and natural gas.  Hence India is concerned that the Arctic has become geopolitically very sensitive with major powers having vital stakes for security and commerce.

But India is very vigilant that its policy is put across within a framework of multilateralism and, of course, with a sufficient understanding of the ground situation. New Delhi knows that there is no alternative to a rule-based governance architecture in the Arctic. How to sustain this rule-based governance architecture is a real challenge for all stakeholders in the region, including India, as well as for their multilevel engagements. If the Arctic Council proceedings are halted for one or the other reason, the implications will be far-reaching, for all regions and all countries of the world.

The China factor and the emerging power equations  

There are questions about the implications of China’s growing activities in the Arctic. India naturally considers China as a competitor in the Arctic with its deeper engagements. New Delhi has apprehensions when China projected itself as a ‘Near Arctic state’ with its new stakes in developing the ‘Polar Silk Road.’ India’s opposition to the Belt Road Initiative is also a part of this apprehension. New Delhi still fears the ‘String of Pearls’ project of China—whether it is real or imaginary—and obviously, everything is connected with this. But Russia can play an effective role in bridging the gulf between Beijing and New Delhi. When India has an interest in the NSR passage due to its geographical positioning, it tends to see the emerging actors in the region from a broader perspective. India being the third-largest sea-faring nation does not want to be lagging behind, in the future opportunities in the region.

At the same time, India knows that it cannot proceed without taking both Russia and China into confidence. This is certainly a challenging task before Indian diplomacy. However, India sees the partnership with Russia as crucial in its Arctic engagements. As an Arctic state with considerable stakes in the region, Russia can open up vast opportunities for India’s scientific and commercial interests. The Western partners of India in the Arctic may not appreciate these collaborations, for obvious reasons.  This is also likely to trigger further speculations when India hosts the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) grouping next year, with India assuming its chair position. Many experts believe that SCO is a counterweight to NATO seeking to offset its eastward expansion. Evidently, India’s Arctic engagements depend on a host of geopolitical issues which got complicated in the post-Ukraine war conditions.

Excerpts from the speech at the ‘Arctic segment’ of the Seventh Eastern Economic Forum (EEF), held at Vladivostok, Russia on 7 September 2022. KM Seethi is a Senior Fellow at the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) and an Academic Advisor to the International Centre for Polar Studies (ICPS), and Director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research, based at the Mahatma Gandhi University Kerala.

The post India’s Arctic policy regime and its geopolitical significance first appeared on KM Seethi.

The Arctic geopolitics has recently witnessed growing big power involvement and rivalry. India’s policy response to the changing geopolitical realities has both challenges and limitations.

The Arctic region is becoming strategically significant for several reasons. While the Antarctic is seen as relatively free from political and military interferences, the Arctic has become geopolitically sensitive with big powers staking their claims and counter claims. The North and South Poles are interconnected with the ecosystem of lives and livelihoods across the vast stretches of the Earth, with the oceans and seas, and with nations and their collectivities. While the Antarctic in the southernmost part is an uninhabited continent of land surrounded by a rim of sea ice, the Arctic in the northernmost part is essentially an Ocean surrounded by inhabited land.

The Antarctic does not have any indigenous population (except seasonal research staff), but there are approximately ten million people living in the Arctic region, and nearly 10 per cent of the total population is indigenous. Indigenous population consists of more than 40 different ethnic groups spreading over the 8 Arctic states—U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Iceland. This makes the Arctic region more socially sensitive and geopolitically significant. Consequently, the emerging geopolitical realities—with big powers having increasingly involved and invested in Arctic affair—tend to have an impact on even the scientific research activities in the region.

A crucial question to be addressed is how far are the major players in the Arctic willing to negotiate within a global governance architecture in the region. We must also look at the potentials and constraints of India as an emerging player in the region within these broad parameters.

Admittedly, contemporary discussions about Arctic geopolitics have different dimensions. However, the Arctic has been an important focal point of the foreign policies of major powers for more than two decades. There are historical and ideological undercurrents in the making of the Arctic strategies of these powers and, naturally, the narratives about the Arctic region continue to reflect the different perceptions of policy makers as well as the emerging Arctic scholarship in different disciplines. What is important is that besides the vast ambit of scientific exploration and research, questions of ecosystem management, human development, sustainable livelihood of indigenous communities, natural resources management, shipping and transportation, sovereignty, national and regional security—all call for greater attention and intervention from the angle of global governance architecture.

There is a transregional governance architecture in the Arctic called the Arctic Council which is an intergovernmental forum with 8 Arctic countries (following the Ottawa Declaration in 1996). There are also observers like China, Japan, India, Singapore, South Korea, Italy, Germany, France UK, Spain, Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and UNEP, UNDP, and NGOs like International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA) etc. The Council is a platform for addressing and negotiating issues of the Arctic states within the framework of international law.

But the Arctic is a problematic terrain, mainly due to its geopolitical characteristics and its proximity to the major powers like Russia, the United States, Canada etc. Russia and the U.S. have different perceptions of security in the Arctic. U.S. sees Russia as having challenged the maritime rules in the Arctic and expressed deep reservations about Russia’s military activity in the region. Russia, in turn, challenged the U.S. and the NATO’s motives in deploying military across the region. The U.S., on the other hand, accused Russia of accumulating unprecedented military might in the Arctic and testing its newest weapons in the region (in a bid to secure its northern coast and open up a key shipping route from Asia to Europe). The U.S. is also uneasy about Russia’s attempts to influence the Northern Sea Route (NSR)—a shipping lane that is expected to reduce the travel time for shipping containers to reach Europe from Asia via the Suez Canal. The volume of cargo shipping along the NSR is expected to increase to 100 mln tonnes in a few years.

