I spent two years as a painter on the beaches of Montpellier in France. I didn’t have any official exhibitions or anything; I just painted by myself and exhibited my work on the streets. I also had some street-exhibitions in Munich, Germany, where I got to know the work of Egon Schiele. The reason I chose his paintings [i.e. their reproductions in a book] in Bad Guy is because at first glance they look vulgar and appear to deal with obscene subjects. But if you actually look at them closely, they are very honest (1).

As a sidewalk artist, he had to struggle but Kim was determined to go ahead with his newfound interest in film and script writing. Among the early influences on his thinking was the social alienation in his home country, which got reflected in many of his films. Likewise, the memories of a host of events, like the Japanese occupation of Korea, the division of the country following the second world war, the Korean war etc had a deepening impact on his craft.

In the 1990s, South Korea witnessed new forms of crises and challenges. The 1997 financial crisis and the emergence of neoliberalism brought in major changes in the society and economy. Kim emerged at this time as a new generation director along with Kang Je-kyu, Bong Joon-ho, Park Chan-wook, Kim Jee-woon, Hong Sang-soo and Lee Chang-dong. In the changing social setting of Korea, the new wave films began to pick up historical events and ideas that were forbidden under the authoritarian regime. These new generation directors were instrumental in making South Korean cinema challenging entries in prestigious international film festivals.

Kim set about his film career as a screenwriter and made his directorial debut with the 1996 feature Crocodile which, by deploying new techniques and spectacular symbolism, dealt with suicide and abuse in an engaging style. After four years, Kim’s The Isle set in motion a wave of Korean entries in international festivals. The film was screened at the Venice and Toronto Film Festivals though its reception in his own home country was very low. Kim himself admitted this in an interview and said that The Isle was a low budget film, but in Korea such films would not get wide audience and thereby its success could only be marginal. The Isle, which revolves around a remote fishing ground owned by a mute woman, unfolded human condition in a metaphoric mode. Address Unknown (2001) was his political film which sketches the wounds left by the Korean war of the 1950s and its contemporary reverberations on a US Army base.

Kim’s masterpiece was undoubtedly Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter… and Spring which portrays the life of a solitary Buddhist monk at a floating Buddhist monastery on a lake. In a review, David Sterritt wrote that the film “conjures a sense of spiritual discipline as suspenseful as it is stunning to watch and exhilarating to contemplate”(2). According to Kim, in Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter,…and Spring “there are typically at least two beings in each scene and that is his own allusion to harmony, as the possibility of conflict and harmony occurs when there are two beings or realities present.” He said that he used film “as a medium to illustrate the metaphors that are important to me.” Since his first film, Kim was reported to “have tried to make films with religious motifs.” “These motifs are mixed with themes of sin and self-wounding situations. People can choose whatever they want to see in my films. I leave the choice up to the audience. However, the religious elements in my stories offer a return to Mother Nature and innocence. These days, our lives are full of artificiality. We have to try much harder to regain our innocence” (3). Paula Marvelly, Editor, The Culturium wrote that Spring,  Summer, Fall, Winter,…and Spring  “transmits a transcendental beauty all of its own, elevating the soul with its elegant and timeless aesthetic from innocence, through love and evil, to enlightenment and finally rebirth, subtlely and silently observed by the impassive gaze of a bodhisattva” (4).

In 2004, Kim won laurels for his Samaritan Girl (Silver Bear award) and 3-Iron (Silver Lion award) in the Berlin and Venice International Film Festivals respectively. There were a few films he made since then, but they did not make much impact till 2011 when his documentary Arirang was acclaimed in Cannes Film Festival’s UnCertain Regard section. The film actually portrayed his own personal setback in the wake of Dream’s production in 2008 wherein Lee Na-young, the lead role played by her in the film, nearly died by hanging. Amen (2011) was yet another experiment of Kim—both in terms of cinematography and narrative, as well as its technical aspect.

Pieta (2012), Kim’s 18th film brings to light the complexities of human relations within an exploitative capitalist system, with sequences of how family gets dislocated and money builds new locale of disquiet between people. It tells the story of a loan shark who uses brutal methods to collect returns from distressed borrowers for his moneylender boss. The film then unveils the events in an offbeat mode with a mysterious woman emerging. The film epitomises violence and sexuality with bluntness as if they represent only physical pointers of fear and misery. Kim later told in an interview that “this is a universal experience not only in South Korea but also in Europe and U.S. The notion of forgiveness and distrust in the film is something we all need to think about on a humanistic level.” Pieta won the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival and got awards and acclaims in other international festivals. He had come to India in 2012 and 2013 at the height of his esteem across international festivals. Kim found the International Film Festival of Kerala (IFFK) quite amusing and exhilarating with tens of thousands of people running after his name, festival after festival. He told reporters then that he could not find a similar popular enthusiasm anywhere in any festival—leave alone his own home country.

Moebius (2013) shows Kim’s predisposition for atypical themes. Moebius as a dialogue-free movie seeks to reinforce viewer engagement in a different way. As Panos Kotzathanasis wrote,

Kim’s obvious purpose was to shock his audience and he definitely succeeded in doing so. Almost every onerous notion is present in “Moebius”, including self-torture, misogynism and Oedipal inclinations. Adding to the sense of perversion erupting from the movie is the almost complete absence of dialogue, a tactic meant to force the spectator to focus on the very graphic images (5).

Notwithstanding the setbacks with some films, Kim made another good attempt in The Net (2016). The Net critically takes on the partition fallout of North-South Korean breakup. As a political project, the principal theme of the film puts in place the dilemma of how citizens of the divided countries tend to view each other and the inside/outside problematic of modern nation-state through the prism of their political ideologies. The story begins when a North Korean fisherman—having his boat unintentionally moved into South Korean waters—is captured and suspected of being either a defector or spy. Through the episodes of interrogation and incarceration, the film makes the point that the doctrinaire burdens under both democratic and communist systems make freedom and the right to life worthless and thereby they are subject to the diktats of all-powerful, despotic systems.

Earlier, Kim’s Stop (2015) sought to offer a deeply emotional story of the dreadful fallout of nuclear radiation on a family. This was done in the context of Fukushima disaster. It depicts the story of a young Japanese couple and how they encounter problems after moving to Tokyo from an area near the disaster-struck Fukushima nuclear plant.

Kim’s Human, Space, Time and Human (2018) puts across a queer problematic of human life in a socially divided world. The film is set out in a cruise trip where the passengers converge from various cultural and social backgrounds. The ‘time-space compression’ in this social microcosm makes room for negotiation and rivalry for justice and fair treatment under conditions of social division, scarcity and danger. Extreme violence, savagery, lewd bouts etc occupy the conditions of ‘life’ in the ship and the ship transforms itself from one level to another. Though the film raises some philosophical questions, it has not been adequately reviewed in the background of allegations of sexual assault against Kim and the subsequent court cases. The film was also not allowed to be released in South Korea. The #MeToo movement made him so unpopular in his own home country.

Kim admitted later that there was “a regrettable case” which happened a few years ago, while making Moebius. The public prosecutor saw his slapping an actress as ‘problematic’ and thereby the court fined Kim for the act. But the court apparently did not charge him for the alleged sexual assault. Dissolve (2019) was his last film which was shot in Kazakhstan. This Russian language film was screened at the Cannes Film Market under the temporary title 3000. Kim was also planning to take a new film, Rain, Snow, Cloud and Fog, a co-production between Korea and Estonia. His visit to the Baltic state would have been associated with the new venture. Kim knew very well that the recent incidents would have damaged his reputation in his own home country. Moreover, he believed that being popular in South Korea would imply essentially three things: “major investment, major distribution and a well-known actor.” Kim admitted that he had “come too far away from those things.” To a question why his work was loved and better appreciated outside his home country, Kim said, “my stories are based on the universality of human beings. I mean every nation revolves around its people, but we Koreans have stronger pride in ourselves as we are taught that we are superior to others. But if you travel around and see the world, every nation has its own uniqueness and I like putting that in my films.”

One of the most persisting questions he encountered in the world of his cinema was the subject of violence in his films and its barefaced portrayal. In the interview with Volker Hummel, Kim said: “The violence that they turn to, I prefer to call a kind of body language. I would like to think of it as more of a physical expression rather than just negative violence.” He pointed out that the people might consider his new films “brutal again.” But, Kim said, “this violence is just a reflection of what they really are, of what is in each one of us to certain degree.” He strongly believed that a director “should not define everything.” Every movie “is a form of a question” posed to the audience: “I want to ask their opinion on my point of view and discuss it with them.” Moreover, Kim used to remind: “I try not to interpret things of the world into a single meaning. Rather, I try the opposite.”

Kim Ki-Duk emerged as a new wave filmmaker in South Korea at a critical juncture, with provocative themes and bewildering narratives. His early films were undoubtedly more persuasive and intellectually engaging. Yet, he has been a demanding filmmaker across the world. Kim’s cinematic legacy is enduring insofar as his creative sway is larger than life with a universal appeal.

Published in Countercurrents and Global South Colloquy, 13 December 2020

References

1. “Interview with Kim Ki-Duk by Volker Hummel,” Senses of Cinema, 2 March 2002, https://www.sensesofcinema.com/2002/feature-articles/kim_ki-duk/

2. Daniel Garrett, “Everything Must Change: Kim Ki-Duk’s Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter, … and Spring; and Alexander Sokurov’s Father and Son, Off-Screen, 31 August 2004, http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/new_offscreen/spring.html

3. Ibid.

4. Paula Marvelly, “Kim Ki-duk: Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter … and Spring,” The Culturium, 17 February 2019, https://www.theculturium.com/kim-ki-duk-spring-summer-autumn-winter-and-spring/

5. Panos Kotzathanasis, “Film Review: Moebius (2013) by Kim Ki-duk,” AMP, 9 January 2016, https://asianmoviepulse.com/2016/01/kim-ki-duks-moebius/

The post Kim Ki-Duk and the Legacy of ‘New Wave’ cinema first appeared on KM Seethi.

Published in Global South Colloquy, 15 September 2020; Countercurrents, 15 September 2020

The deep state in Pakistan is no more a mere conglomerate of civil bureaucracy, army, intelligence, and/or other administrative agencies. The ‘state within the state’ has also its predictable partners in religious constituencies across the country. There is a growing concern now if the judiciary is also becoming a partner of the deep state congregation. A few years back, a report from the International Crisis Group argued that “the judiciary has failed to uphold the constitution and to oppose Islamic legislation that violates fundamental rights.” It pointed out that “the legacy of military rule in Pakistan includes discriminatory religious laws that undermine the rule of law, encourage vigilantism and embolden religious extremists.” The report underlined how the country’s blasphemy law discriminates people on the ground of religious views and “imposes harsher sentences, including the death penalty, for offences against Islam.” It said that Pakistan’s blasphemy law has been “widely abused, particularly by radical Sunni groups targeting religious minorities” (International Crisis Group 2008). The situation has not changed since then and it got worsened as years have rolled by. The latest incidents—that too in a gap of two months—have shown that even judiciary cannot be seen as the last hope of the common man in Pakistan.

On 8 September a sessions court in Lahore granted death sentence to Asif Pervaiz, a young Christian, after finding him guilty of sending ‘text messages’ containing ‘blasphemous content.’ Pervaiz was already in custody for nearly seven years, facing blasphemy charges that were targeted against him by his supervisor in a garment factory he had worked at. Pervaiz was accused of sending derogatory remarks about Prophet Muhammad in a text message, according to reports (The Dawn, 8 September 2020). The judgment says, Pervaiz would first serve a three-year prison term for ‘misusing’ his phone to send the derogatory text message. Then “he shall be hanged by his neck till his death” besides paying a fine Rs 50,000. Pervaiz having already spent seven years in jail, and having denied all charges against him, the lawyer of the accused said he had no option but to go for an appeal to the Lahore High Court. On the same day, a local court in Peshawar remanded into police custody a suspect, Bashir Mastan, arrested on charges of committing blasphemy through a video message on social media (The Dawn, 9 September 2020). Reports also indicated that more than three dozen people were arrested in Pakistan, on the same charges, in the month of August alone.

It was only two months ago that Tahir Naseem, an American citizen on trial for blasphemy in Pakistan, was shot dead in a crowded courtroom in Peshawar by a teenager who accused Naseem—a member of the minority Ahmadiyya community—of insulting the Prophet Muhammad (The Washington Post, 31 July 2020; The Dawn, 30 July 2020). A few hours after Naseem’s brutal murder, a social media hashtag campaign began praising the killer as a ‘hero’ (The New York Times, 30 July 2020). There were many Taliban supporters among them who went on pushing the social media campaign on behalf of the ‘hero.’ Naseem was reported to have survived several Taliban assassination attempts already. Even as the United States took the issue seriously, civil rights activists in Pakistan have come up against such judicial and extra-judicial acts, saying that Pakistan’s blasphemy laws were frequently misused to persecute religious and ethnic minorities even to settle personal scores. There were reported cases of lynching or street vigilantism throughout Pakistan. According to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, nearly 80 people were already imprisoned in Pakistan on such charges — half of whom face life in prison or the death penalty (USCIRF 2019; USCIRF 2020). It may be noted that Pakistan has been a strategic partner of the United States in South Asia for a long time.

Early this year, a Lahore court sentenced a man to death in a three-year-old blasphemy case which also involved a fine of Rs. 200,000. Similar cases were also reported in the recent past (The Dawn, 20 June 2020). The commencement of the year 2020 witnessed new measures being put in place in the country. For example, the Punjab Assembly passed a resolution in early January 2020 to make Pakistan’s blasphemy laws more stringent and introduce a Saudi type filtering of online content to intercept blasphemous material. The Assembly urged the federal government to make new or improve existing laws to rigorously punish those indulging in blasphemy. The resolution reads: “The existing (anti) blasphemy laws in the country had a weak implementation and lack enforcement in letter and spirit, allowing some people to commit blasphemy in the garb of freedom of expression and hurt feelings of Muslims…Therefore, this house demands the immediate establishment of a Saudi Arabia-like central filtration and screening system to prevent blasphemous content.” The resolution also demanded that the authorities should ban and confiscate books containing blasphemous material. It called for revising the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 and Pakistan Penal Code Sections regarding blasphemy to ensure stricter punishments. As soon as the resolution was passed in the Punjab Assembly, the lower house of Pakistan’s National Assembly also adopted a resolution to condemn all blasphemous content (The News International, 26 January 2020; The Dawn, 1 January 2020). In late 2019, a Pakistani court in Multan convicted Junaid Hafeez, a Muslim lecturer at Bahauddin Zakariya University in Multan, sentencing him to death under the blasphemy law for allegedly spreading anti-Islamic ideas. Hafeez has been in jail for almost six years awaiting trial. He has been in solitary confinement most of the time because he would most likely be killed if left with the general population, according to reports (Arab News, 21 December 2019). Earlier, Hafeez’s first lawyer, Rashid Rehman, was killed in 2014 after he agreed to undertake the case (BBC News, 21 December 2019). The Amnesty International (AI) continued to press for his release before the judgment. It said “Junaid’s lengthy trial has gravely affected his mental and physical health, endangered him and his family and exemplifies the misuse of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. The authorities must release him immediately and unconditionally and drop all charges against him” (Amnesty International, 25 September 2019). After the verdict came, AI called it “a gross miscarriage of justice” and described it as “extremely disappointing and surprising”(BBC News, 21 December  2019).According to Al Jazeera, several people have been “extra-judicially killed” in Pakistan in connection with blasphemy allegations since 1990 and many still languished in jails for quite a long period. For instance, Wajeeh-ul-Hassan spent nearly half of his life in jails. Hassan was convicted of committing blasphemy way back in 2002, and he was sentenced to death by a Lahore court in 2002 when he was 25. Now he has spent more than 19 years in jail with no hope of getting released. The report also showed that many cases do not even reach courts, and such cases often ended up with ‘extra-judicial’ killings (Al Jazeera, 21 February 2020).

