India’s Polar policy has assumed considerable significance with the notification of its Arctic Policy early this year and the passing of the Indian Antarctic Law by the Indian Parliament recently. For many South Asian countries, the Arctic is a distant place. Though the Arctic looks far away, whatever happens in the North Pole will have its impacts on them—by way of climate change or change in the energy circuit.  However, with its ‘latitudinal quest’ India is the only South Asian country that sees itself as a significant player in the Arctic given its deeper engagements with the major Arctic states. Both the Arctic policy and the Indian Antarctic Law are thus clear signals that India is committed to playing a proactive role in Polar affairs – with its own claim that India is a ‘Third Pole’ country with the Himalayas providing a new segment of the world’s most sensitive climate zones.

Of late, both the Arctic and Antarctic regions have become complex and delicate with increasing geopolitical engagements of major powers. With its vast stretches of territory adjoining seas and oceans, India has reasons to get involved in Arctic affairs. The Himalayas function as the ‘Third Pole’ serving as the fortress of India and other smaller South Asian countries, from both geopolitical as well as ecosystem points of view.

When India notified its Arctic policy, it also coincided with several developments in international relations, particularly when the major powers in the Arctic Council have taken an antagonistic position vis-a-vis Russia, its current Chairperson, with the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. India has understood the geopolitical developments under the present Arctic dispensation have many ramifications, with NATO reasserting in the region.  However, India is guarded in its policy responses given the future dynamics of India’s relations with the major stakeholders of the region, such as Russia.

Scientific Dimensions

India has shown considerable interest in the Arctic region because of its scientific engagements and collaborations. Here ‘Science Diplomacy’ is the driver of India’s massive techno-scientific power and its global aspirations. As such India’s Arctic policy is enunciated as a multifaceted regime that is basically seeking to strengthen its scientific research and cooperation. It also underlines the significance of “climate and environmental protection; economic and human development, transportation and connectivity; governance and international cooperation; and national capacity building in the Arctic region.” All this is envisaged in partnership with different stakeholders such as academia, the research community, business, and industry.

Basically, the Arctic strategy is to help India’s coordinated policymaking on the implications of ice melting in the Arctic for “India’s economic, military, and strategic interests related to global shipping routes, energy security, and exploitation of mineral wealth.” The policy underlines how climate change is critical for the agro-climatic conditions of countries like India, whose food security is significantly dependent on ecosystem stability. This applies to other South Asian countries too.

As such, there are several areas of collaboration between Polar studies and the study of the Himalayas, and Arctic research will encourage the scientific community in analysing the melting rates of the Third Pole–the Himalayan glaciers.

Economic Opportunities

India’s Arctic policy is also envisaged to strengthen cooperation with countries of the Arctic region under various fora such as the Arctic Council. But it would be a challenging task for India, to increase its participation in the Arctic Council with its Observer Status, given the complex issues associated with the post-Ukraine situation. India recognizes that the Arctic governance is very delicate in the contemporary geopolitical setting and the region itself is governed by several national domestic laws, bilateral agreements, global treaties, conventions, and customary laws for the indigenous peoples. Thus, the Arctic states’ “respective sovereign jurisdictions as well as areas beyond national jurisdiction” need to be viewed within the framework of international and national regulations. Unfortunately, this is still a contested area.

India being one of thirteen nations holding Observer status in the Arctic Council has concerns when the council activities are put on hold. Obviously, the Ukraine war has had an impact on the geopolitics of the Arctic. The eight-member Arctic Council has five NATO members—Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States and seven of the eight Arctic states declared that they would ‘pause’ the work of the Arctic Council.  They sought to halt all working group meetings as they did in 2014. However, Russia warned that any temporary freeze would “inevitably lead to the accumulation of the risks and challenges to soft security in the region.”

Naturally, India faces a strategic dilemma in the context of Western sanctions on Russia, particularly when it has several pending projects with Moscow. For example, an MoU was signed between NITI Aayog and the Ministry for Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic on 4 September 2019 with a view to boosting “the strategic partnership between India and Russia by strengthening cooperation in trade, economics and investment.” The agreement sought to “prepare a program for the development of the Russian Far East and Arctic region for 2020–25.” Likewise, India and Russia were exploring the possibility of the joint development of hydrocarbons on the Arctic shelf and Russia’s Far East. Reports indicated that they were mainly focused on energy cooperation, and exports of Russian hydrocarbons to India were expanding, with the two countries’ mutual interest in the implementation of joint LNG projects persisting.

Over the years, India’s energy ties with Russia have shown growing significance. When President Vladimir Putin visited India a few years back, Russia and India pledged to collaborate on oil and gas projects in Russia, including Russia’s Arctic shelf, and the shores of Pechora and Okhotsk Seas. Russia was already supplying India with Arctic liquefied natural gas, while in 2017 Rosneft bought a 49% share of India’s Essar Oil Ltd.  These deals were interpreted as part of a “trade-off” in the context of India’s self-assurance in addressing the threat of US sanctions and a signature on agreements to procure Russia’s S-400 air defence system.  Evidently, Moscow’s partnership with New Delhi has made Russia inclined to seek Indian investment in the Arctic and other energy holdings.

Arctic Connectivity

India’s Arctic policy has underlined that the country has a great interest in the realm of transportation and connectivity. It says, “India ranks third in the list of seafarer supplying nations catering to almost ten per cent of global demand. India’s maritime human resources could contribute towards meeting the growing requirements of the Arctic.” It’s very clear from the Artic policy that India is committed to exploring the connectivity corridor between the resource-rich Arctic Region and International North-South Transport Corridor.

India has already initiated discussions with Russia on cooperation in connectivity via the Northern Sea Route and joint energy projects in the Arctic region. The Modi-Putin joint declaration in 2019 referred to the Chennai (India)-Vladivostok (Russia) maritime corridor which is expected to play a major role. Enhancement of the India-Russia joint trade commitment will definitely diversify India’s trade space.

When the Indian Prime Minister extended a $1 billion credit line for businesses interested in Russia’s Far-East region, he saw it as part of strengthening India’s ‘Act Far East’ policy. This gesture is expected to “give new impetus to the development of economic diplomacy,” as Mr. Modi indicated in his speech. Certainly, the Far East region of Russia needs a lot of support and help given its geopolitical vulnerabilities.

India is expecting that ice-free conditions in the Arctic would facilitate the opening of new shipping routes and thereby lowering costs and reshaping global trade. India also knows that the Arctic is a rich storehouse of resources with huge deposits of undiscovered oil and natural gas.  Hence India is concerned that the Arctic has become geopolitically very sensitive with major powers having vital stakes for security and commerce.

But India is very vigilant that its policy is put across within a framework of multilateralism and, of course, with a sufficient understanding of the ground situation. New Delhi knows that there is no alternative to a rule-based governance architecture in the Arctic. How to sustain this rule-based governance architecture is a real challenge for all stakeholders in the region, including India, as well as for their multilevel engagements. If the Arctic Council proceedings are halted for one or the other reason, the implications will be far-reaching, for all regions and all countries of the world.

The China factor and the emerging power equations  

There are questions about the implications of China’s growing activities in the Arctic. India naturally considers China as a competitor in the Arctic with its deeper engagements. New Delhi has apprehensions when China projected itself as a ‘Near Arctic state’ with its new stakes in developing the ‘Polar Silk Road.’ India’s opposition to the Belt Road Initiative is also a part of this apprehension. New Delhi still fears the ‘String of Pearls’ project of China—whether it is real or imaginary—and obviously, everything is connected with this. But Russia can play an effective role in bridging the gulf between Beijing and New Delhi. When India has an interest in the NSR passage due to its geographical positioning, it tends to see the emerging actors in the region from a broader perspective. India being the third-largest sea-faring nation does not want to be lagging behind, in the future opportunities in the region.

At the same time, India knows that it cannot proceed without taking both Russia and China into confidence. This is certainly a challenging task before Indian diplomacy. However, India sees the partnership with Russia as crucial in its Arctic engagements. As an Arctic state with considerable stakes in the region, Russia can open up vast opportunities for India’s scientific and commercial interests. The Western partners of India in the Arctic may not appreciate these collaborations, for obvious reasons.  This is also likely to trigger further speculations when India hosts the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) grouping next year, with India assuming its chair position. Many experts believe that SCO is a counterweight to NATO seeking to offset its eastward expansion. Evidently, India’s Arctic engagements depend on a host of geopolitical issues which got complicated in the post-Ukraine war conditions.

Excerpts from the speech at the ‘Arctic segment’ of the Seventh Eastern Economic Forum (EEF), held at Vladivostok, Russia on 7 September 2022. KM Seethi is a Senior Fellow at the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) and an Academic Advisor to the International Centre for Polar Studies (ICPS), and Director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research, based at the Mahatma Gandhi University Kerala.

The post India’s Arctic policy regime and its geopolitical significance first appeared on KM Seethi.

India’s Arctic Policy, launched this March, rests on six pillars, including strengthening scientific research and cooperation, climate and environmental protection, economic and human development, transportation and connectivity, governance and international cooperation as well as building of national capacity.

Professor KM Seethi is a senior fellow at the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) and an academic advisor to the International Centre for Polar Studies (ICPS), based at the Mahatma Gandhi University in the state of Kerala.

Seethi spoke to Sputnik before taking part in the ‘Arctic segment’ of the Seventh Eastern Economic Forum (EEF), due to take place in Vladivostok, a port city on Russia’s Pacific coast, between 5 and 8 September

 

Sputnik: What is the geopolitical significance of the Arctic region for India?

 

Seethi: Though the Arctic region is more than 9,000 kilometers away, India sees itself as a significant player in the context of its deeper engagements in the polar regions, particularly with the major Arctic states.

India’s Arctic Policy released this year and the Antarctic Law passed by Parliament a few weeks ago are specific signals that New Delhi is committed to playing a proactive role in the polar regions – with its own claim that India is a ‘Third Pole’ country. Geopolitically, both the Arctic and Antarctic regions have become sensitive with increasing engagements of major powers.

In fact, India’s Arctic engagements started a century ago with the signing of the Svalbard Treaty in 1920. But its deeper activities in the region began in 2007 with the commencement of its first scientific expedition in the Arctic, followed by setting up a permanent International Arctic research base Himadri at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, in 2008.In 2014, India also put in place a multi-sensor moored observatory IndArc in Kongsfjorden.In 2016, India also established its northernmost Atmospheric laboratory in Gruvebadet. So far, India has conducted 13 expeditions in the Arctic and presently has 23 ongoing key scientific projects.India is a member of several multilateral bodies associated with the Arctic, such as the International Arctic Science Committee, Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee, the University of the Arctic, and the Asian Forum for Polar Sciences.The country’s engagements further deepened in 2013 when it became an Observer State in the Arctic Council and had its status renewed in 2019.

 

Sputnik: Why is Russia crucial for India if it wants to step up its presence in the Arctic region?

 

Seethi: India considers Russia a significant player in a larger framework of its global partnership. Obviously, it will be reflected in its Arctic engagements too. There is a historical context of New Delhi’s partnership with Moscow which goes to the days of India’s independence when non-alignment as a foreign policy strategy earned the respect of countries in the socialist bloc.More importantly, Moscow played a much greater role in strengthening India’s public sector at that time and provided much-needed support for defense infrastructure and scientific and technological development.

Its support in setting up oil and natural gas exploration mechanisms was just as vital. India naturally sees partnership with Russia as crucial in its Arctic engagements. As an Arctic state with considerable stakes in the region, Russia can open up vast opportunities for India’s scientific and commercial interests.

