But, sadly, that did not happen.

It took a long while to reconcile with this loss.

Admittedly, gentleness was one of the finest characteristics that Eeza uncle possessed. Most of us admire gentleness because it creates peace, calm, and consistency of character. It’s something we tend to respect in others, desire for ourselves, and wish for our kith and kin.

Indeed, gentleness pulsed deep within Eeza uncle. And it always brought cool breeze in our meetings, and for everyone to feel it.

Gentleness is surely at odds with quick-tempered, blame-invigorated, self-willed, jealous culture where we sometimes tend to take our frustrations out by ridiculing and slamming others, skirting responsibility, and fearing and fighting anyone or any way of life that we don’t understand or subscribe to.

Eeza uncle was an embodiment of this gentleness being whirled wherever and whenever he interacted with others.

More importantly, Eeza uncle never took refuge in any ideological or doctrinal camps where intellectual or political fortunes could be tempting. Yet, he was a passionate reader and writer within a liberal-progressive frame.

Mohammed Eeza (1929-1999) was a son of Vakkom Moulavi, a great social and religious reformer of Kerala. Being a perceptive writer and thinker, Eeza uncle upheld a progressive-liberal tradition, like his father. He intrepidly wrote against religious conservatism and orthodoxy while keeping hold of secular- pluralist social ethos.

Eeza uncle was only three when Vakkom Moulavi died and, therefore, he had to learn by himself the value and significance of the mission his father had undertaken which spanned over three decades.

After his early education, he went to Madras in pursuit of higher studies and it was there that he came into contact with modern trends in philosophy, politics and religion. He came back to his home village a different man.

By that time he had developed an interest in Marxism (without any pretensions of any doctrinnaire-theorist) and even worked with the Kerala Socialist Party [which subsequently became Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)] for a while, like some of his brothers. Soon he found himself a captive in this field and decided to abstain from party politics. This helped him to return to his intellectual world where he took to writing, offering new insights into politics, literature, philosophy and religion.

Eeza uncle began his career as a teacher which he continued till retirement in the mid-1980s. In between, he went to UAE, for a few years, to work in a company. His return in the early 1980s was the beginning of his revival as a writer.

The earliest of Eeza uncle’s writings appeared in the 1950s in K. Balakrishnan’s Kaumudi. His writings also appeared in Mathrubhumi, Kala Kaumudi, Chitra Karthika, Kerala Kaumudi, Chintha and others.

Eeza uncle wrote a lengthy article on Albert Camus which exposed the intellectual dishonesty of the critics of Malayalam literature at that time who not only failed to understand Camus’ writings, but continued to cast aspersions on him.

Likewise, his intervention in the context of the Shah Banu controversy provided a sense of direction to the ongoing Sharia debate. He had warned that Muslim orthodoxy and fundamentalism would not only generate the potential for ruin and decay within, but bring in unforeseen consequences for the secular fabric of society. Eeza uncle’s forebodings came true when both Islamic and Hindu fundamentalists swelled their ranks, capitalising on each other’s unyielding conservatism.

This further forced him to take up an exhaustive study on religious fundamentalism which appeared in a series of articles in Chintha weekly, under the caption “Islamic Fundamentalism: Myth and Realty,” These articles reflected his depth of knowledge, religious acumen, world vision and social commitment. It is no exaggeration to say that there is hardly any work on the subject in Malayalam till date which reflected the insights and scholarship of Eeza uncle. I had an opportunity to read the draft many times before he sent it for publishing. I also accompanied him to the University of Calicut in the 1990s to meet Prof MN Karassery. He had read the entire text of the series of articles and suggested its publication as a book. Sadly, Eeza uncle could not realise this as he fell ill soon. However, Prof Karassery kept reminding me to do the publishing as early as possible. His effort will not go in vain as the entire text is being recovered and final corrections are done for publication. Vakkom Moulavi Memorial and Research Centre (VMMRC) at Vakkom will be a partner in the publication of the volume of Eeza uncle.

Eeza uncle was one of the founding architects of the Vakkom Moulavi Foundation which, since its inception in the early 1980s, has been a leading intellectual forum in the State’s capital. It was he who inspired me to work with the venture and we travelled a lot together, against all odds. Till he breathed his last on 17 January 1999, Eeza uncle was striving hard to reawaken the forgotten legacy of Vakkom Moulavi.

As a man of great integrity and exceptional qualities, Eeza uncle would also have been the happiest person seeing a memorial emerging in Vakkom with a mission he left behind two decades back.

