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US Proxies and Regional Rivalries

James Petras

US empire building depends on regional regimes' support, especially in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. These proxy regimes fulfill valuable military roles securing control over neighbouring regions, populations and territory. In recent times, however, we witness the same proxies developing their own tendency toward expansionist policies - in pursuit of their own mini-empires.

Client regimes with local or regional ambitions now present Washington with new points of contention. At a time when the US empire has been forced to retrench or retreat in the face of its prolonged losses, a whole new set of conflicts have emerged. The post-imperial war zones are the new focus. Often, imperial client regimes take the initiative in confronting their regional adversaries. In other cases, competing proxies will brush aside their US 'mentors' and advance their own territorial ambitions.

The break-up of the US-dominated empire, far from ending wars and conflicts, will almost certainly lead to many local wars under the pretext of 'self-determination', or 'self-defense' or protecting one's ethnic brethren - like Ankara's sudden concern for the Turkmen in Syria. We will examine a few of the most obvious case studies.

The Middle East: Turkish-Kurdish-Syrian Conflict

Over the past years, the Turkish regime has been in the forefront in the war to overthrow the secular nationalist Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. The Turks acted as proxies for the US - providing military bases, supplies, training and protection, as well as the point of entry, for overseas Islamist terrorist-mercenaries acting on behalf of Washington's imperial ambitions.

As the 'independent' Islamist threat (ISIS) gained territory, targeting US objectives, Washington increasingly turned to its allied, mostly secular, Kurdish fighters. Washington's Kurdish proxies took over territory from both the anti-US

Islamists as well as the Syrian national government - as part of their own long-standing ethno-nationalist agenda.

Turkey saw Kurdish victories in northern Syria as a rallying point for autonomous Kurdish forces within Turkey. President Erdogan intervened militarily - sending tanks, warplanes and tens of thousands of troops into Syria, launching a war of extermination against the US-proxy Syrian Kurds! The Turkish invasion has advanced, taking Syrian territory, under the phony pretext of combating 'ISIS'. In fact, Turkey has created a wide, colonial 'safe zone' to control the Kurds.

The Obama regime in Washington complained but was totally unwilling to intervene as the Turks drove the Kurds out of their northern Syrian home in a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing. Thus, Turkish-Kurdish-Syrian warfare has broken out and the terms, conditions and outcome are well beyond US control.

The US quest for an imperial puppet regime in Syria has flopped: instead, Turkey gobbled up Syrian land, the Kurds resisted the Turks for national-self-determination instead of driving out the Islamist mercenaries and Damascus faces an additional threat to its national sovereignty.

This brutal regional war, started largely by the US and Saudi Arabia, will expose the extent to which the US-Middle East Empire has shrunk.

Asia: Japan, Vietnam, Philippine and China Conflict

The US Empire in Asia has seen the making and unmaking of proxy states. After WWII, the US incorporated Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand as proxy states in an effort to strangle and conquer China, North Korea and Vietnam. More recently India, Vietnam and Myanmar have joined the US in its new militarist scheme to encircle China. Central to the Obama-Clinton 'Pivot to Asia' is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a singular effort to 'unify' Asian nations under US control in order to isolate and diminish China's role in Asia.

The original, post-WW2 proxies, South Korea, Philippines and Japan provided military bases, troops, material and logistic support. Vietnam, the newest 'proxy-on-the-block', welcomes Pentagon weapons aimed at China - despite the millions of Vietnamese deaths during the US war in Indochina. While most of the Asian proxies continue to pay lip service to Washington's 'Sinophobic agenda', many do so on their own terms: they are reluctant to provoke China's economic wrath through Washington's policy of direct confrontation. During the recent ASEAN Conference in Laos (2016), nations resisted Washington's pressure to denounce China despite the 'international court' ruling against Beijing's South China Sea maritime claims. The US' ability to influence events through its Europe-based 'international tribunals' seems to have waned. The US cannot implement its own

transpacific economic 'blockade' strategy (TPP) because of both domestic and external resistance. Meanwhile, new proxy relations have emerged.

The proxy-stooges in Tokyo face growing anti-proxy opposition from the Japanese people over their nation's role as a glorified US airbase. As a result Tokyo carefully pursues its own anti-China strategy by forming deeper economic links to new or minor proxy states in Indo-China, the Philippines and Myanmar. In the course of developing its relations with these weaker proxy regimes, Japan is actually laying the ground for autonomous economic and military policies independent of the US.

Notably, the Philippines under its new President Duterte, seeks to accommodate relations with China, even as its neo-colonial proxy military relations with Washington remain in place. The Western media kerfuffle over Duterte's 'colorful' language and 'human rights' policies masks Washington's imperial disapproval with his independent foreign policy toward China.

While India grows closer ties with the US and even offers military co-operation with the Pentagon, it is signing even greater Chinese investment and trade agreements - anxious to enter the enormous China market. In other words, Washington's Asian proxies have (1) widened their own reach, (2) defined autonomous spheres of action and (3) have downgraded US efforts to impose trade agreements.

Symptomatic of the decay of US 'proxy power' is the 'disinclination' among Washington's clients to express overt hostility to Beijing. In frustration, the Washington-New York financial mouthpieces (New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal) provide bully pulpits for the most obscure, marginal characters, including a minor Hong Kong politician, a decrepit exiled Tibetan 'holy man' and a gaggle of Uighur terrorists!

Washington's Ephemeral Proxies in Latin America

One of the most striking aspects of US empire-building is the ease with which it has secured proxies in Latin America... and how quickly they are undermined!

Over the past three decades the US propped up proxy military regimes, which were overthrown and replaced by independent governments in the last decade. These are currently being replaced by a new wave of neo-liberal proxies - a motley collection of corrupt thugs and elite clowns incapable of establishing a sustainable imperial-centered region.

A proxy-based empire is a contradiction in terms. The Latin American proxies are too dependent on outside support, lacking mass internal popularity and roots. Their very neo-liberal economic and social policies are unable to stimulate the industrial development required grow the economy. The Latin American proxies

are mere predators, devoid of historical entrepreneurial skills of the Japanese and the disciplined nationalist ideology of the Turks.

In that sense, the Latin American proxies more closely resemble the Philippine ruling oligarchy: They preach submission and breed subversion. Proxy instability and policy shifts emerge as powerful forces to challenge the US empire - whether the Chinese in Asia or domestic internal conflicts - like the Trump phenomenon in the US.

Conclusion

Imperial wars continue . . . but so does an upsurge in domestic instability, mass rejection of imperial policies, regional conflicts and national wars. The decline of the empire threatens to bring on an era of intra-proxy wars - multiple conflicts, which may or may not benefit the US empire. The war of the few against the many is becoming the war of the many against the many. But what are the choices in the face of such historic shifts? Only the emergence of truly class-conscious organized mass movements can offer a positive response to the coming deluge.

The Dialectics of Authoritarianism

Prabhat Patnaik

We are seeing in India at present a remarkable inversion of reason. The more the common people suffer from the impact of Modi's demonetization, the more he is lauded for the "courage" shown by him in undertaking it. An economic measure should be, and normally is, judged on the basis of how it benefits the people, and any measure that brings distress to the people is derided for that reason. What we find in the present case however is just the opposite: the more demonetization brings distress to the people, the more it is applauded for its wisdom and courage. And this is done not just by the usual crop of dyed-in-the-wool reactionary BJP ideologues; it is done by many commentators, including by even a group of senior NRI academics who have argued in this fashion and thereby resorted to such an inversion of reason. To be sure, if those who argue in this fashion had shown that demonetization would be beneficial in the long-run, and on that basis argued that the difficulties of the people would be only transitional, then there might have been some point to their encomiums for Modi. They could then argue with some justification that Modi had to be lauded for his courage in risking the people's ire during this period of transition. But none of the applauders of Modi's "courage" have refuted, or even attempted to refute, the critics who have shown that demonetization cannot possibly achieve the goals that the government had mentioned in justification of it. The question of its being beneficial in the long-run therefore simply does not arise. The praise for this measure by those who laud it is thus established on the basis of little else but the sheer fact that it has brought distress to the people. This is why their claim constitutes a case of a pure and simple inversion of reason.

The present case of inversion of reason is even worse than what Bertolt Brecht had satirized when he had written: "The government it seems has lost the confidence of the people; why doesn't it dismiss the people and elect another?" The present case is not one where the government loses the confidence of the people and yet retains power in the name of the people; it is a case of the government

causing acute distress to the people, and being lauded for this very fact.

Such an inversion of reason is fundamentally anti-democratic. It arises from a shift of focus from the people to the leader. This shift reduces the people, at best, to the status of a mere backdrop against which the leader's heroics get a chance to be displayed. Since the focus is on the leader, who, as the cynosure of all eyes, must display his heroics, the tendency on his part inevitably is to "shock and awe", to dazzle everyone by taking extreme decisions which are both shocking and awe-inspiring. And precisely because these decisions are extreme, causing severe hardships to the people, their very extreme nature makes them appear particularly heroic.