China has also been staking high claims in Arctic affairs—assuming itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’, though the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is more than 1400 kilometres. Sensing this scenario, The European Union had already expressed its concerns and anxieties over the expanding role of China in the geopolitical terrain of the Arctic region and the collaborative activities between Russia and China.
While the major powers have been recalibrating their Arctic strategies, India also came out with its (draft) Arctic policy recently. But its policy responses need to be placed within a larger context of the emerging geopolitical challenges.

What attracts the major powers in the Arctic is evidently its rich deposits of oil and natural gas, besides its international maritime connectivity. The region is well endowed with a variety of minerals and rare earth elements. The region’s oil and gas deposits constitute nearly 13 per cent of the world’s unexplored petroleum resources and 30 per cent of the untapped natural gas resources.

When the Arctic is strategically important, the Northwest Passage becomes the most profitable shipping lane between Europe and Asia. Experts say, shipping time could be reduced by 40 per cent if the Northwest and Northeast passages were ice-free all year. China realised the importance of this potential shipping route and in its Arctic Policy published in January 2018, Beijing referred to the trans-Arctic passage as the “Central Passage.” Calling itself as a “Near-Arctic State,’ China noted that “the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative) are important for the country in the coming years.

Russia and China collaborate in the emerging Arctic geopolitics in different ways. While China is fast expanding its Arctic strategy, Russia is also reinforcing its military capability in the Arctic with its Northern Fleet being located in the region where its strategic submarines—essential to maintain Russia’s status as a nuclear power—are maintained.

The U.S Congressional Research Service recently sounded alarm that given the growing Russian military capabilities and activities in the region, the Arctic would become “a region of military tension and competition.” It may be recalled that during the Cold War, the Arctic was a terrain of military rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union when both countries maintained nuclear-powered submarines, long-range bombers, and tactical combat aircraft in the region. Though there was a respite for this rivalry after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the situation began to take a new dimension during the last decade, particularly after Russia asserting that some parts of the Northern Sea Route (NSR)—linking Europe and Asia—pass through its internal waters and hence it has a right to regulate commercial shipping.

This triggered a dispute between the U.S and Russia, which would have implications for other parts of the world as well, and thereby it would even undermine the universal application of international law on international waters. This assumes strategic significance given the fact that five of the eight Arctic states—the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway—are members of NATO and three of them—Denmark, Finland, and Sweden—are members of the European Union (EU). During the Cold War, Norway and its contiguous sea areas were reckoned to be the northern flank of NATO’s defensive line against potential aggression by the Moscow-led alliance. The CRS Report also seriously viewed China’s growing engagements with the Nordic countries, like Iceland and Greenland. China has polar-capable icebreakers and is planning to develop a huge nuclear-powered icebreaker also. It was at a time when the major powers began to recalibrate their Arctic strategies that India came out with its draft Arctic policy in early January 2021.

‘SciTech’ power and India’s Arctic Policy

India’s Arctic Policy has come as a significant milestone in the country’s Science Diplomacy. It is also in line with India’s fast expanding scientific-technological (‘SciTech’ power) status. India’s Arctic contacts began a century ago with its signing of the ‘Svalbard Treaty’ in February 1920 in Paris. A breakthrough in India’s Polar research came in 1981 when the country joined the nations engaged in the Antarctic exploration. However, its engagements did not make much headway till 2007 when the scientists undertook India’s first Arctic expedition. In the following year, India set up a research station ‘Himadri’ at the international Arctic research base at Svalbard, Norway. In 2013, Indian scientists set up another facility which was India’s first multi-sensor moored observatory called ‘IndArc’ – a model of Indo-Norwegian scientific and technical cooperation in addressing the global climate change. It was in the same year that India became an Observer in the Arctic Council—a great recognition of India’s contribution to the Arctic Studies. Another atmospheric laboratory was established in 2016 with the aim of initiating studies on clouds, precipitation, long-range pollutants, and other background atmospheric parameters.

India’s proposed Arctic policy underlined that the Arctic research has helped to initiate studies on glaciers in the Himalayan region. This has tremendous implications for the agro-climatic conditions of countries like India whose food security itself is dependent on ecosystem stability. The policy says that “there are several synergies between polar studies and the study of the Himalayas. Arctic research will help India’s scientific community to study melting rates of the third pole–the Himalayan glaciers, which are endowed with the largest freshwater reserves in the world outside the geographic poles.”

According to the note attached to IAP, “India seeks to play a constructive role in the Arctic by using its vast scientific pool and expertise in Himalayan and Polar research. India would also like to contribute in ensuring that as the Arctic becomes more accessible, the harnessing of its resources is done sustainably and in line with best practices formulated by bodies such as the Arctic Council.

The IAP is articulated with five major areas of engagements—(i) Science and research; (ii) Economic and human development cooperation; (iii). Transportation and connectivity; (iv) Governance and international cooperation; and (v) National capacity building. It is clear that the AP, apart from underlining the significance of science and research, sees the Artic region as a potential area of engagement in diverse areas of human development and commercial activities. The document says: “India seeks to engage in economic development in a manner that is sustainable and is of value to the Arctic residents, especially indigenous communities.” India sees the Arctic as “the largest unexplored prospective area for hydrocarbons remaining on earth” besides its vast reserves of mineral deposits. It also keeps in perspective India’s investment in Russia which amounts to $15 billion in oil and gas projects.

The policy document is also confident of utilising India’s expertise in the digital economy for facilitating establishment of data centres for commerce in the region. It further explores “opportunities for investment in Arctic infrastructure in areas such as offshore exploration/mining, ports, railways and airports.” This inevitably calls for encouraging participation by Indian public and private sector firms with an expertise in these sectors. India’s chambers of industry and commerce will be encouraged to enhance private investment in the Arctic and explore the public-private-partnership model. The draft policy also indicated that Indian companies will be encouraged to obtain membership of the Arctic Economic Council.