Sputnik: Connectivity is one of the pillars of India’s Arctic Policy launched in March this year. How do you view the progress in enhancing connectivity between India and Russia through the International North South Transit Corridor (INSTC) and the Chennai-Vladivostok shipping route? What are the major obstacles?

 

Seethi: It’s very clear from the Arctic Policy that India is committed to exploring the connectivity corridor between the resource-rich Arctic Region and International North-South Transport Corridor. India has already initiated discussions with Russia on cooperation in connectivity via the Northern Sea Route and joint energy projects in the Arctic region.

 

Evidently, India is interested in developing infrastructure, shipping routes, and harnessing minerals in the Arctic region sustainably. The use of the Northern Sea route by India had already figured in some of the meetings held.

For example, the joint declaration by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin in 2019 referred to the Chennai (India)-Vladivostok (Russia) maritime corridor which is expected to play a major role. Enhancement of the India-Russia joint trade commitment will definitely diversify India’s trade space.

This will also reduce India’s energy dependency on the west Asian nations, Africa, and the US. The proposed Chennai-Vladivostok maritime connectivity was seriously considered at policy level during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Vladivostok to attend Eastern Economic Forum (EEF).

The Memorandum of Intent (MoI) shows that both nations are now determined to expand their trade exchanges although COVID-19 and the Ukraine situation introduced some obstacles to the process.

 

Sputnik: The Indian Prime Minister has extended a $1Bln credit line for businesses interested in Russia’s Far-East region, which is also part of the Arctic region. How can Russia benefit from this as far as its own strategic interests are concerned?

 

Seethi: Prime Minister Modi sees this as part of strengthening India’s ‘Act-East’ policy. This gesture is expected to “give new impetus to the development of economic diplomacy,” as Mr Modi indicated in his speech. Certainly, the Far East region of Russia needs a lot of support and help given its geopolitical vulnerabilities. India has shifted its policy regime – from Look East to Act East – obviously keeping in mind what India can do in such resource-deficit regions, without expecting anything in return in economic terms.

 

Sputnik: China has also said that it wants to take an active part in the Arctic region. Should India view Beijing as a competitor or an adversary as far as interests in the Arctic are concerned?

 

Seethi: Yes indeed. India sees China as a competitor in the Arctic with its deeper engagements. It’s not a new thing. New Delhi had concerns when China projected itself as a ‘Near Arctic state’ with its new stakes in developing the ‘Polar Silk Road’. India’s opposition to the Belt Road Initiative is also a part of this concern.

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New Delhi still fears the ‘String of Pearls’ project of China — whether real or imaginary — and obviously, everything is connected with this. But Russia can play an effective role in bridging the gulf between Beijing and New Delhi.

When India has an interest in the Northern Sea route passage because of where it is geographically, it tends to view emerging actors in the region with a broader perspective.

India being the third-largest seafaring nation does not want to be lagging behind in the future opportunities in the region. At the same time, India knows that it cannot proceed without taking both Russia and China into its confidence.

This is certainly a challenging task for Indian diplomacy.

 

Sputnik: India is also an observer at the Arctic Council. The working in the group seems to have been affected by the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict. How should India navigate these differences?

 

Seethi: India’s Arctic Policy was brought out at a critical time of uncertainty. That is also the time when Russia officiates the chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Unfortunately, the seven other Arctic states resolved to ‘pause’ the activities of the Council because of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine.

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Noticeably, India has not only not sided with any of the major alliances, staying non-aligned as it was during the Cold War period, but it has continued to engage with the contending parties while keeping an open mind.

This is a critical time for New Delhi also, as it has been engaging western powers on a variety of issues, such as trade and commerce.

Obviously, the Ukraine conflict is a flashpoint and its early end is very important for the revival of the council’s proceedings, as it cannot be halted for political reasons. However, it remains to be seen whether New Delhi could play any effective role in ending the conflict.

India sees this largely as an issue between Russia and Ukraine and it knows its limitations in such a sensitive geopolitical issue.

 

https://sputniknews.com/20220901/india-must-take-both-russia–china-into-confidence-to-boost-arctic-presence-says-expert-1100255720.html

The post India Must Take Both Russia & China Into ‘Confidence’ to Boost Arctic Presence, Says Expert first appeared on KM Seethi.

സോവിയറ്റു യൂണിയനെ ജനാധിപത്യത്തിന്റെ പാതയിലേക്ക് കൊണ്ടുപോകാൻ ശ്രമിച്ചു ഒട്ടേറെ വിമർശനങ്ങൾ അദ്ദേഹം ഏറ്റു വാങ്ങി.  പാർട്ടിക്കുള്ളിലും പുറത്തും ധാരാളം വിമർശകർ അദ്ദേഹത്തിനുണ്ടായി.

പെരിസ്ട്രോയിക്ക, ഗ്ലാസ്‌നോസ്റ്റു സിദ്ധാന്തങ്ങൾ മുന്നോട്ടു വെച്ച് ക്രൂഷ്ചേവ് പിന്തുടരാൻ ശ്രമിച്ച പാതയിലൂടെയാണ് ഗോർബച്ചേവ് നീങ്ങിയത്. ഇത് ലോക രാഷ്ട്രീയത്തിലും ചലനങ്ങൾ ഉണ്ടാക്കി.

ഗോർബച്ചേവ് 1985 ൽ അധികാരത്തിൽ വരുമ്പോൾ ലോകരാഷ്ട്രീയം കലങ്ങി മറിയുകയാണ്. അഫ്ഘാൻ യുദ്ധം മാരകമായ മുറിവുകൾ ഏല്പിച്ചുകൊണ്ടു തുടരുന്നു. അമേരിക്കൻ പ്രസിഡന്റ് റൊണാൾഡ്‌ റീഗൻ സോവിയറ്റ് യൂണിയനെ ‘രാക്ഷസ സാമ്രാജ്യം’ എന്നാണ് വിശേഷിപ്പിച്ചിരുന്നത്.

തന്റെ ഗ്ലാസ്‌നോസ്റ്റു സമീപനത്തിലൂടെ ഗോർബച്ചേവ് ആദ്യം ചെയ്തത് മൂന്നാം ലോകരാജ്യങ്ങളിൽ ഏർപ്പെട്ടിരുന്ന സോവിയറ്റ് യൂണിയന്റെ എല്ലാ ‘പ്രവർത്തന’ ങ്ങളും മരവിപ്പിക്കുകയും പിന്നീട് നിർത്തിവെപ്പിക്കുകയും ആയിരുന്നു.
ഈ പ്രവർത്തനങ്ങളിൽ ചിലതു വിമോചന സമരങ്ങളെ പിൻതുണയ്ക്കുന്നതും സൈനിക-സാമ്പത്തിക സഹായങ്ങൾ ദീർഘകാലടിസ്ഥാനത്തിൽ നല്കികൊണ്ടിരുന്നതുമായിരുന്നു. ഇതിൽ അഫ്ഘാനിസ്ഥാൻ, ക്യൂബ, അംഗോള തുടങ്ങിയ രാജ്യങ്ങൾ ഉൾപ്പെട്ടിരുന്നു.

രാജ്യാന്തര ബാധ്യതകൾ രാജ്യത്തെ കടുത്ത സാമ്പത്തിക-രാഷ്ട്രീയ പ്രതിസന്ധികളിൽ എത്തിച്ചെന്നു ഗോർബച്ചേവ് പലഘട്ടത്തിലും പറഞ്ഞിരുന്നു. ഭരണകൂടങ്ങൾക്ക് നൽകിവന്ന നിർലോഭ സഹായങ്ങളും വെട്ടിച്ചുരുക്കി. പലസ്തീൻ തുടങ്ങിയ വിഷയങ്ങളിൽ പോലും മോസ്കോ പിന്നോക്കം പോയി. അതെ സമയം സാമ്രാജ്യത്വ രാജ്യങ്ങളുമായി പുതിയ സന്ധികൾക്കും സംഭാഷണങ്ങൾക്കും അദ്ദേഹം ആഹ്വാനം നൽകുകയും ചെയ്തു. അഫ്ഘാൻ യുദ്ധം അവസാനിപ്പിക്കാൻ ഗോർബച്ചേവ് വിമർശനങ്ങൾ അവഗണിച്ചു മുന്നോട്ടു പോയി. 1988 ൽ ജനീവയിൽ സമാധാന ചർച്ചകൾക്കും പിന്നീട് സോവിയറ്റ് പടയുടെ കാബൂളിൽ നിന്നുള്ള പിന് വാങ്ങലിലും നിർണായക പങ്കു വഹിച്ചു.

തന്റെ രാഷ്ട്രീയ എതിരാളികളെ അവഗണിച്ചു ധൈര്യപൂർവം മുന്നോട്ടു പോയ ഗോർബച്ചേവ് പ്രത്യയശാസ്ത്രത്തിന്റെ എല്ലാ ഉടയാടകളും അഴിച്ചു വെച്ചു. അല്ലെങ്കിൽ തന്നെ പ്രത്യയശാസ്ത്ര പ്രതിബദ്ധതകൾ മാറി വന്ന ഭരണകൂടങ്ങൾക്ക് കുറഞ്ഞുവരികയായിരുന്നു. അതിന്റെ ഏതാണ്ട് പൂർത്തീകരണമാണ് ഗോർബിയുടെ കാലഘട്ടത്തിൽ കണ്ടത്.
ഇന്ത്യയിൽ ഇ. എം. എസ് നമ്പൂതിരിപ്പാട് ഉൾപ്പടെയുള്ള സിപിഎം നേതാക്കളും മാർക്സിസ്റ്റ്-ലെനിനിസ്റ്റ്-മാവോയിസ്റ് പാർട്ടികളും ഗോർബച്ചേവിന്റെ പ്രത്യശാസ്ത്ര നിലപാട് മാറ്റങ്ങളെ നിശിതമായി വിമർശിച്ചു. റിവിഷനിസ്റ്റു പാരമ്പര്യങ്ങളിലെ ഏറ്റവും ഒടുവിലത്തെ ചുവടുമാറ്റം എന്ന് മിക്കവരും അദ്ദേഹത്തെ പരിഹസിച്ചു. ഇതിനുള്ള പ്രധാന കാരണം വിവിധ രാജ്യങ്ങളിലെ കമ്മ്യൂണിസ്റ്റ് പാർട്ടികളും വിമോചന പ്രസ്ഥാനങ്ങളും അവരവരുടെ സാഹചര്യങ്ങളിൽ നിന്നും വിഭവ സമാഹരണം നടത്തി പോരാട്ടങ്ങളുമായി മുന്നോട്ടുപോകണമെന്ന ഗോർബച്ചേവ് നിലപാടായിരുന്നു. മോസ്കോയിലേക്ക് നോക്കിക്കൊണ്ടുള്ള സമരപോരാട്ടങ്ങളെ വിലക്കിയത് മാത്രമല്ല, ഗോർബച്ചോവിന്റെ സാമ്രാജ്യത്ത-ചങ്ങാത്ത നിലപാടും വിമർശനങ്ങൾക്ക് അടിത്തറയിട്ടു.

സോവിയറ്റ് യൂണിയൻ അതിന്റെ തകർച്ചയുടെ ഘട്ടത്തിലേക്ക് നീങ്ങുമ്പോൾ സോഷ്യലിസ്റ്റ് വ്യവസ്ഥിതിയെ നിലനിർത്താൻ അദ്ദേഹം ശ്രമിച്ചില്ല എന്ന വിമർശനം അദ്ദേഹം ഏറ്റുവാങ്ങി.