The shift of focus from the "people" to the "leader" therefore necessarily takes the business of decision-making outside the bounds of "rationality". "Rational" decisions are based on careful calculations, which seek to maximize some objective (or what economists call an "objective function") within a set of constraints that are given. "Rational decisions" of course are not synonymous with "good" or "moral" or "ethical" decisions. When an "investor" maximizes his economic gains by indulging 2 in speculation, he is acting "rationally", even though speculation is not necessarily a "desirable" or wholesome activity. But a leader attempting to "shock and awe", to establish his "heroic" image, to justify his being the cynosure of all eyes, does not make careful calculations. He prides himself over the fact that he does not make careful calculations but has the courage to take decisions which others are too timid to take. In short, he prides himself on his irrationality.

To be sure, even a "rational decision" may appear irrational in retrospect. This is because in taking the "rational decision", the constraints may have been wrongly comprehended, or the efficacy of particular instruments in achieving objectives may have been wrongly estimated, and so on. In short, there may be data errors because of which decisions taken "rationally" on the basis of the available data may turn out in retrospect to be irrational. But such "irrationality", arising from data errors underlying even the most careful calculations that are supposed to produce "rational decisions", is very different from the eschewing altogether of careful calculations and of rational decision-making, and their replacement by "shock and awe". Authoritarian regimes of the sort that Narendra Modi is leading tend to be "irrational" in this fundamental sense: they are irrational not in the sense that their "rational" decisions turn out to be erroneous because of data errors, and hence apparently irrational in retrospect, but because they decry "rationality" as timidity, as being unworthy of the leader donning the mantle of a hero.

The question is often raised: what was Narendra Modi's motive for introducing such massive demonetization? I have often been asked this question in meetings

where I have spoken on the subject of demonetization. Those asking this question agree that the effect of demonetization would be to decimate the "informal sector", which accounts for nearly half of the total output of the economy and over eighty percent of its total employment, without making a dent on the black economy or on terrorist activities, which supposedly were its primary targets. In fact their question acquires pertinence, in their view, for this very reason: since such a decimation of the "informal economy" will extract a huge electoral cost from the BJP government, why did Modi undertake this massive demonetization?

The answer which those asking this question want is expected to lie in one of two possible realms: either that there were "data errors" vitiating his rational decisionmaking for achieving his stated objectives, or that he had some other unspecified objective (i.e. an objective function different from what he has publicly professed). In either case it is assumed that he was acting "rationally" rather than with heroic "irrationality". But the attribution of "rationality" to such a decision is itself unwarranted. Nobody decides, on the basis of rational calculations, to demonetize overnight as much as 86 percent of the currency of a country that is predominantly currency-using. Such decisions are necessarily "irrational", undertaken in the quest of a heroism that is a necessary feature of an authoritarian regime, i.e. of a regime where the "people" have been supplanted by the "leader" as the focus of attention. A hallmark of this "irrationality" is the utter refusal to amend, adjust, or make alterations in the policy in the light of the people's distress, or even to discuss with others what can be done to mitigate this distress. A "rational" decision is one that is necessarily open to amendment. As the data errors become manifest, a rational decision taken to achieve some objective gets amended, as it becomes clear that it would not be able to achieve this objective at all, or to the anticipated extent. But an 3 "irrational" decision does not get amended, since it is not based on any rational calculation, but is meant only to highlight the heroism of the leader. Modi's refusal to talk to political parties on ways and means to alleviate the people's distress, or to modify the original measure to alleviate this distress, is itself a symptom of "irrationality". Obviously it is his prestige rather than the people's distress that takes priority in his view. The focus in short is on the "leader" rather than on the "people". This shift of focus is typically accompanied by the claim that the "people" themselves appreciate the heroic act of the "leader" even when it causes them hardship. For instance, an argument advanced not just by the BJP ideologues but by several others, including even the senior NRI academics mentioned earlier, goes as follows: since there are no serious protests by the people, despite their distress, against the government's demonetization, the people are accepting this measure for the greater social good it brings about.

This argument however is obviously infirm. Just as the absence of protests against oppression does not indicate an acceptance of oppression, likewise the

absence of protests against the demonetization measure does not suggest that this measure is accepted. Why there are no protests even when people are distressed is a matter that has to be separately investigated. But the absence of protests certainly does not constitute a vindication of the measure itself.

And to the extent that the absence of protests indicates a belief in the measure's worthwhileness, it only suggests that the inversion of reason surrounding demonetization does not remain confined to the ruling elite but penetrates even segments of those who are distressed by it. Many of them too, since they cannot believe that such distress can be imposed upon them gratuitously, come to think that their suffering must be serving some higher purpose. And having accepted this they too laud the very government that has imposed distress upon them for its audacity. The government's "shock and awe" in short does succeed, at least up to a point, in instilling "awe" in segments of those who are the victims of it. Unless this bubble of "shock and awe" is pricked, and people made aware of the fact that their distress serves no higher purpose, but rather constitutes only a gratuitous imposition upon them, the shift of focus from the "people" to the "leader" will set up a dialectics of transition from democracy to authoritarianism that is extremely dangerous.

Courtesy: *People's Democracy*

The Nuclear Dimensions of Nehruvian Science

Jalil Mehdi

This paper lays down the basic contours of Nehruvian science and argues that the passionate pursuit of nuclear science by Nehru was in line with the basic character of his government's policy on scientific progress and technological development. It attempts to show that nuclear science was not sought for military and defence purposes, but was seen as the most modern and sophisticated of all sciences and hence indispensable for the development of science in a postcolonial state.

The aim of this paper is to problematize the understanding of nuclear science as purely defence oriented. Contrary to the bulk of the scholarship on this theme, the paper tries to contextualize the Nehruvian 'fetish' with nuclear technology in the larger passionate pursuit for science and technology. Nehru's romantic belief in the power of science and technology as being the cure of all the problems and backwardness of India made nuclear science—which was still in its infancy in the developed west— as the most desirable for a newly independent postcolonial state.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part lays down the character of Nehruvian science in the context of the politics of the time. The second part deals with the process of the institutionalization of science in India and the final part contextualizes the importance of nuclear science and technology in the discourse of the Nehruvian era.

Introduction

India emerged from the strong clutches of British Empire as an essentially backward state with enormous challenges threatening the survival of the state itself. The socioeconomic indicators were at best pathetic and the strategic environment was hostile. According to the data published in 1950, India had a dismal literacy rate of 12% and the total GDP amounted to a depressing figure of 93.7 billion rupees (Nayaka & Nurullah, 1974; Desai 2007). The lack of strong industrial centres, institutions of excellence and skilled manpower, that are essential for growth and

development, compounded the problems of the leaders of independent India. This problem was acutely felt and diagnosed by Jawaharlal Nehru, the anointed heir of Mahatma Gandhi.

Nehru was deeply attached to the values of enlightenment and had a deep understanding of the historical forces that shaped Europe and gave it a huge edge over Asia and rest of the world. He saw the industrial revolution as the source of this European leap forward that strengthened it enormously for unprecedented world domination. Industrial revolution was a result of the inculcation of a certain kind of thinking in European public by the leaders and scholars of enlightenment that he variously called the 'scientific spirit', the 'scientific method' of thinking or more often the 'scientific temper'. Nehru had a romantic faith in science and technology and considered the inculcation of the 'scientific spirit' or the 'scientific temper' as a savoir for the Indian nation. This was essential to 'oversee a radical change in India without having recourse to revolutionary violence or state authoritarianism' (Arnold 2013). The advancement in science and technology would ensure that India sheds its colonial baggage of underdevelopment, dismal infrastructure and mass poverty in quick span of time. He saw the 'scientific temper' as 'the temper of a free man…along which man should travel' and saw its inculcation and mastery as an essential requirement for a free and aspiring India trying to catch up with the modern western civilization. For Nehru, scientific method of enquiry was

> the adventurous and yet critical temper of science, the search for truth and new knowledge, the refusal to accept anything without testing and trail, the capacity to change previous conclusions in the face of new evidence…the hard discipline of the mind…necessary, not merely for the application of science but for life itself and the solution of its many problems…the scientific approach and temper are… a way of life, a process of thinking… it is the temper of a free man (Arnold 2013: 360-370).