Almost a decade back, Pakistan’s blasphemy law had shot into global media attention when Salman Taseer, former Governor of Punjab, visited Asia Bibi—a Christian woman—who was sentenced to death by a court for allegedly committing blasphemy. Taseer’s visit was to declare solidarity with her. After his visit he felt that the provisions in Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) regarding blasphemy were too bad and therefore he called it a ‘Black Law.’ Taseer’s comments eventually resulted in his death on 4 January 2011 when his own attendant killed him in Islamabad. However, after several years, the Supreme Court annulled Asia Bibi’s conviction in 2018. But her release saw thousands of Islamists in Pakistan protesting against her acquittal (The News International, 1 November 2018). There were similar incidents reported during this time—most of them were against Christian minorities (CRSS 2014). The mob attack in the Joseph Colony of Christian community in Lahore in March 2013 was a major incident when a spat between two friends ended up in blasphemy charges, which eventually led to destroying as many as 150 houses of poor Christians in the area. There were several such blasphemy-related cases and incidents in the following years (The Dawn, 19 December 2015; The Dawn, 20 June 2019).

Draconian amendments to PPC under General Zia

The blasphemy laws in Pakistan emerged mostly from Sections 295 and 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The provisions incorporated essentially embody amendments made of the British-Indian Penal Code of 1860 pertaining to religious offences that were applicable to all religions. It was in 1927 that Section 295-A was added to the Indian Penal Code in the wake of communal tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities. After independence in 1947, Pakistan maintained the Penal Code inherited from the British colonial office. However, during 1947-1977, there were only ten reported judgments that were related to offences against religion. Meanwhile the Pakistani state had to deal with issues related to religious and ethnic minorities (Seethi 2015; Seethi 2019). The problem of Ahmadis continued to be a critical issue since the riots perpetrated against them in 1953 (Pakistan 1954). Successive governments did not consider their basic democratic rights even under the popular rule. For instance, in 1974, during Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s rule, the National Assembly amended the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, to declare that any person “who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of The Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.” Following the second Constitutional amendment, the Ahmadiyya community, who considered themselves as a sect within Islam, were specifically branded as a “non-Muslim religious minority community” (International Commission of Jurists 2015:9). Yet, they were perpetually harassed in Pakistan and even the basic rights of a minority community have been denied all these years.

While a popular government (under Bhutto) did this draconian amendment to disempower the Ahmadis, it was during the military rule of General Zia, in the 1980s, that these ruthless provisions were further incorporated into the PPC. In 1991 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif introduced the mandatory death penalty for blasphemy after the National Assembly failed to step in to reject the death penalty upheld by the Federal Sharia Court in 1990. According to Section 295-B of PPC (Defiling, etc., of Holy Qur’an), “Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.” As per Section 295(C) – use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet- “Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine” (Pakistan 1860). Section 298-A(Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of holy personages) says that “Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of any wife (Ummul Mumineen), or members of the family (Ahle-bait), of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), or any of the righteous Caliphs (Khulafa-e-Rashideen) or companions (Sahaaba) of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” While Section 298-B pertains to punishment for the “misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles, etc., reserved for certain holy personages or place,” Section 298-C prescribes punishment for person of Quadiani group (Ahmadis,) etc., “calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith” (Ibid). According to Pakistan’s Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2004, offences relating to Section 295C of the PPC, which prohibits derogatory remarks against the Prophet Muhammad (Pakistan 1860), must be investigated by a police officer at the level of superintendent or above (Pakistan 2005).

It may be noted that before the Zia military regime (1977-1988), there was no provision in the PPC specifying punishment for blasphemy. According to The News International report, there were only ten blasphemy cases heard in court in the 58 years between 1927 and 1985, but since 1986, particularly after the amendments to the PPC, there were more than 4,000 cases, citing the data gathered by different non-governmental organisations working on the issue. As per the information brought together by the Lahore-based Centre for Social Justice, not less than 1,472 people were charged under the blasphemy laws during 1987-2016. Curiously, majority of the accused were Muslims (730) while there were 501 Ahmadis, 205 Christians and 26 Hindus (The News International, 1 November 2018).

Way back in 2012, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers found that the blasphemy laws “serve the vested interests of extremist religious groups and are not only contrary to the Constitution of Pakistan, but also to international human rights norms, in particular those relating to non-discrimination and freedom of expression and opinion” (UN 2012: 13). The Special Rapporteur also recommended that “Pakistan should repeal or amend the blasphemy laws in accordance with its human rights obligations.” Moreover, it was further clarified that “the mandatory imposition of the death penalty, which is prescribed under section 295-C, is prohibited under international human rights law.” The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) opined that all institutions of the Pakistani State—the executive, the parliament, and members of the judiciary—”have effectively abdicated their responsibilities under human rights law when people are accused of committing blasphemy, knowingly leaving them either at the mercy of mobs and organized extremist religious groups or facing trials that are fundamentally unfair” (International Commission of Jurists 2015: 6). According to the ICJ report,

Individuals accused of blasphemy continue to be vulnerable even after formally coming within the ambit of the criminal justice system. In many cases, blasphemy accused awaiting trial or serving sentences following convictions have been assaulted while held in custody and authorities have failed to protect them. Some have even been killed. In a few cases, police officials themselves have reportedly been the perpetrators. Individuals who are prosecuted for blasphemy are also routinely denied fair trial guarantees: blasphemy-related proceedings are unduly protracted; prior to trial accused persons are frequently unduly denied bail and are held in custody for extended periods of time awaiting trial; and while detained, they are often held in solitary confinement for prolonged periods (Ibid: 7).

Human rights groups and religious and ethnic minorities within and outside Pakistan continued to demand repeal of the draconian anti-blasphemy regulations which have been repeatedly misused to target minorities and all voices of dissent, but the successive governments remained apathetic. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) in its Annual Report 2020 noted that the “systematic enforcement of blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya laws, and authorities’ failure to address forced conversions of religious minorities—including Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs—to Islam, severely restricted freedom of religion or belief.” On many occasions, the senior U.S. officials highlighted Pakistan’s religious freedom violations in their interactions with the government agencies. The Annual Report 2020 stated that several ongoing trials linked with blasphemy charges saw prolonged delays as cases were shifted between judges. Besides, as the Report says, “these laws create a culture of impunity for violent attacks following accusations.” The murder of Professor Khalid Hameed in March 2019 by a student over alleged ‘anti-Islamic’ comments is a case in point. Mobs attacked and burned Hindu shops and houses of worship in Sind following incidents related to accusations of blasphemy. Another mob attack on the Christian community was reported from Punjab. In yet another incident, as many as 200 Christian families in Karachi were forced to flee their homes following mob attacks, after a fake blasphemy accusation was put up against some Christian women. The USCIRF further pointed out that the Ahmadi Muslims, whose faith has been criminalized, became targets of relentless “persecution from authorities as well as societal harassment due to their beliefs, with both the authorities and mobs targeting their houses of worship” (USCIRF 2020: 32-33).

Blasphemy laws and attacks

Historically, the laws that criminalize blasphemy have been on the statute books of many countries for centuries. This was quite discernible in countries where Semitic religions held sway. Scholars argue that blasphemy laws were part of both Judaism and Christianity, much before Islam emerged in the seventh century (Levy 1995; Sanders 1990; Webster 1990). In the modern era, this assumed new dimensions with ruling classes resorting to tactics that would sustain their regime interests and legitimacy. According to a study recorded by the U.S. Congress, many countries in Western Europe still maintain blasphemy and related laws. In some countries they are never implemented, but “there have been prosecutions in recent years in Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Switzerland, and Turkey.” In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, “laws prohibiting proselytization or insulting religion are prevalent.” Some of the recent cases are noted in the study from the experiences of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (The U.S. Congress 2017).

Most countries in West Asia and North Africa have stringent laws prohibiting abusive or offensive remarks and actions against Islam or religion generally. Many of them have lately enacted and sharpened such laws, including in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and the West Bank. Sub-Saharan African countries having such laws prohibiting blasphemy, proselytization, or similar conduct are Comoros, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe albeit their enforcement was not widely reported. In South Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan have blasphemy laws that are vigorously enforced. India’s Penal Code retains the provisions of the British Indian Penal Code (1860) that has a blasphemy law that reportedly “is used by all of India’s faith groups when their religious sensibilities are hurt” (Ibid). Bangladesh also has regulations along these lines, but not to the extent of granting death penalty for blasphemy. However, in 2013, hundreds of thousands of people staged protests in Dhaka demanding that the government introduce an anti-blasphemy law that would make provision for death penalty for those who insult Islam. The Islamist organisation Jamaat-e-Islami was in the forefront calling for a new blasphemy law with a death penalty (Al Jazeera 7 April 2013). But prime minister Sheikh Hasina said that no such law was necessary because the existing laws were enough to handle such cases (it may be recalled that the Bangladeshi writer Taslima Nasreen had to escape from her country in 1994 following Islamists’ fatwa against her for “casting aspersions on Islam” in her novel Lajja).

Countries in Southeast Asia such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Myanmar have blasphemy-related laws that are in place. Other countries with such laws in the region, as well as in East Asia and the Pacific, include Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Japan and New Zealand. There are only a few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean which have blasphemy laws. Canada has a blasphemy law in North America, but it is not enforced (The U.S. Congress 2017).

The world also witnessed attacks and fatwas on writers and media personnel in the recent past on charges of blasphemy. Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses had triggered mass protests across the world. In the wake of the publication of the novel in 1989, the spiritual and political leader of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa (for death penalty) against Rushdie. Besides, Iran also offered a reward of several million dollars for the assassination of Rushdie. Rushdie had to go underground and, since then, lived under the protection of British security (Levy 1993). There were many other incidents associated with the Rushdie affair. The Japanese translator of The Satanic Verses was stabbed to death in 1991. The Italian translator of the novel was also attacked, but he somehow survived. Similarly, the Norwegian publisher of Rushdie’s work also suffered serios injuries in a firing. The attack on the office of French satirical publication Charlie Hebdo, in early 2015, resulted in the death of a dozen people. The incident happened following the publication of a cartoon on Prophet Muhammad (Trench 2016). There were similar attacks on magazine and newspaper offices in Europe. The publication of drawings of Prophet Muhammad in a Denmark newspaper resulted in similar attacks. Since then the International Blasphemy Rights Day (30 September) is held every year to show solidarity with those who oppose draconian laws and social prohibitions against free expression, to support the right to challenge prevailing religious beliefs without fear of violence, arrest, or persecution.

Is there really a blasphemy law in Islam?

There are contesting versions about ‘laws’ that prescribe punishment (including death penalty) for insulting Islam or the Prophet Muhammad. The Quran and Sunnah are the fundamental sources of Islamic laws, but they have been subject to different interpretations by various schools of Islamic theology over centuries. Islamic jurisprudence involves hermeneutical engagements of the Quranic text and contexts. According to learnt Islamic scholars, the Quran embodies several allegories, metaphors as well as ambiguities that need interpretations based on appropriate principles of justice, fairness and virtues of a good life. In fact, there are no references to blasphemy in the Quran. It did not appear anywhere in the history of Islamic jurisprudence. There are many instances in the Quran when disbelievers went on deriding and teasing Prophet Muhammad. Yet, there is no specific command for punishing those who ridiculed him. Rather the Quran asks Muhammad to leave the punishment to God for such acts of insults and derogatory remarks. The Quran also tells believers to invoke God’s mercy and grace for the Prophet.

Those who agree that Islamic traditions have laws for blasphemy since its beginning will argue that such laws are based on the Sunnah (sayings and practices) of the Prophet. They bring in the instance of a Jewish woman who was believed to have been killed for writing provocative poems against the Prophet and Islam. There is no authenticity for this story that tells that the Prophet ‘praised the man’ who killed her. However, there is another version which says that the Jewish woman was actually killed for sedition for breaking the covenant signed in Medina, and not for any blasphemous comments. It may be remembered that whenever the Prophet was in Mecca, it was not quite unusual for the people to abuse and show disrespect or dishonour him for his radical measures. In the emerging context of setting up an Islamic state, it was natural that there were too many adversaries for the Prophet. Yet, he remained unmoved and showed tremendous patience. The Quran itself provides a number of such instances.

The Surah 21:41 reads,
“Mocked were (many) apostles before thee; but their scoffers were hemmed in by the thing that they mocked” (Al-Anbiyaa – translation by Yusuf Ali).

The Surah 38:4 says,
“So, they wonder that a Warner has come to them from among themselves! and the Unbelievers say, “This is a sorcerer telling lies!” (Sad – translation by Yusuf Ali).

In spite of such attacks and ridicules, the Quran (Surah 73:10), in fact, advises the Prophet to “have patience with what they say and leave them with noble (dignity)” (Al-Muzzammil translation by Yusuf Ali).

The Surah 5:13 reads:
“But because of their breach of their Covenant We cursed them and made their hearts grow hard: they change the words from their (right) places and forget a good part of the Message that was sent them nor wilt thou cease to find them barring a few ever bent on (new) deceits: but forgive them and overlook (their misdeeds): for Allah loveth those who are kind” (Al-Maida, translation by Yusuf Ali).

The Surah 25:63 is rather categorical:
“And the servants of (Allah) Most Gracious are those who walk on the earth in humility and when the ignorant address them they say “Peace!” (Al-Furqan translation by Yusuf Ali).

The most oft-quoted Surah (2: 256) runs like this: “Let there be no compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear from error; whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things (Al–Baqara translation by Yusuf Ali).

The ‘texts’ of Islamic jurisprudence cannot ignore such instances of compassion, humility and patience displayed by the Prophet during his time. Ziauddin Sardar, a writer and commentator on Islam, argued that blasphemy laws have no basis in the Quran and that “there are better ways than demanding death sentences to show love and respect for the Prophet” (Sardar 1995). Asghar Ali Engineer, another scholar on Islam, says that the Prophet was “so spiritual that he would never indulge in seeking revenge for personal insult.” He was “a model human being to be followed by others” (Engineer 2011). He cites an instance of a Jewish women who used to insult the Prophet by throwing garbage on him whenever he passed her house. But the Prophet never sought to punish her. One day, when the woman did not turn up with garbage, the Prophet asked why she did not. When heard that she fell ill, the Prophet straightaway went to see her. The woman felt ashamed of herself by misbehaving with such a person and immediately embraced Islam. Engineer says that to “avenge an insult is not a sign of religiosity but betrays worst human instincts” (Ibid).

It may be noted that in the next two centuries after Prophet Mohammad, there was hardly anything like a blasphemy law. It was during the Abbasid rule, in the beginning of the ninth century, that the notion of blasphemy began to gain some acceptance, particularly in the context of rebellion against Islam and the state. Plausibly, the idea assumed new dimensions in the background of legitimising the political power of the ruling dispensations. When a military general like Zia-ul-Haq introduced blasphemy law in Pakistan, it all became clear that the purpose was only to legitimise his authoritarian regime under the garb of an ‘Islamic state.’ Gen Zia also acquiesced to the agenda of orthodox ulama in Pakistan with a view to making inroads into the society through his military dictatorship (Kennedy 1996; Seethi 2019). The situation has not changed since then, even after the transition to democracy.

In sum, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws put across a big question mark regarding its own Islamic credentials as well as its international legal obligations. The deep state in Pakistan has hardly any respect for protection for freedom of religion or belief, freedom of opinion and expression, equality before the law, the prevention of discrimination and, above all, ensuring a fair trial rights. The blasphemy laws have obvious repercussions for religious and ethnic minorities in the country, and segue into the situation of religious intolerance, fundamentalism and Islamic radicalism. Even as Islamabad has come under the international pressure of countering terrorism and religious extremism, the question is whether the deep state will allow the political forces and the civil society in the country to revisit the draconian blasphemy laws, in their present mode, and rescind or drastically revise all infractions related to religion in line with its international human rights obligations.