Another area where India has leverage in the Arctic region is human development. The document says: “the Arctic’s indigenous inhabitants are being inevitably impacted by climate change. This is similar to the socio-ecological-economic predicament of the Himalayan people. The disruption of unique ecosystems and erosion of traditional knowledge are common to both. India has substantial expertise in addressing such issues and is uniquely placed to make a positive contribution in assisting the Arctic’s indigenous communities cope with similar challenges.”

In the realm of transportation and connectivity, India has vital stakes. According to IAP, “India ranks third in the list of seafarer supplying nations catering to almost ten per cent of global demand. India’s maritime human resources could contribute towards meeting the growing requirements of the Arctic.” India expects that ice free conditions in the Arctic would soon result in the “opening of new shipping routes and thereby lowering costs and reshaping global trade. Traffic, especially through the Northern Sea Route, is rising exponentially and is projected to multiply in a few years. The draft policy also seeks to “explore the possibility of linking the International North South Transport Corridor with the Unified Deep-Water System and its further extension to the Arctic.” India expects that “the North-South connectivity will result in lowering shipping costs and overall development of the hinterland and of indigenous communities more than East-West connectivity.”

India knows that the Arctic governance is very crucial in the geopolitical milieu and the region itself is “governed by numerous national domestic laws, bilateral agreements, global treaties and conventions and customary laws for the indigenous peoples.” However, the major focus of ‘capacity building’ is on science and technology, the draft document does not seem to have given importance to social sciences (including strategic) component in the making of India’s Arctic policy even as the four of the ‘five pillars’ IAP outlined deal with these social areas.

India notified its IAP at a crucial time of global and regional power realignments. It was in 2018 that China notified its Arctic policy as a ‘White Paper.’ Though China does not have territorial sovereignty and related sovereign rights in the Arctic, it has been so eager to establish a foothold in the region with its self-assumed identity as ‘near-Arctic state.’

The strategic significance of China’s Arctic Policy cannot be underestimated. It underscores that the Arctic is a region having “global implications and international impacts.” It says that the geopolitical scenario “goes beyond its original inter-Arctic States” having a vital bearing on the interests of States outside the region and the interests of the international community as a whole.

China has also gone to the extent of conceding, perhaps for the first time, that its interests in the Arctic region cannot be limited to ‘scientific research’ but would move to a broad range of commercial activities. This obviously becomes a part of its project to build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ that links China with Europe through the Arctic and fits in with the new ‘blue ocean passages’ extending from Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR), put in place in 2013.

China became more assertive in its maritime policy and it apparently believes in the argument that “Whoever controls the Arctic sea route will control the world economy and a new internationally strategic corridor.” A decade back, a Chinese admiral said that the Arctic “belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it.” Such statements cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric given the new tempo of Chinese maritime strategies today.

Insofar as the Arctic is rich in resources, it has become so sensitive over years, and the region is warming far more rapidly than anywhere else on the planet. It certainly calls for extreme vigilance when powers like US, Russia and China think about transforming the Arctic into a terrain for rivalry. In the emerging scenario, India’s Arctic policy has great constraints in engaging the broader geopolitical issues of the region, especially when New Delhi has strategic ties with Russia and the US, on the one hand, and a very complex and uncertain pattern of relations with China, on the other. At the most, its basic approach—which underlines the value of ‘sustainable engagement’ through its ‘Sci-Tech’ power—has great value. India is well aware of the “vulnerability of the Arctic to unprecedented changes in the climate.” Hence its emphasis on ‘rule-based governance architecture’ in the region is in line with India’s science diplomacy and science and technology policy regime.

Excerpts from the paper presented at the International Seminar on Polar Studies organised by the International Centre for Polar Studies (ICPS), Mahatma Gandhi University on 24 June 2021. An earlier version of the paper had appeared in Economic and Political Weekly.

The post Challenges to India’s Arctic policy amid great power rivalry first appeared on KM Seethi.

The instant case manifests the actual implementation of the age old adage that “charity begins at home”, not for the homeless, the landless, the labourer, the beggar, or those without any source of income, but practiced by the powerful, the high and mighty, the rich who committed trespass on huge tracts of public land (including forests), and have acquired proprietary rights over them, not because of need, but out of sheer greed, completely unconcerned about the resultant damage to the national and public interest (High Court of Jammu and Kashmir (2020): Prof. S.K. Bhattia Vs State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, PIL No. 19/2011: IA No.48/20148 & CM Nos. 4036, 4065 of 2020, pronounced on 09.10.2020).

The court said:

…In fact, the implementation of this adage, as is manifested in the present case, tantamount to implementation of a “loot to own” policy. That these looters could motivate a legislation to facilitate their nefarious design, by itself speaks about their insidious and deep penetration into the corridors of power and authority; about the level and scale of their influence at all levels and suggests involvement of all those who mattered including in propounding and implementation of the policy (Ibid).

The High Court further pointed out that they had not “come across any such legislative state action legitimising criminal activity at the cost of national and public interest with incalculable loss and damage to the public exchequer and the environment, without financial (or other) impact assessment.” The Court’s attack on public authorities is even more revealing:

What is even more shocking is that (despite two PILs), their pleas for justice to the people of Jammu and Kashmir have fallen completely on the deaf ears of the official respondents. The bureaucracy and Government officials are enjoying huge salaries and benefits for their acts of omission and commission each of which was tantamount to a penal offence and have thus actively encouraged usurpations of public lands. Those in power, authority and the respondents have completely failed to discharge their constitutional functions, their statutory duties and public law obligations towards the public to whom they owe their very existence (Ibid).