ഒറ്റുകാരാനെന്നും വഞ്ചകനെന്നും ഒരു ഭാഗത്ത് ഇകഴ്ത്തപ്പെട്ടപ്പോൾ ലോകത്തിനു തന്നെ ‘മാതൃക’യായ ഒരു സ്റ്റേറ്റ്സ്മാൻ എന്ന് ഗോർബച്ചേവിനെ മറ്റുള്ളവർ വാഴ്ത്തി.

എന്നാൽ പതിനഞ്ചു രാജ്യങ്ങൾ ആയി മാറിയ സോവിയറ്റ് യൂണിയൻ രാഷ്ട്രീയമായോ സാമ്പത്തികമായോ ഒന്നും ബാക്കി വെച്ചിട്ടല്ല മണ്മറഞ്ഞതു. റഷ്യ ഉൾപ്പടെയുള്ള ഈ രാജ്യങ്ങൾ സോഷ്യലിസ്റ്റ് പാത കൈവിട്ടെങ്കിലും മുതലാളിത്തം ഇന്നേ വരെ അവരുടെ രക്ഷയ്ക്കെത്തിയില്ല.

സാമ്പത്തികമായും രാഷ്ട്രീയമായും തകർന്നടിഞ്ഞ ഈ മുൻ സോഷ്യലിസ്റ്റ് രാജ്യങ്ങൾ ജനാധിപത്യത്തിന് വേണ്ടിയും ഇപ്പോഴും പാടുപെടുന്നു. വർഷങ്ങൾ കഴിയുന്നതിനു മുമ്പ് തന്നെ ഗോർബച്ചേവ് ഇത് തിരിച്ചറിഞ്ഞിരുന്നു.
തന്റെ ഭരണ കാലത്തു കിഴക്കൻ ജർമനിയിൽ റഷ്യയുടെ കെ.ജി.ബി. ഉദ്യോഗസ്ഥനായിരുന്ന വ്ളാഡിമർ പുടിന്റെ കഴിവുകളെക്കുറിച്ചും ബലഹീനതകളെക്കുറിച്ചും ഗോർബച്ചേവിനു നല്ല ബോധ്യമുണ്ട്. യുക്രൈനിയൻ മാതാവിന്റെയും റഷ്യൻ പിതാവിന്റെയും പുത്രനായി ജനിച്ച ഗോർബച്ചേവിന് പുടിന്റെ നയങ്ങളോടുള്ള യോജിപ്പും വിയോജിപ്പും പല ഘട്ടങ്ങളിലും തുറന്നു പറഞ്ഞിട്ടുണ്ട്. യുക്രൈൻ റഷ്യയുടെ ‘സഹോദര രാജ്യ’മാണെന്ന കാഴ്ചപ്പാടിനോട് യോജിപ്പുണ്ടെങ്കിലും ഫെബ്രുവരി 24 നു തുടങ്ങിയ യുദ്ധത്തോടുള്ള ഗോർബച്ചേവ് നിലപാട് വ്യക്തമല്ല. രോഗകിടക്കയിൽ വെച്ച് അദ്ദേഹം എന്ത് പറഞ്ഞിരുന്നു എന്ന് ലോകം ഒരു പക്ഷെ അറിയുമായിരിക്കും.

എന്നാൽ 2014 ൽ റഷ്യയുടെ ക്രൈമിയൻ പിടിച്ചടക്കലിനെ ഗോർബച്ചേവ് ന്യായീകരിച്ചിരുന്നു. അത് മേഖലയിലെ ജനങ്ങളുടെ ഇംഗിതമനുസരിച്ചാണെന്നു പറയുകയും ചെയ്തു. മാത്രമല്ല യുക്രൈനെ നാറ്റോയുടെ ഭാഗമാക്കാനുള്ള പാശ്ചാത്യ ശ്രമങ്ങളെ അദ്ദേഹം നിശിതമായി വിമർശിക്കുകയും ചെയ്തു.

2017 ൽ എഴുതിയ ഒരു ലേഖനത്തിൽ പുടിന്റെ നിലപാടുകൾക്ക് ‘ന്യായീകരണ’മുണ്ടെകിലുംദീർഘകാലാടിസ്ഥാനത്തിൽ റഷ്യയ്ക്ക് നഷ്ടങ്ങളെ ഉണ്ടാക്കിയിട്ടുള്ളൂ എന്ന് ഗോർബച്ചേവ് പറഞ്ഞു. സർവ്വാധികാര പ്രവണതകളെ ആദ്യഘട്ടത്തിൽ ‘ന്യായീകരി’ക്കാമെങ്കിലും അതിന്റെ ആത്യന്തിക ഫലം പാർലമെന്റിന്റെയും ജുഡിഷ്യറിയുടെയും സിവിൽ സമൂഹത്തിന്റെയും മാധ്യമ സ്വാതന്ത്ര്യത്തിന്റെയും തകർച്ചയിലാണ് അവസാനിച്ചത്. ഗോർബച്ചേവ് എഴുതി:

“റഷ്യയുടെ ജീവിത നിലവാരം തകർന്നു. പട്ടിണിയും അഴിമതിയും വർധിച്ചു. വിദ്യാഭ്യാസം, ആരോഗ്യം, ശാസ്ത്രം എന്നീ മേഖലകളിൽ കാര്യങ്ങൾ കൂടുതൽ മോശമായി. രാഷ്ട്രീയ വ്യവസ്ഥയിൽ സമൂല മാറ്റങ്ങൾ ഇല്ലാതെ ഇതൊന്നും പരിഹരിക്കാൻ ഭരണകൂടത്തിന് ആവില്ല. ജനാധിപത്യത്തിൽ കൂടി മാത്രമേ റഷ്യയ്ക്ക് ഇനിയും വിജയിക്കാൻ കഴിയൂ.”

ആണവശക്തിയെക്കുറിച്ചുള്ള ഗോർബച്ചേവിന്റെ നിലപാടുകൾ ലോകം ശ്രദ്ധിക്കാൻ തുടങ്ങുന്നത് 1986 ലെ ചെർണോബിൽ ആണവ ദുരന്തത്തോടെയായിരുന്നു. ചെർണോബിൽ തന്റെ കണ്ണ് തുറപ്പിച്ചെന്നു അദ്ദേഹം പിന്നീട് പറഞ്ഞു. സൈനികേതര ആവശ്യങ്ങൾക്കുപോലും ആണവോർജം ഉപയോഗിക്കുന്നതിലെ അപകടം ഗോർബച്ചേവ് ചൂണ്ടിക്കാട്ടി. സോവിയറ്റ് യൂനിയന്റെ യഥാർത്ഥ തകർച്ചക്കുള്ള കാരണം പെരെസ്ട്രോയ്ക്ക യെക്കാളും ചെർണോബിൽ ദുരന്തമായിരുന്നു എന്നാണ് പിൽക്കാലത്തു അദ്ദേഹം പറഞ്ഞത്. ദുരന്തത്തെകുറിച്ചുള്ള വിവരങ്ങൾ പോളിറ്റ് ബ്യൂറോ മൂടിവെച്ചെന്ന ആരോപണങ്ങൾ അദ്ദേഹം നിഷേധിച്ചു. ദുരന്തത്തിന്റെ സാമ്പത്തിക പ്രത്യാഘാതങ്ങൾ വർഷങ്ങൾ കഴിഞ്ഞിട്ടും റഷ്യയെയും യുക്രൈനെയും ബെലാറസിനെയും ബാധിച്ചു. ദുരന്തത്തിന് മുമ്പ് തന്നെ ആണവായുധങ്ങളെ ഭൂമുഖത്തുനിന്നും ഇല്ലായ്മ ചെയ്യാൻ താൻ ശ്രമങ്ങൾ തുടങ്ങിയിരുന്നു എന്നും ചെർണോബിൽ തന്റെ കണ്ണ് തുറപ്പിച്ചു എന്നും അദ്ദേഹം വർഷങ്ങൾക്കു ശേഷം എഴുതി. അമേരിക്കയുമായി തന്ത്രപ്രധാനമായ ആണവ നിയന്ത്രണ കരാർ 1987-ൽ അദ്ദേഹം ഒപ്പിട്ടത് ഈ ലക്‌ഷ്യം നിറവേറാൻ വേണ്ടിയായിരുന്നു 2019-ൽ ഡൊണാൾഡ് ട്രംപ് ഏകപക്ഷീയമായി ഇതിൽ നിന്നും പിൻവാങ്ങി. വളരെ ദുഃഖത്തോടെയാണ് ഗോബർച്ചേവ് ഈ വാർത്ത കേട്ടത്. ഇത് ലോകത്തിനു നല്ലതല്ലെന്നും അദ്ദേഹം മുന്നറിയിപ്പ് നൽകി.

The post ഗോർബി എന്ന നായകൻ first appeared on KM Seethi.

The roundtable became the first event of the series of expert roundtables “Arctic Sessions”. The project has received a grant of the Gorchakov Fund and is implemented by the Center for Support of International Journalism RBMC in partnership with the Project Office for Arctic Development (PORA).

Arctic Sessions – Experts will discuss the future of the Arctic Council during a live discussion.

According to Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the Committee for Senior Officials of the Arctic Council Nikolay Korchunov, “a forced pause in full-fledged activities of the Arctic Council on the background of decisions by seven Arctic countries will inevitably result in escalation of risks and challenges to soft security in the Arctic, which have been previously effectively resolved by this organization”.

What is the importance of the Arctic Council in resolution of today’s problems? Participants of the roundtable “The Arctic Council: Future Scenarios for the International Forum” will discuss this and other questions.

The roundtable will become the first event of the series of expert roundtables “Arctic Sessions”. The project has received a grant of the Gorchakov Fund and is implemented by the Center for Support of International Journalism RBMC in partnership with the Project Office for Arctic Development (PORA).

Participants of the roundtable:

Nikolay Korchunov, Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the Committee for Senior Officials of the Arctic Council;
Nikolay Doronin, Chairman of the Management Board of the Project Office for Arctic Development;
Lassi Heininen, Editor of Arctic Yearbook, Finland;
Yan Cheng, Professor of Shanghai University for International Studies, Executive Director of Shanghai Academy of Global Governance and Area Studies, China;
K.M. Seethi, Senior Fellow,  Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), Director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension (IUCSSRE) and Academic Advisor to the International Centre for Polar Studies, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala, India;
Moderator: Pavel Devyatkin, Research Fellow, The Arctic Institute, USA.
When: On July 20, Wednesday, 5:00-6:00 pm Moscow Standard Time.

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“I am terribly afraid of my identity as a minority Christian in my own homeland and the fear is more horrible than anything else,” according to a Delhi-based scholar who felt uneasy about celebrating this year’s Christmas with his friends. He was recollecting reported cases of how Christmas celebrations were being interrupted, statues of Jesus were destroyed and effigies of Santa Claus were blazed in bouts of violence against the Christian community in several states in India. This was obviously not a sudden spurt of attacks on them, but it has been brewing for sometime, and the Christian minority—who make up about 2.3 per cent of the population—were targeted by the right-wing outfits across the country amid growing intolerance.