Nehru was not a scientist. However, as a student at Trinity College he opted for the natural sciences tripos, with botany, chemistry and geology as his subjects. Though not a distinguished student, he was fascinated with the scientific form of enquiry that included thorough observation, rigorous experimentation and objective analysis. It was this scientific outlook that he dreamed of instilling in Indian minds. He wanted a 'culture of science' to permeate deep in the Indian psyche. He sought inspiration in the ancient Indian society that had tried to understand the human condition beyond the superficial and simplistic explanation provided by religion and had pioneered the study of abstract sciences like mathematics, algebra and astronomy (Nehru 2010: 230-35). Much of their work transmitted via Arabs, according to Nehru, laid the foundations of modern sciences during the European renaissance. The renaissance in turn, 'released the mind of Europe from many of its old fetters' and a 'new spirit of objective inquiry' was born (Nehru 2010: 230-

35). It was this culture of science that values abstract thought and critical enquiry coupled with the modern scientific modes of experimentation that he wanted to create or 'recreate' in the Indian society. Science was not only a new mode of thinking, a new way of life but was also an indispensable imperative for a weak, poor and unprivileged Indian nation. Science was not only required for uplifting India from her backwardness but was also essential for defending it from threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since the whole world was in many ways benefitting from science and technology and making new advancements in defence and military technology, it was essential for Indians 'to understand and master these new' forms of production, otherwise 'we' will continue to 'remain poor and backward' and unable to 'even defend our freedom and our independence' (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 52: 260). The material gains of European society convinced him that 'poverty cannot be ended without understanding and using knowledge and power of science'. 'There is no other way' of eradicating mass poverty in the world (Selected Works: 260). Therefore, it was impossible for a recently decolonized state like India to stand tall in the global community of nations without any tangible progress in science and technology. Though Nehru invoked science continuously during his premiership of the independent India, this shifted towards a greater focus on technology during the later years. This was logical given the urgent need of the country to develop cutting edge technology to support and enhance the speedy process of development. Thus, Nehru's earlier focus on the need for galloping growth of science had, by 1956, been replaced by 'the stupendous growth of technology' and the need to develop 'scientific temper' was replaced by a need to think 'in technological terms'. This was in line with the imperatives and requirements of the planning process.

Nehru very early diagnosed the roots of the Asian subordination in the lack of scientific and technological progress. The only reason why Asia in general and India in particular could not catch up with the western civilization was the lack of evolution of the revolutionary ideas of science in such societies. Nehru argued that up until the beginning of the eighteenth century 'the countries of Asia' particularly India and china 'were relatively more advanced' where foreigners including Europeans came 'to profit by our fine manufactures, not to bring their manufactures'. In trying to explain the decline of Asian supremacy in 18th and 19th centuries when Europe practically dominated and controlled Asia, he again looks at the development of science and technology to explain the sudden reversal in Asian fortunes. Speaking to an educated gathering at Tehran University, he sums up his position in these words:

> [I]t is obvious [that] the change came [through] science and technology [and with it] new methods of doing things, new sources of power, new technologies, new techniques

> which gave strength and power to Europe. And as the science and technology advanced the difference between Europe and Asia became bigger and bigger... Asia had become weak because it could not keep pace in terms of science and technology because it did not use the new sources of power which Europe had got (Selected Works, Vol. 52: 271).

Nehru proceeds to explain the causes of this relative decline of Asia vis-a-vis Europe in the early phases of 18th century and attributes Asia failure to shed its baggage of excessive traditionalism and lack of zeal for continuous progress as the main cause of its weakness. In his usual didactic tone he asks,

> Why Asia which has been dominant in thought and even in many branches of science in the past suddenly lost the lead and became...rather stagnant? Was it due to too much... traditionalism, to a belief that they had achieved what they could achieve and there was nothing more to achieve (Ibid: 271-72).

The only logical solution to this 'Asian problem' was to pull out from this 'traditional way of life which is allied to old methods' and these 'old methods are allied to poverty and scarcity' (Ibid: 275).

Nehru saw in science a panacea to all the ills of the impoverished country. His romantic idea of science had convinced him that a fast development of science and technology is the only way in which India can dream of achieving parity with the materially powerful western nations and may even compete with them in the course of time. The greatest achievement of the western civilization was not French revolution's liberal ideas on fraternity and total equality or the Russian revolution's communist ideas on economic and social equality. They were important 'revolutions', but still far less tectonic and decisive than the 'scientific revolution'. Science was responsible for Industrial revolution in Europe 'which is a bigger revolution than a political revolution can ever be'. For Nehru all the other revolutions and the ideologies that they propagated were secondary and that there was 'nothing more revolutionary ultimately than science' (Ibid: 267-274).

It was science that allowed an unprecedented material progress in the west, raised the quality of life of a common man to a level unparalleled in history which in turn helped to democratise the wider public sphere. This material wealth came 'to Europe because of the development of industry. Industry had developed because of science and technology'. People accepted science as a new way of living because it allowed a standard of life that was not possible before. The acceptance of science in the European public sphere led to an inculcation of scientific spirit in the general public which in turn benefited the progress of science. Science ushered in 'an era of rapid changes', tapping the power of steam (steam revolution), electricity (electric revolution), and atom (atomic revolution). These new sources of energy from the nature...transformed the entire way of life' (Selected Works, Vol. 56: 29).

It was the 'scientific revolution' which had a miraculous effect in changing the course of history and hence was the only true revolution that needs to be imitated and aspired for. But, Nehru cautioned against the blind imitation of the western civilization and importing the handmade models of science. He proposed to integrate the western models of growth and development based on science and technology into the Indian society not by a blind process of imitation and replication but by allowing these changes to grow organically and creatively. These changes must be 'self grown' and not 'imposed'. He criticized Britain for not appreciating an indigenous growth of scientific talent in India but imposing their own models of techno-industry which benefited them but destroyed the indigenous and organic growth of scientific spirit and thus Indians 'became imitators of certain technical devices or scientific ways which others have invented'. He rejects this approach and asserts that 'no country can really progress by imitating unless it has that genius to produce things'. It is impossible to advance in the competitive world of science, technology and industry 'by mere imitation' (Selected Works, Vol. 52: 273).

This does not mean that Nehru was averse to learning from the west. He encouraged Indian scientific community to learn from the western scientists, develop institutional collaboration with leading scientific initiations in the west and model themselves on the strengths of the western work ethic. He was aware that India needs to borrow a lot of technology and industrial knowhow from the west, but was not in favour of 'hiring people to put up hired machines' in India. Instead 'we have to produce these ourselves' was his usual advice to members of scientific community (Selected Works, Vol. 47: 410-415). He was not ready to compromise on self-reliance. His passion and quest for self-reliance extended to all others domains including politics and economy. Non-alignment was a political face of developing a confident self-reliant polity whereas the Nehruvian socialist focus on import substitution was the economic expression of self-reliance. Naturally, Nehru wanted the technological and industrial base of India to be self sufficient especially in terms of producing world class scientists and skilled manpower. In a letter to Swaran Singh, then minister of Steel Mines and Fuel, Nehru dismisses the reliance on even foreign advisers and consultants for the same reason. He writes:

> We appoint them as consultants, who naturally advise us according to their own viewpoint which is seldom that of ours. This is not merely a technical matter, but there are various others considerations involved. Naturally all this is much more costly and there are probably greater delays. But the main thing is that we do not build up our own apparatus and personnel...the real approach should be to put responsibility on our men and rely on their advice...we seem to rely on outsiders and cannot even produce a project report or the necessary designs for it (Selected Works, Vol. 49: 460-62).

For Nehru science was both a universal phenomenon and a national project. Since science had a universal appeal and every civilization had contributed to its

glory and progress, it cannot be monopolised by the western powers. Embracing this universality of science, Nehru rejected the arcane labels like 'English science, French science, American Science' attached to science. Nehru did not endorse a concept of 'Indian science' for the simple reason that 'it might imply that India remained locked in an arcane localism' failing to embrace the 'universality of modern science' Arnold (2013). He expected the scientific community to have an international outlook and a Universalist perspective, and not get bogged down in the parochial national frames. While scientists 'may inevitably function in national spheres', considering the huge responsibilities of national development on them, 'science is international and should have an international outlook and should gradually change national outlook into international outlook' (Selected Works, Vol. 1: 377).

Institutionalising Nehruvian Science

Nehru understood the urgency in developing a world class industrial base that could produce cutting edge technology and eventually compete with the developed world. But, he also understood that India needs to develop at a much faster rate in order to catch up and 'cannot wait for 150 years as in the case of' western development of industrial infrastructure. 'Having been static or having been slow in movement in the past 200 years' India must 'make up for it by going faster and if we don't, our problems will overwhelm us' (Selected Works, Vol. 52: 278). It was this urgency that made 'atomic revolution' so attractive to Nehru. Nuclear technology was not only the most advanced technologies in the world which the west was also struggling to develop, it also provided an answer to the choking power needs of the industrially aspiring country for which a continuous supply of power is absolutely essential.