Following the judgement, the J&K administration in its order on 1 November cancelled all land transactions taken under the Roshni Act (under which 2.5 lakh acres of land was to be transferred to the existing occupants). The administration also entrusted the principal secretary and revenue department to put in place measures to retrieve large tracts of state land vested under the Act. The court identified that more than 6,00,000 kanals of the state land were regularised and transferred to the occupants. This included more than 5,70,000 kanals in Jammu and 33,392 kanals in the Kashmir province (one kanal is equivalent to 505.857 square metres or one-eighth of an acre).

It was the National Conference (NC) government led by Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah who brought in the Roshni Act in 2001 with a view to regularising the unauthorised land (the NC was, at that time, part of the BJP-led NDA coalition at the Centre and Omar Abdullah was a minister in the NDA government). The NC government claimed that the Act would facilitate it to mobilise as much as Rs. 25,000 crore which would be used to augment power generation in the state (the label ‘Roshni’ implied electricity or light). The state government had fixed 1990 as the cut-off year for the Roshni scheme. But, in 2005, the PDP-Congress coalition government of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed extended the cut-off year to 2004 and this was again changed to 2007 by the Ghulam Nabi Azad government (Government of Jammu and Kashmir 2007).

Meanwhile there were serious allegations of corruption in the land transfers. Investigation agencies recorded many instances of public land being allotted to ineligible beneficiaries. The State Vigilance Organisation (SVO) itself found that the government officials were also involved in the fraud transactions.

In 2014, a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (C&AG) pointed out serious wrongdoings in the transfer of encroached land to its occupants. The C&AG report noted that the Roshni scheme could not meet its purpose—against the target of Rs 25,448 crores, the scheme had yielded only Rs 76 crores during 2007-2013 (C&AG Report 2014:38-54). In 2015, the SVO charged more than 20 officials (which included three former deputy commissioners) for their abuse of the provisions of the Roshni Act. Since then, efforts were underway to put a halt to the illegal deals. In November 2018, the J&K High Court restrained beneficiaries of the scheme from proceeding with any transaction. Later, on 28 November 2018, the J&K Governor Satyapal Malik revoked the Roshni Act and ordered a probe into the scam. The J&K situation, however, turned more complex with the political uncertainty looming large in the state—which eventually led to the abolition of Article 370 and the reorganisation of the State into Union Territories in August 2019. Massive arrests and restrictions followed in the UT.

Meanwhile, Jammu Kashmir Law Commission in its report in March 2020 pointed to the reports of abuse of the Roshni Scheme. The Commission characterised the Act as a typical example of the fences swallowing the crop. These are covered in dust from top to toe. The state has gone against the grain in legislating the Act and in framing the rules. It further said that such legislation where a huge chunk of land comprising thousands of kanals in which the public, in general, had an interest has been conveniently allowed to be transferred to the trespassers and the encroachers by a blatant misuse of the public trust and power cannot find a place in any nook and corner of the Indian State. The Commission recommended immediate retrieval of land transferred in favour of illegal beneficiaries under the garb of this legislation as only the wealthy, the mighty and those wielding political clout got benefitted. The Report concluded: The policy of loot and scoot was adopted by the State throwing all the norms and the laws to the winds just to benefit the big-wings (J&K Law Commission Report, March 2020; see DE 2020).

The High Court verdict of 9 October 2020 fully confirmed all apprehensions and allegations of massive corruption raised by different agencies. Following the court verdict, the CBI registered separate cases and took over the investigation of the matter, earlier registered by Vigilance Organization, Jammu (now Anti-Corruption Bureau, UT of J&K) vide FIR No. 23/2015, FIR No. 5/2015 and FIR No. 6/2014(CBI 2020). Since then, the J&K administration started publishing list of beneficiaries under the Roshni Act on its website. The list disclosed the names of top echelons of J&K which included many politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen who were reported to have abused the provisions of Roshni Act and encroached upon the state land. What angered many was the list, which included former chief ministers, Farooq Abdullah and Omar Abdullah, for having built their residential house in Jammu over “illegally-possessed land,” a charge denied by them instantly. Farooq Abdullah came down heavily on the administration’s campaign and said that this was being done with “malicious intent.” He further denied that the headquarters of NC in both Srinagar and Jammu were “legalised under the controversial Roshni Act.” Among the list were many other top politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and former superintendents of police. The administration also notified encroachments other than under the Roshni Act which emerged in the revenue records—they are mostly agricultural land in Jammu.

In the meantime, the lists brought out by the J&K administration demolished the myth of ‘land jihad.’ For instance, in the first list released by the administration, there were only 3 Muslims out of 541. In the second list, there were around three dozen Muslim names out of 1237. Reports indicated that the majority of the 1.58 lakh land scam cases involved the role of non-Muslims. The lawyer of Bhalla, who challenged the Roshni Act, admitted that of the 44,000 kanals encroached on in Jammu district, Muslims got only 1,180 kanals. He further said that “in Kathua district (of Jammu), 98 per cent of the 11,000 kanals have gone to non-Muslims” (The Telegraph 2020).

Fears of the marginalised communities

There is also a flipside side of the land scam. With the Roshni Act being repealed, there is a section of people in J&K who are much frightened. They are the poor who were inveigled by the privileged sections to purchase public land with the government support. These people—who were literally struggling to make ends meet—somehow secured a few marlas of land (one marla is equivalent to a little over 25 square metres). Today they are too distressed about the future of their land and, therefore, accused the NC government of resorting to deceit by making them the ultimate victims of this fraud. They knew that the wealthy and the privileged people have the necessary wherewithal to escape from the setbacks of land transactions. “Where do we poor people go?”, they ask.

Many lament that they were lured into the scheme, several years ago, by asking them to file an application and pay an amount as fee to possess land. Once the fees paid, the property would be regularised in the hands of the owner without even telling that this was the state land. With the possession of land, many constructed small houses with their sweat and labour, but now, after several years, the administration is set to evict them by demolishing houses. This is true of the conditions of Gujjar and Bakerwal people who are afraid of losing their land, particularly in the Jammu region.