The post Gentleness breeds character…Mohammed Eeza (1929-1999) first appeared on KM Seethi.

It appeared in Economic and Political Weekly, 13 May 2021

India’s Arctic Policy (IAP), notified as a draft document in early January 2021, has come as a shot in the arm for the country’s Science Diplomacy. The draft policy is also in line with India’s fast expanding scientific-technological (‘SciTech’ power) status which has both national and international dimensions. As per the global ranking, India currently occupies the third position in scientific and technical manpower in the world. Its Research and Development (R&D) expenditure and Science and Technology(S&T) publications also rose significantly. With the surge in S&T publications, India is globally at the third position (India, Ministry of Science & Technology 2020)

IAP has been drafted in a strategic milieu of big powers (like China) having invested with great ambition in the Arctic region. China’s ‘Polar Silk Road’ is essentially a part of its robust ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) which seeks to reinforce its geopolitical and geoeconomic posture in the region. India has stepped in at the right time with its ‘sustainable engagement’ diplomacy and ‘SciTech’ power in the Arctic.

Geospatially, the Arctic is located above the Arctic Circle, which encompasses the Arctic Ocean basin (roughly 6.1 million square miles) and the northern parts of Scandinavia, Russia, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), and the U.S. state of Alaska. Canada, Russia, Denmark, Norway and the U.S. state of Alaska have direct access to as well as jurisdiction over the Arctic Ocean.

The Arctic Council was formed as an intergovernmental forum with these countries along with Finland, Sweden and Iceland, following the Ottawa Declaration in 1996. The Declaration has provisions [3(a), (b) and (c)] for non­-Arctic states and organisations to participate in and contribute to the working of the Council with an ‘Observer status.’ The Council is envisaged as a forum to promote cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues such as environmental protection and sustainable development in the region (The Arctic Council 1996).

There are five states from Asia holding ‘Observer status’ in the Arctic Council—India, China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore, all joined in 2013. India renewed its membership in 2019 for another five-year period. The admission of ‘Observers’ in the Council was made conditional upon recognising the “Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic” besides recognising the broad international legal framework that has a bearing on the Arctic Ocean, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The United States had insisted at some point that the Council “should not deal with matters related to military security” and this was added as an addendum upon signing the Ottawa Declaration. Curiously, after twenty years, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in a statement in 2019 said that since the situation in the Arctic region had changed—having become a terrain of ‘power and competition’—the eight Arctic States should “adapt to this new future” (The New York Times 2019). Obviously, the reference to ‘power and competition’ was aimed at the expanding role and activities of China to which the Trump administration had serious reservations (an analysis on the subject is available in Seethi 2019). However, geostrategic concerns continued to generate anxieties among the Arctic States and, consequently, countries like Russia, Canada and Norway have to bolster defence infrastructure in the region.

India’s Arctic contacts began a century ago with its signing of the ‘Svalbard Treaty’ in February 1920 in Paris.¹ A breakthrough in India’s Polar research came in 1981 when the country joined the nations engaged in the Antarctic exploration.  However, its engagements did not make much headway till 2007 when the scientists undertook India’s first Arctic expedition with a view to initiating studies in glaciology, biological sciences, ocean and atmospheric sciences. In the following year, India set up a research station ‘Himadri’ at the international Arctic research base at Svalbard, Norway.

In another six years’ time, scientists from the ESSO-National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research (NCAOR) and the ESSO-National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT) set up another facility at Kongsfjorden (which is part of the Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic Ocean). The facility is India’s first multi-sensor moored observatory called ‘IndArc’ which is to undertake studies and collect real-time data on the Arctic climate and its impact on the monsoon. The successful deployment of this facility is seen as a model of Indo-Norwegian scientific and technical cooperation in addressing the global climate change.

Another atmospheric laboratory was established in 2016 at Gruvebadet in Ny-Alesund with the aim of initiating studies on clouds, precipitation, long-range pollutants, and other background atmospheric parameters. The Arctic research has obviously helped to initiate studies on glaciers in the Himalayan region. The importance of such comparative studies is underlined by The Annual Report 2018-19 of the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR), which acts as the nodal agency for India’s Polar research programme, that also includes Arctic studies. According to the Report, “the glaciers are melting world over and those in Arctic and Himalaya are no exception. The Svalbard glaciers and ice caps cover an area of 34,600 km² while Himalaya occupy nearly 38,000 km² area. Observation revealed that for the last one and half decades, the process of glacier retreat has been significantly enhanced in both the regions” (NCPOR 2019).