In order to build a strong industrial base, in addition to capital and natural resources, the most important resource needed for the purpose was trained scientists and skilled manpower. This was only possible by providing special attention to train the human resource in colleges and university and give them ample training to serve the purpose of a fast rate of industrial and technological expansion. The establishment of world class universities and engineering institutions was seen as an important state prerogative and the basic requirement for industrial growth and development. This explains why Nehru's government made heavy budget allocations for higher education. Nehru realised that independence in thinking and technical capacity was a necessary correlate of political independence. Higher education didn't only serve this utilitarian purpose but was also an effective instrument of 'new forms of sociability' were group identities were transcended, thereby foster a culture of social and political unity (Mehta 2014).

The University Grants Commission, established many years earlier, was formally established in November 1956, by an Act of Parliament as a statutory body responsible for 'promotion and co-ordination of University education and for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in Universities' (The University Grants Commission Act 1956). In the same year Indian institute of technology act, and amended subsequently in 1961, was passed by the parliament to establish 'institutions of national importance' (The Institutes of Technology Act, 1961). This was simultaneously accompanied by providing the huge funds and capacities for building efficient and autonomous specialized institutions to push the growth of 'big science' at a steaming pace. In a period of less than two decades, about twenty-odd CSIR institutes were set up, a feat that has never been accomplished again or surpassed. This is not only a reflection of the political energy spent on the development of 'big science' but it also shows the importance accorded to science but the recently decolonized developmental state.

The idea of these specialized institutes to push the pace of scientific growth was particularly interesting. Once scientific research acquired a home outside the universities and established itself in the research institutes driven by goals other than the pursuit of knowledge, it led to some unexpected results. On the one hand it led to a remarkable growth in 'big science' including the growth in heavy industries, nuclear technology and defence but on the other hand it led to a crippling impoverishment of the Indian universities. Scholars of science policy in India suggest that this 'impoverishment was not planned', but the 'decision makers of those times didn't foresee this outcome since it was never part of their calculus' (Raina 2006/2007: 182-195).

Nehru wanted the science conducted for the people of India but at the direction and discretion of the state. There were some compelling reasons for this. Nehru had rightly understood, partly due to an amazing magnitude of literature on science that he read during his time in the prison, the requirements of modern science and technology as being too fundamental but also too specialist and strategic. It was imprudent to relegate such a vitally strategic and terribly essential task to poorly organized universities. The huge focus on national self-sufficiency and the imperative of national defense which need a targeted 'effort and resources applied in the pursuit of science' favoured centralized control of science by the state (Government of India, Scientific Policy Resolution 1958). Naturally this was accompanied by the state control of major industries in order to bridge the ever increasing gap between the developed work and the 'backward countries' like India. As the head of the government he used its apparatus, its scientific institutions and the resulting control over science and industry to build a marvellous establishment

sympathetic to the idea of state-led science. There was another factor in Nehru's calculation that made universities especially unsuited for a 'concentrated effort' for a rapid growth of science and technology in India: the lack of adequate specialised human resource. Invoking this as a severe handicap for organising science in universities during an intervention in one of the debates in Lok Sabha in 1959, Nehru rejected the idea of treating universities 'as the centres of very specialised works, especially in the atomic energy field' (Selected Works, Vol 47: 415-24).

Nehru was completely in sync with the international context of the time. The two world wars and the polarization of scientific community in the early phases of cold war had led to a gradual transformation of 'Little sciences' into 'new' or 'big science' that was 'driven by big projects run by large teams of scientists requiring large funding, the development of sophisticated instrumentation, which often needed to be subcontracted to industry'. The defence establishment became the strongest factor in shaping the research priorities of the 'big science' and media was an essential medium to 'trumpet the story of the triumph of science and its heroes' to boost public support for such projects. This changed topography of big science with Five M's –Machines, Manpower, Money, Military and Media- could only function in a 'concentrated manner' with a harmonious purpose under the strict control of a centralized state (Raina 2006/2007: 182-195). The success of big science in the form of Manhattan project and similar successful state projects in Soviet Union changed the nature of science policy forever.

Nehru, Nucleus and the Nation

Since the Nehruvian science was through and through developmental, this theme is ubiquitous in its every characteristic. The developmental obsession of the postcolonial state was never more subtle and passionate than in the case of nuclear science and technology. It represented the zenith of everything that Nehruvian science sought to achieve. It was the most 'modern' and contemporary of all the sciences and represented the advancement of science at its pinnacle. To handle, master and tame the secrets of this mysterious atom, Nehruvian state would spend enormous amount of vital public funds, build world class nuclear infrastructure and rally immense political capital and public support behind it. The success of the developmental project of nuclear science was not only an imperative for the growth of 'big science' in India, but 'the very legitimacy of the state depended on it'. The most cherished goal of the recently decolonized state was to cement its freedom and legitimacy by acquiring modern technologies, create a skilled technological cadre committed to national growth in order to push the development of the state. Therefore, Atomic energy was in congruence with the ideological and practical goals of the postcolonial state 'seeking to establish its national and international

legitimacy'. As a result, the development of a strong nuclear industry was part of the Indian state's 'conceptual landscape from practically the moment of political independence'.

Nuclear science represented the summit of the overall character of Nehruvian science: it was a state's monopoly, a source of immense pride and prestige and a weapon for a radical break from the colonial legacy of scientific and industrial backwardness. It would not only be a bearing proof of the modern credentials of this recently decolonized state but also a vital agent for removing the critical infrastructural bottleneck to national development by providing cheap electricity for industrial production and civilian use. This was the reason why the postcolonial Indian state showed such great urgency to pass the Atomic Energy Act in 1948. The bill was passed by constituent assembly which did not wait for the formal elected parliament to convene and pass the bill. At the time of passing the act, only one state, the United States of America, had demonstrated its total mastery over nuclear technology. Other important powers were either struggling or slowly itching towards mastering this technology.

Nehru felt an impulsive need to be at par with the west to share the fruits of this 'bigger revolution', which was much ahead and advanced than the earlier power generating 'steam revolution' and 'electric revolution'. Since India had missed the first too revolutions, she could ill afford to neglect the third one. In a dialectically generalizing account of human history wherein there are states that embraced such scientific revolutions are those that are left out, Nehru assets that when the man discovered the power of steam,

> ...the industrial age came in. India, with all her many virtues, did not develop that source of power. It became a backward country...a slave country. The stream age and the industrial age were followed by the electrical age which gradually crept in, and most of us were hardly aware of the change... Now we are facing the atomic age...infinitely more powerful than either stream or electricity... If we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation which keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy (Selected Works, Vol 5: 421-27).

Science, Sovereignty and State

Nehru was equally aware of the military side of the nuclear technology and sought to distance the Indian nuclear program from any possible military dimensions. The superpowers of the day, the USA and USSR, had an explicit commitment to the weaponization of the nuclear technology since the very beginning. The western nuclear programs started as explicit nuclear programs and then gradually started acquiring civilian dimensions. In India, the trajectory was completely inversed. The Indian nuclear program began as a purely civilian program aimed at generating power to usher in rapid growth through industrialisation. The

military component was added much later. However, Nehru tried to separate the civilian aspect from the military one, but didn't exclude the military potential of the programme completely.

> We must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war... for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes... of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way. But I do hope that our outlook... is going to be a peaceful one...and not one of war and hatred (Selected Works, Vol 5: 421-27).

Nehru was not prepared in any way to tie down the hands of the future leaders of India and to bind them into a commitment that they may find impossible to hold to. Nehru hoped that India will not 'allow herself to be dragged into wars' but was frank to admit that he lacked the authority to speak for the future.

Nehru was aware of the destructive side of science and technology and after the unprecedented destruction caused by the two world wars it had become somewhat axiomatic to designate nuclear science as an evil force. Nehru tackled this problem of the use of science for destructive purposes in a variety of ways even much before the independence of the country. For him, the modern science and technology with its army of 'big machines' have 'not been unmixed blessings' for humanity. The good and the bad, the virtue and the vice have been a constant feature of the growth of science. Though science is responsible for 'the growth of civilization', producing abundance and teaching the virtues of 'co-operation, organization, punctuality', it has also been responsible for 'the growth of barbarism by producing terrible weapons of warfare and destruction'; the abundance produced by it has been a prerogative of a privileged few and it has also made life 'a dull routine', 'a mechanical burden with little of joy or freedom in it' (Nehru 2004: 401). These two faces of science are 'like Janus' with both 'its destructive side, and a constructive, creative side'. Because of the way science has been used by man, these two sides of science will be in conflict with each other until one side ultimately triumphs over the other. In a more recent history, 'Hiroshima became a symbol of this conflict' (Selected Works, Vol 1: 374).