Plausibly, attacks against minorities have been on the increase in India and there are reports about the destruction of churches, attacks on priests, and the unlawful incarceration of church workers etc. The death in custody of the 84-year-old Jesuit priest and tribal rights activist Stan Swamy is a case in point. The UN Human Rights Office of the Commissioner reported that this custodial death “will forever remain a stain on India’s human rights record” because  Stan Swamy had “dedicated much of his life to defending the rights of indigenous peoples and the Adivasi minority…” The UN human rights expert said, “There is no excuse, ever, for  a human rights defender to be smeared as a terrorist, and no reason they should ever die the way Father Swamy died, accused and detained, and denied his rights.”

In the recent past, Christians came under attacks in several states such as Karnataka Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Odisha, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, and Delhi.  Karnataka witnessed new bounds of violence in the background of the passing of the ‘Protection of Freedom of Religion Bill, 2021’ on 23 December 2021, a day before Christmas.  The bill, commonly referred to as the anti-conversion Bill, was passed in the Assembly amid opposition protests. The proposed law seeks to prohibit conversion from one religion to another by misrepresentation, force, fraud, allurement or marriage. Even before tabling the bill, right-wing groups attacked members of the Christian community and set their religious books on fire. The incident at Srinivasapura in Kolar district was widely reported.

According to reports brought together by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Karnataka witnessed as many as 39 incidents of attacks on Christian community members this year till November. The Archbishop of Bengaluru, Peter Machado, expressed concerns that the government’s attitude in a way helped “increase in attacks” on the Christian community. He said: “Certain behaviour or certain utterances from the government, certain attitude from the government is the reason that this (attacks) is allowed and tolerated. This can go on and is sad for us.” The Bishop further said that similar cases were reported from interior places where “there were fewer members of the community and small churches. But to happen in Hubballi, Dharwad, Bengaluru means people are taking the law into their hands.”  The PUCL alleged that even “police department and some politicians colluded with right-wing organisations in carrying out these attacks.” The civil liberties body also said, “Due to the aggressive incitement of hatred against Christians across the state, several people from the community have lost employment and face economic crises. In schools, teachers have threatened to expel students who are Christians. Christian tenants have lost their residence. Even small businesses have refused customers solely because they are Christians.”

A recent New York Times report says, “Anti-Christian vigilantes are sweeping through villages, storming churches, burning Christian literature, attacking schools and assaulting worshipers. In many cases, the police and members of India’s governing party are helping them, government documents and dozens of interviews revealed. In church after church, the very act of worship has become dangerous despite constitutional protections for freedom of religion.” The report also noted that many “Christians have become so frightened that they try to pass as Hindu to protect themselves.”

According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent U.S. federal government commission that reports on religious freedom, “violence against Christians also increased: With at least 328 violent incidents, often under accusations of forced conversions. These attacks frequently targeted prayer services and led to the widespread shuttering or destruction of churches.” The 2020 Report says that “Empowered by anti-conversion laws and often with the police’s complicity, Hindutva groups also conduct campaigns of harassment, social exclusion, and violence against Christians, Muslims, and other religious minorities across the country. Following attacks by Hindutva groups against religious minorities for conversion activities, the police often arrest the religious minorities who have been attacked.” The Commission even recommended that India should be included in the category as “a ‘country of particular concern,’ (CPC), for engaging in and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).”

Added to the latest list of woes is the Union Government’s refusal to renew the license of Mother Teresa’s Missionary of Charity (MoC) under the Foreign Contributions Regulation (FCRA) Act. Criticising BJP’s action, Rajya Sabha MP, P Chidambaram underlined that the Centre’s action “reveals bias and prejudice against Christian charity work.” In the wake of the controversy, Father Dominic Gomes, the Vicar General of the Archdiocese of Calcutta ridiculed the Modi Government, saying that the move is a “cruel Christmas gift to the poorest of the poor.” According to Gomes, “Missionaries of Charity Sisters and Brothers are often the only friends of lepers and social outcasts no one will even venture near… this latest attack on the Christian community and their social outreach is, even more, a dastardly attack on the poorest of India’s poor.”

According to Paul Robinson, CEO of Release International, which supports persecuted Christians across the world, “This rising tide of intolerance has increased since the election of the nationalist BJP in 2014. It has resulted in attacks against religious minorities and the passing of anti-conversion laws in many states. These laws are targeted at both Muslims and Christians.”

A young priest in Kerala told this author that when Pope Francis accepted an invitation from Prime Minister Narendra Modi (during the latter’s meeting at the Papal Palace in the Vatican on 30 October this year) to visit India, they had heaved a sigh of relief. It was a long-awaited visit of the Pontiff to the land of 28 million Christians—the second largest Christian community in Asia. When the Pope gifted the Indian Prime Minister with a bronze plaque with an inscription, The desert will become a garden, it resonated an engaging warmth and sanguinity. The priest, who requested anonymity for fear of reprisal for airing his views, said that the much-vaunted adage “absolute power corrupts absolutely” has come to acquire a new meaning in a communal cauldron of repressed anger.

What is more intriguing is a near silence on the part of Muslim leaders when the ‘people of the book’ come under attacks in their own neighbourhood. Has it got something to do with the ‘waning of the warmth’ that started surfacing with the rising incidents of inter-religious conflicts and the Muslim-Christian perceptions of threat across the world?

Admittedly, a host of issues emerging from regional and international locales (such as Easter bombings in Sri Lanka two years back, and the terror reprisals in Europe and Asia-Pacific region) would have contributed to a scenario of cautious responses. Religious feelings are so sensitive lately that each religion—and each denomination within each religion—has multilevel issues that transcend ‘spiritual’ boundaries. India, being a multicultural, multireligious society, has a constitutional system that provides a social space for mitigating conflicts between communities, but it has, of late, come under challenge with communalism making a dent in the secular fabric of the nation. Consequently, minorities and other subaltern sections of the population have become convenient targets of attacks.

The post Specters Of Communal Frenzy: Will ‘The Desert Become A Garden’? first appeared on KM Seethi.

India mourns the unexpected loss of General Bipin Rawat—India’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)—his wife and other defence personnel who died after an Indian Airforce helicopter (Mi-17VH) crashed in the Nilgiris district in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu, killing 13 on board. The tragedy came amid preparations for the 50^th anniversary of the Indian victory in the 1971 war. General Rawat and his colleagues were on their way to the Defence Services Staff College in Wellington for a function.

Tributes 

Even as the preparations for cremation of the departed military personnel get underway in the national capital, tributes continued to pour in from different parts of the world for General Rawat and his colleagues. Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that General Rawat was “an outstanding soldier” and “a true patriot” who “greatly contributed to modernising (Indian) armed forces and security apparatus.” Modi said his “insights and perspectives on strategic matters were exceptional.”  Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi called it “an unprecedented tragedy.” The Communist Party of India ( Marxist) leader Sitaram Yechury and several other leaders from both ruling and opposition parties also condoled the demise of General Rawat and other military personnel.

The Secretary General António Guterres, while expressing his heartfelt condolences, recalled that General Rawat had “served the United Nations with distinction” when he was Brigade Commander of the North Kivu Brigade of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo (MONUC) in 2008 and 2009. The U.S. officials also mourned the death of Gen. Rawat. A defence spokesman said that “General Rawat was a valued partner. He was a strong proponent of the U.S.-India defense partnership” who “helped to deepen the strategic partnership” between the two countries.  The Secretary of State Antony Blinken said General Rawat was “an exceptional leader who served his country and contributed to the US-India defence relationship.” Russian envoy to India, Nikolay Kudashev, said that “Russia has lost a very close friend, who played a big role in promotion of our bilateral special and privileged strategic partnership.” Sun Weidong, Chinese ambassador to India, also expressed “deep condolences on the sad demise” of General Bipin Rawat, his wife and other victims in the helicopter crash accident.” From Pakistan, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Lt Gen Nadeem Raza and Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa “offered their condolences” on Gen Rawat’s “tragic death” and “the loss of precious lives.” Gen. Rawat and Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Bajwa had served together in the UN mission in Congo in 2008.

Rise to CDS 

General Rawat was undoubtedly a man with high profile credentials and commitment in the Indian military establishment. His renewed career as CDS was hardly two years since his assumption of office. General Rawat became India’s first Chief of Defence Staff, following the announcement of the creation of the post by Prime Minister Modi in August 2019. The post of CDS was envisaged as the Principal Military Adviser to the defence minister on all tri-services matters with a view to providing independent inputs and advice to the political brass. The very idea of CDS was mooted by a Group of Ministers (GoM), way back in 2001, that was assigned the responsibility of studying the Kargil Review Committee (1999) Report.  The Kargil Review Committee(KRC), headed by K Subrahmanyam, was appointed by the government following the India-Pakistan war in 1999. The Committee had recommended a comprehensive review of the national security framework for better decision-making in defence matters and suggested that necessary mechanisms be put in place between the Defence Ministry and the Service Headquarters, and the interface between them should be holistically studied and reorganised.

Meanwhile, a parliamentary committee had raised this issue seriously. The Report of the Standing Committee on Defence–which dealt with action taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in their Thirty-sixth Report (Fourteenth Lok Sabha) presented to Lok Sabha and laid in Rajya Sabha on 24 February 2009—had “emphasized on reorganization of the entire gamut of national security management and apex decision making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters so as to promote improved understanding and the efficient functioning of the Ministry.”

The Committee had noted that the position of the Chairman, Chiefs of the Staff Committee (COSC), a forum for the three Services to discuss matter having a bearing on the activities of the Services and also to advise the Ministry, presently devolves on a longest serving Chief of Staff and consequently rotates amongst three Services. In the light of the fact that the Chairman of the COSC has no command and control authority over the Services other than his own, the Committee had expressed doubts over the efficacy of the system in emergent situations by ensuring quick response and coordinated action. In this regard, the Committee had found that the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) exists in 67 countries including France, Germany, UK and USA and the system has proved its efficacy in those countries. The Committee had recommended to take timely and appropriate steps to revise the composition of the COSC by creating a post of CDS to act as Chairman of COSC by evolving consensus on the issue. The Committee had also recommended that the incumbent so selected for the post may be a four-star officer drawn from the Services in rotation and be appointed for a tenure of not less than two years and the duties and responsibilities to be entrusted to the CDS may be decided by the Government keeping in view the objectivity and independence required for the purpose. The Committee had also recommended to give appropriate authority to the Chairman COSC in the present set up to command and control the resources of the Defence Services whenever the situation so demands till such time the post of CDS is created.

The Committee further noted that one of the important recommendations made by KRC and GoM relating to the appointment of CDS could not be approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in May 2001 since it was decided that the Government would take a view after consulting the political parties. In the long period of eight years that has passed since then, political consensus on the issue still could not be evolved. The Committee fail to understand the lack of political consensus on such an important issue concerning the security of the nation, particularly when the system of CDS is prevalent in 67 countries of the world which include the developed countries like France, Germany, UK and USA and had proved its efficacy. The Committee conclude from what has been stated above that the concerted efforts in this regard have not been made by the Government. Merely writing letters even from the level of the defence minister is not sufficient. There is an urgent need to use the various fora of interaction with the leaders of the political parties. Besides the efforts can also be made by deliberating the issue in Parliament through various mechanisms available under the rules. The Committee expect the Ministry to take the effective steps as suggested above so that the institution of CDS is set up expeditiously. 