References

Amnesty International (2016): “As Good As Dead,” The Impact of The Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan,” available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/585a41704.pdf

CRSS (2014): Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A Historical Overview, Centre for Research and Security Studies, available at Islamabad, https://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Report-on-Blasphemy-Laws-.pdf

Engineer, Asghar Ali (2011): “Blasphemy Law–how much religion and how much Politics?” Secular Perspective, 16-31 January, available at https://csss-isla.com/secular-perspective/blasphemy-law-how-much-religion-how-much-politics/

International Commission of Jurists (2015): On Trial: The Implementation of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws, November 2015, Geneva: ICJ, available at https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Pakistan-On-Trial-Blasphemy-Laws-Publications-Thematic-Reports-2015-ENG.pdf

International Crisis Group (2008): “Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan,” Asia Report No 160, Islamabad/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Levy, L. W. (1995): Blasphemy a Verbal Offense against Sacred from Moses to Salman Rushdie, New York: University of North Carolina Press.

Levy, Leonard (1993): Blasphemy, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Kennedy, Charles (1996): Islamization of Laws and Economy, Case Studies on Pakistan, Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.

Pakistan (1954): Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, Lahore: Government of Pakistan.

Pakistan (1860): Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), Act XLV of 1860, October 6th, 1860, available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html

Pakistan (2005): Act No. 1 of 2005. An Act to Amend the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, available at http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/uploads/Pakistan%20-%20Criminal%20Law%20(Amendment)%20Act%202004.pdf

Rumi, Raza (2018): “Unpacking the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan,” Asian Affairs, XLIX(II): 319–339, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2018.1469338

Sanders, E. P. (1990): Jewish Law from Jesus to Mishnah: Five Studies, Philadelphia: Trinity Press International.

Sardar, Ziauddin (1995): “Faith and Reason: Blasphemy laws have no basis in the Koran,” Independent, 11 March, available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/faith-and-reason-blasphemy-laws-have-no-basis-in-the-koran-1610999.html

Seethi, K.M. (2015): “Political Islam, Violence and Civil Society in Pakistan,” Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol.8(1).

Seethi, K.M. (2019): “Pakistan: State, Civil Society, and Political Islam” in Mathew Joseph C (ed.), Pakistan and the Muslim World, New Delhi: KW Publishers.

The U.S. Congress, Law Library of Congress (2017): Blasphemy and Related Laws in Selected Jurisdictions, January 2017, Washington, DC.: The Global Legal Research Centre, available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/blasphemy.pdf

Trench, B. (2016): “Charlie Hebdo,” Islamophobia and Freedoms of the Press,” Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 105(418): 183-191, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/24871662

UN (2012): Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, available at UN Doc. A/HRC/23/43/Add.2, para 57.

USCIRF (2019): Policy Update: Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law, October, available at https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019%20Pakistan%20Blasphemy.pdf

USCIRF (2018): Annual Report 2018, Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, available at https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Tier1_SAUDI%20ARABIA.pdf

USCIRF (2020): Annual Report 2020, Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, available at https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202020%20Annual%20Report_Final_42920.pdf

Yusuf Ali, Abdullah (2016): The Holy Quran – English Translation with Commentary, Chennai: Goodword Books.

Webster, R. (1990): Brief History of blasphemy: Liberalism, Censorship, and The Satanic Verses, Southwold: The Orwell Press.

The post Blasphemy Estate: The ‘Deep State’ and Deepening Fundamentalism in Pakistan first appeared on KM Seethi.

First Published in Countercurrents, 21 February 2019; also appeared in Global South Colloquy, 21 February 2019

https://countercurrents.org/2019/02/21/unlocking-the-india-pakistan-dilemma-twenty-years-of-lahore-declaration-and-missed-opportunities/

Many treaties and agreements in international relations are the natural outcome of conflicts and wars between two or more players. In India-Pakistan relations too, the two major agreements signed between them, the Tashkent Declaration (1966) and the Shimla Pact (1972) were the follow-up of negotiations started in the wake of the 1965 and 1971 wars. But the Lahore Declaration, signed between Prime Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, on 21 February 1999 was followed by reports of Pakistani intrusion into Kashmir and a prolonged war with India in the months of May, June and July 1999. What makes the Lahore Declaration quite significant at that time was a host developments emerging from 1998—the Pokhran and Chagai nuclear tests and the sanctions imposed by the Western powers.

It was often stated that one of the supreme accomplishments of Vajpayee was his commitment to keep open channels of conversations with Pakistan and encourage friendly relations. His launching of Delhi-Lahore bus service and the signing of Lahore Declaration were seen as great successes in that sense. Even Nawaz Sharif was reported to have said that Vajpayee could “now win elections even in Pakistan” (Ray 2018). No doubt, Vajpayee’s ‘bus diplomacy’ found an important place in India-Pakistan ‘people-to-people’ contacts. Eminent people like Kuldeep Nayar, Mallika Sarabhai, Dev Anand, Javed Akhtar and others had accompanied Vajpayee.

The Lahore Declaration was, in many ways, a commitment to help revive and strengthen the spirit of Shimla Accord, which, for many years, had not worked in the expected direction. The Lahore Declaration acknowledged that “the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries.” The Declaration recognised that “confidence building measures for improving the security environment” is very important. Most importantly, the two countries agreed to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir” and “refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs.” There was also a commitment to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.” It is also to be noted that both countries reaffirmed “their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace”(India, Ministry of External Affairs 1999).

Following the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries. As per this MoU, both had agreed to “engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.” The two sides also had undertaken “to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.” Besides, the two sides agreed to “continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.”

A few weeks after the signing of the Declaration, there were reports about Pakistani intrusion into Kashmir, which eventually became a war between India and Pakistan from May 1999 onwards (Seethi 1999). There were even calls for the use of nuclear weapons in both countries. The CIA had warned that during the 1999 Kargil war, when the Pakistan military army was suffering major setbacks, the Nawaz Sharif government was planning to deploy and use its nuclear weapons against India. The CIA’s assessment was part of its classified briefing for the President in July 1999. Bruce Riedel, who had worked in the National Security Council of the White House, was reported to have said that “The morning of the Fourth (of July, 1999), the CIA wrote in its top-secret Daily Brief that Pakistan was preparing its nuclear weapons for deployment and possible use. The intelligence was very compelling. The mood in the Oval Office was grim” (The Economic Times 2018). Later, there were reports about a “confirmation of truth” by Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that the Kargil “misadventure” in 1999 by troops of his country was a stab in the back for the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the two neighbours were engaged in a peace process” (First Post 2016). Obviously, Nawaz Sharif was pointing to the role of army in derailing the peace process. The military takeover under Gen. Pervez Musharraf, in the wake of the Kargil war, had upset Nawaz Sharif’s calculations.
Admittedly, Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif had gone to the extent of recognizing the necessity of going “beyond stated positions and devise a solution that would take the interests of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people into consideration,” as noted by AG Noorani. He wrote:

Only a week later, Inder Kumar Gujral reneged on the accord. He would not agree to a working group on Kashmir. This accord was a precursor to the aborted Agra Declaration of July 16, 2001, which also provided for a composite dialogue. Gujral reneged on the first. Atal Behari Vajpayee allowed Advani and Co. to wreck the second. A recent disclosure in The Telegraph (July 22, 2001) is relevant: “One of the myths about Indian diplomacy is that there are hardliners and softliners on Pakistan. In the Indian establishment you cannot deal with Pakistan and be what peaceniks would call a ‘softliner'(Noorani 2002).

Noorani continues: “When he was Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral, who was miffed at criticism that he was soft on Pakistan, told this correspondent: ‘Do you think I will give away anything to Pakistan? I am as much a nationalist as anyone else.’ He stressed that his Gujral doctrine ‘did not cover Pakistan’.” Noorani said that this “was tragic” insofar as Sharif had “secured a mandate to settle Kashmir. Deadlock ensued.” Noorani also quotes a report from The Hindu (3 April 1999) which stated that “In a radical proposal, Mr. Vajpayee suggested to Mr. Sharif that the two countries open the Line of Control (LoC) at Uri in Indian Kashmir to allow Kashmiris living close to it to meet each other” (Ibid).

In less than a decade after the Lahore Declaration, India-Pakistan relations witnessed a series of twists and turns, following the Indian Parliament attack in 2001, India–Pakistan standoff during 2001-02, the Samjhauta Express bombings in 2007, the Mumbai attacks of 2008 etc. The following decade also witnessed a series of events upsetting the process of peace building in India-Pakistan relations. Pathankot, Uri and Pulwama attacks only added to the festering wounds in bilateral ties. What is significant in the transformation of bilateral relations, during the last two decades since the Lahore Declaration, is the burgeoning role of militants and Pakistani-based jihadi groups. Pakistan says that it, too, is suffering from the menace of terrorism and the number of causalities within the country is much higher than in India. However, India insisted that stringent action against the terrorist groups is a precondition for any dialogue with Pakistan.

More importantly, the weapons’ capability of both countries has increased considerably over the last two decades. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reports say that “Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 140 to 150 warheads.” This apparently exceeded the projection made by the US Defense Intelligence Agency in 1999 that Pakistan would have 60 to 80 warheads by 2020. It estimated that Pakistan’s stockpile “could more realistically grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, if the current trend continues. If that happens, it would make Pakistan the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapon state” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2018a).

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists also stated that “India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, with at least five new weapon systems now under development to complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems.” India was “estimated to have produced enough military plutonium for 150 to 200 nuclear warheads, but has likely produced only 130 to 140. Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2018b).

Evidently, the nuclear scenario of South Asia is too dangerous and both India and Pakistan have not adhered to the spirit of Lahore Declaration all these years. Moreover, even the spirit of regionalism in South Asia has been undermined with the 19th SAARC summit scheduled to be held in Pakistan in 2016 has been postponed indefinitely due to bilateral issues. The Lahore Declaration itself had made a commitment to strengthening regional cooperation through SAARC, and it remains, unfortunately, a pipe-dream.

References

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2018a): “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2018b): “Indian nuclear forces, 2018, available at https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/indian-nuclear-forces-2018/

First Post (2016): “Sharif’s remarks on Kargil being a stab in Vajpayee’s back are confirmation of truth: MEA,” 18 February, available at https://www.firstpost.com/world/sharifs-remarks-on-kargil-being-a-stab-in-vajpayees-back-are-confirmation-of-truth-mea-2632544.html

India, Ministry of External Affairs (1999): “Lahore Declaration Joint Statement, Memorandum of Understanding, February 02, 1999,” available at https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999

Noorani, A.G. (2002): “The truth about the Lahore Summit,” 16 February- 1 March, https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1904/19040850.htm

Ray , Sanjana (2018): “Vajpayee Sahab Can Win Elections in Pakistan: Nawaz Sharif in 1999,” The quint, 18 July , https://www.thequint.com/news/india/vajpayee-sahab-can-win-elections-in-pakistan-nawaz-sharif-said-in-1999#gs.hB37eqJe

Seethi, K.M. (1999): “A Tragedy of Betrayals: Questions Beyond the LoC in Kashmir,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.34, No.37, September 11.

The Economic Times (2018): “Pakistan was to deploy nukes against India during Kargil war,” 12 July, available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-was-to-deploy-nukes-against-india-during-kargil-war/articleshow/50019153.cms

The post Unlocking the India-Pakistan Dilemma : Twenty Years of ‘Lahore Declaration’ and Missed Opportunities first appeared on KM Seethi.

First Published in Countercurrents, 16 February 2019; also appeared in Global South Colloquy, 16 February 2019

https://countercurrents.org/2019/02/16/kashmir-back-to-square-one/

http://globalsouthcolloquy.com/kashmir-back-to-square-one/

The terror attack on the CRPF convoy in Pulwama (Jammu and Kashmir), which killed dozens of soldiers of the paramilitary forces, sent shock waves across the country and the world. The attack came in a crucial time of political uncertainty in J&K, the forthcoming general elections in India, and the meetings planned in connection with the opening of Kartarpur corridor for the facilitation of pilgrims with the 550th birth anniversary of Guru Nanak. The attack was claimed by the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which unleashed similar terror campaigns before in several places like Uri, and is believed to have been an associate of the Indian Parliament attack in 2001. The mastermind of these attacks is Maulana Masood Azhar, who was arrested by India in the 1990s but, later, released as part of a hostage exchange in the wake of the high jacking an Indian Airlines flight to Kabul in 1999.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that “perpetrators of Pulwama terror attack act will be punished” and that “they will have to pay a heavy price.” Stating that free hand has been given to the security forces to act, Modi “dared Pakistan not to live in illusion that it can destabilize India. Our neighbour which is already isolated by the global community is in a state of illusion, if it thinks that it can demoralize India with its dastardly acts and nefarious designs.” He continued: “Let me state categorically that it should stop day dreaming to destabilize India. This neighbour of ours which is in a state of economic despair must know that any such attempt is destined to fail and will be foiled” (PMIndia 2019).

The Ministry of External Affairs in its statement said that Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist organization proscribed by the UN and other countries “has been given full freedom by Government of Pakistan to operate and expand his terror infrastructure in territories under the control of Pakistan and to carry out attacks in India and elsewhere with impunity.” The Ministry strongly reiterated its “appeal to all members of the international community to support the proposal to list terrorists, including JeM Chief Masood Azhar, as a designated terrorist under the 1267 Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council and to ban terrorist organisations operating from territories controlled by Pakistan” ” (India, Ministry of External Affairs” 2019b). Later, rejecting Pakistan Foreign Secretary’s statement on the non involvement the country, India’s foreign affairs ministry said that the “demand for an investigation is preposterous when there is a video of the suicide bomber declaring himself a member of the JeM. There are also other audio-visual and print material linking JeM to the terrorist attack. We have therefore no doubt that the claim is firmly established. The ministry demanded that “Pakistan take immediate and verifiable action against terrorists and terror groups operating from territories under its control to create a conducive atmosphere in the region free of terror”(India, Ministry of External Affairs” 2019b).

The Union Home Minister said “the country is fighting a decisive battle against terrorism unitedly and will certainly emerge victorious.” He said “the world stands with India and the morale of the security forces is very high.” Reiterating that “only a miniscule numbers of misguided youth have joined hands with those across the border in their evil design to spread terrorism” Rajnath Singh said “these elements are enemies of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. The Home Minister also appealed the people “to maintain communal harmony “(India, Ministry of Home 2019). The all-party meeting on the Pulwama terror attack, chaired by Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh in Parliament on 16 February, also resolved to stand united in solidarity with security forces in fighting terrorism and defending the unity and integrity of India.

The Government of India has apparently taken a series of decisions to offset the damage done. It has already withdrawn the MFN status granted to Pakistan in 1996, registered its official position through diplomatic channels, and launched an international campaign to draw the attention of world to the emerging situation. India may not risk an open war with Pakistan at this stage given the geopolitical complexities of the situation. However, given enormous political pay-offs in the background of the forthcoming Lok Sabha elections, the BJP may use Pulwama episode as a rallying point for its own electoral advantage. There are criticisms of lapses in respect of the ‘intelligence failure’ and many tend to believe that we could have saved the lives of jawans had the security apparatus taken appropriate measures in a convoy of military vehicles involving more than 2000 soldiers. The opposition parties have taken a strategic stand in support of the Government (as reflected in the all-party meeting), at least until the dusts are settled, even as their criticism of lapses in respect of defence deals and compromises on national security continued.
The BJP-led NDA Government had undertaken “surgical strikes” on Pakistani military targets and terrorist camps across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016 following JeM attacks on Indian military facilities. Defence experts conceded that emergency plans were afoot for retaliatory action against Pakistan in the event of a devastating terrorist attack. But all such options carry the risk of retaliation and uninhibited escalation given the fact that both countries have stockpiled nuclear weapons and advanced missile systems.