This bifurcation of science is not inherent in its structure that cannot be rectified for human progress with peace. Rather, the good and the bad in science are interlinked dialectically that cannot be separated by anything except by the man himself. He takes the blame off the 'poor machine' and thrusts it on the man and the society who have 'misused it' and 'not profited by it fully. For him, 'it is unthinkable that the world, or any country, can go back to the old days before the industrial revolution'. Human society cannot 'throw away the numerous good things that industrialism has' given it 'to get rid of some evils'. Here, he is trying to

unburden science from the destruction caused by its use and putting the onus of responsibility on the human beings themselves.

Naturally, scientists, the individuals responsible for its production, are the main target of this criticism and they must bear responsibility of what is produced by them. Scientists must look at the bigger ethical and moral picture and try to resolve the tension inherent in the way science is used especially when they 'are yoked into work in preparation for future wars'. Scientists should not allow themselves to be 'misused and exploited for base ends and should make it clear that they do not want to be so exploited'. Though it is difficult to draw a line between the scientific research for war and peace, and India will develop its scientific potential 'to the fullest' but 'for peaceful purposes' only. For science, however specialized, cannot be divorced from the social and political problems of the milieu in which it grows and progresses. It is 'not merely an individual's search for truth' but 'must have a social objective before it'. In the Indian case, the greatest objective of scientists is to become 'crusaders of peace in India and the world' and work towards the rapid bettering of the immensely poor populace of India (Selected Works, Vol 1: 373-74).

Conclusion

Nehruvian Science was a not only a developmental project aimed at securing the industrial future of India, but it was also a cultural project designed to instil the scientific method of thinking in an educated Indian. The emphasis placed on the inculcation of 'scientific temper' by Nehru was aimed at resolving both the societal fragmentation and create a committed scientific and technical cadre focused singularly on the national growth and development.

The character of Nehruvian science was essentially developmental. All its other characteristics were either a means to this end or unavoidable imperatives towards this goal. The development of India's defence and military capabilities were part and parcel of this project, but they were not to be sought as entities separate from the overall development of the industrial and technological capacities of the state. Such exclusion was not within Nehruvian parameters of scientific development. Nehruvian science was state science, a program for socio-cultural change, an institution building project and a historiographic project designed to inspire both the national pride and nurture India's development regime. The development of nuclear science in India would proceed according to theses standards and aimed to achieve these aims. Nuclear science was not aimed at exclusively defence purposes, as many scholars have argued, but was aimed to usher in an era of surplus energy to foster industrial development in India.

Notes

1. For an original postcolonial reading of the nuclear industry in India and its developmental goal See, Abraham, Itty (1998); Sagan (2009) and Abraham (2010).
2. It is interesting, however, the manner in which the early nuclear programme of all the states benefited from foreign help. Nuclear programs are identified by particular states having an indigenous and unique national character which not only serves the reasons of the state but also the parochial interests of scientists and the bureaucracy. It must be stated, that there have never been any purely indigenous nuclear programmes. The United States atomic bomb programme, the Manhattan Project, was a multinational effort with essential contributions from British, Canadian, expatriate German and other allied member scientists. It is the huge experience from the Manhattan project that was later used by Canadian and British scientists into building their own nuclear industry. The British secret programme, Tube Alloys, was gradually incorporated in the Manhattan project during the war effort. Infact, the McMahon Act (Atomic Energy Act of 1946), introduced by Senator Brein McMahon, was a testimony to the contributions of the allied scientists in the successful use of revolutionary science into building the first Nuclear bomb tested successfully, codenamed trinity test, on 16 July 1945. The 1946 Act determined how US would manage nuclear technology that it had jointly developed with its wartime allies. The French approached both the Norwegians and the Canadians from help in the early development of their programme. Chinese scientists who worked with Max born in Edinburgh and at Pasadena Jet propulsion Lab during war years helped built the Chinese bomb, not to mention the huge soviet help in early years. Indian programme is not an exception. For comprehensive historical discussion on the development of national nuclear bomb projects and the collaboration between different powers see, Rhodes, Richard (1986): The Making of the Atomic Bomb, New York: Simon and Schuster ; Cathcart, Brian (1995): Test of Greatness: Britain's Struggle for the Atom Bomb London: John Murray Publishers Ltd,; Halloway, David(1994): Stalin and the Bomb, new Haven: Yale University Press, ; Lewis, John P., and Xue Litai(1988): China Builds the Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University press, Cohen, Avner (2013), Israel and the Bomb, New York: Columbia University Press.

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The Role of Prestige in Diplomatic Decision Making: A Case Study of India and Pakistan

Kanica Rakhra

Thomas Hobbes' triad of grounds on which states act - fear, glory and gain - is still pivotal to the study of politics generally and global politics specifically (Steele 2008). This paper specifically focuses on the second component, *glory*, seen as national Prestige, and how it shapes decisions of states. National Prestige plays an important role for every state in the international system. It denotes self-esteem and also helps build a state's internal cohesion. Every state is proud of its heritage, culture and contribution to the world. But what makes the concept more important to certain states? One of the reasons is that the newly created states are more desirous of catching up with the 'western states' who were, *de facto*, the creators of the international system. Steele (2008: 11) posits that "States are 'rational egoists', they base their egoism not upon (independent and exogenous) material structures, but upon self-identity needs". A state can seek Prestige in various forms, in the form of military capability, as a defender of human rights, or as an upholder of moral values. There is a constant loss and gain happening with respect to a state's Prestige. In this need to seek recognition and Prestige, what role does diplomacy play? Is prestige-seeking an important part of diplomacy?

Foreign policy of a state is influenced by a number of factors, such as social, economic, and political. Nevertheless, it is the collective identity that binds the people into a nation and is an imperative factor that defines a state's foreign policy. This collective identity derives its understanding from its history, its experiences and its self-understanding. The national/cultural pride of a state is reflected in the ethos of the people, in their understanding of other states and their interactions with other states. Using the case studies of India and Pakistan, this paper aims to bring out the gaps that exist because of the difference in each state's perceived image vis-à-vis its self image. The paper looks at the Agra Summit and the Parliament Attacks, and how, in both cases prestige was an overriding factor in decision making, which might not have been beneficial in the long term.

Turner and Stets (2005) point out how the process of physiological activation is underway before individuals can take full cognizance of the events or objects causing emotional mobilization. They also bring out the 'gestalt approach' which emphasizes that humans seek consistency and congruence among cognitions, and since self is a central cognition for all individuals, people are motivated to have cognitions about self and cognition about the response of others to self in balance. With respect to a state, in International Relations one studies only the reactions of state behaviour and not the emotional responses of the state and how they, unconsciously, become motivators or catalysts behind the decisions taken.

Using Social Identity Theory, the paper seeks to provide an alternative understanding to how a states' decision making is linked to its 'self'. Social Identity Theory, by Henri Tajfel (1982), posits that categorization changes the way people see themselves, activating a different level of one's self-concept. This notion of self will always differ from the 'other' states' perceived image. The paper seeks to explore, in the context of India and Pakistan, the intermittent links between Prestige and Diplomacy, what were the diplomatic failures that one can learn from and whether Prestige played an important role in such situations, reaching a mutually agreed upon document. The paper also questions if in the case of India-Pakistan there was a genuine difference in the self image and the perceived image as both states are well aware of the 'other' and how each state views itself and the other.

Prestige and Diplomacy

McGinn defines Prestige as explicitly represented as a kind of accumulation: a reservoir or body of opinion which can shrink or swell, be augmented or depleted, gained or lost over time. He points out that political discourse couched in terms of the discourse of Prestige most often revolves around what the agent had done, is doing or proposes to do with its Prestige, for e.g. attempt to secure it (McGinn 1972). Prestige belongs to an extended conceptual family that includes honour (O' Neill 1999; Joshi 2008; Lebow 2008), status (Weber 1922,; Reinhold 1969), reputation (Tang 2005; Sharman 2007; Wylie 2009), glory (Slomp 2000), credibility, respect, pride and legitimacy. Self esteem and national esteem, also related to Prestige, often reflect each other (Wood 2013). The paper aims to understand the role that Prestige plays in a state's decision making.

Prestige as a concept has always been the driving force in international relations (Crane 1992). It is also associated with a number of terms such as pride, respect, and reputation. Pride is a complex notion, which is related to identity, self-esteem and loyalty, as well as pleasure. In the words of Rorty (1998: 3): "National pride is to nations what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement. Too much national pride can lead to bellicosity and imperialism,

just as excessive self respect can produce arrogance." There is considerable empirical evidence that individuals are often unaware of emotions expressed in their behaviour. Indeed it is often the case that a person becomes aware of these emotions when others call attention to their behaviour (Turner 2000).

National Prestige plays an important role for every state in the international system. It denotes self-esteem and also helps build a state's internal cohesion. The national/cultural pride of a state is reflected in the ethos of the people, in their understanding of other states and their interactions with other states. The importance of security is not being diminished or underscored; rather it is being understood within the context of Prestige and Social Identity Theory and how important a role it plays in a states' decision making. Being able to secure the state provides a sense of national prestige for the collective.