Needless to say, this has tremendous implications for the agro-climatic conditions of countries like India whose food security itself is dependent on ecosystem stability. The draft IAP itself says that “there are several synergies between polar studies and the study of the Himalayas. Arctic research will help India’s scientific community to study melting rates of the third pole–the Himalayan glaciers, which are endowed with the largest freshwater reserves in the world outside the geographic poles” (India 2021).

The institutions involved in Polar studies are not many in India. The Goa-based NCPOR, under the Ministry of Earth Sciences, focuses on Polar studies and research. While the Ministry of External Affairs looks after the engagements with the Arctic Council, other ministries such as the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Space etc are involved in Polar research.  In fact, India’s interest in Polar studies began in 1981 with the first scientific expedition to Antarctica. Since then, several projects got underway in the areas of the Arctic, Antarctic, Southern Ocean and the Himalayas.

According to the note attached to IAP, “India seeks to play a constructive role in the Arctic by leveraging its vast scientific pool and expertise in Himalayan and Polar research. India would also like to contribute in ensuring that as the Arctic becomes more accessible, the harnessing of its resources is done sustainably and in consonance with best practices formulated by bodies such as the Arctic Council” (India 2021).

The IAP is enunciated with five major areas of engagements—(i) Science and research; (ii) Economic and human development cooperation; (iii). Transportation and connectivity; (iv) Governance and international cooperation; and (v) National capacity building. It is clear that the IAP, apart from underlining the significance of science and research, sees the Artic region as a potential area of engagement in diverse areas of human development and commercial activities. The document says: “India seeks to engage in economic development in a manner that is sustainable and is of value to the Arctic residents, especially indigenous communities. The Arctic offers viable opportunities in different sectors where Indian enterprises can be involved, become part of international commerce, promote traditional indigenous knowledge, businesses and best practices” (Ibid).

IAP sees the Arctic as “the largest unexplored prospective area for hydrocarbons remaining on earth” besides its vast reserves of mineral deposits. It also keeps in perspective India’s investment in Russia which amounts to $15 billion in oil and gas projects.²Hence India seeks to explore “similar opportunities in other Arctic nations as well” (Ibid).

The draft policy document is also confident of utilising India’s expertise in the digital economy for facilitating establishment of data centres for commerce in the region. It further explores “opportunities for investment in Arctic infrastructure in areas such as offshore exploration/mining, ports, railways and airports.” This inevitably calls for encouraging participation by Indian public and private sector firms with an expertise in these sectors. India’s chambers of industry and commerce will be encouraged to enhance private investment in the Arctic and explore the public-private-partnership model. The draft policy also indicated that Indian companies will be encouraged to obtain membership of the Arctic Economic Council (Ibid).

Another area where India has leverage in the Arctic region is human development. The document says: “Specialized cultures of the Arctic’s indigenous inhabitants are being inexorably impacted by climate change as well as economic development and improved connectivity. This is similar to the socio-ecological-economic predicament of the Himalayan peoples. The disruption of unique ecosystems and erosion of traditional knowledge are common to both. India has substantial expertise in addressing such issues and is uniquely placed to make a positive contribution in assisting the Arctic’s indigenous communities cope with similar challenges” (Ibid).

In the realm of transportation and connectivity, India has vital stakes. According to IAP, “India ranks third in the list of seafarer supplying nations catering to almost ten per cent of global demand. India’s maritime human resources could contribute towards meeting the growing requirements of the Arctic” (Ibid).

India expects that ice free conditions in the Arctic would soon result in the “opening of new shipping routes and thereby lowering costs and reshaping global trade. Traffic, especially through the Northern Sea Route, is rising exponentially and is projected to quadruple by 2025.” The draft policy also seeks to “explore the possibility of linking the International North South Transport Corridor with the Unified Deep-Water System and its further extension to the Arctic”  India expects that “the North-South connectivity will result in lowering shipping costs and overall development of the hinterland and of indigenous communities more than East-West connectivity” (Ibid).

India is well aware of the fact that the Arctic governance is very crucial in the geopolitical milieu and the region itself is “governed by numerous national domestic laws, bilateral agreements, global treaties and conventions and customary laws for the indigenous peoples.” Hence the Arctic states’ “respective sovereign jurisdictions as well as areas beyond national jurisdiction” need to be reckoned within the framework of international and national regulations.