What is more critical is the internal situation in Kashmir. Already the state had entered a cycle of uncertainty following BJP’s decision to pull out of the coalition with the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Interestingly, the reason put across by the BJP for its withdrawal is still important for the Modi government–that the alliance with PDP had become unsustainable in the background of mounting violence! (Seethi 2018). BJP’s withdrawal came hardly a day after the suspension of ceasefire in the Kashmir Valley ordered by the Centre. Mehbooba Mufti was reported to have asked for continuance of ceasefire in the Valley. But the Centre declined this request in the background of BJP’s rethinking on its alliance with the PDP. Before these things happened, a prominent journalist and editor of Rising Kashmir, Shujaat Bukhari, was murdered outside his office by gunmen. The murder had raised a very serious credibility crisis for the Mufti government because Bukhari’s brother was a member of her cabinet. Incidentally, it was on the same day that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights released its Report on the Human Rights in J&K and Azad Kashmir which catalogued the human rights abuses and violations over the last two years (UN, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2018; Seethi 2018). The Report, which called for independent inquiry into human rights violations in both in J&K and Azad Kashmir, was rejected by India—calling it as an interference in the country’s national sovereignty and security. India called it “fallacious, tendentious and motivated.” India questioned the credibility of the report calling it “selective compilation of largely unverified information” (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2018). This was not the first time that New Delhi has rejected such reports and statements of international human rights agencies (Seethi 1999; Seethi 2005/2009; Seethi 2016).

There were already issues emerging from different corners of State, over years and months. The Army’s indiscriminate use of pellet guns on the protesting people had generated widespread condemnation. The number of civilians who suffered injuries, including loss of vision, was very high. Indian army’s response was again aggravating the situation which led to more and more casualties and increasing incidents of human rights violations throughout the summer of 2016 and into 2018 (Seethi 2018).

Meanwhile, the militants in the Valley continued to gain strength. There were a large number of attacks on schools also during this period. The Union Government told the Parliament that as many as 32 schools were damaged in such attacks by militants. India accused Pakistan of actively supporting such armed groups based in territories controlled by Pakistan. It was reported that from the late 1980s, a number of militant groups have been actively operating in J&K, and they were responsible for unleashing human rights abuses, including kidnappings, killings of civilians and sexual violence(Ibid). The UN Report noted that the site of intervention by groups operating in J&K has shifted over the years. “In the 1990s, around a dozen significant armed groups were operating in the region; currently, less than half that number remain active. The main groups today include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen and Harakat Ul-Mujahidin; they are believed to be based in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir. Hizbul Mujahideen is also part of the United Jihad Council, which began as a coalition of 14 armed groups in 1994, claiming to be fighting Indian rule…”(UN, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2018:38-39). Though Pakistan denied of any support to these groups, the UN Report recorded experts’ opinion that “Pakistan’s military continues to support their operations across the Line of Control.” Three of them—Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harakat Ul-Mujahidin—are listed on the Security Council “ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List”303 for their activities in J&K (Ibid).

Since the state of J&K has been placed under the Governor’s rule—the eighth in its political history—the Modi government has enormous freedom to control the State politics by using the security situation in the Valley. But JeM terror strike came as a big blow to its Kashmir policy as well as its strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan. It’s hardly a week for the twentieth anniversary of the Lahore Declaration, signed between India and Pakistan during the BJP-led Government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, way back in February 1999, in the background of the rising tensions followed by nuclear tests conducted by the two countries. Among the major commitments made in the Declaration include their resolve to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.” They committed themselves to “refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs.” While undertaking the task of promoting and protecting human rights, the two countries also reaffirmed “their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace,” even as they agreed to “intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda” (India, Ministry of External Affairs 1999). Before the ink dried of the signing of the Lahore Declaration, there were reports of Pakistani intrusion into Kashmir which, eventually, resulted a major war in the Kargil sector in 1999. However, the latest terror episode shows that India has not learnt the lessons of the Kargil war which in fact had called for multi-level intelligence gathering and preemptive measures in respect of the intrusion and operation of non state actors in the Valley.

References

India, Ministry of Home, Press Information Bureau (2019): “Union Home Minister reviews security scenario in J&K at a high-level meeting in Srinagar,” http://pib.nic.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1564834

India, Ministry of External Affairs (1999): “Lahore Declaration February, 1999,” https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999

India, Ministry of External Affairs (2018): “Official Spokesperson’s response to a question on the Report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on “The human rights situation in Kashmir,” 14 June, http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/29978/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_question_on_the_Report_by_the_Office_of_the_High_Commissioner_for_Human_Rights_on_The_human_rights_situation_in_K

India, Ministry of External Affairs (2019a): India strongly condemns the cowardly terrorist attack on our security forces in Pulwama, Jammu & Kashmir, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31053/India_strongly_condemns_the_cowardly_terrorist_attack_on_our_security_forces_in_Pulwama_Jammu_amp_Kashmir

India, Ministry of External Affairs (2019b): “Official Spokesperson’s response on Pakistan Foreign Secretary’s briefing rejecting Pakistan’s involvement in the Pulwama attack and Pakistan following a constructive approach, February 15, 2019,” https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/31056/Official+Spokespersons+response+on+Pakistan+Foreign+Secretarys+briefing+rejecting+Pakistans+involvement+in+the+Pulwama+attack+and+Pakistan+following+a+constructive+approach

PMIndia(2019): “PM’s statement on terror attack in Pulwama, 15 Feb, 2019,” http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-statement-on-terror-attack-in-pulwama/?comment=disable

Seethi, K.M. (2018): “Kashmir in a Dense Cauldron of Uncertainty,” Countercurrents, 20 June https://countercurrents.org/2018/06/20/kashmir-in-a-dense-cauldron-of-uncertainty/

Seethi, K.M. (2016): “Still Across the Line of Control and the ‘Unfinished Innings in Kashmir,” Countercurrents.org, 21 July.

Seethi, K.M. (2005/2009): “Kashmir: Rethinking Security beyond the Line of Control,” in Rajen Harshe and K.M.

Seethi (eds.), Engaging with the World: Critical Reflections on India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Orient Longman/Orient Blackswan.

Seethi, K.M. (1999): “A Tragedy of Betrayals: Questions Beyond the LoC in Kashmir,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.34, No.37, September 11.

UN, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2018): Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir: Developments in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from June 2016 to April 2018, and General Human Rights Concerns in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit – Baltista, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/PK/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril2018.pdf

The post Kashmir: Back to Square One? first appeared on KM Seethi.

First Published in Countercurrents, 5 February 2019

https://countercurrents.org/2019/02/05/farewell-to-inf-treaty-setting-multilateralization-for-n-persons-game/

The Unites States withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987) and the subsequent Russian decision to quit the regime generated considerable fears and anxieties across the world about a renewed nuclear arms race and showdown. The allegations and counter-allegations in respect of the violation of the Treaty by both parties continued for several years and Washington and Moscow crossed swords over the issue on many occasions and across different fora. US President Donald Trump had indicated the possibility of Washington’s pull out in 2018, in the wake of the reports about Russian violation of the Treaty. Yet, many tend to believe that the action has been pre-planned to extend the coverage of the regime to China, in the emerging geo-strategic environs involving Russia and China. So far, the INF Treaty is a bilateral instrument between the US and Russia and many nuclear weapon powers are outside the ambit of the Treaty.

President Donald Trump in his statement said that Russia has, for long, violated the Treaty “with impunity, covertly developing and fielding a prohibited missile system that poses a direct threat” to US allies and troops abroad. He said that NATO allies also “fully support” insofar as “they understand the threat posed by Russia’s violation and the risks to arms control posed by ignoring treaty violations” Trump further claimed that Washington “has fully adhered to the INF Treaty for more than 30 years” but it “will not remain constrained by its terms while Russia misrepresents its actions.” Indicating that the US “cannot be the only country in the world unilaterally bound by this treaty, or any other,” he said that the US “will move forward with developing (its) own military response options and will work with NATO and (its) other allies and partners to deny Russia any military advantage from its unlawful conduct (US, White House 2019a).

The White House statement continues:

“Nearly 6 years of diplomacy and more than 30 meetings have failed to convince Russia to return to compliance with the INF Treaty. Enough is enough. At President Trump’s direction, the United States will suspend its obligations under the INF Treaty effective February 2, 2019. The United States will also deliver formal notice on February 2, 2019, to Russia and other Treaty Parties, that the United States will withdraw from the INF Treaty in 6 months. Only Russia’s complete and verifiable destruction of its INF-violating missiles, their launchers, and associated equipment can save the INF Treaty” (US, White House 2019b).

The White House statement accused Russia of having “produced and fielded multiple battalions of its INF-violating, nuclear-capable missile, which threaten our allies and troops in Europe and Asia.” It further warmed that Washington “will move forward with developing its own intermediate-range, conventionally-armed, ground-launched missile system. In addition, China and Iran, which are not parties to the Treaty, each possess more than 1,000 INF Treaty-range missiles” (Ibid).

In December 2018, NATO Allies had declared that Russia “developed and fielded a missile system, the 9M729, which violates the INF Treaty, and poses significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security. Allies strongly supported the finding of the United States that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty and called upon Russia to urgently return to full and verifiable compliance. Since that announcement, the United States and other Allies have remained open to dialogue, and have engaged Russia on its violation, including at a NATO-Russia Council meeting on 25 January 2019. Allies regret that Russia, as part of its broader pattern of behaviour, continues to deny its INF Treaty violation, refuses to provide any credible response, and has taken no demonstrable steps toward returning to full and verifiable compliance.” It Further said that the United States “is taking this action in response to the significant risks to Euro-Atlantic security posed by Russia’s covert testing, production, and fielding of 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile systems. Allies fully support this action (NATO 2019).

Responding to the US suspending its obligations under the INF Treaty, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that “Moscow’s proposals remain on the table. Moscow issued a ‘mirror’ response to the US move by suspending its own observance of the treaty” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that “Moscow would react to military threats related to the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty “by military-technical means”, i.e. with weapons development” (Sputnik 2019). According to Russian experts, “US plans to build low-power nuclear weapons will sharply lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.” Moreover, Russian Foreign Ministry charged that NATO states were “not ready for meaningful dialogue on the Mk-41 launchers, which are located in Romania, and will appear in Poland next year, in violation of the INF Treaty. These are integrated into the NATO missile defence system, so the alliance is also directly responsible for undermining the treaty”(Ibid). The Russian president said that Moscow would suspend its obligations under the INF Treaty in response to a similar decision announced by US. He reminded that “the use of target rockets and the deployment of Mk 41 launchers in Europe since 2014 by the United States is a direct violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty” (Ibid).

INF Setting

The history of INF Treaty goes back to 1970s when the US was so exercised over the control of intermediate-range missiles emerged in the wake of Moscow’s domestic deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles during the decade. The SS-20 appeared to be qualitatively improved version of Soviet nuclear forces in the European theater by providing a longer-range, multiple-warhead alternative to the earlier versions of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 single-warhead missiles (Arms Control Association 2019). NATO ministers responded to this with its “dual-track” strategy—a parallel drive for arms control negotiations with the deployment of intermediate-range, nuclear-armed U.S. missiles (ground-launched cruise missiles and the Pershing II) in Europe to balance the SS-20. Negotiations, however, fell through even a US missile deployments continued in the early 1980s. Efforts began to make headway when Mikhail Gorbachev became the General-Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985. Moscow and Washington held talks and negotiations in the following year(Ibid). The efforts by President Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev eventually culminated in the signing of the INF Treaty on 8 December 1987, and the treaty came into force on 1 June 1988 (US, Department of State 1987).

The ban under the regime originally applied only to US and Soviet forces, but the Treaty’s membership expanded in 1991 with a view to including successor states of the former Soviet Union. Currently, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which had inspectable facilities on their territories at the time of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, joined Russia and the United States in the treaty’s implementation. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also possessed INF Treaty-range facilities (SS-23 operating bases) but forgo treaty meetings with the consent of the other states-parties (Arms Control Association 2019).

Thus, active states-parties to the regime were just five countries. However, many European countries also dismantled the INF Treaty-range missiles in the post-Cold war era. Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic dismantled their intermediate-range missiles in the decade, and Slovakia removed all of its missiles by October 2000 after extensive US pressure. On 31 May 2002, Bulgaria, the remaining possessor of intermediate-range missiles in Eastern Europe entered into an agreement with the United States to dismantle all of its INF Treaty-related missiles. Within six months, Bulgaria completed the dismantling of its missiles (Ibid). By 31 May 2001, the States-parties’ right to carry out on-site inspection under the Treaty came to an end. Yet, the use of surveillance satellites for data gathering followed. The Treaty had set up the Special Verification Commission (SVC) to function as an implementing agency for the Treaty. It apparently addressed issues of compliance and agreeing on measures to “improve (the treaty’s) viability and effectiveness.” Insofar as the INF Treaty is of an indefinite period, states-parties could arrange the SVC at any time (Ibid). However, Article XV of the Treaty says that each party “shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests” (US, Department of State 1987). It is this clause that enables both parties to pull out from the regime.

However, the INF Treaty’s protocol on missile elimination identified the specific types of ground-launched missiles to be dispensed with and the acceptable means of doing so (Ibid). Under the regime, the US was obliged to get rid of its Pershing II, Pershing IA, and Pershing IB ballistic missiles and BGM-109G cruise missiles. The Soviet Union had to eliminate its SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23 ballistic missiles and SSC-X-4 cruise missiles. Besides, both the US and Soviet Union were obliged to destroy all INF Treaty-related training missiles, rocket stages, launch canisters, and launchers. Nearly all missiles were done away with through different processes and procedures (Arms Control Association 2019).

Meanwhile, Russia, at least since 2000, began to raise the question of withdrawing from the Treaty arguing that the regime unjustly constrained it from having weapons that its neighbours such as China were developing and deploying. Russia also had warned that the proposed American deployment of strategic anti-ballistic missile systems in Europe might cause its withdrawal from the Treaty. Despite all this, both parties issued a statement at the United Nations General Assembly in October 2007 reaffirming their support for the Treaty and calling on all other states to join them in renouncing the missiles banned by the regime. However, the declaration of such commitments did not continue for long. During 2013-14, several reports indicated that Washington had concerns about Russia’s ‘violations’ of the Treaty. In July 2014, the State Department accused Russia of violating the accord by “producing and testing an illegal ground-launched cruise missile.” Though Russia dismissed such ‘allegations’, the US publicly stated that Russia continued to violate the Treaty. Meanwhile, press reports suggested that Russia had deployed an operational unit of the treaty-noncompliant cruise missile now known as the SSC-8. In March 2017, the Pentagon officials again confirmed that Russia had deployed a ground-launched cruise missile that “violates the spirit and intent” of the INF Treaty. The State Department’s 2017 annual assessment again pointed to Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty for the fourth consecutive year (Ibid).

In December 2017, the Trump administration brought out an integrated strategy to offset alleged Russian violations of the Treaty. It also involved the initiation of research and development on a conventional, road-mobile, intermediate-range missile system. In October 2018 President Trump announced his intention to “terminate” the INF Treaty, pointing to “Russian noncompliance and concerns about China’s intermediate-range missile arsenal.” On 4 December 2018, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States had “found Russia in “material breach” of the treaty and will suspend its treaty obligations in 60 days if Russia does not return to compliance in that time” (US, Department of State 2019). This was followed by the Trump administration’s suspension of US obligations under the Treaty and announced its plan to pullout in six months. Russian President Putin immediately thereafter announced that Russia would be officially suspending its treaty obligations as well.
The reciprocal actions, on the part of both the US and Russia, in effect wrap up a regime viewed by many as one of the most vital safeguards against nuclear confrontation. The situation makes the US-Russia relations more complicated even as issues from the immediate past remain such as Russia’s attempts to take over Crimea from Ukraine, and its alleged meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections. Experts fear that the INF-free world will help strengthen Russia’s efforts to redesign its strategic balancing in Eurasian geopolitics. Mark Fitzpatrick, Executive Director of the non-proliferation programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says that “Nothing good will come out of the US withdrawal.” According to him, “The Trump administration has made a huge mistake – it’s a breakdown of arms control. It’s a breakdown of trust between US and Russia. The US will have problems with its European allies, and it will engage in a new arms race with China as well” (Al Jazeera 2019). Tom Nichols, a security expert, pointed out that it was “a provocation to menace the Europeans and to see if they could bait the Americans into walking away.” He said that the Washington’s response brought to light how ‘confused’ its nuclear arms policy was (Ibid). Observers also pointed out that most European counties, including NATO Allies would not welcome any land-based intermediate-range missiles that the US might develop. Fitzpatrick, another nuclear expert, says that the ‘real reason’ for the US withdrawal was America’s anxiety over China’s buildup of intermediate-range missiles in the Western Pacific. Reports say that China’s stock holds as much as 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles, almost 95 per cent of which would violate the INF Treaty if Beijing were a signatory. However, the Treaty prohibits Washington from deploying short and intermediate range missiles on land near China as a deterrent (Ibid). It is not even clear if the American allies in Asia-Pacific such as Japan or South Korea would be willing to let such weapons come to the region (Ibid). However, China appealed to the US and Russia to adhere to the Treaty. It warned that “scrapping the treaty would be the beginning of the collapse of the global arms control system. It’s highly likely a new arms race will start.”