There are a number of authors who have written on prestige and its role in International Relations. Kim's (2004) critique of neo-realism suggests that Prestige is not independent of the political use of force, but supplementary to it. An important positive source of Prestige is the successful use of power in war, for example, the Prestige of the US belatedly caught up with its actual power after the victory in World War II. Moreover, regardless of the nature of sources states employ to gain Prestige, they still seek the approval of the 'other' to validate this notion of Prestige (Kim 2004). Theodore Kemper (1978) developed a theory on how emotions are influenced by power (authority) and status (Prestige). The central argument was that when individuals have or gain power, they will feel positive emotions like satisfaction, confidence and security; and conversely, when they lose power, they will experience anxiety, fear and loss of self-confidence.

An event can lead to reduction of Prestige just as another can help regain lost Prestige. The idea of what is 'prestigious' can be different for different states. Wylie (2009:124) proposes that "powers such as Canada do believe in the rule of law, global governance and human rights" suggesting that for a pacifist state such as Canada, upholding certain notions is considered more prestigious than associating Prestige with power and increase in self-esteem. In a majority of cases, the idea of national Prestige is directly proportional to not only how other states view the said state but also how they view themselves. Morgenthau, too, discusses Prestige in detail. For Morgenthau (1967), Prestige as a concept could not be ignored in International Relations and he stated that "what others think about us is as important as what we actually are. The image in the mirror of our fellow's mind (i.e. our Prestige)…determines what we are as members of society."

O' Neill (1999) talks about how an expansive historiography, symbolic interaction, linguistic analysis, and game theory can be effectively combined and applied to illuminate the influence of Prestige and honour; Wegener (1992) argues

that 'rational and normative foundations of Prestige are possible'; Breiner (2004: 299) refers to Prestige as a potential trigger and protection of a security dilemma. All these scholars place Prestige in International Relations, whether it is from a security dilemma perspective or from a normative aspect. Weber talks about the linkages between Prestige and power.

> All power of political entities carries in itself a specific dynamic: it can be the basis for a specific 'prestige'-pretension of those who belong to them, which influences their externally focused behavior…prestige pretensions extends itself across relations among political entities; feudal rulers, likewise modern military officers or state beaurocrats, are the natural primary bearers of this 'prestige'-striving (Weber 1922: 691).

For Lebow (2008), Prestige is bound with beliefs about cultural eminence, heroism, and honour. For citizenry and rulers, organic and abstract entities merge for performances in which 'standing and honour' can be very important and interrelated. National identity and sentiment permeate his account. Both Lebow and Morgenthau insist on the importance of Prestige as a concept but these concepts have not yet been used to understand the state behaviour of the two case studies present.

Michael Dyson (2006), in his book points out the difference between patriotism and nationalism by stating that patriotism is 'self-referential' whereas nationalism is inherently 'comparative', both involving a degree of Prestige in them. Expressions of nationalism often appeal to advance their national interests in the international order. On a different note, Aaron Ben Ze'ev (2000), states that as in other emotions, the comparative concern is important in pride. The comparative value, rather than the absolute one, is of greatest concern in pride. Pride does not necessarily presuppose exclusivity, but it presupposes some sense of a comparatively high value and often also superiority. The importance of the comparative concern in Prestige indicates that although pride is directed at one self, the opinion of others is of crucial importance as well.

Prestige steers diplomacy's concern to avoid offense, or with how 'we' treat 'them' and are perceived too. Lack or loss of Prestige incites resentment and occasionally extreme reaction. 'The Prestige deprivation inflicted by the Versailles Treaty' Elizone argued, 'is commonly seen as a factor contributing to the emergence of Nazism, a movement obsessed with national status.' Foreign policy related discourses give meaning to the outside world and the positions, interests, and interactions of the self and the other in the international system (Doty 1993). They tend to shape the identity of the state, its 'rationality', the 'reality' it defines, and its interests and preferences in its interactions with the world (Moshirzadeh 2007). "Great Prestige with the inner public is necessary in order to negotiate from strength and success in negotiations increases inner Prestige" (Liverani

2001:10). Thus, a state seeks Prestige as much for the people it represents as for the upliftment of its self-esteem, which would help it interact with other states. As the scholarship points out, in a generic sense every state is proud of itself and that the notion of Prestige can be looked at from a realist as well as a constructivist lenses in understanding state decision making. But this notion of Prestige is not associated with any particular decision that helps explain and place Prestige as a concept in IR.

The role of Prestige in diplomacy then, becomes very significant. Every decision taken by the state is, in effect, a reflection of its international standing. Seen especially from the case study perspective of India and Pakistan, the notion of upholding their National Prestige defines their decisions. This shall be discussed further along in the paper.

In the study of a states' Prestige, the primary area of study is its social identity; how it sees itself in the international arena; and what determines its decisions. Tajfel and Turner argue that the motivating principle underlying competitive intergroup behaviour is the desire for a positive and secure self-concept (Hornsey 2008). Striving for a positive social identity, group members are motivated to act and think such that they are able to create a positive distinctiveness between their own groups and relevant out-groups. Hogg and Abrams (1990) extrapolate that lower self-esteem promotes greater in-group bias.

Social Identity Theory

All states justify their actions, even when such actions compromise existing international principle states. Change in terms of an actor's (re) construction of its (an actor's) identity; and the meaning an actor attributes to this identity, determines an actor's interests and interactions (Wood 2013: 25-37). States 'talk' about their actions in identity terms and this is necessary because "only in the telling of the event does it acquire meaning, the meaning that makes such events politically relevant" (Lang 2002: 13). Those specific 'tellings' which link by implication a policy with a description or understanding of a state 'self' constitute a states' biographical narrative (Steele 2008:10).

Tajfel originally defined social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978a, p. 63). The theory posits that group membership gives people a sense of where they belong (with respect to others) and acts as a practical guide, imparting norms that are concerned with desirable forms of behavior for a particular group. People see themselves and others in terms of group membership, and to the extent that they personally identify with the social group to which

they belong, they will tend to act towards others as group members rather than as unique individuals (Huddy 2001). Consequently, in order to achieve a positive evaluation of their group, group members will be motivated to establish, and to maintain, a positive differentiation between in-group and relevant out-groups on valued dimensions of comparison (Tajfel, 1978a).

Social Identity Theory lead to the development of Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), by Turner et al (1987), which together are referred to as the Social Identity Approach. As noted by Turner et al. (1987), self-categorization theory is a "cognitive elaboration" of Tajfel's earlier theory that provides an explanation for how individuals come to identify and "act as a group" (p. 42). Simon and Klandermans (2001) state that in the SCT, relationships between groups are almost always mediated by a super-ordinate category, highlighting the important aspect of political cognition and rhetoric. As a result, political action may not always be direct at the outgroup, but towards a more general audience. SCT also postulates that when we self-categorize as group members we come to see ourselves as similar to (and interchangeable with) other in-group members on the key stereotypical aspects that define the group, a process termed *depersonalization* (Sindic and Condor 2014). Social Influence plays an important role in political processes such as the spread of political ideas, elections, voting, and political mobilization (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). For SCT, social influence depends on the relationship between messenger and audience that is established by the self-categories employed in a particular social context (Sindic and Condor 2014).

Overall, the identity dynamics described by SIT could be termed political as they not only shape but are also shaped by the power dynamics. It can thus, be argued that the SIT provides a general framework to understand the 'politics of identity' (e.g. Guiberneau, 1996). The discussion of identity has had less impact than might be expected, however, on the quantitative study of political behavior in general and on political psychology more specifically. Despite the recent emergence of identity politics around the world, researchers of political behavior have been slow to incorporate the concept of identity into their empirical studies. Social identity theory is useful for several reasons. Not only has it spawned an enormous number of studies in a diverse group of countries (see Brewer & Brown, 1998), it has also generated testable hypotheses that can be applied to a wide range of groups, including those linked to politics (Huddy 2001).

According to Brewer and Brown (1998), identities need to confer the optimal mix of distinctive and common attributes, thus explaining why members of majority groups evince weaker in-group identities than do members of minority groups. Moreover, the valence of identity depends on the meaning attached to the symbols of patriotism at that given time, for that particular generation. For

example, Americans who came of age during the Vietnam War felt less patriotic and were less attached to symbols such as the flag than were older Americans of the World War II generation. These examples show the potential of studying the valence of group membership and how events influence an entire generation to think in a particular way, their emotions associated with the said events and their influence on decisions made at the state level. Another example would be the India-China war of 1962. The defeat had a very deep impact on an entire generation that thought India was indefensible and it is only now, with the present generation that the Indian states' relationship with China is getting better as the previous generation was unable to negotiate with China after the humiliating defeat.