Through IAP, India is expected to “enhance its human resource capabilities” and as part of its Arctic engagement, the overall approach is to “expand capability, capacity and awareness for Arctic-related scientific research by strengthening NCPOR, involving academic and scientific institutions in India and identifying nodal institutes.” While the overall focus of capacity building is on science and technology, the draft document does not seem to have given adequate space for social sciences (including strategic) component in the making of India’s Arctic policy though the four sections of the ‘five pillars’ IAP outlines deal with these diverse areas.

India notified IAP at a crucial time of global and regional power realignments, even in the midst of the pandemic. It was in 2018 that China declared itself a ‘Near Arctic State’ and brough out a ‘White Paper.’ Though China does not have territorial sovereignty and related sovereign rights in the Arctic, it has been so eager to establish a foothold in the region with its self-assumed identity as ‘near-Arctic state.’

The strategic significance of China’s Arctic Policy (2018) outlined through its ‘white paper’ cannot be glossed over. It underscores that the Arctic is a region having “global implications and international impacts.” Referring to the Arctic situation, the white paper says that the geopolitical scenario “goes beyond its original inter-Arctic States or regional nature, having a vital bearing on the interests of States outside the region and the interests of the international community as a whole, as well as on the survival, the development, and the shared future for mankind” (The People’s Republic of China 2018).

China has also gone to the extent of conceding, perhaps for the first time, that its interests in the Arctic region cannot be limited to ‘scientific research’ but would move to an array of commercial activities. This obviously becomes a part of its project to build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ that links China with Europe through the Arctic and fits in with the new ‘blue ocean passages’ extending from Beijing’s   Maritime Silk Road (MSR), put in place in 2013 (Global Times 2014).

A document by the European Parliament Think Tank (EPTT) says that “China’s Arctic policy suggests a strong desire to push for the internationalisation of the Arctic’s regional governance system. The white paper is not a strategy document, and is more interesting for what it omits, such as the national security dimension that is a major driver of China’s Arctic ambitions” (European Parliament 2018).

By calling itself as a “responsible major country,” China, however, tries to dispel concerns of the Arctic or non-Arctic states—about the extent of its geopolitical ambitions in the region—by emphasising Beijing’s “commitment to international law and cooperation and balancing economic interests with environmental protection” as EPTT pointed out (Ibid).

Though there were frequent references to UNCLOS in the white paper, experts contest China’s sincerity and credentials. In 2016, for example, as EPTT document says, “China bluntly disregarded the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea versus the Philippines’ claims, and on the environmental damage China’s large-scale artificial island-building on several maritime features entailed” (Ibid).

China became more assertive in its maritime policy during the last decade, but the scholars and experts were already absorbed in reimagining the Chinese power in the global strategic landscape. For example, Li Zhenfu, Faculty, Dalian Maritime University—one of the most ardent Chinese commentators on Arctic issues—wrote a decade back that “Whoever controls the Arctic sea route will control the world economy and a new internationally strategic corridor” Li said that China must “play an active, pre-emptive, and vigilant role in Arctic affairs” (Lasserre et al. 2015; also Wright 2011).

In 2010 a Chinese admiral Yin Zhuo said that the Arctic “belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it… China must plan an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world’s population.” However, such statements cannot be dismissed as mere ‘academic’ or far-fetched ‘opinions’ given the new tempo of Chinese maritime strategies under Xi Jinping (Lasserre et al. 2015; also Wright 2011).

No doubt, the Arctic is rich in resources (with as much as 13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 per cent of its undiscovered natural gas reserves). However, the Arctic has become so sensitive these years and the region is warming far more rapidly than anywhere else on the planet. Scientists say that temperatures mounted almost 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit (1 Celsius) in the past decade alone. It certainly calls for extreme vigilance when powers like China and Russia think about transforming the Arctic into a terrain for big business and rapid economic development.

Plausibly, India’s draft Arctic policy is embedded in its basic approach which underlines the significance of ‘sustainable engagement’ through its SciTech power. IAP is also cognizant of the “vulnerability of the Arctic to unprecedented changes in the climate” (India 2021).³ Hence its emphasis on ‘rule-based’ governance architecture in the region fits in with India’s long-standing policy.