The Global Times editorial says:

“Washington has been hyping the Russian threats in recent years, but Russia’s strategic deterrence is clearly weaker than in the Soviet era. The US has also complained about China’s development of missile capabilities. This is even more unreasonable. China’s nuclear deterrence isn’t comparable to that of the US and Russia. Portraying China’s military development as part of an “arms race,” the US is creating an excuse to suppress China’s legitimate build-up of its national defense. If the treaty is abolished, security risks will be reassessed and major powers will redefine what “security” is. Overall international relations will be implicated. Such a scenario is unfavorable to an end to the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and runs the risk of a rise in conflicts in other regions. As far as China is concerned, the US intends to make the INF treaty a multilateral agreement, which may become an excuse for Washington to exert pressure on Beijing. Without the restraints of the treaty, the US may intensify its deployment of offensive missiles and anti-missile systems around China, further increasing China’s strategic security challenges. Beijing will never accept the treaty becoming a multilateral agreement. It must reject any request from the US on the issue. Instead of relying too much on land-based missiles for national security, China must diversify its strategic nuclear deterrence. It’s an urgent task” (Global Times 2 February 2019).

China had taken a similar stand even before. In the UN General Assembly meeting last year, the representative of China said the “Treaty is important, playing a crucial role in history and maintaining global stability. Maintaining the INF Treaty is highly relevant.” China said that “the countries concerned can honour their commitments and properly handle relevant issues through consultation. China opposes any unilateral act of withdrawal. Treaty multilateralization involves a host of legal issues. Many countries have their own concerns about this and do not support Treaty multilateralization (UN, General Assembly 2018).

Obviously, the Trump administration, which has been pulling out of several international treaties during the last three years, on the ground of its opposition to multilateral arrangements that ‘threaten’ the American interests, is reversing its game strategy by withdrawing from a bilateral treaty that has tremendous international implications. While Trump seeks to have promoted more and more bilateral arrangements for international trade and commerce (2-person model), he seems to be fixed for multilateral options on questions of security and strategic balancing. In any case, his game-plan has apparently the larger objective of netting China within a new package and thereby setting a new ‘level playing field’ for a N-persons’ game. The end result is, the global strategic landscape will again witness the fear of an apocalypse of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction).

References

Al Jazeera (2019): “‘Huge mistake’: Fears of arms race as US, Russia suspend INF pact,” 3 February, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/mistake-fears-arms-race-russia-suspend-inf-pact-190203152747235.html

Arms Control Association (2019): “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance,” 2 February , https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty

NATO (2019): “Statement on Russia’s failure to comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Issued by the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 1 February 2019,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_162996.htm

Sputnik (2019): “Russia to React to US Exit From INF Treaty by Military-Technical Means – Lavrov,”
4 February , https://sputniknews.com/world/201902041072099247-russia-inf-treaty-lavrov-usa/

UN, General Assembly (2018): “General Assembly Rejects Resolution Calling for Strengthening Russian-United States Compliance with Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,’ 21 December, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12116.doc.htm

US, Department of State (1987): “Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), 8 December , https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm

US, White House (2019a):” Statement from the President Regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,” 1 February, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty/

US, White House (2019b): “President Donald J. Trump to Withdraw the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,” 1 February, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-withdraw-united-states-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty/

The post Farewell to INF Treaty: Setting Multilateralization for N-Person’s Game? first appeared on KM Seethi.

First Published in Countercurrents, 27 January 2019

https://countercurrents.org/2019/01/27/national-awards-ethics-of-conferment-and-politics-of-selection/?fbclid=IwAR1CPHVDvRR-TQ_DKE1Q7aSA_yAzIu7oE4ztjprJNtIfcNXOlpIctutkEsU

As expected, the announcement of the national awards for 2019 again brought forth a storm of controversy in India. This time it has drawn special attention due to the fiddly criteria used for selection. However, politics of awards is as old as the constitutional history of India. Saffronisation of awards is also a part of this history of ‘give and take.’

Politics of the selection of ‘Bharat Ratna’ has a history that goes back to the 1950s. Inevitably, debates and controversies followed. It is generally assumed that the Modi Government has done it what the previous Congress governments also did it, over decades. Many also believed that Jawaharlal Nehru, as Prime Minister, should not have accepted ‘Bharat Ratna’ in principle, while being in office in 1955. Whether it was announced by President Rajendra Prasad by himself or whether it was done by violating the ‘rules’ already put in place a year ago, the process had set a bad precedent. Ironically, Rajendra Prasad himself received it (in 1962) when Nehru was the Prime Minister. The procedure of awarding the Bharat Ratna is apparently simple. The Prime Minister put across the names to the President of India, who, in turn, accepts nominations. There is hardly any specific regulation in place on the matter and it is more or less treated as a convention and not the law of the land.

However, in July 1955, the Rashtrapati Bhavan witnessed a dramatic scene in a banquet hosted by President Rajendra Prasad. While announcing the conferment of Bharat Ratna on Nehru dramatically, the President was reported to have confessed that he had “acted unconstitutionally” insofar as he decided “to confer the honour without any recommendation or advice from my Prime Minister or the Cabinet” (Times of India, 16 July 1955; see also Laliwala 2018). Many raised their eyebrows even at that stage whether persons holding (or having held) the position of Head of State or Head of Government should be a ‘natural’ choice for conferring such civilian honours/awards.

Other prime ministers like Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, Rajiv Gandhi, and Vajpayee also received. Former Presidents/Vice Presidents like S. Radhakrishnan, V.V. Giri, A. P. J. Kalam also come in line. Pranab Mukherjee’s choice in 2019 is obviously a part of this history of ‘self-help.’ Mukherjee was his ‘Master’s Voice’ in different ways. He was not only a silent spectator under the Modi dispensation, but a part of many crucial decisions. The invitation to RSS headquarters was not quite unexpected. Nanaji Deshmukh was a straight choice for BJP without any pretensions of ‘bias.’ Bhupen Hazarika was ‘honoured’ for his hobnobbing with Sangh Parivar towards the end of his career.

Article 18 of the Constitution of India stipulates that (1) No title, not being a military or academic distinction, shall be conferred by the State; (2) No citizen of India shall accept any title from any foreign State; (3) No person who is not a citizen of India shall, while he holds any office of profit or trust under the State, accept without the consent of the President any title from any foreign State; (4) No person holding any office of profit or trust under the State shall, without the consent of the President, accept any present, emolument, or office of any kind from or under any foreign State (India, Ministry of Law and Justice 2018: 26).

Even as the Government of India started instituting Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan and Padma Shri, a major question was raised whether such “Titles” come within the purview of Article 18 of the Constitution of India. During 1960-70, Acharya J.B. Kripalani had moved a non-official bill for the abolition of such titles. He argued that although Article 18 had abolished titles, they “were sought to be brought in by the back door in the form of decorations; the decorations were not always awarded according to merit, and the Government of the day is not the best Judge of the merits or the eminence of the recipient; and these “new titles” were at first given to very few, exceptional persons; this small stream had since become quite a flood” (The Supreme Court of India 1995). Though the bill generated heated debates in the Lok Sabha, it was eventually defeated. The following year, however, saw Indira Gandhi being chosen for the Bharat Ratna! During the Janata Government, the institution of the national awards was cancelled through a notification. This was again revived in 1980. Ironically, the persons responsible for cancelling such titles during the Janata regime were given Bharat Ratna subsequently—Morarji Desai (1991) and AB Vaypaee (2015).

Interestingly, even some members of the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights in the Constituent Assembly had expressed reservations about dispensing with titles. C. Rajagopalachari (who became the last Governor-General of India) put a suggestion across, during the debates, that it should be left open to the legislature to determine whether titles are good or bad. He was reported to have said that “if there was a nationalist, communist or socialist policy, and the profit motive was removed, there would be a great necessity for creating a new motive in the form of titles” (Supreme Court of India 1995). Alladi Krishnaswamy Aiyar, M. Ruthnaswamy et al. also supported such a position. K.T. Shah and a few others argued that “the conferring of titles offended against the fundamental principle of equality sought to be enshrined in the Constitution.”Ironically, C. Rajagopalachari himself became the first recipient of Bharat Ratna in 1954 (along with the then Vice President S. Radhakrishnan and CV Raman). Interestingly, Vallabhbhai Patel said that “such titles were often being abused for corrupting the public life of the country and, therefore, it was better that their abolition should be provided as a fundamental right” (Ibid). Again, it would appear like an irony of history that Patel was chosen for Bharat Ratna in 1991, along with Desai and Rajiv Gandhi.

However, in 1995 the Supreme Court said (in Balaji Raghavan/S.P. Anand vs Union of India case) that “the National Awards are not violative of the principles of equality as guaranteed by the provisions of the Constitution” and endorsed the system of awards etc “to recognise excellence” in the performance of certain duties enshrined in the Constitution itself (Ibid). Yet, controversies and litigations continued. For example, nomination of Subhash Chandra Bose, former Tamil Nadu Chief Minister MG Ramachandran et al. created sensational news, litigations and discussions. Bose’s nomination itself was cancelled by the apex court in 1997. While the controversies surrounding Bharat Ratna continued over years, the other awards (such as Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan and Padma Shri) also generated similar arguments and heated squabbles.

Distribution of honours/awards etc is part of an exercise in legitimising authority and its inherent ideological mission. It happens everywhere, in all systems, in one way or other. It is a process of (not necessarily recognizing) coopting certain sections/people for ideological and social justification of the regime in place. Decades back, ‘political development’ theorists had argued that the ‘survival’ of the political systems depends on certain ‘capabilities’ and these ‘capabilities’ can even be used as yardsticks for classifying and characterizing political systems as ‘democratic’/‘authoritarian’/‘developed’/ ‘underdeveloped’/‘transitional’ etc. These capabilities include ‘extractive’, ‘regulative’, ‘distributive’, ‘symbolic’, and ‘responsive’ categories (Almond and Powell 1966/1972:190-212).

If we employ these categories for judging the effectiveness of the Modi regime, I would say, it has high propensity to use ‘regulative’, ‘distributive’ and ‘symbolic’ capabilities and sustains very low propensity to exercise ‘extractive’ and ‘responsive’ capabilities. While ‘regulative’ capability has something to do with securitization of society by way of threats, persuasions and force (both legally and illegally), the other two capabilities have been employed to ‘distribute’ the spoils of the system like positions, power, honours and awards, on the one hand, and to transmit ‘symbols’ of the regime through displays, parades and show off, on the other. Many authoritarian systems are like this under the façade of democracy. However, Modi knows very well that his political future does not begin with (nor does it come to a terminal point of) such ‘distribution’ capability. If the system has had high capability of distributing goods and wealth of the country on a platform of egalitarianism (rather than distributing offices and honours) he would have been a wonderful ruler. The Oxfam Reports, however, point to the fact that the ‘neoliberal raj’ has not at all helped India reimagine itself as an ‘emerging power’ in the world. In its latest Annual Report released at World Economic Forum, Oxfam said that India’s wealthiest 1 per cent got wealthier by 39 per cent as against the bottom half of the population whose wealth increased by mere 3 per cent over the last year, accelerating the divide between the rich and the poor (Oxfam 2019). Obviously, the ‘distributive capability’ of the NDA dispensation is inherently at odds which is also fraught with lopsided paths of both governance and development.

References

Almond, Gabriel A, G. Bingham Powell (1966/1972): Comparative politics: a developmental approach, Boston: Little, Brown and Company (Indian edition 1972).

India, Ministry of Law and Justice (2018): The Constitution of India (as on31 July 2018), http://www.legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/COI-updated-as-31072018.pdf

Laliwala, Sharik (2018): “Fact Check: Did Jawaharlal Nehru Award the Bharat Ratna to Himself?” The Wire, 14 November, https://thewire.in/history/bharat-ratna-jawaharlal-nehru

Oxfam (2019): Public Good or Private Wealth, https://www.oxfamindia.org/sites/default/files/Report.pdf

The Supreme Court of India (1995): “Balaji Raghavan/S.P. Anand vs Union of India on 15 December1995,” https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1882300/

The post National Awards: Ethics of Conferment and Politics of Selection first appeared on KM Seethi.

KM SEETHI

Image Credit: AFP

First Published in Countercurrents, 4 January 2019

https://countercurrents.org/2019/01/04/hartal-raj-under-the-sangh-hegemony/

Kerala still appears to have been languished in a self-imposed prison of hartals in spite of all efforts to terminate the snowballing menace of social disruption and public nuisance caused by its reckless ‘declaration.’ It was only recently that nearly three dozen trade organisations got together to declare that 2019 would be a ‘hartal-free year.’ However, 2019 began with the undeclared hartal on the second day of the new year itself with widespread blockades and violence across the state protesting the entry of two women into the Sabarimala temple in the early hours of the day. This has been followed by the declaration of a dawn to dusk hartal on 3 January causing widespread violence, stone pelting, lathi charge, tear gas shelling etc. Even those shops that boldly opened on the hartal day were attacked and forcefully shut down.  It was the Sabarimala Karma Samithi which announced the hartal in protest against the women entry into Sabarimala, which the Constitutional bench of the Supreme Court of India allowed in its historic judgement three months ago. The hartal on 3 January has been fully backed by the Sangh Parivar organisations, including the BJP who were obviously upset by the success of the ‘women-wall’ on the new year day lined up by more than five million women across the state—from Kasargod to Thiruvananthapuram.  What angered them further was the confirmation of the report that the two young women who were not allowed to enter the temple two weeks ago have made it now, following the ‘women-wall.’

Already, the Sangh Parivar organisations held as many as 7 hartals (both state-wide and district-wise) during the last three months. Altogether the state witnessed as many as 97 hartals in 2018 (the Sangh Parivar organisations declared 33, the Congress-led United Democratic Front 27, and the ruling Left Democratic Front 16. They were either state-wide or district/taluk-wise). The situation was almost similar in 2017 when it crossed 100 hartals by October of that year. In the first six months of 2017 alone, there were 65 hartals (in 165 days!).  All this pointed out clearly that the loss of man-days and the setbacks in trade, agriculture and industry would be colossal.

According to a report by the Union Labour Ministry, Kerala had lost around 2.1 lakh, 2.11 lakh, 2.94 lakh, and 1.53 lakh (January-October 2017) man-days following lock-outs in its industrial sector in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively. During the same period Kerala had lost 1.71 lakh, 4.04 lakh, 1.65 lakh and 1.37 lakh days due to general strikes. Traders’ organisations say that a ‘full-fledged’ state hartal means the state would incur the loss of as much as Rs.900 crore. However, this does not cover the colossal loss in the informal sector of the state. This is particularly important when the public sector employment is steadily decreasing and the private sector is making headway in the state (according to the Kerala State Planning Board [KSPB], in 2016, out of 11.85 lakh persons employed in the organised sector, 5.75 lakh (48 per cent) were in the public sector and 6.10 lakh (52 per cent) were in the private sector).