Although GoM and the parliamentary committee had recommended creation of CDS, no effort was made to bring this reform in the country’s security apparatus. There was a feeling that the Manmohan Singh government did not have the political will to bring about this significant reform. However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a bold initiative to realise this long pending proposal in 2019.  On 24 December 2019, the Cabinet Committee on Security resolved to create the post of CDS to enhance the quality of military advice to political leadership through integration of Service inputs. The Chief of Defence Staff thus became the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and would act as the Principal Military Adviser to Raksha Mantri.  General Rawat who was the Chief of the Army Staff from 2016 to 2019 continued in his new position as CDS from 1 January 2020.

Among the tasks handled by General Rawat as CDS were; heading the Department of Military Affairs in Ministry of Defence and function as its secretary, acting as the principal military advisor to the defence minister on all tri-service matters, functioning as the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, officiating as a member of Defence Acquisition Council chaired by the defence minister, functioning as the Military Advisor to the Nuclear Command Authority, bringing about jointness in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc of the three Services, ensuring optimal utilisation of infrastructure and rationalise it through jointness among the Services, implementing Five-Year Defence Capital Acquisition Plan and Two-Year roll-on Annual Acquisition Plans, as a follow up of Integrated Capability Development Plan, and bringing about reforms in the functioning of three Services with the aim to augment combat capabilities of the Armed Forces by reducing wasteful expenditure.

Military Modernisation and Integration 

With General Rawat at the helm of affairs, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), has been striving “to achieve better results at all levels through effective coordination between the Armed Forces and the Civil Services.” This, in fact, helped facilitate “inter-service integration and better civilian-military coordination” in the country’s defence apparatus. Under DMA, the Logistics structure has been refurbished to make it more competent. Along this line, three Joint Services Study Groups (JSSG) have been developing common logistic policies for Services that would enhance all supply chain functions such as planning, procurement, inventory-maintenance, distribution, disposal and documentation.

Under General Rawat, a rigorous work has been underway “to move forward from a Single Service approach to integrated planning and execution.” With this end in view, three Joint Doctrines have been framed during the last year, while four new joint doctrines namely Capstone, Space, Cyber and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) were at an advanced stage. As noted by a government document, a holistic review of the training methodology is also underway to modernise, integrate and rationalise training, as also to ensure optimal utilisation of infrastructure and resources. As the document indicated, ten subjects were fixed for conducting joint training among the three Services.  Also, in line with the goal of Aatmanirbhar Bharat, DMA brought out the first “Positive Indigenisation List” in August 2020 to ban import of 101 items and the “Second Positive Indigenisation List” comprising of 108 items on 31 May 21. These included major Combat Platforms, advanced Weapon Systems, Armament and Ammunition. The Department also kept “issuing new lists at regular intervals to foster building a robust defence industrial eco-system in the Country.” The task of setting up ‘Theatre/Joint Commands’ was also progressing quickly. Under General Rawat, the CDS and DMA were working to promote integration of the three Services through joint planning for best use of military capabilities. The demise of General Rawat came at a crucial juncture of India’s military modernisation and Services integration.

General Rawat was considered as a person with wide-range of experiences and exposure. Having studied at St Edward’s School, Shimla and the National Defence Academy, Rawat was commissioned in 1978 into the Fifth Battalion of the Eleventh Gorkha Rifles of the Infantry. Having graduated from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, he won the coveted ‘Sword of Honour.’ He commanded an Infantry Battalion along the Line of Actual Control in the Eastern Sector and a Rashtriya Rifles Sector in the Kashmir Valley. He then became a part of the UN operation in Congo. Later he was assigned to Command an Infantry Division along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir and was Corps Commander in the North-East. General Rawat was conferred several Presidential Awards which include the PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM and the VSM for his distinguished service, which spanned over four decades.

During his long career, one of the major tasks he had undertaken was the 2015 cross border operation in Myanmar, and the Indian Army under his leadership had successfully responded to the challenges from the NSCN-K militants. General Rawat was also a part of planning the 2016 surgical strike against the terrorists in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (following Uri attack), and subsequent operations and planning in Kashmir, and during the India-China standoff in Doklam, and in the conflict in Galwan valley. General Rawat had also incurred a lot of criticism from within and across the country for his forthright comments on national security. For example, his statement that “China is the biggest security threat facing India, ‘much bigger’ than Pakistan,” and that “the country is prepared to   deal with ‘any misadventure’ on the “land borders or the high seas”, came in the  middle of November. He also had warned: “Should they carry out a Galwan-like incident again, they will get it (back) in the same coin as they got last time.” The neighbouring countries like Pakistan and China had already come down heavily against his statements and comments on India’s handling of national security issues along the LoC and LAC. However, General Rawat remained intrepid and self-assured on issues concerning India’s national security in the background of mounting tensions with both Pakistan and China.

General Rawat was not a military hawk, as some critics would like to call him for his dauntless comments. It was little known that from Doklam, Kashmir to Galwan valley, General Rawat also sought to ensure that diplomacy had no substitute, by initiating and engaging, in different times, with his counterparts in Beijing and Islamabad. He was well behind negotiations with India’s adversaries in the past years, but it seldom went acknowledged. Doubtless, General Rawat would be remembered for his bold initiatives as well as for the modernisation drive in India’s security apparatus.

The post General Bipin Rawat Remembered first appeared on KM Seethi.

Desert travel writing tends to evoke feelings of excitement, enthusiasm and surprises. In an article in The Times Literary Supplement, Caroline Eden wrote that deserts “offer a cultural and geographical otherness that suits travel writing.” Calling Ethiopian-born British military officer Wilfred Thesiger’s Arabian Sands “a classic of travel literature,” Eden quotes his words on desert adventuring: “Your morale improves…the hypocritical politeness and the slavery of civilisation are left behind you in the city …. Where do we hear of a traveller being disappointed by it?”

Travel writers, philosophers and cultural theorists have imagined and reimagined deserts in innumerable ways. It was Jean Baudrillard, French philosopher and cultural theorist, who wrote that the “desert is a natural extension of the inner silence of the body.” He says that “if humanity’s language, technology, and buildings are an extension of its constructive faculties, the desert alone is an extension of its capacity for absence, the ideal schema of humanity’s disappearance.” Baudrillard would remind us: “When you emerge from the desert, your eyes go on trying to create emptiness all around; in every inhabited area, every landscape they see desert beneath, like a watermark. It takes a long time to get back to a normal vision of things and you never succeed completely.”

To Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,  a desert is nothing but a sign of ‘deterritorialization’ insofar as it is one of the ‘smooth spaces’ where “one no longer goes from one point to another, but rather holds space beginning from any point.” They say, “the nomads inhabit these places; they remain in them, and they themselves make them grow, for it has been established that the nomads make the desert no less than they are made by it.” Deleuze and Guattari say, “they are vectors of deterritorialization. They add desert to desert, steppe to steppe, by a series of local operations whose orientation and direction endlessly vary. The sand desert has not only oases, which are like fixed points, but also rhizomatic vegetation that is temporary and shifts location according to local rains, bringing changes in the direction of the crossings.” Intellectual descriptions and literary imaginations vary, but each engagement of deserts provides compelling reasons to revisit these mysterious stretches of landscape.

Camels in the Sky 

One of the absorbing titles at the 40th edition of the Sharjah International Book Fair (SIBF)—commenced at the Expo Centre Sharjah (UAE) on 3 November with the slogan ‘There is always a right book’—is Camels in the Sky: Travels in Arabia translated from Malayalam, the language of the largest segment of expatriates in the GCC country. Long served as a journalist in Saudi Arabia, Kerala-born V. Muzafer Ahamed’s desert travelogue, serialised in Mathrubhumi Weekly a decade and a half ago, had already captured the Malayali readers. The Oxford University Press published volume is a compelling repertoire of 23 literary exposés written over a period of six years (2006-2012). They were originally part of two Malayalam books Marubhoomiyude Athmakadha (Autobiography of the Desert), and Marumarangal (Desert Trees), and the former had won Kerala Sahitya Akademi Award in 2010.

Muzafer reached Al-Nafūd desert way back in 1999 as part of rural affairs reporting. He says: “The desert singed me with bitter and bruising experiences.” He used to return to his city office with “scars on…his body and soul, almost certain that the desert was not (his) cup of tea.” But what changed everything was his meeting of Abd’ Rehman, an illiterate Bedouin, in a restaurant. It was Abd’ Rehman who hinted that “there was a flipside to the severity of the desert” that he should experience it as “a paradise-like euphoria.” Muzafer “took the bait.” He owes the “invaluable tip that there was no better metaphor than the desert for instilling the lessons of life and death, love and hatred, thirst and moisture…” And it was during the desert journeys that he witnessed “the inexorable transformation of a ‘scorched’ landscape into a life-scape!”

Muzafer undertook the desert travel several times during the long years he lived in Saudi Arabia and captured the life-world of Bedouins who settled themselves in the desert. He learnt that “the desert is a complete biosphere in which life’s minute sparks, nature’s dark secrets, and artless openness cohabit.” And each journey filled his life “that had been resigned to emptiness with various kinds of experiences. Landscapes and mindscapes streamed one after another.”

Muzafer begins with ‘Water War’ that forms part of the desert life-world, part of Arabia’s history. It also encapsulates the kind of troubled times that many countries and communities across the world are faced with. For a person coming from Kerala—a tropical rain-rich land with more than three dozen rivers and innumerable streams—the disputes over the ownership of wells are not mere isolated episodes. Muzafer himself experienced assaults and litigation for taking a photograph of a well owned by his Saudi friend.

To Muzafer, Gaaf tree is “an appropriate metaphor for the Bedouin’s life.” It can survive for years without rains and Bedouins say that Gaaf tree is “the mysterious poetry of the desert.”

‘Burn Marks of Death’ depicts the dreadful episode of a migrant Nepali labourer, employed in a masara (farm), being found dead in the belly of a python, after three days of his missing. Earlier, everyone thought that he had escaped from the masara, “unable to bear the hardship and loneliness associated with the work on desert farms.” The description of the conditions of immigrants in such remote parts of the country almost coincided with the slave narrative in Benyamin’s Aatujeevitham (Goat Days), appeared during the same year.

Muzafer writes: “The farms are usually very isolated and located in desolate places. Isolation and a lonely existence, irregular receipt of wages and denial of home leave for years together are common and are among the reasons for desperate attempts to run away.” The portrayal of the conditions of labourers by both Muzafer and Benyamin goes the same way. Muzafer says: “Some rice, a sackful of onions, and some khuboos (the flat Arab bread) form the ration these labourers are given by the farm owners. Instances of overseas labourers engaged in tending goats and camels, forgetting their language due to prolonged isolation form human contact, have been reported. Some have even gone insane, conversing with only goats and camels. There are also, of course, instances of desertion, for better pay, and working conditions with another employer (even though it is illegal).” Muzafer “was convinced that urban dwellers were oblivious to the hardship of those trying to build their lives in the desert.”

‘Cactuses Drink Moonlight’ is a marvellous poetic exposé. Muzafer depicts how Cactus “got intoxicated with the moonlight” and the romantic silhouette of desert sun set and shape-swinging sand dunes. He has a deep and reflective ability to portray the desert profile. An instance of this is seen in his portrayal:

“A sand dune transformed into a ferocious, snarling dinosaur in the distance. At the end of a new sand dune carved up by the wind, flying sand looked like a wedding procession of charming chambermaids coyly escorting the bride to the honeymoon hut that was taking shape on another sand hill.”

Elsewhere, Muzafer writes: “The wind was building sand castles with wet sand on the eastern slopes of the Dahna desert. It kicked up sand dunes. Some of it flew up, visited the sky, and came down in a sprang.” “One moment it is fury incarnate; at next, it could be as calm as the character in the Adonis poem, playing quietly with the little toy car.”