Since the Roshni Act has been rescinded, many argue that the tribal population in J&K should not be penalised for their ignorance of rules and regulations. Way back in 1991, Gujjars, Bakerwals, Gaddis and Sippis of the State were bestowed Schedule Tribe status. Though these communities were entitled to 10% reservation in state jobs, all other benefits enjoyed by the Scheduled Tribes elsewhere in India were not in place in J&K. For instance, the Forest Rights Act of 2006 was inoperative in the state. The Act grants Scheduled Tribes dwelling in forests across the country the “right to hold and live in forest land.” But the Forest Rights Act was not extended to J&K. Now that the Jammu and Kashmir administration announced that it would implement the Forest Rights Act, 2006 in the UT, the tribal communities in J&K (who constitute nearly 12 per cent of the population) heave a sigh of relief even as many keep their fingers crossed. The administration was reported to have plans to complete by mid-January 2021, the process of identifying claimants by the forest rights panels for assessing the nature and extent of rights claimed at the village-level. Reports suggested that the tribes and traditional forest dwellers would be bestowed the rights over forest land for “the purpose of habitation or self-cultivation or livelihood, ownership, access to collect, use, and dispose of minor forest produce, and entitlement to seasonal resources among others.” However, according to official statements, the rights granted under this Act would be heritable but not transferable. Yet, the problem with some sections of the marginalised communities in J&K would be the actual fallout of reversing the Roshni Act.

Even as the land scam issue has taken a new turn with new lists of beneficiaries of illegal transactions being announced, the Union Government notified the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Adaptation of Central Laws) Third Order 2020 (Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs 2020). With the new regulation in place, no domicile or permanent resident certificate is mandatory to buy non-agricultural land in J&K. The Ministry of Home Affairs also notified the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, facilitating the procurement of land in J&K by all Indian citizens. Earlier, under Article 35-A of J&K Constitution, there was prohibition on the sale of land to those who were not state subjects. The new order also authorizes the government to proclaim any area in the UT as strategic.

While such changes are seen as part of BJP’s long-proclaimed position on terminating the ‘special status,’ many eyebrows are raised with respect to the implications of the notification scrapping the Big Land Estate Abolition Act, 1950 – which, in fact, was instrumental in ending landlordism in J&K and had ensured radical redistribution of land (Prasad 2014). The laws repealed by the Union Government included the Jammu and Kashmir Alienation of Land Act, Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, Jammu and Kashmir Common Lands (Regulation) Act 1956, Jammu and Kashmir Consolidation of Holdings Act 1962, Jammu and Kashmir Right of Prior Purchase Act, and the Jammu and Kashmir Utilization of Lands Act (Mir 2020). Many fear that a cumulative effect of all modifications of laws could be disastrous for the poor, local inhabitants. According to them, the long-term objective of the government might be to effect demographic changes in the UT, particularly in Jammu. Political parties in J&K also feel that the changes put in place would also undercut the federal character of the system. Spokespersons of the People’s Alliance for Gupkar Declaration—a platform of political parties committed to the restoration of Article 370—also argue that the Union Government’s interventions would only destroy the basic principles of Centre-State relations.

However, the land scam brought to light one of the fundamental causes of the alienation of the people of J&K, over the years—the land question. Notwithstanding a few accomplishments of the land reforms (of the 1950s), the successive governments in the state failed to address the basic problems of the people with an open mind. All major ruling dispensations in the past—from the Indian National Congress to National Conference and the People’s Democratic Party—tended to see the affairs of the state only from an exclusive power dimension which caused many hassles and pitfalls in the past. Now the burning question is if a new power circuit emerging from New Delhi can set right the mistakes of the erstwhile ‘Special Status’ era?

Originally Published in Policy Circle, 8 December 2020

References

CBI (2020): “Press Release, New Delhi, 16.11.2020,” available at http://www.cbi.gov.in/pressreleases/pr_2020-11-16-1.php; also see http://www.cbi.gov.in/firs/2020/2020_pdf/2020_acb_jammu_firs/RC0042020A0011.pdf

C&AG (2014): Government of Jammu and Kashmir: Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Revenue Sector and Public Sector Undertakings (Social, General and Economic Sectors) for the Year ended 31 March 2013, available at https://cag.gov.in/uploads/download_audit_report/2014/Jammu_Kashmir_Report_1_2014.pdf

DE (2020): “Law Commission recommends retrieval of land transferred under Roshni Scheme,” Daily Excelsior, 7 March, available, https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/law-commission-recommends-retrieval-of-land-transferred-under-roshni-scheme/

Government of Jammu and Kashmir (2001): The Jammu and Kashmir State Lands (Vesting of Ownership to the Occupants) Act, 2001, Act No. XII of 2001, available at http://jkrevenue.nic.in/pdf/acts/Roshni-Act-2001.pdf

Government of Jammu and Kashmir (2007): The Jammu and Kashmir State Lands (Vesting of Ownership to the Occupants) RULES, 2007 [Revenue Department Notification SRO 64 dated 5th May, 2007, available at http://jkrevenue.nic.in/pdf/acts/Roshni-Rules,2007.pdf

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs (2020): Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Adaptation of Central Laws) Third Order 2020, 26 October, https://jkadworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/order-jkup.jpg

High Court of Jammu and Kashmir (2020): Prof. S.K. Bhattia Vs State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, PIL No. 19/2011: IA No.48/20148 & CM Nos. 4036, 4065 of 2020, pronounced on 09.10.2020, available at https://services.ecourts.gov.in/ecourtindiaHC/cases/display_pdf.php?filename=Wvv66Dud4dpqZq8Ja%2B1FGGM6ibGoca8jahICywR9JLZREUY3%2B2eQjiiOfYki7YqM&caseno=PIL/19/2011&cCode=1&appFlag=

Mir, Shakir (2020): “Modi Govt’s New Land Policy for J&K Overturns 7 Decades of Land Reform,” The Wire, 28 October, available at https://thewire.in/government/jammu-and-kashmir-land-policy-reform

Prasad, Anirudh Kumar (2014):” Sheikh Abdullah and Land Reforms in Jammu and Kashmir,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 49, no. 31, 2014, pp. 130–137. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24480469. Accessed 28 Nov. 2020.