More importantly, unorganised sector is very crucial in the Indian economy from the point of view of employment and its contribution to the GDP, savings and capital formation. KSPB says that more than 90 per cent of workforce remained in the unorganised sector and nearly 50 per cent of the GDP emerged from that sector. It says: “A high proportion of socially and economically weaker sections of society are engaged in the unorganized economic activities in India and Kerala. As per the Employment and Unemployment survey carried out by the NSSO (68th round) based on UPSS approach it is estimated that self employed workers in Kerala constituted 37.7 per cent of the total workers. Comparatively, the percentage share of regular wage/salaried employee accounted for 22.5 per cent and that of casual labour accounted for 39.8 per cent” (Kerala State Planning Board 2016). With the escalating rate of casual labour and daily workforce in the state, the burden of hartal on the working population is very high. This is over and above the number of migrant workers from other states in Kerala whose number had crossed 3 million in 2017.

From bandhs to hartals

Efforts to put a ban on total strikes like bandhs have a quarter century history. This was in the background of persistent strikes in the state, including bandhs and hartals which created an impression that Kerala was not ‘industry-friendly.’ However, the High Court of Kerala in a judgment in 1997 declared the bandhs illegal. The petitioners seeking a ban on bandhs argued that they would violate fundamental rights of the citizens. It was contended that the right to freedom cannot be compromised insofar as the workers would be restrained from going to their workplace, traders being prevented from running their business, citizens being barred from accessing medical facilities in case of emergencies, etc. It was further argued that bandhs under the pretext of peaceful protests would instil fear in the citizens and the likelihood of violence dissuade citizens from discharging their normal activities. Though political parties contended that it was their fundamental right to call for a bandh under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, the High Court held that there existed only the right to peaceful protest through hartals and demonstrations and not through a bandh insofar as exercising freedoms and rights must end when it interfered with rights and freedoms of another individual (Law mantra 2016).  The Court further said that when there was absence of legislation to deal with an issue or when the State failed to take steps to curb a problem, it would be the duty of courts to step in to protect fundamental rights of citizens. Thus taking note of the violence, violation of rights, destruction of property and losses caused to the economy, the court declared call for bandh by any party, organization or association as “illegal and unconstitutional” (Kerala High Court 1997; Law Mantra 2016).

In a subsequent appeal filed by the State Government, the Supreme Court endorsed the High Court judgment and refused to reverse the order. The apex court said: “We are satisfied that the distinction drawn by the High Court between a “Bandh” and a call for general strike or “Hartal” is well made out with reference to the effect of a “Bandh” on the fundamental rights of other citizens. There cannot be any doubt that the fundamental rights of the people as a whole cannot be subservient to the claim of fundamental right of a n individual or only a section of the people. it is on the basis of this distinction that the High Court has rightly concluded that there cannot be any right to call or enforce a “Bandh” which interferes with the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of other citizens, in addition to causing national loss in many ways. We may also add that the reasoning given by the High Court, particularly those in paragraphs 12, 13 and 17 for the ultimate conclusion and directions in paragraph 18 is correct with which we are in agreement. We may also observe that the High Court has drawn a very appropriate distinction between a “Bandh” on the hand and a call for general strike or “Hartal” on the other. We are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court” (Supreme Court of India 1997).

But the political parties in the state found a different route to sidestep the apex court judgment by rechristening bandhs as hartals. Though the High Court again ruled in 2000 that the enforcement of a hartal call by any party or organization by “force, intimidation and coercion” would be “unconstitutional,” that did not bring forth any change in the situation of resorting to frequent hartals.  In James Martin vs State Of Kerala case in 2003, the Supreme Court held that “in the name of Hartal or Bandh or strike no person has any right to cause inconvenience to any other person or to cause in any manner a threat or apprehension of risk to life, liberty, property of any citizen or destruction of life and property, and the least any government or public property. It is high time that the authorities concerned take serious note of this requirement while dealing with those who destroy public property in the name of strike, hartal or bandh” (Supreme Court of India 2003).  In George Kurian vs State Of Kerala on 28 May, 2004, the High Court pointed out that “whatever name it is called, whether general strike, hartal or any other name, nobody can create a Bandh-like situation or obstruct the fundamental rights of others….Those who call for ‘hartals’ or strikes by whatever reason must make it clear in their call that nobody will be compelled to participate in the ‘hartals’ or strikes, that traffic will not be obstructed and those who are willing may go for work and that fundamental right of others to move about will not be affected. They must also instruct their supporters to see that no coercion or force is used for compelling others to participate in the strike or ‘hartal’ ” (Kerala High Court 2004).

In 2015, the UDF Government brought in a bill to curb hartals, introduced by the Home Minister Ramesh Chennithala. He said the aim was not to ban but to curb unnecessary hartals. As per Clause (2) of the Kerala Regulation of Hartal Bill, 2015, “hartal means cessation of activity in any form or of business or occupation or service, at the instance of any other person or organization, for the purpose of creating public pressure, social tension, economic intimidation or apprehension of violence in order to advance a cause or a campaign sponsored by the organizers of the hartal: Provided that a ‘hartal’ under this Act shall not include any strike by workers or a strike organized by any trade union or professional body which otherwise complies with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), the Trade Union Act, 1926 (Central Act 16 of 1926) or any other law governing trade union activity and workers’ rights” (Kerala, Legislative Assembly 2015). The Bill says that “no person, group or organization shall have a right to call or conduct any hartal”… “without three days public notice through the media to the fair knowledge of public bodies likely to be affected by the proposed hartal.” It also stipulates that the “organizers of a hartal shall deposit such an amount, in such manner, as may be prescribed, as the security for payment of compensation for destruction or damage likely to cause to property and life.” The Bill says that “whoever calls for, or conducts, hartal in violation of the provisions of this Act shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend up to six months or with fine which may extend up to ten thousand rupees or with both.” “Any person who forcibly prevents another person on the ground of  a hartal from attending his work, visiting a hospital, hotel, educational institution or fuel delivery station or using transport facility, shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend up to six months or with fine which may extend up to ten thousand rupees or with both. The Bill makes it clear that the “police and other agencies shall provide all assistance as specified in sub-section (2) and where the police or such other agency fails to help any person who needs such help, such failure shall be treated as a dereliction of duty on the part of the officer concerned and shall be punished with fine which may extend up to ten thousand rupees.”

However, the LDF which was in opposition then strongly opposed the bill, characterizing it as ‘anti-democratic, anti-people.’ It was seen as against the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Though the bill was referred to a select committee for consideration, it has not been taken up for the consideration of the Legislative Assembly. Ironically, the Congress party which spearheaded the bill during its rule became responsible for declaring a large number of hartals in the state.

An important ruling relating to the regulation of hartals came in 2009 in the case of In Re: Destruction of public & private properties v. State of A.P. & ors. The Supreme Court set up two committees to bring forth guidelines to deal with the issue. One committee was headed by Justice K.T. Thomas, a former judge of the Supreme Court and the other was headed by Fali S. Nariman, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India. Justice Thomas committee brought out recommendations for the amendment to the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 “to create a rebuttable presumption of guilt against offenders, amending the Act to make leaders of the party who call for direct action, guilty of abatement, Videography of demonstrations and activities damaging public property, granting of bail only in cases in which the Court has reasonable grounds to presume that the accused is not  guilty of the offence.” The Nariman Committee report dealt with “imposition of liability for damages caused to public and private property.”  The apex court accepted both the committee reports and brought forth a set of guidelines. Besides the recommendations noted earlier, the guidelines included: 1. “Organizers to meet police before the protest and give an undertaking for maintenance of peace; 2. Use of knives, lathis and weapons to be prohibited; 3. The senior most police officer in the district or city to supervise the protest; 4. The police shall submit a report of event and damages caused to the State Government which  shall then file a report before the High Court or Supreme Court as the case may be; 5. High Court may issue suo motu action and set up a machinery to investigate the damage caused and to award compensation; 6. A retired or sitting High Court or Supreme Court judge may be appointed as Claims Commissioner estimate damages and investigate imposition of liability. An Assessor may be appointed to assist the Claims Commissioner. They shall have power to summon video footage and other evidence to discharge their duties; 7. Absolute Liability shall be imposed once the link between the event and damage is clear; 8. Damages shall be assessed for damage to public property, private property, damage due to  causing of hurt or death of persons and cost of actions taken by police and the executive to take preventive steps; 9. Exemplary damages not exceeding twice the amount of damages liable to be paid may be imposed; and 10. The Claims Commissioner shall report to the High Court or Supreme Court as the case maybe” (Law Mantra 2016).

In 2015, the Union Government had brought in the Prevention of Damage Public Property (Amendment) Bill, incorporating the guidelines put across by the Justice Thomas Committee Report and the Nariman Committee Report. It apparently got delayed since then. In 2018, in the Kodungallur Film Society &Vs Union of India &Ors case, the Supreme Court held that “Nobody has the right to become a self-appointed guardian of the law and forcibly administer his or her own interpretation of the law on others, especially not with violent means. Mob violence runs against the very core of our established legal principles since it signals chaos and lawlessness and the State has a duty to protect its citizens against the illegal and reprehensible acts of such groups”( Supreme Court of  India 2018). The Court also took note of the proposed legislation on Prevention of Damage Public Property (Amendment) Bill, 2015, which was under consideration of Parliament, and noted that the guidelines put in place by Justice Thomas Committee Report and the Nariman Committee Report were comprehensive enough to deal with the issue of protecting the public and private properties. The court hoped that “the said Bill will be taken to its logical end in the right earnest” (Ibid).

While there have been court orders and directions from time to time on the issue of the destruction of public property, violence and disruption of  normal life, the political parties and organisations continued to resort to hartals and other violent protests causing widespread destruction and damage. For example, on the day of hartal in Kerala on 3 January, the police registered more than 500 cases in connection with the widespread violence. As many as 700 persons were arrested across the state on charges of violence, arson, rioting, unlawful assembly, illegal use of explosives, attacks on law-enforcers on duty, destruction of public property etc. Several hundred people remain in preventive custody. The situation may continue to be tense until the Supreme Court takes up the review petitions later this month. However, the Sangh Parivar organisations seem determined to turn the tide against the Left Government of Kerala for political gains in the forthcoming Lok Sabha lections. Meanwhile, the people of the State will have to bear the burden of all vandalism let loose by the Sangh Parivar.

References

Kerala High Court (1997): “Bharat Kumar K. Palicha And Anr. vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 28 July, 1997, AIR 1997 Ker 291,”  available @https://indiankanoon.org/doc/385307/

Kerala High Court (2004): “George Kurian vs State Of Kerala on 28 May, 2004,” available @ https://indiankanoon.org/doc/904355/

Kerala, Legislative Assembly (2015): “The  Kerala Regulation of Hartal Bill, 2015, Thirteenth Kerala, Legislative Assembly Bill No.369,  http://www.niyamasabha.org/bills/13kla/published/369-pub-eng.pdf

Kerala State Planning Board (2016): Economic Review 2016, http://spb.kerala.gov.in/EconomicReview2016/web/index.php

Law mantra ( 2016): “An Overview and Critical Analysis of the  Legal  Framework Regulating Bandh, Hartal and Similar Protests in India,” http://journal.lawmantra.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/14.pdf

Supreme Court of India (1997): “The Communist Party Of India (M) vs Bharat Kumar & Ors on 12 November, 1997,” available @ https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1663947/

Supreme Court of India (2003): “James Martin vs State Of Kerala on 16 December, 2003,” available @ https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1812977/

Supreme Court of India (2018): “Kodungallur Film Society &Vs Union of India &Ors,” WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.330 OF 2018, available @  https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/3158/3158_2018_Judgement_01-Oct-2018.pdf

The post ‘Hartal Raj’ under the Sangh Hegemony first appeared on KM Seethi.

Problems of Engaging Modernity and the Muslim Reform Movement in Kerala

K.M. Seethi

This article is written in commemoration of the 145^th anniversary (28 December) of Vakkom Moulavi who played a major role in reforming the Muslim community in Kerala.

First Published in Countercurrents, 27 December 2018

https://countercurrents.org/2018/12/27/why-vakkom-moulavi-matters-today/

Even as Kerala has been in the midst of resuscitating the ‘cultural capital’ of the early 20^th century ‘renaissance’ (a term widely used to denote the ‘reform’ and ‘restructuring’ of the social sphere), in the background of the Sabarimala temple entry issue and the ‘women’s wall’ being organised as part of gender equality campaign, questions have been asked if the efforts underway constituted a ‘communal’ agenda, sidelining (if not undermining) many facets of ‘renaissance’ that got underway within and across minority communities and castes in the state. The opposition parties in the state have come down heavily against the LDF Government, calling it a ‘majoritarian wall’ in total disregard of the reforms that took place within the Muslim and Christian communities.

The Government, in fact, had invited nearly 200 such organisations to discuss the social strategies of dealing with the crisis that got worsened during the last several weeks, but some sections deliberately kept out of it. This included several Muslim organisations who apparently got confused with the question in regard to the ‘inheritance’ of ‘Muslim renaissance.’ The dominant sections of the traditional Muslim community (having affiliation with the Sunni organisations) never accepted the contributions of the major Muslim reformers of Kerala like Vakkom Moulavi et al. Even those who claim themselves as ‘inheritors’ of renaissance/reform movement among them are not sure about their role in a women empowerment/gender equality campaign in the present context. However, they all agree that the state of Kerala has been going through a critical phase of communalisation which the Sangh Parivar organisations are determined to cash in on in the background of the Sabarimala issue. This certainly calls for a revisit of the process of communalisation in the state and how it has, over years, undermined the reform agenda of the Muslim community.

Communalism in modern India

Communalism has been a critical problem of modern India and it unfolds itself in the ever-intensifying scenario of social tensions and conflicts across the country. Though long-acclaimed as the bastion of secularism in India, Kerala society too is confronting the complex process of communalisation and its accompanying social conflicts. Locating the sources of communalisation and their socio-historical context could well be an important task of social scientists in addressing the complex issues underlying the phenomenon [1]. Communalisation is certainly a part of, if not the by-product of, the over-all socio-economic processes taking place in the Indian and global context. No doubt, the share of ‘history’ is also significant, particularly when ‘history’ itself could emerge as a legitimising factor for communalisation.

Many questions are raised in the contemporary debates on communalism whether stagnation and regression of secularisation in Kerala should be understood in terms of the failure of social reform or the inability of social reform to address the whole lot of challenges of modernity. The implicit assumption of such questioning is that any social reform agenda must necessarily be a complete whole having a broad spectrum of politico-economic objectives. Also, such debates uncritically ignore the limits and possibilities of the social reform process within the existing socio-political milieu. Therefore, any stocktaking in terms of “success or failure” may end up with stereotypical readings of the social reform process—that too without understanding its internal dynamics, probably with unrecognized prejudices. Shouldn’t we enquire whether the reform process itself had undergone internal changes and contradictions because of various cross-undercurrents within? We should begin our analysis by a deeper understanding of the wider socio-political realm, within which the social reform process took place. In fact, the wider socio-political realm, by and large, sustained different combinations of social tensions and conflicts—within and across cultures/religions –- as a result of the cross-undercurrents within the Indian nationalism and the stratagem employed by the colonial apparatus, the effects of both have far-reaching implications for social reforms, extending to even Kerala.

That communalism emerged in this setting of colonial modernity is not a new argument. The stagnation and regression of the secularisation process can, thus, be located within modernity itself. Modernity as such was a critical domain to be understood in a wider realm of the structural changes brought about by colonialism and the inevitable responses generated in the context of nationalist politics. Nationalism itself was a problematique engaged differently by different forces. Communal politics in India, in its real sense, began as a response to the structural changes brought about by colonialism and the inevitable race for power and privileges. The mindsets of upper class Hindus and upper class Muslims were moulded by these factors of structural changes that were later interpreted to mean as endemic feelings of cultural/religious dichotomy, if not of distrust. Thus, the history of communalism goes back to the conditions which disrupted social harmony with the onslaught of colonialism. The question here is whether the social reform process had its inevitable share in the making of various identities both at the macro and micro levels. When this is addressed in the context of the social reform among the Muslims of Kerala, several points merit our attention.