In ‘Quivering Fossils’ Muzafer portrays the skeletons of dead animals as well as human beings found in the desert village. Carcasses of humans were found in the middle of the desert who probably died of thirst and dehydration. Most often, the victims were illegal migrants who got trapped in the desert without any sense of direction and communication. The lesson the desert taught was that it “is not a place for taking risks.” A Bedouin reminded: “If you befriend the desert, you can travel on its ways. Otherwise, caught on its horns, you can court death.”

The subject of ‘death’ is further exemplified in ‘Necropolis’ which shows the inns and outs of the Dilmun civilisation and its burial mounds (in Bahrain). Muzafer writes: “The burial mounds are the Dilmun civilisation’s covenant that everyone should be remembered forever” and “the persons close to the dead decide to not let the memories of the dead disappear with him.” “The Dilmun civilisation promised rebirth, even if youthful immortality was beyond the reach of some.” Muzafer says Victor Hugo had understood this, quoting him: “In life we dream of Utopia, in death we actualise this ideal world.”

‘Mirage, Mirage’ offers a poetic representation of the changing shadows that develop odd forms under the scorching sun. Muzafer writes: “Mirages must be the outpouring of the desert’s longing for water.” “Imagination is boundless in chasing a mirage”, he adds saying that mirages “deliver a big lesson of life while travelling and living in the desert.”

In “Heroines of the Desert”, Muzafer says that the women deep inside the country, “in the depth of the desert, are very hardworking.” Though women were forbidden to drive in the country, “deep in the interiors of rural Arabia, women do take the wheel, not only of light cars but even heavy trucks, similar to the huge petrol tankers. In such places, women even manage the workshops” (this article was written in 2010, but the Saudi government lifted the ban in 2018).

Women in the desert villages take up all kinds of heavy jobs to run the house. Muzafer writes: “The desert abounds with such tales of bravery; stories of brave and hardworking Arabian womanhood.” Though Bedouin women lag behind their men in literacy and education, “they have several poetesses among them who compose poems in the oral tradition.” Muzafer says that Moneera Al-Ghadeer’s Desert Voices: Bedouin Women’s Poetry in Saudi Arabia unveils the “power of imagination and the depth of women’s dreams in the desert.” “They have a communicative power that can put any accomplished travel writer to shame,” says Muzafer. For example, a poem in Al-Ghadeer’s collection “compares the speed of a young mother rushing home to breastfeed her baby to the leap of an antelope. That sums up the Bedouin woman’s life—the leap of the antelope.”

Muzafer also unearths the plight of Chadian women who were engaged in handling scrap and recyclable waste. While the media depict them as ‘mafia’, Muzafer says that they never “cared to explain why Africa, which was the staging post of humanity’s many momentous events, had turned a waif; why the illegal immigrants from Africa turned robber, thief, bootlegger, or document forger. The media never cared to unravel the historical processes that impelled them.” He also puts some questions across: “Who plundered Africa, and who prompted the civil wars that bleed the continent remain unanswered questions.”

Muzafer also brings in Ibn Batutta’s narratives which include an episode of a spring during his travel, wherein one of it “had water that wiped out memories of one’s past as soon as you drink.” But the hot water in Ain Ul Haaar—one of the largest six hot springs in Saudi Arabia—keeps memories alive. And a fascinating part of the spring is that people get attracted by Ain Ul Haaar’s ‘therapeutic properties.’ Muzafer says: “As for myself, dipping my head in the pool for sometime seemed to have dissipated the tobacco smoke that clouded my brain. Suddenly, things I had forgotten for a long while came back with all their vividness. Memories came flooding in as though a light shore in the recesses of the brain and body.”

In “Life’s Laboratory,” Muzafer regretted saying that they “did not come across a wise and wizened Bedouin anywhere,” but it was accompanied by an unrecognised voice in the vehicle, “aren’t they all beyond fence?” This unrecognised voice has a bearing on the culture and civilisation that India and Pakistan also share, but got divided, if not shattered, by history, borders and fences. Muzafer refers to the “India-Pakistan camaraderie built between Salim and Faizullah.” The latter, a Pakistani expatriate, became philosophical saying, “this is life’s laboratory, brother.” “Borders and nationalities became irrelevant here. Those who have come here come to make a living, and they are all insaan!.” Muzafer reminds that “the mind of memories is bright. It is in memories, not in the desert, that time stands still.” Camels in the Sky has several such philosophical reflections, poetic representations, and sociological expositions. The translator of the volume, P.J Mathew, says that having kept the narratives of Freya Stark and Muhammed Asad in the backdrop, Muzafer “explored the desert in the modern communication era and interpreted the sights in his eastern Third-World perspective.”

Camels in the Sky is lyrical, rich in insights, and encapsulates all that enthrals in a desert foray. P.J. Mathew has done a tremendous job by literally transforming the text into a ‘con-textual’ desert experience, making it an indispensable addition to any ‘diaspora cultural collective’ anywhere in the world.

The post ‘Deserts’ Imagined/Reimagined: Reading Camels in the Sky – Review first appeared on KM Seethi.

Hunger and poverty are so intertwined that reports concerning one have implications for the other, and a palpable common factor is food security. The release of the Global Hunger Index (GHI) for 2021, on the eve of the observance of World Food Day (16 October), and the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty (17 October) has naturally generated both anxieties and resentment. While anxieties are understandably pervasive across regions and countries, the resentment has come, this time, from an emerging economy in South Asia—India—which has high stakes in the global economy with its collaboration and partnerships with a large number of stakeholders. This, however, does not mean that the economy at the macro level is doing badly, notwithstanding pressures of global recession and the pandemic. It is yet critically important what countries such as India are doing at the micro level where the link between poverty and hunger is so obvious.

The United Nations has already come out with reports that as much as 842 million people across countries are undernourished and “almost all of them live in developing countries,” such as in regions like Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia. According to the UN, “the COVID-19 pandemic that gripped the world during the past year has resulted in reversing decades of progress in the fight against poverty and extreme poverty.” Quoting from the World Bank data, it says that “between 88 and 115 million people are being pushed into poverty as a result of the crisis, with the majority of the new extreme poor being found in South Asian and Sub-Saharan countries where poverty rates are already high.” The UN predicted that in 2021, “this number is expected to have risen to between 143 and 163 million. These ‘new poor’ will join the ranks of the 1.3 billion people already living in multidimensional and persistent poverty who saw their pre-existing deprivations aggravated during the global pandemic.”

According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), more than 3 billion people (nearly 40 per cent of the world population) cannot afford a healthy diet. This happens when the world’s agri-food system employs 1 billion people, more than any other sector. FAO says that small holder farmers produce more than 33 per cent of the world’s food, despite challenges including poverty, and a lack of access to finance. FAO also underlines that governments “need to both repurpose old policies and adopt new ones that foster the sustainable production of affordable nutritious foods and promote farmer participation.” It also says that policies “should promote equality and learning, drive innovation, boost rural incomes, offer safety nets to smallholders and build climate resilience. They also need to consider the multiple linkages between areas affecting food systems including education, health, energy, social protection, finance and more, and make solutions fit together.”

Does this happen in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia? While the year-long farmers’ agitation in India is an indication of the ground level reality and burgeoning anxieties, the scenario in Africa is predictably grim. It is in this context that GHI 2021 holds significance, for countries like India.

Global Hunger Index and India

According to the GHI Report, India occupies 101th position in the hunger index, a further deterioration from 2020 rank (94). What is more disappointing for the policy circles in New Delhi is that India is lagging behind its neighbours in South Asia such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan. GHI—prepared by the Irish aid agency Concern Worldwide and Germany’s Welt Hunger Hilfe—revealed that 18 countries, including China, Brazil and Kuwait, come on the top of the ranking, with GHI scores of less than five. The GHI characterised the condition of hunger in India as ‘alarming.’ GHI sought to analyse data from 135 countries, but only 116 countries provided sufficient data.

The GHI considered four major indicators for score analysis—undernourishment; child wasting or the share of children under the age of five who have low weight for their height, reflecting acute undernutrition; child stunting or the number of under-5 children who have low height for their age, reflecting chronic undernutrition; and child mortality. According to the report, wasting among children in India grew from 17.1 per cent between 1998 and 2002 to 17.3 per cent between 2016 and 2020. “People have been severely hit by covid-19 and the pandemic-related restrictions in India, the country with the highest child-wasting rate worldwide.” The Report further said that though other countries in the region such as Nepal (76), Bangladesh (76), Myanmar (71) and Pakistan (92) are also placed in the ‘alarming’ hunger list, they have managed better at feeding its citizens than India. This obviously angered New Delhi. The Statement issued by India’s Ministry of Women and Child Development says:

“It is shocking to find that the Global Hunger Report 20201 has lowered the rank of India on the basis of FAO estimate on proportion of undernourished population, which is found to be devoid of ground reality and facts and suffers from serious methodological issues. The publishing agencies of the Global Hunger Report, Concern Worldwide and Welt Hunger Hilfe, have not done their due diligence before releasing the report.”

Terming the methodology employed by FAO as ‘unscientific,’ the Ministry alleged that these agencies “based their assessment on the results of a ‘four question’ opinion poll, which was conducted telephonically by Gallup. There is no scientific methodology to measure undernourishment like availability of food grains per capita during the period.” The statement further said that the scientific measurement of undernourishment “would require measurement of weight and Height, whereas the methodology involved here is based on Gallup poll based on pure telephonic estimate of the population.” According to the Ministry, the agencies completely disregarded “Government’s massive effort to ensure food security of the entire population during the covid period, verifiable data on which are available. The opinion poll does not have a single question on whether the respondent received any food support from the Government or other sources. The representativeness of even this opinion poll is doubtful for India and other countries.”

It also said that both GHI 2021 and FAO report on The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021 have completely ignored some glaring facts available in public domain, pertaining to schemes such as Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojna (PMGKAY) and Atma Nirbhar Bharat Scheme (ANBS). Under PMGKAY, the government “made allocation of food grains @ 5 kg per person per month free of cost for around 80 Crore (800 million) beneficiaries of the 36 States/UTs covered under National Food Security Act (Antyodaya Anna Yojana and Priority Households) including those covered under Direct Benefit Transfer for the period April to November 2O2O and again for the period May to November 2021.” In 2O2O, 3.22 crore (32.2 million) metric tons of food grains and in 2021, about 3.28 crore (32.8 million) metric tons of food grains were allocated free of cost under PMGKAY scheme to approximately 80 Crore (800 million) NFSA beneficiaries. Besides food grains, pulses were provided @ 1 kg per household per month for the period April to November 2020 free of cost to all beneficiaries under NFSA covering 19.4 Crore (194 million) households. The Ministry also noted that under ANBS, the government made allocation of about 8 lakh (800 thousand) metric tons of additional free of cost food grains covering all the States/UTs for migrants/stranded migrants who were neither covered under NFSA nor State Scheme PDS cards, @ 5 kg per person per month free of cost for a period of two months, May and June 2020.