The Telegraph (2020): “Lists contest ‘land jihad’ line in Jammu,” 26 November, https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/lists-contest-land-jihad-line-in-jammu/cid/1798583

The post Land jihad? The reality of land scam in Jammu and Kashmir first appeared on KM Seethi.

And he knew, also, what the old man was thinking as his tears flowed, and he, Rieux, thought it too: that a loveless world is a dead world, and always there comes an hour when one is weary of prisons, of one’s work, and of devotion to duty, and all one craves for is a loved face, the warmth and wonder of a loving heart (Albert Camus, The Plague).

KM SEETHI

First Published in Policy Circle, 22 September 2020

For PDF Version see KM SEETHI – Ageing in Times of COVID-19 – GSC – 2020

Ageing and health has been a priority issue across countries in both the Global North and Global South. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) underline the significance of ageing population, proclaiming that “no one will be left behind.” It seeks to ensure “healthy lives” and promote “well-being at all ages.” In its commitment to achieve SDGs, the UN further stated that “all indicators should be desegregated by age” (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015a; 2015b; United Nations Development Programme 2017). While such proclamations apparently remain a distant goal in the neoliberal era (with no more blanket promises to ‘social security’ and welfare measures), the state and non-state actors cannot but make explicit commitment to the protection of vulnerable people whose number has been increasing in low-and middle-income countries. This is increasingly due to the intervention and activism of judicial agencies, human rights and civil liberties organisations etc. In situations of national and international emergency (such as disasters and pandemics), the role of these agencies is critical and reassuring. The current scenario of COVID-19 with its attendant implications for older persons is a case in point.

Even as the global pandemic witnessed a tidal surge in India and across the world, the Supreme Court of India directed all states to file a comprehensive affidavit, bringing out the details and the measures put in place by them (apropos a petition seeking proper facilities for the ageing population in the country). The court also gave one month to those states which have not filed affidavits yet (Supreme Court of India 2020b). The Supreme Court bench was hearing a plea which sought the intervention of the judicial body with regard to the elderly, saying they need more care and protection in this critical time of the pandemic. Earlier, on 4 August, the matter had come up before the apex court which, in turn, directed that all eligible old age people should be paid pension without any interruption and that the states should provide them necessary medicines, masks, sanitisers, and other essential goods in the wake of the pandemic (Supreme Court of India 2020a). In its August 4 direction, the court had pointed out that given their vulnerability, the ageing people should be rendered priority in admission in government hospital and if any complaint emerged in this direction, lodged by them, the hospital authorities should take immediate measures to remedy their grievance. Senior advocate and former Union Minister Ashwani Kumar who moved the court said that the elderly living alone constituted the “worst sufferers” and they were not able to get medicines, masks, sanitisers, and other essential goods (Ibid).

It may be noted that even months before the first case of COVID-19 was reported in India, the Supreme Court in its 13 December 2018 verdict had said that the statutory rights of over 10 crore elderly persons in India must be recognised and implemented, directing the Centre to obtain information from all states and Union Territories about the number of old age homes in each district (Supreme Court of India 2018). The court, while emphasising the social justice aspect, said that the state is obligated “to ensure that right to live with dignity, shelter and health of citizens, including the elderly, are not only protected but also enforced.” It also directed that a plan of action should be prepared for giving publicity to provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to make the elderly aware about their constitutional and statutory rights, and that the Centre must exercise its power and issue appropriate directions to the states for effective implementation of the provisions of the Act, and also conduct a review for the purposes of monitoring its progress (India, Ministry of Law and Justice 2007; Supreme Court of India 2018).

It is more than a coincidence that the August 4 direction of the Supreme Court came just a day after the 73rd World Health Assembly (WHA) endorsed the proposal for a Decade of ‘Healthy Ageing’ (2020-2030). The ‘Healthy Ageing’ is the process of developing and maintaining the functional ability that enables wellbeing in older age. Functional ability is about having the capabilities that enable all people to be and do what they have reason to value (WHO 2020a). The Decade of ‘Healthy Ageing’ is envisaged as an opportunity “to bring together governments, civil society, international agencies, professionals, academia, the media, and the private sector for ten years of concerted, catalytic and collaborative action to improve the lives of older people, their families, and the communities in which they live” (Ibid). The WHA, in its resolution on 3 August, noted that populations across the world “are ageing at a faster pace than in the past and this demographic transition will have an impact on almost all aspects of society.” It further noted that a decade of determined world-wide action on ‘Healthy Ageing’ would be urgently needed. This is quite significant because there are already more than 1 billion older people aged 60 years or above, with most living in low-and middle-income countries. Many find it quite difficult to have access to even the basic needs of existence to lead a life of minimum dignity. Others face numerous impediments that inhibit their full mobility and participation in society. The WHO projected that in the next three decades, the global ageing population is expected to be more than double, reaching over 1.5 billion persons (WHO 2020b). By 2050, the ageing people will have increased to 21.5 per cent of the global population. The demographic shift will be more discernible in the Global South countries which, by 2050, will have eight out of 10 of the world’s over 60s. The emerging scenario of low-and middle-income countries has prompted many to say the Global South is “growing old before it grows rich” (UNDP 2015). However, the WHO warns that the Universal Health Coverage cannot be achieved without addressing their needs (WHO 2020b).