Huddy (2001) points out how there is continued disagreement among researchers on the relative stability and fluidity of social and political identities. On the one hand, social identity researchers focus on how fluid the concept of identity is, highlighting how identities change with a change in the social context. On the other hand, there is also abundant evidence from everyday politics on how political and national identities are manipulated by the words and actions of political leaders, who aim for power and have their own agendas to fulfill. Although Jonathan Turner and colleagues are some of the strongest proponents of the view that social identities are highly labile, it is hard to believe that longstanding political identities linked to major ideologies or political parties would exhibit a high level of fluidity as it would go against their support base which chooses them because of certain attribute (Huddy 2001).

Foreign policy of a state is influenced by a number of factors, such as social, economic, and political. Nevertheless, it is the collective identity that binds the people into a nation and is an imperative factor that defines a state's foreign policy. This collective identity derives its understanding from its history, its experiences and its self-understanding. Using Social Identity Theory, the study seeks to provide an alternative understanding to how a states' decision is linked to its 'self'. Social Identity Theory, by Henri Tajfel (1982), was the first social-psychological theory to acknowledge that groups occupy different levels of hierarchy of status and power, that intergroup behaviour is driven by people's ability to be critical of and to see alternatives to, the status quo. The theory posits that categorization changes the way people see themselves, activating a different level of one's self-concept. At the intergroup level, people's self-concept will mostly comprise of one's 'social identity', defined as those aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which she/he belongs, as well as the emotional and evaluative consequences of the said groups membership. The study would broadly be based in the Social Identity Approach looking at the Social Identity Theory to understand the Role of Prestige in the decision making of states.

State as a Person

It has been observed that the theorists of International Relations, such as Realists, Neorealists, Neoliberal Institutionalists, theorists of International Society, and even many Marxists were content to treat states as, in effect, people with perceptions, desires emotions, and the other attributes of state personhood (Jackson 2004). As the disparate behaviour of states illustrate, identity needs compel them to pursue actions that are seemingly irrational, yet such behaviour would make sense to the state agents who decided upon the course of action at that time (Steele 2008). Wendt (1994: 384-7) distinguishes three state identities, each as important for a state: *corporate identity*, which refers to a state's intrinsic qualities such as norms, beliefs, and resources; *social identity* (or roles), which consists of a set of meanings that a state attributes to itself; and *collective identity,* which is established when a social identity generates collective interests. Thus, all three aspects influence the way a state perceives itself and in turn interacts with the international community.

State personhood is a useful analogy, metaphor, fiction or short hand or something else. That something else, what state persons really are, is the behavior and discourse of the individual human beings who make them up (Wendt 2004). To think about the 'state as person' is to attribute to the state certain properties that we attribute to individuals- intentions, personalities, rationalities, intentions. Walter Bagehot, the nineteenth century British Constitutional Lawyer, argued that personification was useful because it made governments more easily understood and more apt to gain the loyalty of its subjects (McGraw and Duclan 2007). Thus, personification of the state is helpful not only to the state and the people representing the state, but also to the people who are represented by it and in turn bounded by it.

Scholars disagree about which properties of persons should be ascribed to states, how important state persons are relative to other corporate persons like MNCs or NGOs, whether state persons are a good thing, and whether failed states can or should be persons at all (Wendt 2004). Although Robert Gilpin (1981) states that only individuals can actually be actors, he also acknowledges that Prestige is the currency of international relations, and there are major gaps in the understanding of a state as a person; there is a need to look at the state as an entity that reacts with emotions. But even though there are problems in the defining of a state and what attributes should or should not be taken, it is clear that some form of personification is needed as it helps in dealing with the other states as entities. Each state as a unit will have divisions amongst them but in the end a collective front in needed for interaction with other states.

Views about states are often intimately bound to views about salient features. Because states are abstract entities, they frequently require physical embodiment, in order for ordinary citizens and even state elites to make sense of them. Embodiment can be in the form of a national leader, institution, symbols or social groups (McGraw and Duclan 2007). It is these leaders, institutions and symbols that become the backbone of the state identity and give it legitimacy in the eyes of the people it represents and with the other state units it interacts with. For example, a flag of a state, national language, and important institutions that become landmarks such as the burj kalifa in Dubai.

States are readily described as collective cognition. Although they usually have one person in charge, leaders do not know everything their states know. States are characterized by massive division of labor internally, the structure of which enables their members to operate as a single cognitive system. Some state identities and interests stem primarily from relations to domestic society, others from international society; more recently a number of neoliberals have emphasized the domestic (and thus systematically exogenous) roots of state identities (Wendt 1994). Both the points stated above clearly refer to the various gaps in literature and in the understanding of the state as a person, but also mention how a states' identity is sometimes formed in its interactions as a unit with other similar units. The corporate identity of a state generates four basic interests of appetites:

- Physical security, including its differentiation from other actors
- Ontological security, or predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities
- Recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force
- Development in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level (Wendt 1994).

As Wendt puts it, "Relative to the alternatives, a strong argument can be made that they should (be persons) not withstanding its potential costs: states help bring order, and yes, even justice to the world, and if we want to have states then it is better to take them as persons rather than something more amorphous, because it will make their effects more politically accountable" (Wendt, 1994). Although there is much to be debated as to whether states do become more politically accountable or not they do tend to make interactions with other states as units more manageable.

India-Pakistan

India and Pakistan have had a very chequered history ever since partition. Their history does act as baggage at certain points in the discussions between the

two states and at some times helps the two states build on bridges to engage in dialogue with each other. Both the states have fought three wars with each other and the border disputes between the two exist at least three points. Even though the major dispute between the two states is that of Kashmir, the problems exist at many deeper levels wherein a basic mistrust of each other ceases to go away from their trajectory.

Wood believes that, like change in the international balance of influence, Prestige is generally a stronger impetus for revisionist actors than those satisfied with the status quo (Wood 2013: 17). But this statement does not take into account status quo-ist India who consistently aimed to seek Prestige in its foreign policy decisions. Another school of thought proposed by Dijkink (1996), points out that India's role in the international arena was formulated by Nehru alone and no one in the domestic political elite challenged it, even though the parliament kept a close eye on India's foreign policy. As long as India could uphold its Prestige in the international system, which it usually did in the 1950s, everyone was satisfied. India acquired Prestige from mediating in international conflicts such as Korea (1949) and Indochina (1954). There have been examples when India, at the international forums, has blatantly taken sides with the Soviet Union. Whenever this has happened, the domestic elite and the public opinion have risen against the official line of foreign policy (Dijkink 1996). Thus, India values her national Prestige and has taken decisions that are in line with this school of thought.

A state dissatisfied with the status quo, should not, under rational deterrence, undertake a course of action that would further cause deterioration or decline in its position (Berejikian 2002). But Pakistan, has constantly challenged the international system and tried to establish its world view on the said system. This is because of the states' need to be self assured and comfortable with its identity. This self-assurance for a state comes only when there is a sense of pride in its conduct in the international system. Although Pakistan has bandwagoned with the United States because of the short as well as long term benefits, its notion of prestige has always been an underlying factor. Its interaction with India, specifically because of their common history, has had a strong notion of prestige attached to it.

Diplomatic relations between the two have been very turbulent, with ambassadors being called back to their home countries at the drop of a hat. Both sides show their displeasure about a situation by breaking all diplomatic ties. Upholding national prestige has always been of paramount importance to both the states. On some occasions, India may have taken the higher ground, but only to show-case to the 'super-ordinate' audience and not out of just goodwill.

Agra Summit

The Agra Summit is an example of how two states with the best of intentions of wanting an agreement can fail to reach an accord because of the images they have to project to their respective collectives and uphold a sense of national prestige.

The Summit started on a positive note with both the heads of state, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Parvez Musharraf showing enthusiasm for going down in history (Sarma 2001). Both were recent entrants into the power dynamics of their states and hoped that a peace accord would strengthen their positions within the internal polity. But the very reasons that were to be factors that helped get the peace process in the way became a hindrance. Unable to decide on a term to describe the activities in Kashmir, both the states blamed the other for failure of talks.

The President of Pakistan who entered India stating flexibility in his interactions with the press went on to write in his autobiography, *In the Line of Fire,* that there were higher powers involved which did not want for a referendum of any kind (Chellaney 2001). He would also name this higher person later, but it did not elicit any response from the Indian side. Meanwhile, the Indian side, which began its relationship with Pakistan on more than cordial notes, was forced to take a call when the Pakistani government refused to bulge from its place regarding the terminology of the people's struggle/ terrorist activities.

It was important for the Vajpayee government to come out of the summit victorious as it had recently been forced into elections after the fall of the minority government led by him. It was equally important for President Musharraf to have a successful meeting with his counter-part in India as he was well aware that he was not an elected leader and had to prove his mettle in different ways. But what is freedom struggle for one is terrorism for the other. The Social Identity of the collective on both sides does not go beyond blaming the other for their problems. Leaders and scholars in Pakistan constantly emphasize how India has been playing the role of the big brother in the neighbourhood (Ahmed 2001), while the Indian side feels it is constantly being taken advantage of by its smarter neighbours (Chellaney 2001).