Muslim Reform Movement

The emerging criticisms of the Muslim reform process in Kerala that there was “near complete absence of engagement with the enlightenment paradigm” or “a realistic engagement with modernity” are not only exaggerated but they tend to dampen our intellectual propensity to study social reform process in its complexity and in its socio-historical context[2]. The reform among the Muslims of Kerala did not have a uniform, unilinear character due to the particular circumstances under which it emerged and had to sustain itself. The experiences of south Kerala (Travancore-Cochin) and north Kerala (Malabar) differed, as they had undergone different socio-historical processes and changes. But there had been as many tensions within each segment, as there were between the north and the south.

The Muslim reform process in Kerala extending over half a century since 1880s had different engagements with modernity – from an accommodation within the colonial modernity to expanding concerns of nationalism and the politics of bargain within. The dominant stream of the reform agenda among the Muslims was spearheaded by Sanahullah Makhti Thangal (1847-1912), Vakkom Abdul Cader Moulavi (1873-1932), Sheikh Mohammed Hamadani Thangal (died in 1922), Maulana Chalilakathu Kunjahammed Haji (1856-1919), K.M.Moulavi (died in 1964), et al. under the Islahi movement. They addressed many critical issues of religion and society, thereby taking up the challenges of modernity in right earnest. At no point did they disengage themselves from the enlightenment paradigm. Their voices were not only inspiring but got manifested in their profound thoughts and activities through organisations such as Mohammadiya Sabha in Kannur, Chirayainkil Thaluk Muslim Samajam, Lajunathul Mohammadiya Sangham in Alappuzha, Muslim Aikka Sangham in Kodungaloor, Kerala Naduvattul Mujahideen etc.

The Muslim reform movement, as it was underway profoundly till the early thirties in Kerala, did not seek “a return to the Islamic polity” of a pristine purity, as speculated by many, but it was forward looking, critically and constantly engaging with the challenges presented by modernity. For instance, Makhti Thangal, the pioneer of Muslim reform movement, began his career as a British official, but opted to remain in the realm of Islah, seeking to engage with modernity. On one end of the spectrum, he confronted the Church missionaries who propagated a highly distorted image of Islam; on the other hand, Thangal exhorted the Muslims to come out of their social seclusion to undertake English education (besides in their mother tongue, Malayalam) and through it the emerging challenges of modernity[3]. Makhti Thangal was not anti-British in his essential character, just as Sir Syed Ahamed Khan was during this time, but sought to uplift the Muslims from their self-imposed backwardness and to prepare them to face challenges of modern times.

Similarly, Vakkom Moulavi’s Islahi [4] movement, which spanned over the first three decades of the 20th century, was addressing the challenges of modernity and the critical issues presented by the enlightenment paradigm. The very launching of Swadesabhimani (Patriot) in 1905 heralded the beginning of this engagement. Moulavi’s Swadesabhimani was the first newspaper in Kerala which established communication links with the London-based Reuter. The press itself was imported from England. Those who would talk about Swadesabhimani Ramakrishna Pillai seldom mention about the moving spirit behind it and the symbiotic relationship that prevailed between Vakkom Moulavi and Ramakrishna Pillai[5] While the Islahi movement was profoundly social, it also exhibited its politico-religious commitments. It was essentially anti-colonial in character; yet it did not seek to offer any Islamic alternative in political terms. Instead, Vakkom Moulavi’s major initiative was to liberate the Muslims from the morass of self-delusions to which they had fallen for so long. But this should not be interpreted to mean a mere ‘purification’ campaign, as argued by some[6], calling for a return to the pristine purity of the holy texts. Moulavi had an entirely different approach to the importance of the holy texts, which exhibited both hermeneutical as well as social foundations. Both were combined in the very principle of ijtihad[7], to which he was profoundly committed. The principal aim of the Islahi movement should therefore be kept in perspective. It was primarily a call for engaging with modernity, and the Muslims were called upon to come forward to understand both religion and modern society in dialectical terms, not to the level of discarding one in favour of the other. Most historians tend to ignore this, for one reason or other.

Those who underestimate Vakkom Moulavi’s Islahi movement try to disregard its inherent potential as such. His basic position on religious reforms centres on the concept of ijtihad. Moulavi strongly argued that the door of ijtihad couldn’t be closed[8]. He exhorted the Muslims to rediscover and reinstate ijtihad, the principle of independent judgment with a view to rebuilding the shariat in the light of modern thought and experience [9]. Moulavi’s adherence to the Islamic hermeneutical tradition could be seen in his insistence on individual ijtihad, which was not only permitted but was essential to arrive at decisions where the holy texts were either ambiguous or silent. His perspicuous analysis on the laws of Islam further provides evidences of his rational approach. Even while affirming that “the laws of Islam concerning spiritual matters are eternal,” he strongly argued that “the laws of Islam concerning temporal matters are not immutable, and hence depending on the conditions of time and place, they are subject to change”[10]. The most radical of his views can be seen in his perspectives on the Islamic laws. Vakkom Moulavi said that the Muslims should address their socio-economic problems even transcending the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence if they were unable to equip them [11]. Obviously, the Islahi movement Vakkom Moulavi, carried on for three decades, did not seek a mere pilgrimage to the past, but it was a progressive engagement with modernity. It addressed not only the questions of laws and beliefs in Islam, but took up challenges of modern education, including women’s education, gender justice, rational outlook on social and religious matters etc[12].  Needless to say, very few ulama could accept Moulavi’s exegesis concerning spatio-temporal matters. That is why he had to face stiff opposition from orthodox elements who were only concerned about the scriptural matrix of Islam, besides keeping the community in perpetual ignorance and superstition.

Even as Vakkom Moulavi’s Islahi movement got underway (in the most dynamic way with multiple agenda of reforms), traditional Mullahs rose in revolt against the mission he had set in motion. They obviously did not have any scholarship or any sense of the implications of modernity. This led them to initiate a counter campaign even calling Vakkom Moulavi ‘kafir’ (infidel/disbeliever) and ‘Wahhabi’ (a derogatory term used against Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and his followers). It is true that Moulavi Moulavi had written about Wahhab (as part of cataloging the reform efforts in the Islamic history) pointing to his mission of ‘purging’. But Moulavi never considered himself as a Wahhabi. Rather many of his modernist views were derived from the writings and perspectives of Al-Ghazali  (whose Kīmyāyé Sa’ādat [The Alchemy of Happiness] he translated into Arabic Malayalam), Muhammad Abduh of Egypt (whose ‘Al-Manar’ had deeply influenced him), Shah Waliullah (1703–1762)  Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897) and Syed Ahmad Khan (1817 -1898).  A common thread of all these traditions is the humanism embedded in Islam and its potential to engage modernity and all its challenges.

Moulavi’s movement saw positive results when there was general receptivity to his call. However, since the early 1930s, it did not progress further in a wider realm due to the particular circumstances imposed by the nationalist politics, on the one hand, and the politics of bargain on the other.

While the Mappila resistance to the British rule, through a series of rebellions since the 19th century has been identified as an appropriate response to the colonial policy, the 1921 uprising earned the ‘disrepute’ as ‘communal’ because, the Mappilas were believed to have drawn inspiration from Islamic texts and sought to establish ‘‘Khilafat kingdoms.” But little did we see the impact of the political call sent out by the Khilafat movement, set in motion by the so-called secular, nationalist Congress under Mahatma Gandhi. The Mappilas, inspired by Gandhiji and the nationalist Congress who favoured mixing up religion with politics as a tactical struggle, soon found the Congress virtually disowning them. Even Gandhiji became critical of the rebellion and the Mappilas, while conveniently forgetting the fact that the stage was partly set by the Congress itself with its launching of the Khilafat movement as a tactical realm of confronting the British for their betrayal in Turkey[13]. This seemed to have a lasting impression on even secular Muslims of Kerala, particularly in Malabar. The situation was aptly summed up by E.M.S. Namboodirippad:

The Hindu intelligentsia of Malabar started going more or less in the same direction as their counterparts in North India. The Arya Samaj and other Hindu communal organisations came and started their work in Malabar, first by way of affording relief to Hindu refuges fleeing from the areas of the rebellion, then by reconverting those Hindus who had been forcibly converted to Islam by the rebels and ultimately going to the extent of converting Muslims to Hinduism. The Muslim intelligentsia were terror-stricken because of the post-rebellion repression that they had to go through but were nevertheless extremely indignant. They could do nothing, but be resentful for the time being, but that was by itself sufficient for the creation of an atmosphere ideally suited for communal squabbles[14].

Locating the site of communalism, E.M.S. writes:

In fact, the Malabar Congressmen themselves were split into Hindus and Muslims. When they started reorganising the Congress in the post-rebellion years, there were virtually two centres of the Congress – one Hindu and the other Muslim – each having its own paper, Mathrubhumi and Al-Ameen. It is also remarkable that some Hindu Congressmen were themselves the organizers of the Hindu Mahasabha. The gulf between the two groups was so wide that though each claimed to be a group of congressmen, one could not cooperate with the other even in organising the Congress[15].

The analysis of E.M.S. holds importance even today. The formation of Muslim League in Kerala in the mid-thirties was the logical culmination of this Muslim alienation started in the post-rebellion period. This was accentuated by a host of problems emanating from the nationalist scene since the 1920s just as the Congress-Hindu Mahasabha hobnobbing, the Nehru Report, issues of cow slaughter etc. The emergence of the League could thus be seen as a setback to the secular politics in the country. Communal politics gained strength since the 1920s, and it continued to affect secularisation and democratisation process in India. Kerala was not immune to these cross-undercurrents in the nationalist politics. However, the gains of social reform process could not be consolidated in the emerging scenario of the Congress-League tussle. Meanwhile, the situation created by the absence of a strong leadership, after Vakkom Moulavi, was soon to be appropriated by the more orthodox Ulama, on the one hand, and the Jamaat-i-Islami on the other. Kerala Naduvatul Mujahiden, however, continued to strive hard to make inroads into the Muslim masses. But this was considerably constrained by the emerging confrontation and competition within the Muslim community for leadership. The most long-lasting setback of the reform process started in the late 1950s when all religious and communal forces arrayed themselves against the democratically elected communist government in Kerala under the banner of vimochana samaram. Ever since, the successive governments in Kerala have been engaging the religious and communal forces in the state, most strategically, in the electoral process.

Conclusion

Thus, the present-day communalisation cannot be seen in isolation by merely searching for its roots in the social reform process. The problem lies with modernity itself, with the way it was engaged by both the colonial apparatus and the nationalist leadership. Its genesis could be traced back to the structural changes brought about by colonialism and the manner in which the upper class Hindus and Muslims responded to them. The metropolitan capital succeeded in widening the gulf, as it would ultimately undermine the strident anti-colonial struggle. Situated as it was, between the colonial apparatus and the emerging nationalist movement, the social reform process could not be expected to address larger issues of facilitating capitalism or agrarian reform or labour process or commodity production. It was rather too much to expect such a broad-based agenda from the social reform movements.

Though the Muslim reform process did not continue beyond 1930s, the gains of the same did have a lasting influence on the socio-body politic of Kerala. The secular-democratic process gained momentum over a period of three-four decades since 1930s, and the entire social fabric of Kerala remained strong, at least until the early 1980s. Caste-based, religion-based, community-based organisations began to gain strength across the world since the early 1980s when neoliberalism got underway rejuvenating the far-right and all reactionary forces. Kerala society, having been exposed to these influences in a variety of ways, could not escape from the emerging scenario of caste/communal consolidations because the capital accumulation process taking place at the national and global levels along neoliberal lines called for caste-based, religion-based, and community-based social capital formations in order to offset any class-based resistance to the policies of modern techno-capitalism. The emergence of the Modi Government in 2014 further encouraged the communal forces across the country to consolidate the far-right mobilization. This wider realm of communalisation process cannot be glossed over when we engage ourselves in locating the sites of its origin.

 (This is a revised paper I had presented at the University of Calicut in a seminar organised by the Department of History, a decade and a half ago, on the theme “Kerala Renaissance and Social Reform Process: A Contemporary Reappraisal.” For details see  K.M. Seethi, “Communalism and the Muslim Reform Movement in Kerala: Problems of Engaging with Modernity,” VMMRC, 2 September 2006).

Notes and References

[1] For a cross section of studies relating to communalism, see K. N. Panikkar (ed.),   Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture (New Delhi: Manohar 1991); Gyanendra Pandey, The Constructions of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press 1990); Ram Puniyani, Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths (New Delhi: Sage 2003); Asghar Ali Engineer, Communalism in India (New Delhi: Vikas 1995); Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (New Delhi: Vikas 1984) and; Bipan Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India (New Delhi: Orient Longman 1981).

[2] An instance of the refusal/inability to understand such reform attempts in a broader perspective can be seen in the work of Roland Miller, a Canadian scholar who had lived in Kerala for nearly a quarter of a century to study the Mappilas. Even while Miller acknowledged that “the wind of change” in Islamic reform in Kerala “blew from the south” in the personality of Vakkom Moulavi, he could not fully grasp the depth of his thought and came to the slapdash conclusion that Moulvai’s reform was basically a “conservative reform.” See Roland E. Millar, Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends (Madras: Orient Longman 1992): 270-74; also see Jose Abraham, Islamic Reform and Colonial Discourse on Modernity in India, Socio-Political and Religious Thought of Vakkom Moulavi (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan 2014).

[3] See Makthi Thangalude Sambhoorna Krithikal (Tirur: Kerala Islamic Mission 1981): 632-46.

[4] Conceptually, Islah unfolds the broad agenda of reform within the community.

[5] See T. Venugopalan,Swedesabhimani: Rajadrohiyaya Rajyasnehi (Kochi: The Kerala Press Academi, 1996): 43-56 and 218-59. While acknowledging the relationship between Moulavi and Pillai in the right spirit, Venugopalan, like many others, failed to grasp the essence of the Islahi movement, which led him say that Vakkom Moulvai was neither a religious reformer nor a religious modernist (225).

[6] See Ibid:226.

[7] Ijtihad has different connotations in the Arabic lexicon, but, in the main, it implies “strenuous endeavour” – an intellectual activity denoting the pursuit of an individual scholar to derive rules from the authentic texts (the Quran and the Hadith) without relying on the opinion of other scholars. This is what Iqbal called the principle of movement in Islam. See Bernard G. Weiss, “Ijtihad,” in The Encyclopaedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan 1987), vol.7: 90-92; also see Sir Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: S.H. Muhammad Ashraf 1982):148.

[8] Vakkom Moulvi, Lau-ssabah (Nilakkamukku: Islam Dharmaparipalana Sangham, 1930); This has been reproduced in Vakkom Moulaviyude Thiranjedutha Krithikal (Vakkom: Vakkom Moulavi Publications 1979), edited by S. Mohamed Abda, 312-13 (hereafter cited as Selected Works),
[9] See Selected Works: 91.

[10] Ibid: 129.

[11] Vakkom Moulavi, “Islam Mathanaveekaranam,” in Sahrudayopaharam (Idava: Bharakkathul Muslimmen 1930); also see Selected Works”167-68.

[12] See Vakkom Moulavi, “ Nammude Sthreekal,” Al-Islam, Vol. 1, No.1, April 1918; also see Selected Works:185-87.

[13] See W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India (London: Victor Gollancz 1946), p.207; also see Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press 1982).

[14] See E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Kerala Society and Politics: An Historical Survey (New Delhi: National Book Centre 1984): 121.

[15] Ibid:122.

The post Why Vakkom Moulavi Matters Today? first appeared on KM Seethi.