An unprecedented contagion for older people

While the international declarations on ageing people continue to emerge, the COVID-19 has already taken the largest share of fatalities from the older persons. Health experts agree that the present pandemic is unprecedented in history. Admittedly, it is for the first time that the people over 65 are more vulnerable to risks and fatalities than they were any time in history. This has tremendous implications for how the pandemic sweeps, how many people will succumb to death and what the economic and social consequences would be (Holt et al. 2020; CDC 2020; WHO 2020c). The influenza pandemic of 1918-19—which killed more than 50 million people and caused more than 500 million (one-third of the world population) infections across the world—was not too bad for older people. The worst victims were the adult population (Martini et al. 2019). However, COVID-19 set a bad health scenario for the older. Those over 65 and above, particularly with comorbidities will continue to be disproportionately vulnerable to hospitalisation and fatality. This is the trend globally. Those above 85 or above faced the highest risk for severe illness from the coronavirus (CDC 2020).

Thus, the pattern of COVID-19 deaths by age has been palpable since the beginning of the pandemic. Investigations in the United States, Spain, England, Italy, China, Brazil, Russia and other countries in Europe have estimated the risks involved. They reveal that age is undoubtedly the strongest factor of an infected person’s danger of fatality (Mallapaty 2020; Greenwood 2020; Daoust 2020). In China, where the pandemic took its origin, nearly 80 per cent of deaths occurred among adults aged 60 years or older. In the United States, where the death toll has crossed 2 lakhs (with nearly 7 million confirmed cases by 20 September) older people remain at risk of becoming fatally ill. People 65 and older account for 16 per cent of the US population, but 80 per cent of coronavirus deaths in the US are from this age range—higher than their share of deaths from all causes (75 per cent) over the same period. It means 8 out of 10 COVID-19-related deaths reported in the United States have been among people aged 65 years and older (CDC 2020). The New York Times reported that more than 40 per cent of COVID-19 deaths were linked to nursing homes (The New York Times, 13 August 2020). According to BBC, an analysis by a non-partisan foundation found that 45 per cent of US deaths had come from such care homes (Prasad 2020).

There were also some disturbing reports, in the early stage of the pandemic, that a section of hospitals in the US and Europe had discouraged older people with coronavirus symptoms approaching for medical care in the context of dwindling facilities. More than 95 per cent of the deaths reported from COVID-19 infection in Europe were people in the age category of above 60 (Seethi 2020). In Australia people aged over 65 and those with comorbidities remain extremely susceptible to hospitalisation and death. They were also reported to be at heightened risk of psychological distress from prolonged social distancing procedures and the changing pattern of health care delivery (Holt et al. 2020). In Italy, the spread of COVID-19 affected mostly people over 50 years of age. It claimed more than 35,000 lives since it entered the country. The mortality rate appeared to be very high for the order patients. For people above 80 years of age, the fatality rate was above 34 percent. At some stage, the mortality rate had reached 13.8 per cent, higher than that registered in other countries (Statista 2020).

In India, the fatality rate continued to be higher in the elderly with those above 60 accounting for as much as 50 per cent of the total deaths. And those in the relatively younger age band of 45-60 years also appeared to be increasingly vulnerable—accounting for 37 per cent of fatalities (The Times of India, 5 August 2020). Studies say that 68 per cent of India’s ageing population live in rural areas, 58 per cent are illiterate, and 70 per cent (male: 55%, female: 88%) remained dependent on others (Kumar and Kumar 2019). Meanwhile, family relations in India seem to be changing and there were cases of younger children deserting their older parents, as they were reported from rural and urban India (Varma and Babu 2010). All this shows that the emerging situation in India would deepen the susceptibility of the elderly people further with the spread of the pandemic (Ranjan and Muraleedharan 2020).

Age International, an international non-governmental organisation working for the well-being of older people, reported that the “pandemic has amplified the violence, abuse and neglect of older people around the world.” Before the COVID-19 set in, one in six older people was estimated to have suffered abuse but reports indicated that the “abuse has increased in many countries as a direct result of the pandemic” (Age International 2020). The abuse suffered by older people manifests in diverse ways, which include physical, psychological, verbal, financial and sexual abuse, besides neglect. Older women remained at higher risks, and people with disabilities and those with support needs also suffer. There were reports that economic stresses caused by the pandemic situation are intensifying the incidence of economic abuse of older people (Ibid).

The United Nations has admitted that the pandemic has triggered deep anxiety, fear and miseries for the ageing population in the world. As the virus has swept across countries in the Global South, the death rate for ageing population could mount even higher. Less noticeable but no less distressing are the larger consequences: older persons may get neglected with health care being denied for conditions not actually related to coronavirus; abuse and mistreatment in care facilities; a surge in unemployment and poverty; atypical effect on mental health; and humiliation and discrimination (United Nations 2020). The UN noted that even before the onset of COVID-19, a significant section of the ageing population around the world were living in poverty and encountering social exclusion. It says: “The risk of poverty increases with age, with the percentage of older persons living in poverty as high as 80% in some developing countries” (UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Programme on Ageing 2015). In the background of the pandemic, the UN warned that the emerging situation “may significantly lower older persons’ incomes and living standards.” It also noted that the “downturn will most likely have a disproportionate impact on older women, given their limited access to income” (United Nations 2020; ILO 2018).

Drawing from the experiences of Europe and the United States, the world body further recorded that the spread of coronavirus in care homes and similar institutions has taken “a devastating toll on older people’s lives, with distressing reports indicating instances of neglect or mistreatment.” It also pointed out that the older persons living in refugee camps, informal settlements and prisons “are particularly at risk, due to overcrowded conditions, limited access to health services, water and sanitation facilities, as well as potential challenges accessing humanitarian support and assistance” (United Nations 2020).