GHI, however, stated that while India fared better in indicators such as the under-5 mortality rate, prevalence of stunting among children and incidence of undernourishment due to inadequate food continued to be high. The report indicated that food security is under challenge on multiple fronts. It highlighted that deteriorating conflict, weather fluctuations related to global climate change, and the economic and health challenges associated with the Covid-19 pandemic are all causing hunger. It said that “since 2000, India has made substantial progress, but there are still areas of concern, particularly regarding child nutrition. India’s GHI score has decreased from a 2000 GHI score of 38.8 points—considered alarming—to a 2021 GHI score of 27.5—considered serious. The proportion of undernourished in the population and the under-five child mortality rate are now at relatively low levels. While child stunting has seen a significant decrease—from 54.2 percent in 1998–1999 to 34.7 percent in 2016–2018—it is still considered very high. At 17.3 percent—according to the latest data—India has the highest child wasting rate of all countries covered in the GHI. This rate is slightly higher than it was in 1998–1999, when it was 17.1 percent.”

The report also noted that “it is difficult to be optimistic in 2021 because the forces driving hunger are overpowering good intentions and lofty goals. Among the most powerful and toxic of these forces are conflict, climate change, and covid-19—three Cs that threaten to wipe out any progress that has been made against hunger in recent years,” the report added.

As the GHI report appeared, the CPI(M) General Secretary Sitaram Yechury came down heavily against the Union Government saying that while “food grains rotting in central godowns, mass hunger grows.” He said that in 2014 when Modi became prime minister India ranked at 55. In 2020, India “slipped to rank 94. Now we rank 101/116 countries.”

It may be recalled that months back, India had proposed to help the World Food Programme (WFP) replenish its foodgrain stock from overflowing state-owned granaries to assist the organization’s efforts in providing food to the most vulnerable global population amid the covid-19 crisis. The proposal was in reply to an appeal by WTO nations to lift ban on shipment of foodgrain for humanitarian aid. A Live Mint report said that in recent years, the government’s record procurement had led to burgeoning central pool stocks at 2.5 times the existing buffer norms. Till September, for instance, Food Corporation of India had central stocks of 22.2 million metric tonnes of rice and 47.8 million metric tonnes of wheat. The food grains Stock in Central Pool for the years 2016-2021 is now available in the public domain.

A major question being raised is whether the Public Distribution System (PDS), which played an important role in providing relief to people in India, is any more ‘viable and sustainable’ under neoliberal policy regime and its pressures, beyond this critical period of pandemic. While the peasant population in India is under tremendous pressure of ‘contracting out’ farming, without any state protection, the accumulation of problems emerging from the situation of state withdrawal will be so critical. Hunger caused by poverty will naturally be higher notwithstanding robust schemes put in place from time to time. The peasantry in India is already a victim of crop price fluctuations, high inflation and the rising cost of living. The Global Hunger Index (GHI) for 2021 is therefore a matter of concern insofar as its forewarning has a bearing on policy-making, beyond the politics of resentment.

The post Between Hunger and Poverty: Politics and Policies of Estimation first appeared on KM Seethi.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks had marked a defining moment in international relations. Even as the world community remembers its horrific effects after 20 years, the emergence of the Taliban in Kabul (with 14 of 33 members of the ‘interim’ government on UN’s terror blacklist) comes as an ironic twist of fate. Throwing all cautions to the wind, the ‘exclusive’ coterie of the new regime in Kabul are set to play a new game in the region with Pakistan, China and Russia hammering out fresh deals with the Taliban. The geopolitical setback Washington suffered in the last phase of its ‘engaging Afghans’ is also a reminder that the ‘war on terror’ did not auger well for the West. Rather it turned out to be a disaster for millions of people across the Eurasian region who still bear the brunt of the 20 years’ crisis.

The 9/11 attacks and the consequent militarism in the name of ‘war on terror’ caused extensive damage to people and valuable assets in the regions beyond Afghanistan. While the 9/11 episode set in motion further Islamist terror attacks in other places like London, Madrid, Bali, New Delhi, Djerba etc., nations and international organisations came together to face the threat of terrorism in different ways. While the American-led forces intervened in Afghanistan and pulled apart the Taliban and al-Qaeda infrastructure, it took several years for them to finish off the masterminds of terrorism, including Osama bin Laden. Yet, the task remains ‘unfinished’ with the withdrawal of the US-NATO forces, facilitating the return of the Taliban !

The most devastating effect of the post-9/11 US operations was in Iraq in March 2003. The dismantling of the Iraqi administration and military spurred a civil war, which eventually led to the emergence of al-Qaeda in the country. It also prodded Daesh—the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), a radical Sunni Islamic jihadi outfit which stretched across Iraq and Syria. ISIS is considered to have receded its fighting ability since 2015, but its ideology is seized by new Jihadi militants in other regions (such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan) and, naturally, it poses new challenges to international security and stability. The return of the Taliban is also a grim reminder that the Islamic Jihadi militants in many parts of the world will spur fresh bouts of religious mobilization. This is a dangerous scenario which China and Russia are conveniently glossing over. More than the specificities of Xinjiang and Chechnya, and more than the transient geopolitical gains of engaging Afghanistan, the two Asian giants must look at the religious spurt as something like a Jihadi-estate that will spell disaster for the entire world. A special grid in this emerging geopolitical scenario of Jihadi-estate is maintained by Pakistan with its oligarchic power structure operating at different levels. The happiest country in the rise of the Taliban in Kabul is undoubtedly Pakistan and it is quite possible that both China and Russia will look upon Islamabad as a ‘frontline power’ in their strategic games. Pakistan’s role as a ‘frontline state’ in the American strategy in South Asia had lost its relevance way back in the early 1990s, with Moscow’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and the disintegration of the Soviet state itself. Though ‘war on terror’ warranted Pakistan’s second episode of ‘frontline’ role post-9/11, Washington knew that Islamabad would play a different sort of game in South Asia. This has been made evident in several reports, documents, and writings of the U.S. policy makers.

According to The 9/11 Commission Report (Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Pakistan helped nurture the Taliban. The Pakistani army and intelligence services, especially below the top ranks, have long been ambivalent about confronting Islamist extremists. Many in the government have sympathized with or provided support to the extremists.”  The Report says that “Pakistan stood aside and allowed the U.S.-led coalition to destroy the Taliban regime.” It also noted that “the Pakistani government tried to walk the fence, helping against al Qaeda while seeking to avoid a larger confrontation with Taliban remnants and other Islamic extremists. When al Qaeda and its Pakistani allies repeatedly tried to assassinate Musharraf, almost succeeding, the battle came home.” The report further said: The country’s vast unpoliced regions make Pakistan attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also provide a base for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Almost all the 9/11 attackers traveled the north-south nexus of Kandahar–Quetta–Karachi. The Baluchistan region of Pakistan (KSM’s ethnic home) and the sprawling city of Karachi remain centers of Islamist extremism…” The report noted that the “U.S. forces in Afghanistan have found it challenging to organize effective joint operations, given Pakistan’s limited capabilities and reluctance to permit U.S. military operations on its soil.”

Larry Pressler, former Chairman of the U.S. Senate’s Arms Control Subcommittee, writes in his Neighbours in Arms: An American Senator’s Quest for Disarmament in a Nuclear Subcontinent (2017) that America’s “rationale for continuing to provide aid to Pakistan” was “flawed.” Pressler quotes Matthew M. Aid’s 2012 work Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight against Terror: “US intelligence experts were reluctant to admit that the ISI and the Taliban were collaborating. But the evidence kept mounting and, in 2008, they determined that the ISI was providing training, money, and logistical support to the Taliban. Furthermore, a December 2010 National Intelligence Estimate claims that Pakistan continues to harbour every major terrorist group that the United States deems an enemy. The northern Pakistan region remains lawless ‘Wild West’ where the Pakistani Taliban and other homegrown terrorists roam without much interference.” Elsewhere Pressler writes: “We let Pakistan use US taxpayer money to build to their nuclear weapons programmes. Why do we now let them use US taxpayer money to harbour terrorists?”

The 9/11 Commission Report was equally critical of the role of Saudi Arabia. It says: “Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism. At the level of high policy, Saudi Arabia’s leaders cooperated with American diplomatic initiatives aimed at the Taliban or Pakistan before 9/11. At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s society was a place where al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals and through charities. It was the society that produced 15 of the 19 hijackers.” The Report clearly states that as “Saudi wealth increased, the amounts contributed by individuals and the state grew dramatically. Substantial sums went to finance Islamic charities of every kind.” And the Saudi government “uses zakat and government funds to spread Wahhabi beliefs throughout the world, including in mosques and schools. Often these schools provide the only education available; even in affluent countries, Saudi-funded Wahhabi schools are often the only Islamic schools. Some Wahhabi-funded organizations have been exploited by extremists to further their goal of violent jihad against non-Muslims.”

Barack Obama in his A Promised Land (2020)—which covers his political career up to the period of the operation that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011—explains many episodes of the difficulties in the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. He writes: “ The lack of a coherent U.S. strategy didn’t help matters. Depending on who you talked to, our mission in Afghanistan was either narrow (wiping out al-Qaeda) or broad (transforming the country into a modern, democratic state that would be aligned with the West). Our Marines and soldiers repeatedly cleared the Taliban from an area only to see their efforts squandered for lack of even halfway capable local governance. Whether because of overambition, corruption, or lack of Afghan buy-in, U.S.-sponsored development programs often failed to deliver as promised, while the issuance of massive U.S. contracts to some of Kabul’s shadiest business operators undermined the very anti-corruption efforts designed to win over the Afghan people.”

Obama knew that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan had tricky implications. He told Robert Gates (Secretary of Defence) that “my first priority was to make sure our agencies, both civilian and military, were aligned around a clearly defined mission and a coordinated strategy. He didn’t disagree. As a CIA deputy director in the 1980s, Gates had helped oversee the arming of the Afghan mujahideen in their fight against the Soviet occupation of their country. The experience of watching that loosely organized insurgency bleed the mighty Red Army into retreat—only to have elements of that same insurgency later evolve into al-Qaeda—had made Gates mindful of the unintended consequences that could result from rash actions. Unless we established limited and realistic objectives, he told me, “We’ll set ourselves up for failure.” Obama wrote that Joe Biden, after his visit to Kabul, “had convinced him that we needed to rethink our entire approach to Afghanistan” and “he saw Afghanistan as a dangerous quagmire and urged me to delay a deployment, suggesting it would be easier to put troops in once we had a clear strategy as opposed to trying to pull troops out after we’d made a mess with a bad one.”

Quoting from The Riedel report, Obama says “The report’s added emphasis on Pakistan was key: Not only did the Pakistan military (and in particular its intelligence arm, ISI) tolerate the presence of Taliban headquarters and leadership in Quetta, near the Pakistani border, but it was also quietly assisting the Taliban as a means of keeping the Afghan government weak and hedging against Kabul’s potential alignment with Pakistan’s arch rival, India. That the U.S. government had long tolerated such behavior from a purported ally—supporting it with billions of dollars in military and economic aid despite its complicity with violent extremists and its record as a significant and irresponsible proliferator of nuclear weapons technology in the world—said something about the pretzel-like logic of U.S. foreign policy. In the short term, at least, a complete cutoff of military aid to Pakistan wasn’t an option, since not only did we rely on overland routes through Pakistan to supply our Afghan operations but the Pakistani government also tacitly facilitated our counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda camps within its territory. The Riedel report, though, made one thing clear: Unless Pakistan stopped sheltering the Taliban, our efforts at long-term stability in Afghanistan were bound to fail.”(emphasis added) In fact, what Obama wrote has actually come true today. Obama was also sure that the U.S. would face formidable difficulties in Kabul. According to him, “The situation in Afghanistan was bad and getting worse, with the Taliban emboldened, the Afghan army weak and demoralized, and Karzai, who prevailed in an election tainted by violence and fraud, still in charge of a government that was viewed by the Afghan people as corrupt and inept.” By November 2009, Obama realised “substantive differences” between members of his “team had by this point shrunk considerably. The generals conceded that eradicating the Taliban from Afghanistan was unrealistic.” However, Joe Biden and Obama’s “NSC staff acknowledged that CT operations against al-Qaeda couldn’t work if the Taliban overran the country or inhibited our intelligence collection.”