Notes

3. The Svalbard Treaty was signed on 9 February 1920, which recognised the sovereignty of Norway over the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard (erstwhile t). The treaty was put in place to regulate the demilitarisation of the archipelago which gave the signatories equal rights to engage in commercial activities on the islands. It had 14 original High Contracting Parties. Several additional nations, which included India (under Britain), China and others acceded to the treaty after it was ratified by the original signatories. As of 2018, there were 46 parties to the treaty. For details see https://www.spitsbergen-svalbard.com/spitsbergen-information/history/the-spitsbergentreaty.html
4. The Arctic region’s oil and gas deposits constitute nearly 13 per cent of the world’s unexplored petroleum resources and 30 per cent of the untapped natural gas resources. For details see https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4650; also Seethi (2021).
5. The Arctic region is having special significance to India as several studies have indicated that “there exist a tele-connection between the northern polar region and Indian monsoon intensity, which forms the backbone of Indian economy” (Nayak 2008). Ghosh and Aggarwal (2021) pointed out that “India could be particularly impacted as changes in the Arctic have an effect on water security and sustainability, weather conditions and monsoon patterns, coastal erosion and glacial melting, economic security, and critical aspects of national development.” The said that the “frigid Arctic, which keeps losing ice due to global warming, is one of the batteries feeding the variations in Indian monsoons, over 7,000 kilometres away. Studying the response to warming in the form of melting is quite relevant to India as it provides tools to monitor changes in the Arctic.”

 References

European Parliament (2018): “China’s Arctic policy: How China aligns rights and interests,” available at https://www. europarl. europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/ BRIE / 2018 / 620231 / EPRS_BRI(2018)620231_EN.pdf

Ghosh, Sahana and Mayank Aggarwal (2021): “India’s Draft Arctic Policy Explores What the Two Regions Can Do for Each Other,” Science The Wire, 23 January, https://science.thewire.in/environment/india-draft-arctic-policy/

Ghosh, Sahana & Mayank Aggarwal (2021): “With a new policy, India aims to understand the impact of the Arctic region on its monsoon,” Quartz India, 25 January, available at  https://qz.com/india/1939274/indias-arctic-policy-to-focus-on-climate-change-monsoon-rains

Global Times (2014): “Silk Road economic belt concept pushes trade, investment between China, Central Asia,” 30 June, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/868211.shtml

India (2021): “India’s Arctic policy, Roadmap for Sustainable Engagement,” https://arcticpolicyindia.nic.in/

India, Ministry of External Affairs (2013): “India and the Arctic,” June 10, 2013, https://mea.gov.in/in-focus- article.htm?21812/India+and+the+Arctic

India, Ministry of Science & Technology (2020): “India’s R&D expenditure & scientific publications on the rise, India is placed 3rd among countries in scientific publication,” 1 May, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1620083

Lasserre, Frédéric; Huang, Linyan et Alexeeva, Olga (2015): “China’s strategy in the Arctic: threatening or opportunistic?” Polar Record, online version, doi:10.1017/S0032247415000765

Nayak, Shailesh (2008): “Polar Research in India,” Indian Journal of Marine Sciences, Vol.37(4): December: 352-57

NCPOR (2019): National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research: The Annual Report 2018-19, https://ncpor.res.in/upload/annualreports/AR English.PDF

U.S. (2012): U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, China and the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles, April 13, 2012, http://library.arcticportal.org/1677/1/China-and-the-Arctic_Apr2012.pdf

Seethi, K.M. (2021): “The Arctic Region in a strategic melting pot,” Eurasia Review, 22 March, available at https://www.eurasiareview.com/22032021-the-arctic-region-in-a-strategic-melting-pot-analysis

Seethi, K.M. (2019): “A New ‘Washington Consensus’: ‘Indo–Pacific’ and India’s Emerging Role,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.53, No.8, 23 February.

The Arctic Council (1996): “The Ottawa Declaration 1996,” available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996 _ Founding_ Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y(accessed on 30 January 2021).

The New York Times (2019): “United States Rattles Arctic Talks With a Sharp Warning to China and Russia,” 6 May, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/climate/pompeo-arctic-china-russia.html

The People’s Republic of China (2018): China’s Arctic Policy, White Paper, The State Council of Information Office, January 2018, available at http://English.www.gov.cn/archive/ white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm

Wright, David Curtis (2011): “The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China,” China Maritime Study No. 8, August 2011, U.S. Naval War College, available at https://digital-commons. usnwc. edu/ cgi/ view content .cgi? article=1007&context=cmsi-red-books

The author wishes to thank the expert who read this paper and made suggestions for improvement.

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