K. M. Seethi

First Published in Countercurrents, 2 November 2018

https://countercurrents.org/2018/11/02/historicizing-international-relations-theory-robert-cox-remembered/

http://ppesydney.net/tributes-to-robert-w-cox/

Robert Cox is a scholar-extraordinary in the discipline of International Relations (IR)  His writings continued to inspire scholars in both Global North and Global South. Cox’s deeply entrenched historicist position, in fact, set in motion shock waves across the positivist-realist traditions which dominated the discipline for decades. When I started teaching IR at Mahatma Gandhi University, in the South Indian state of Kerala, way back in early 1980s, not many had heard about him. In fact, the Kottayam School of IR made a departure by incorporating new trends in diverse areas of social sciences and, obviously, the post-positivist and critical theory traditions attracted our immediate attention. That was the period when Structral  Realism was the subject of discussion everywhere.  Cox’s writings stimulated our thinking in different ways.  When I wrote a paper on “Sluice Model under Neoliberal Siege” (a critical study on Habermas) a decade and a half ago, Cox’s writings were the real inspiration. Undoubtedly, Cox is a compulsory reading for serious IR scholars across the world. He will be remembered for an intellectual subversion in the traditional scholarship of IR.

The discipline of International Relations (IR) has lost another outstanding scholar—Robert W. Cox (1926-2018)—who made a mark in its intellectual history in the last century, like Samir Amin. Canada-born IR theorist Cox had a long stint at the International Labour Organisation (ILO)—for over two decades—before he started teaching at Columbia University, New York.  He then proceeded to take up a professorship at York University, Toronto where he remained for a decade and half (1977-1992). In 2014 Cox was made a member of the Order of Canada.

A leading Critical Theorist in IR, Cox emerged as an indispensable scholar in International Political Economy (IPE) like Susan Strange. His writings displayed a distinctive historicist approach to IR studies with a focus on political economy. Though an independent scholar that he was, Cox never sought to bring in any particular school or tradition.

An erudite intellectual in every sense, Cox has to his credit several scholarly works and articles. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (1987) became a well known treatise that analyzed power relations in production and its implications for the organization of society and international system. Among the articles that became very popular in the 1980s were “Social Forces, States and World Orders” (1981) and “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations” (1983), both appeared in Millennium: Journal of International Studies. These two seminal papers set in motion a new wave at a time when the discipline was so entrenched in Realist/Structural Realist/Positivist traditions. His critical thinking offered several perspectives in IR theory beyond its problem-solving mode. Cox also became instrumental in applying the ideas of Antonio Gramsci in the studies of the IR.

Cox’s intellectual life was influenced by his passion for conceptualizing social conditions in historical terms. R.G. Collingwood was one of those who inspired him, as he told in an interview, and he inevitably fell in line with his “sense of historical materialism.” Collingwood, according to him, had a different sense about the ‘inside’ as well as the ‘outside’ of historical events. Even as positivists see at what happens (by classifying and collecting events and drawing inferences from them), Collingwood looks at the ‘outside.’ His emphasis on the ‘inside’ of events was “to understand the meaning of things in terms of the thought-processes of the people who were acting, and their understanding of the structure of relationships within which they lived. To understand history in those terms is what gives meaning to events.”

Cox said that though he was not a Marxist, he believed that a lot should be learned from Marxist thinking, particularly the “ideas on the tension between capital and labour, and the attempts to institutionalize these relations on state-level and the international level in order to advance material interests.” He identified his approach as ‘historical materialism,’ yet he had linked it not so much with Marx as with Giambattista Vico, the 18th-century critic of Descartes and later with Gramsci.

According to Cox, among the Marxists, Gramsci made a distinction between a deterministic and positivist historical economism and historical materialism, in which “the realm of ideas is an autonomous force.” Gramsci recognized the relative autonomy of cultures and ideas and their intimate relationship with material conditions.

Cox argued that Critical Theory is basically concerned with how the world may be changing while the problem solving theory has to take the basic existing power relationships as given. It will be biased towards perpetuating those relationships, thus tending to make the existing order hegemonic. What critical theory does, according to him, is “question these very structural conditions that are tacit assumptions for problem-solving theory, to ask whom and which purposes such theory serves. It looks at the facts that problem-solving theory presents from the inside, that is, as they are experienced by actors in a context which also consists of power relations. Critical theory thus historicizes world orders by uncovering the purposes problem solving theories within such an order serve to uphold.”

What Cox actually meant is that “there is no theory for itself; theory is always for someone, for some purpose.” According to him, there “is no neutral theory concerning human affairs, no theory of universal validity. Theory derives from practice and experience, and experience is related to time and place. Theory is a part of history. It addresses the problematic of the world of its time and place.” As such a scholar “has to aim to place himself above the historical circumstances in which a theory is propounded. One has to ask about the aims and purposes of those who construct theories in specific historical situations.”

Stephen Gill calls Cox as “an intellectual pioneer, a towering figure, a fugitive from orthodoxies and cliques: a “universal foreigner.  Andrew Linklater says that for more than three decades, Robert Cox’s of-quoted phrase that “theory is always for someone and some purpose” has been popularized as a “symbol of shifting disciplinary concerns.” Linklater reminds that critical theory “has diversified greatly over the last three decades and scholars continue to search for and draw on new sources and perspectives. But all who work within the critical theory perspective, broadly defined, remain indebted to Robert Cox’s pioneering investigation of the changing complexities of world politics.”  For Mustapha Kamal Pasha, Cox was “the original trailblazer in the unfinished critical project in International Relations.”  He says that “Cox’s humility and seriousness are virtues in short supply in a profession eager to idealize new stars and immediacy.”

In an interview Cox said that the neoliberal world order will be forced to change, sooner or later. He said that some change called “self-organization” at a global level is inevitable. In that sense, the world economic crisis is ‘a great advantage’ because it shows that global capitalism has failed, Cox noted. Like Samir Amin, Robert Cox continued to inspire new generation of both IR and IPE scholars across the world.

Bibliography

Cox, R.W. (1953):  “The idea of international labor regulation,” International Labour Review, 68 (2): 191–6. Reprinted in Cox, R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1969): “The executive head: an essay on leadership in international organization,” International Organization, 23 (2): 205–30. Reprinted in Cox, R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. and J. Harrod, et al. (1972):  Future Industrial Relations: An Interim Report, Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies.

Cox, R.W. and Jacobson, H.K. (1972): The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1976): “‘On Thinking about Future World Order,” World Politics, 28 (2): 175–96.

Cox, R.W. and Jacobson, H.K. (1977): “Decision making,” International Social Science Journal (Special issue edited by Abi-Saab, G.), 29 (1): 115–35. Reprinted in Cox, R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1977): “Labor and Hegemony,” International Organization, 31 (3): 385–424. Reprinted in Cox, R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1979): “Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: reflections on some recent literature,” International Organization, 33 (2): 257–302. Reprinted in Cox, R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1980): “Labor and hegemony: a reply,” International Organization, 34 (1): 159–76. Reprinted in Cox, R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. 1981 ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10 (2): 126–55. Reprinted in Cox, R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1982): “Production and Hegemony: Toward a Political Economy of World Order,” in Jacobson, H.K. and Sidjanski, D. (eds.) The Emerging International Economic Order: Dynamic Processes, Constraints, and Opportunities, London: Sage Publications.

Cox, R.W. (1983): :Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,”  Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 12 (2): 162–75. Reprinted in Cox, R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1986): “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” with a Postscript (1985), in R.O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1987): Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, New York: Columbia University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1989a): “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order,” International Journal, 44 (4): 823–62. Reprinted in Cox R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1989b): “Production, the State and Change in World Order,” in Czempiel, E. and Rosenau, J.N. (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges, Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan.

Cox, R.W. (1992a): “Global Perestroika,” Reprinted in R.W. Cox with T.J. Sinclair 1996, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1992b): “Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualisation of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun’, in Rosenau, J.N. and Czempiel, E. (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1992c): “Take six eggs’: theory, finance, and the real economy in the work of Susan Strange,” in R.W. Cox with T.J. Sinclair. Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. 1992d ‘Multilateralism and World Order’, Review of International Studies, 18 (2): 161–80.

Cox, R.W. (1993a): “The Global Political Economy and Social Choice,” in Gill, S. (ed.) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Reprinted in Cox. R.W. with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1993b): “Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe,” in Gill, S. (ed.) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. 1993c ‘Production and Security’, in Cox. R.W. with T.J. Sinclair. 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1993d): “Realism, Political Economy and the Future World,” in Morgan, R. et al. (eds.) New Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: Essays for Susan Strange, New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Cox, R.W. (1995a): “Critical Political Economy,” in Hettne, B. (ed.) International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder, London: Zed Books.

Cox, R.W. (1995b): “Civilizations: Encounters and Transformations,” Studies in Political Economy, 47: 7–31.

Cox, R.W. with T.J. Sinclair (1996): Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1996a): “Civilisations in World Political Economy,” New Political Economy, 1 (2): 141–54.

Cox, R.W. (1996b): “Influences and commitments,” in R.W. Cox with T.J. Sinclair 1996 Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1996c): “A Perspective on Globalization,” in Mittelman, J.H. (ed.) Globalization: Critical Reflections, London: Lynne Rienner.

Cox, R.W. (1996d): “Preface,” in R.W. Cox with T.J. Sinclair 1996, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R.W. (ed.) (1997a): The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order, New York: United Nations University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1997b): “Some Reflections on the Oslo Symposium,” in Gill, S. (ed.) Globalization, Democratization and Multilateralism, New York: United Nations University Press.

Cox, R.W. (1999a): “Civil society at the turn of the millennium: prospects for an alternative world order,” Review of International Studies, 25 (1): 3–28.

Cox, R.W. (interview with R. Germain) (1999b): “The Millennium Symposium: Conversations with Manuel Castells, Robert Cox and Immanuel Wallerstein,” New Political Economy, 4 (3): 379–408.

Cox, R.W. (1999c): “Susan Strange: A Personal Reflection,” BISA News: The Newsletter of the British International Studies Association, nr 61 May 1999.

 Cox, R.W. (2000): “Political Economy and World Order: Problems of Power and Knowledge at the Turn of the Millennium,” in Stubbs, R. and Underhill, G.R.D. (eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Second Edition), Ontario: Oxford University Press.

Cox, R.W. with Schechter, M. (2002): The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization, London: Routledge.

Cox, R.W. (2004): “Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order,” New Political Economy, 9 (3): 307–23.

The post Critical International Relations Theory: ‘Subversive’ Historicist Tradition first appeared on KM Seethi.

K.M.SEETHI

First Published in Countercurrents, 30 October 2018

https://countercurrents.org/2018/10/30/distress-signals-from-colombo/

Sri Lanka has landed itself in an unexpected, unprecedented crisis with the President Maithripala Sirisena taking decisions having tricky political implications. Citing differences over a host of issues, Sirisena cast out Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, dismissed the cabinet and suspended Parliament.  President’s extraordinary move to suspend Parliament and appoint Mahinda Rajapaksa as new Prime Minister raised many eyebrows in Sri Lanka as well as in other countries in the region. While Wickremesinghe refused to step down, calling the action of President ‘anti-constitutional,’ the Speaker of Parliament, Karu Jayasuriya, warned that unless order is established, Sri Lanka would witness ‘bloodbath’ with the unfolding political crisis  assuming a dangerous dimension. What surprised many was the installation of Rajapaksa who ruled Sri Lanka for a decade since 2005, but eventually earned widespread criticism and global condemnation for human rights violations. Curiously, he issued a statement pledging that he “eschew the politics of hate and set up an interim government that will protect the human rights of all citizens that will protect the independence of the judiciary and establish law and order.”

There were reports of protests in the Island which even took a life in police firing. Reports also indicated that Sri Lankan state media has been captured by Rajapaksa’s followers. They are also apparently blocking access to ministers who belonged to Wickremesinghe’s party.   Meanwhile the differing postures of Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksa have created a feeling that there would be contesting claims of majority in Parliament which would enable one or the other to run the Government. Even as uncertainty continued, Rajapaksa announced that he would appoint a new cabinet without any delay.

In an address to the nation on 29 October, Ranil Wickremesinghe said that in January 2015 all the political parties and the forces got together and made Sirisena the President of the country. He said he was appointed as the Prime Minister with the confidence of the majority of the Parliament. While functioning as a National Government, President Sirisena resorted to measures that violated the provisions of the Sri Lankan Constitution. He said that the powers of the President are curtailed under the 19th amendment of the Constitution. As per Article 42(4) of the Constitution, the member of the Parliament who commands the confidence of the house should be appointed as the Prime Minister. However, in his address to the nation, President Sirisena said that “in view of the political crisis, economic crisis and assassination plot against him the only option left to him was nominating former President Mahinda Rajapaksa as the Prime Minister.” But, Article 42(4) of the Constitution is clear that only a Member of the Parliament who commands the confidence of the house could be appointed as Prime Minister. Accordingly, President’s action declaring that he nominated the Prime Minister (who has no command of the majority of the House) is “an illegal, anti-constitutional and opportunistic act.”

President Sirisena, on the other hand, argued that there were acute differences with Wickremesinghe for more than three years. He even cited Wickremesinghe’s role in the controversial Central Bank bond sale, which was alleged to have resulted in a huge loss. He accused a cabinet minister of having a hand in a plot to assassinate him. Hence, under these circumstances, the ‘only alternative’ was to bring Rajapaksa back as prime minister, according to the President.

Interestingly, Sirisena and Wickremesinghe were together to pull down Rajapaksa in the 2015 Presidential election. But they could not pull together over many issues—from the mismanagement of the economy to relations with China and India. It may be noted that the Sri Lankan economy has already been facing a crisis with the declining value of its currency, the rise in oil prices and the burgeoning debt which Colombo owes to China. It was also reported that Sirisena and Wickremesinghe had serious differences over the government’s plan to lease a port to India.

The Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and his United National Party (UNP) came to power promising accountability for alleged atrocities committed in Sri Lanka’s civil war and during Rajapaksa’s a decade-old rule. Curiously, Sirisena himself was a minister under the Rajapaksa Government before turning against him.  Rajapaksa continued to make a claim that he brought the country back to order and stability with the ending of the civil war in 2009. But he had to encounter world-wide criticism for the means by which he registered victory – as many as 40,000 Tamil civilians were reported to have been killed by the government forces in the last stage of the fighting. In less than three decades, nearly 100,000 people were killed with both sides alleged to have perpetrated war crimes. However, Rajapaksa was reported to be responsible for mass killings and widespread displacement of innocent Tamil civilians. International human rights agencies even sought to book him for war crimes against civilians.

Though India has high stakes in Sri Lanka, it faces multiple challenges. For example, China has put in high financial investment in the Island, especially in infrastructure projects. Moreover, China has been considered as a strong supporter of Rajapaksa. Beijing has already congratulated him on his coming back as prime minister.  On the other side, those who backed Wickremesinghe (who seek to have strategic ties with India) saw a Chinese role in his attempted replacement – albeit dismissed by Beijing.

India has obvious concerns in Rajapaksa’s return. It was he who facilitated Sri Lanka’s main port to Chinese naval submarines which caused irritants in New Delhi. Naturally, Rajapaksa’s another innings would generate further concerns in India that China would hold sway over the Island that lies along the strategic circuits.  South Block officials reported to have indicated that they were willing to do business with the new leader so long as his appointment was in line with the country’s constitution. A spokesman of the MEA said that “India will continue to extend our developmental assistance to the people of Sri Lanka.” However, the Tamil political parties in India view the situation with considerable anxiety. There are even fears that if the uncertainty continues, it would trigger civil war leading to further displacement, casualties and cross border migration. Eventually, the Tamil population will have to bear the burden of any political stability in the Island, for several historical reasons.

Sri Lanka entered an era of political instability when depression has already set in the country.  Various studies say that Sri Lanka’s national output had declined from its peak of 9.1 per cent in 2012 and reached at 3.1 per cent by 2017. During the first quarter of 2018, the country’s national output was at a level as low as 2 per cent. Annual reports of the Central Bank recorded this trend of the economy and the challenging role of the government in maneuvering the trends.  These reports confirmed that the national output has been drastically declining and the economy as a whole performing very badly. Whoever is emerging ‘victorious’ in the current political bargain has a daunting task to put the economy back on track, besides facilitating the safe return of  thousands of internally displaced Tamils living in several camps for almost a decade.

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