First Published in The Wire, 4 March 2024
 
West Asia is passing through one of its most critical phases in the last half-century. Even as Oman-led diplomatic talks with Iran were expected to resume this week, the United States and Israel launched unexpected and unprovoked strikes against the country, killing top leaders and hundreds of civilians, including children in an elementary school. The central question today is whether regime change in Tehran has become a likely scenario amid attempts to reorganize the state’s leadership structure. 

At present, the regime change sought by the United States and Israel appears far from certain. While the attacks have weakened Iran’s leadership structure, the political system has not collapsed. Instead, Iran seems to be preparing for a complex internal transition.
Reports indicate that the Assembly of Experts has selected Mojtaba Khamenei, the second son of the late Ali Khamenei, as the new Supreme Leader. Until this leadership is fully consolidated, a three-member interim leadership council—comprising President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, and the cleric Alireza Arafi—was attempting to maintain administrative continuity.

In this uncertain moment, the decisive factor will be Iran’s security apparatus, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is not simply a military institution. It is also a powerful political actor and a vast economic network. Whoever emerges as Iran’s next political authority will need the support, or at least the neutrality, of this organization. If the IRGC remains unified, the existing system of governance could continue even in the face of severe external pressure. 

The IRGC is one of the two principal armed forces in Iran, alongside the regular military known as the Artesh. It was created after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, when the revolutionary leadership under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini distrusted the Shah’s former army because of its close ties with Western powers. The new regime, therefore, established the IRGC as an ideological force dedicated to defending the revolution and the Islamic political system. The Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s transformed it from a small revolutionary guard into a central pillar of the Islamic Republic.

Unlike the Artesh, which functions as a conventional military responsible for protecting Iran’s territorial borders, the IRGC has a bigger mandate. It oversees Iran’s ballistic missile programme, controls the Quds Force responsible for operations abroad, and commands the Basij paramilitary network used for internal mobilization and security. Most importantly, the IRGC answers directly to the Supreme Leader, not the president, which gives it a unique position within Iran’s power structure.

Over the years the IRGC has also expanded into major sectors of the economy, including construction, energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure. In regional crises it often takes the leading role through missile deployments, naval patrols in the Gulf, and support for allied groups across the Middle East. In simple terms, while the regular army protects the Iranian state, the IRGC protects the revolution.
Nevertheless, several factors could still increase the possibility of a real regime change. If the interim leadership becomes a battleground between hardliners and other conservative factions within the clergy, the administrative system could become paralyzed. Political regimes often collapse when the military refuses to obey orders. If the regular army indicates that it will not suppress protests, the entire balance of power could change rapidly.

For a domestic transformation to succeed, however, Iran would need a unified opposition with a clear political programme. At present the Iranian opposition remains uneven Figures such as Reza Pahlavi have gained renewed visibility, but the diaspora opposition itself is divided. Monarchists, republican and leftist alliances, reformist clerics, and various ethnic movements all envision different futures for the country. Despite widespread enthusiasm for change, there is no single leadership capable of coordinating these forces.

History shows that when a regime collapses, a clear transitional plan becomes essential. Security institutions, basic public services, border control, and the prevention of retaliatory violence must all be managed simultaneously. Without such a plan, the collapse of a centralized government can produce chaos rather than democracy. In the absence of authority, provinces could fall under the control of armed groups, smuggling networks, or competing external powers. In such a situation, it is ordinary citizens who bear the greatest burden.

External military pressure can weaken a regime, but it can also provoke a surge of nationalist sentiment. Even many Iranians who oppose the Islamic Republic may reject the idea of foreign powers destroying their country. If centralized authority in Tehran were to collapse, the region would not necessarily become more peaceful. Instead, the Middle East could become a battlefield for competing powers seeking to fill the vacuum. The immediate effects would be felt in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, where groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis depend heavily on Iranian support. While their weakening might produce temporary strategic gains for Israel, it could also lead to the rise of fragmented and uncontrollable armed factions.

Israel would certainly gain a strategic advantage if its most formidable regional rival weakens. However, this does not automatically mean that Israel would become an uncontested regional power. Several Arab states that maintained cautious understandings with Israel primarily because of the Iranian threat may reconsider their strategies. Israel’s continuing wars and cross-border operations could also generate new forms of resistance and alternative power alignments.

In Iraq, a weakening of Iranian influence could intensify competition among rival political factions seeking control over territory, ministries, and oil resources. The Gulf states may experience a sense of relief from the decline of Iranian missile and proxy threats, but this relief is accompanied by deep uncertainty about regional stability. 

Iran’s influence on the global economy is felt most strongly through the energy market. The country matters not only because of its own oil production but also because of its geographic location. The Strait of Hormuz remains the world’s most critical energy corridor, which is now paralysed. Nearly 84 percent of the crude oil passing through this route is destined for Asian markets, making countries like China, India, Japan, and South Korea highly vulnerable to disruptions.

For China, Iran has long been both an energy partner and a geopolitical counterweight to American influence. If Iran becomes a failed state or shifts toward a pro-Western government, China could lose an important strategic foothold in the region. Meanwhile, regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt will seek to change the emerging order in West Asia. Saudi Arabia is likely to position itself as the primary guarantor of Gulf stability, strengthening regional air defense systems and protecting energy infrastructure. What Riyadh fears most is not Iran as a state, but the unpredictable behaviour of a weakened Iran.

Turkey will focus on developments in Iraq, Syria, and Kurdish politics, seeking opportunities to expand its influence as Iran becomes distracted by internal challenges. Ankara may also attempt to strengthen its role as a regional diplomatic and transportation hub. Egypt, for its part, will prioritize the economic security of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, while also seeking a stronger voice in diplomatic initiatives so that the future of West Asia is not decided exclusively by Washington and Tel Aviv.

For West Asia, therefore, the collapse of Iran would not automatically bring peace. Instead, it could open the door to intense competition and localized conflicts across the region. Iraq, the Gulf, and territories influenced by Iran-backed groups could become arenas of prolonged instability. The global economy is already under pressure, and any sustained rise in oil prices will increase transportation costs, food prices, and inflation, particularly affecting energy-importing nations across Asia.

West Asia is thus entering a phase where regime uncertainty, energy insecurity, and great-power rivalry are converging into a long-term geopolitical crisis. The coming days may determine whether Iran undergoes an orderly political transition or whether the region descends into a prolonged period of instability.