Thus, as the UN and WHO testified, the older persons in many countries face age discrimination in the choices on health care, in deciding the urgency and priority of medical attention, and life-saving remedies. Even before COVID-19, older persons in many countries did not have access to essential health services due to the prevailing inequalities. The pandemic may also lead to a falloff of critical services for other illnesses, further intensifying risks to the lives of ageing population. It is true that while the coronavirus infection cases have swelled everyday, overburdened hospitals and medical services encounter challenging decisions around the use of limited facilities. The WHO says that the recovery from the pandemic is an occasion “to set the stage for a more inclusive, equitable and age-friendly society, anchored in human rights and guided by the shared promise of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to Leave No One Behind” (WHO 2020b). No doubt, older people need to be supported to access their social security and other protection measures. Evidently, COVID-19 has changed the pattern of their life-world in an unprecedented manner, which include the care and support they get, and the possibilities of socially connected. Health experts warn that the global pandemic may persist in different forms with unpredictable bouts in the coming months. Now that the low- and middle-income countries are witnessing an exponential rise in the contagion, it has become imperative that the state and civil society play a more constructive and interventionist role in ensuring the social security of the older persons.

References

Age International (2020): “World Elder Abuse Awareness Day: Neglect and abuse of older people intensified by COVID-19,” 15 June, available at https://www.ageinternational.org.uk/news-features/news/2020/coronavirus2/neglect-and-abuse-of-older-people-intensified-by-covid-19/

Daoust J.F. (2020): “Elderly people and responses to COVID-19 in 27 Countries,” PLoS ONE 15(7): available at https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0235590

CDC (2020): “Corona Virus Disease (COVID-19), Older Adults,” Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 16 August, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/older-adults.html

Holt, Nicolette R. Johannes T Neumann, John J McNeil and Allen C Cheng (2020): “Implications of COVID-19 in an ageing population,” The Medical Journal of Australia, 6 May, available at https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2020/implications-covid-19-ageing-population

ILO (2018): Social protection for older persons: Policy trends and statistics 2017-19, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—edprotect/ soc_sec/documents/publication/wcms_645692.pdf

India, Ministry of Law and Justice (2007): Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, available at http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A2007-56.pdf

Kumar, Shailendra and K Anil Kumar (2019): “Living Arrangement and Economic Dependency among the Elderly in India: A Comparative Analysis of EAG and Non EAG States,” Ageing International, Vol 44(4):352–70, available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s12126-019-9344-3.

Mallapaty, Smriti (2020): “The coronavirus is most deadly if you are older and male — new data reveal the risks,” Nature, 28 August, available at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02483-2#ref-CR3

Martini M, Gazzaniga V. Bragazzi NL, Barberis I.(2019): “The Spanish Influenza Pandemic: a lesson from history 100 years after 1918,” Journal of Preventive Medicine and Hygiene, 60(1), available at E64-E67. DOI:10.15167/2421-4248/jpmh2019.60.1.1205

Prasad, Ritu (2020): “Coronavirus: How bad is the crisis in US care homes? BBC News, 13 July, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53172302

Ranjan, Alok and Muraleedharan V R (2020): “Higher Disease Burden in India’s Elderly,” Economic and Political Weekly, 55(35), 29 August, available at https://www.epw.in/journal/2020/35/commentary/higher-disease-burden-indias-elderly.html

Seethi, K.M. (2020): “A ‘Testing Time’ for Ageing: Geronticide or Necropolitics?” Global South Colloquy, 8 April, available at https://globalsouthcolloquy.com/a-testing-time-for-ageing-geronticide-or-necropolitics/: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12775880.v2

Statista (2020): “Coronavirus (COVID-19) death rate in Italy as of August 25, 2020, by age group,” available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/1106372/coronavirus-death-rate-by-age-group-italy/

Supreme Court of India(2020a): Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 193/2016, 04-08-2020, available at
https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2016/6532/6532_2016_35_1_23282_Order_04-Aug-2020.pdf

Supreme Court of India(2020b): Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 193/2016, 07-09-2020, available at
https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2016/6532/6532_2016_34_2_23792_Order_07-Sep-2020.pdf

Supreme Court of India (2018): Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s).193/2016, 13 December 2018, available at https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2016/6532/6532_2016_Order_13-Dec-2018.pdf

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015a):Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, available at https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015b): “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages,” available at https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3

UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Programme on Ageing (2015): “Income Poverty in Old Age: An Emerging Development Priority,” available at https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ageing/documents/PovertyIssuePaperAgeing.pdf

UNDP (2015): “Ageing and Development,” by Asghar Zaidi, 13 November 2015, United Nations, Development Programme, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ageing-and-development

UNDP (2017): Ageing, Older Persons and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 12 July 2017, United Nations, Development Programme available at https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/ageing–older-persons-and-the-2030-agenda-for-sustainable-develo.html

United Nations (2020): Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on older persons, May 2020, available at https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/Policy-Brief-The-Impact-of-COVID-19-on-Older-Persons.pdf

Varma, G R, Y S Kusuma and B V Babu (2010): “Health-related Quality of Life of Elderly Living in the Rural Community and Homes for the Elderly in a District of India,” Zeitschrift Für Gerontologie Und Geriatrie, Vol 43(4): 259-63, available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s00391-009-0077-x.

WHO (2020a): “What is the Decade of Healthy Ageing?” available at https://www.who.int/initiatives/decade-of-healthy-ageing

WHO (2020b): “Universal Health Coverage and Ageing?” available at https://www.who.int/ageing/health-systems/uhc-ageing/en/

WHO (2020c): “Older people & COVID-19,” available at https://www.who.int/teams/social-determinants-of-health/covid-19

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