Several years later, the U.S. had to take an inevitable decision—to pull out troops from Afghanistan without anticipating any “unintended consequences.” In any case, the role of Pakistan in the Afghan crisis has increased, over years, with its consistent support to the Taliban and other Jihadi networks. This has been evident since the U.S.-Taliban deal and the subsequent announcement of U.S. withdrawal of troops (by both Trump and Biden). Amid reports of uncertainty in the days since the fall of Ghani government on 15 August, Islamabad had sent different signals to Kabul in the making of a new dispensation. That’s why Pakistan’s Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry had “warned of potential spillovers from the Afghan crisis, saying the world would have to deal with a “huge mess” if Pakistan’s advice on the war-ravaged country was ignored.” Following this statement came the visit of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director General Lt Gen Faiz Hameed and a team to Kabul. Gen Hameed said that “everything will be okay.” The new dispensation emerged within a short time after this ‘strategic’ visit. Many observers believe what Larry Pressler had written several years ago that the ISI ‘still matters’ in the making of a Jihadi-estate in Kabul.

The Jihadis who are wholly, or intermittently committed to al-Qaida and ISIS version of Islam are unreceptive to any persuasion or democratic engagement. The 9/11 Commission Report says: “It is among the large majority of Arabs and Muslims that we must encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity, even though our own promotion of these messages is limited in its effectiveness simply because we are its carriers. Muslims themselves will have to reflect upon such basic issues as the concept of jihad, the position of women, and the place of non-Muslim minorities. The United States can promote moderation, but cannot ensure its ascendancy. Only Muslims can do this.”

Is the Taliban’s ‘ascendancy’ an expression of American predicament or a wishful thinking? The new dispensation in Kabul has already intimated what an ‘inclusive government’ is. They have ‘included’ all blacklisted terror brains in the cabinet. The position of women has already been proclaimed—under the Taliban-dictated Sharia—and the place of minorities is writ large with fresh reports of persecution emerging from several provinces.

The upshot of the power games in Kabul is fairly clear. Global agencies have already warned of a devastating humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan with 18 million people being pushed into a deepening crisis of poverty. UNDP signalled that almost 97 per cent of the country’s population would fall below the poverty line if the current crises are not addressed immediately. With Afghanistan’s frozen assets still remaining blocked, the scenario in the country would be unpredictable.

The post Redlines In Kabul: Post-9/11 Promises And Predicament – OpEd first appeared on KM Seethi.

The unfolding events in Afghanistan amid persisting uncertainty and growing anxiety in Kabul have a very complex, yet diverse responses—from state to nonstate actors, from thinktanks to political commentators. Frantic efforts still get underway to ‘rescue’ panic-struck people who keep thronging to the Hamid Karzai international airport. The most important crisis for the fundamentalist Taliban forces in Kabul is trust-deficit. Given its track record of violation of human rights in the past—as a ruling regime (1996-2001) and later as a fighting force (2001-2021)—people and governments across the world cannot be blamed for their downbeat mindset. ‘Who is trusting whom’ is a bewildering scenario of the Afghan society today.

There are also reports that US military may stay beyond 31 August to complete the evacuation process. Though the Taliban have ‘taken control’ of Kabul, the uncertainty regarding the nature and composition of the new ruling dispensation gets prolonged even after a week. The Taliban’s offer of ‘amnesty,’ ‘restraint’ and ‘peaceful’ handling of ‘transfer of power’ appeared to be a false rosy package, and it has been exposed by itself with violence and attacks being resorted to by its ‘rank and file’ in many places across the country since 15 August. But they were noticeably widespread in different stages of their march to Kabul. Moreover, reports from Panjshir Valley, Pul-e-Hesar, Deh-e-Salah and Banu indicate that all is not well for the Jihadi outfits in Kabul. Writing in Washington Post, Ahmad Massoud—the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud—is confident that the Taliban “is not a problem for the Afghan people alone. Under Taliban control, Afghanistan will without doubt become ground zero of radical Islamist terrorism; plots against democracies will be hatched here once again.” But the capability of the so-called ‘Northern Alliance’ is doubtful this time with countries like China, Russia and Pakistan throwing their full weight behind the Taliban.

However, the dilemma of many countries is how to deal with the Taliban-in-Kabul. In the foreign affairs registry of these countries, the Taliban still remains a ‘terrorist’ organisation having a sordid record of human rights violations, illicit drug trade, several bouts of violence against women and children, sheltering (and being in connivance with) other terrorist/jihadi outfits etc. This is also the case with international and regional organisations (like the U.N. and the European Union) who continued to treat the Taliban as a ‘terrorist’ outfit. What makes more burdensome is that the Taliban ‘comes to power’ not through any democratic process; nor as a result of any power-sharing arrangement, as a follow up of the deal that they had made with the Trump administration.

In fact, the Taliban itself violated the very spirit of the agreement albeit the Trump administration had gone out of the way in yielding to the pressures of the outfit. The agreement says: “The participants of intra-Afghan negotiations will discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire, including joint implementation mechanisms, which will be announced along with the completion and agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan.” The ‘negotiations’ underway in Kabul post-15 August do not correspond with the deal. Rather, the ongoing power-sharing bargains are in sheer violation of the deal itself.

But the US seemed to have been more concerned about getting the US and other NATO prisoners (nearly a thousand) released from the Taliban strongholds in return for the release of up to 5,000 prisoners of “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban,” as repeatedly referred to in the deal. The United States also got an assurance from the Taliban that “its released prisoners will be committed to the responsibilities mentioned in this agreement so that they will not pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies.” The U.S. is actually struggling to ensure this through its evacuation drive. However, the deal was absolutely silent on the Afghan Government in place in Kabul and the fact that its role was completely relegated to the backyard of negotiations was a clear indication of the shape of things to emerge. The deal eventually strengthened the hands of the Taliban and betrayed the cause of the people who really mattered in the scheme of things. So, trust-deficit has been a part of the U.S.-Taliban deal itself. What made things more fluid for the jihadi outfit was the misgovernance of the Kabul regime and its impact on the state army personnel who were already disgruntled by their pay and perks. Obviously, this brewing ‘deficit crisis’ in other sectors of the government accelerated the process, and it is likely to snowball in the coming days with the Taliban bounding towards people with its fangs bared.

For countries like China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan, the ‘rise of the Taliban’ amounts to offsetting the American strategy in the South, Central and West Asian regions. But little do they realise that fostering a fundamentalist-jihadi force in sensitive region like South-West Asia would be a political suicide, and the manner in which the Taliban were supported, both overtly and covertly, in antagonistic perception of a U.S.-led western world is a clear vindication of the ‘realpolitik of expediency.’

The U.S. has undoubtedly fumbled in handling the Afghan crisis, from one phase to another. The Biden Administration inherited all smouldering timbers of the past four decades and, more importantly, the ‘Trump-Taliban deal’ of 2020 turned out to be the beginning of a disaster. According to former U.S. Defense Secretary, Mark Esper, it was Donald Trump who himself ‘undermined’ the deal by pushing for American forces to leave Afghanistan without the Taliban fulfilling the conditions of the Doha agreement. Biden has his ‘logical’ justification saying,

when I became President, I faced a choice—follow through on the deal, with a brief extension to get our Forces and our allies’ Forces out safely, or ramp up our presence and send more American troops to fight once again in another country’s civil conflict. I was the fourth President to preside over an American troop presence in Afghanistan—two Republicans, two Democrats. I would not, and will not, pass this war onto a fifth.

The Taliban’s unexpected ‘rise’ would have surprised many, but it has been facilitated by many endogenous and exogenous factors. The latter is obviously related to the games of the big players as well as regional actors. Its systematic operations, notwithstanding the twenty-years’ fighting with the U.S. and NATO forces, have been sustained by funding from different sources. If the outfit has been able to generate as much as $2 billion a year, it means many things. A Report of the U.N, in June 2021, says that most of its funds are from criminal activity which included   opium production, drug trafficking, blackmail and kidnapping for ransom. The Taliban, which had banned opium production when it was ruling, reversed its stand by relying on the same for ‘holy jihad.’ According to the U.N. report, the Taliban leaders have also amassed funds from natural resources in areas under their control through mining operations. They were also mobilising money by way of donations from network of nongovernmental charitable foundations and other rich people. The Gulf countries were directly and indirectly supporting them. The U.S. officials had also accused Russia of giving money, weapons and training to the Taliban. Similar charges were made against Pakistan and Iran also, for their anti-U.S. and anti-NATO stance in the emerging geopolitics of the region.

Fahd Husain, Dawn’s resident editor, writes that “Pakistan, China and Russia have consolidated their positions in the region as a result of the latest developments in Afghanistan while the US and India have lost out.” He concludes his analysis thus: “Exciting and uncertain times are upon us. With the two-decade-long chapter that started with the 9/11 attacks now closing, a new and promising one is opening up in our region. Are we positioned well to leverage the huge opportunities that may be on offer in the months and years to come?” Among the “possible advantages” that Fahd Husain envisaged for Pakistan are: (1) Kabul will not have a pro-India regime with an intelligence service like NDS actively promoting instability in Pakistan; (2) Peace in Afghanistan would mean reduced pressure of refugees coming into Pakistan, and possibly at a future date a return of some of the nearly four million Afghan refugees currently in Pakistan; (3) Pakistan could open up a land route to Central Asia and beyond and push forward its geoeconomic agenda etc. President Iran Khan’s speech in Islamabad after the Taliban take over reflected a similar mood.

If the mindset in Pakistan is like this, the scenario in other neighbouring countries is equally disquieting. The Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said, in talks with outgoing Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, that “The military defeat and pullout of the U.S. from Afghanistan must be turned into an opportunity to revive life, security and sustainable peace in the country.” The Russian ambassador to Afghanistan Dmitry Zhirnov admired the Taliban’s conduct saying the group had made Kabul “safer in the first 24 hours.” He described the Taliban’s overall approach as “good, positive and business-like.” Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China’s hope that “the Afghan Taliban will put the interests of the country first, hold high the banner of peace talks, set the goal of peace, build a positive image, and pursue an inclusive policy.” According to The Global Times editorial, “Compared with countries outside the region, such as the US and some European countries, China is more willing to see a prosperous and stable Afghanistan.” For each of these powers, the Afghan crisis is an ‘opportunity’, either to settle scores with the U.S and NATO, or to extract new benefits from Kabul for larger geoeconomic interests.

Even as the impasse continues, amid frantic evacuation and soaring cases of violence, the Taliban forces are set to launch a fresh round of fight with its rivals in different areas, such as in Panjshir Valley. If it causes a new spell of prolonged fight, the efforts in place for an ‘inclusive’ government would remain a distant goal. Afghanistan would naturally plunge into yet another ethno-tribal internecine war. This will also send a grim signal to the ‘prospective’ regional partners of the Taliban-in-Kabul.

The post The Taliban-In-Kabul: Between ‘Trust-Deficit’ And ‘Crisis As Opportunity’ – OpEd first appeared on KM Seethi.