The notion of the other is so firmly defined in the minds of both the states that it is difficult to reach a consensus on terminology. It would have been disastrous for the Pakistani President to go back home with calling of the freedom struggle in Kashmir, terrorism as the people had been fed on a steady diet of atrocities, real and imagined, leading the collective Pakistani society to support the movement in Kashmir with their moral compass pointing north and their conscience clear. On the other hand, the Indian state has also constantly emphasized the difficulties faced by the soldiers at the hands of the terrorists, and the need to keep a state

within its fold, regardless of the attempts by neighbours to break the nation. These differences were at the heart of reaching any referendum.

Parliament Attacks

The event being looked into is the 13 December, 2001 attack on the Indian parliament by militants allegedly from Pakistan. There are certain sections of the media who felt that the attack on the Parliament was a result of the failed Agra Summit (Chandran 2005). While that may or may not necessarily be true, the events that followed it were most certainly a result of the attack on the parliament.

The attack in itself came as a rude shock as it was the first time any such attack had taken place in the 'heart' of the Indian democratic system. Never before had the entire political leadership been targeted together with the sole purpose of destroying not only the buildings but also the political leadership. As a result, the state leaders felt it necessary to react strongly, wanting to pass on a message to the perpetrators behind the act that such an incident would not be overlooked.

The attack on the Indian parliament was conducted by non- state actors from Pakistan, but it was alleged by the Indian intelligence that the Pakistani intelligence agencies were involved in the planning and execution of the said event. This lead to India making accusation on the Pakistani side with Pakistan vehemently denying any of the chargers levied against it. While Pakistan was denying these allegations, the Indian side decided to take action and not just make the customary noises which result in nothing. India decided to showcase its capability and its anger by positioning its army at the border areas. With Pakistan not one to back off, it also started getting ready for the confrontation. This lead to a buildup that kept on increasing till it reached the point of no return for both the states and the people who were directly involved in the incident (Rakhra 2013).

Finally international intervention took place with the then US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice spoke with senior politicians on both sides of the border and helped mellow down the situation. But the angers were running so high on both sides that it is the closest India and Pakistan have come, to be in a nuclear standoff. The entire standoff lasted for close to eight months and was an important one as it was the first time a government institution had been attacked so brazenly in broad day light by not a group of highly trained men, but men who were anti the Indian government but not necessarily the top brass in a chain of command. An important aspect of the incident was the reaction of the Indian government, which was not passive or defensive, but reactionary resulting which the Pakistani government too kept on building on a situation even though no government was directly involved in the situation to begin with. Both states were bound by the security dilemma and could not afford to back out of the deployment of military race as for Pakistan it

would have meant accepting the superiority of India and giving in and for India it would have meant not being able to stand up and make a statement about its anger regarding the attack on one of India's symbol of democracy. Upholding prestige became so important for both the states that the colossal waste of resources became secondary.

When India was under attack by members of a militant organization in December 2001, it was sever enough for the escalation of war to last almost a year as it was subsided in October 2002 and that too only after international intervention. The initial reaction of the Indian state had been to blame the Pakistani side for its fallacies and to put the blame for the attack on certain militant organizations that were situated in Pakistan. And although Pakistan condemned the attack officially, it still lead to a buildup of the army on both sides. Thus, one sees how India started to associate internal attributions to the Pakistani side; whereas the reaction of the Indian side was completely justified by its external situation, i.e., the attack on the parliament, making it circumstantial that lead to a stage of nuclear standoff between the two nations.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Prestige demonstrates 'universality' and 'persistence' and acts as a motivational tool for states' decision making. It is close to being an informal ordering principle in international affairs. Possessed or sought, Prestige emerges from and contributes to the shaping of identities and interests (Wood 2013). This refashioning of identity goes hand-in-hand with the modern desire for authenticity and external recognition—finding one's true self and having it acknowledged by others (Taylor, 1994).

Thus, prestige determines the decisions states take, irrespective of the position they are in. The situation may be one of conflict or peace, but no state, especially India and Pakistan, would agree to dispel the situation by backing off. The after effects of the December 13 Attacks are here for all to see. Massive build up of forces just to showcase that some action is being taken by the state government, even though there was no game plan on how to move forward or what was expected of the army deployed. The Agra summit is another clear example of wanting to solve issues and being the bigger hero, but not at the cost of upholding the national prestige of the state.

The BJP led governments in the past have always had a very high notion of prestige attached to their foreign policy decisions as it is based on their historical narrative, and the new government led by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi promises to take this a notch higher as the notion of 'self' is more strongly defined. The first sign by the P.M., calling all South Asian Heads of States in an individual

capacity for his swearing-in ceremony, was a step in the right direction. But what remains to be seen is whether in times of crisis or in times of peace, decision making would be negatively affected by the notion of Prestige or not.

Not only does the new government, in its deals with Pakistan, need to make sure it keeps its prestige, but it also should try and make sure that the government on the other hand is not forced into decisions because of upholding their notion of prestige. If used correctly, prestige could become a point from where both the states are able to do justice to their people by showcasing a win and still manage to get a deal wherein there is some progress made on specific issues.

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India's Migration Policy: Need for Reforms

Girish Kumar R.

India is the second most populous nation in the world with 1.21 billion people and has the world's largest youth population with 356 million 10-24 year-olds (UNFPA 2015). Being a labour surplus nation, its national migration policy should further National Interest generally, by promoting emigration and discouraging immigration.

The World Bank classifies India as one of the top emigrating countries in the world. About 13.88 million Indians live worldwide as of 2013. India figures in three of the top five emigration corridors in the South Asia region, that is, India–United States, India–Saudi Arabia, India–United Arab Emirates where the stock of migrants are estimated to be beyond 2 million. With a favourable demographic dividend in terms of its large emerging youth, India ranked first among the top remittance receiving countries in 2014, with $70.38 billion. This was followed by China ($64.4 billion) and Philippines ($28.4 billion). The impact the overseas Indians have contributed are at all three levels – our economy, society and families. India, being the richest among the South Asian nations sharing borders with other South Asian nations, comparatively poor, is also host to many illegal immigrants; and as the largest democratic nation in the world subscribing to liberal democratic ethos, India is also preferred by refugees in the region. Any policy needs to consider these two aspects that make the scale, selection and rights of migrants – beyond Government's control, into account. India's Immigration policy needs to weigh the following fundamental objectives also: Distribution effects that create winners and losers among existing residents; Economic efficiency that maximizes net benefits from immigration; National and social cohesion, the Indian Diaspora; and National security and public order (Ruhs 2013). Following Recommendations vis-à-vis India's Migration Policy are proposed (three on Immigration and three on Emigration).

Immigration

The following policy recommendations are suggested for Immigration.

1.2.1. National Deportation Policy:

Rising surge in crimes and terrorism from illegal immigrants calls for stringent immigration regulations. The absence of controls at its porous borders with Bangladesh makes India home to3,084,826 illegal migrants from Bangladesh. Given the cultural and geographical proximity it may not be possible for Indian authorities to separate people who share same values, and togetherness by constructing a fence overnight (Dikshit and Dikshit 2013; BBC 2006). But the Supreme Court in one of the cases observed that the influx of illegally migrated Bangladeshi nationals into Assam posed'a threat to the integrity and security' of India's north-eastern region and changed the region's demographic character. The Bench comprising Chief Justice R.C. Lahoti, Justice G.P. Mathur and Justice P.K. Balasubramanyan struck down the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 saying that rules "has created the biggest hurdle and is the main impediment or barrier in the identification and deportation of illegal migrants." The Bench further observed that of the 3,10,759 cases booked under the IMDT Act, only 10,015 persons were declared illegal immigrants. Among these, only 1,481 were physically expelled till April 2000 (less than half percent of the cases initiated), threatening the demographic character of Assam. The IMDT Act and the Rules negated the constitutional mandate contained in Article 355 of the Constitution, where a duty has been cast upon the Union of India to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance. As State of Assam is facing "external aggression and internal disturbance" on account of large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals, the IMDT Act, which contravenes Article 355 of the Constitution is, therefore, wholly unconstitutional and must be struck down"the Court held (Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India 2005).

The Centre set up the Illegal Migration (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 on December 12, 1983 under an act of Parliament to tackle the issue of illegal migration into Assam. The Act was only applicable to Assam and accordingly, anybody settled in Assam before March 25, 1971 was a legal citizen. For the rest of India, the cut off date for acquiring Indian citizenship was July 19, 1948. Besides this, under the IMDT Act the onus of proving defendant's citizenship status fell on the complainant. This was a 'killer clause' favouring the illegal immigrant strongly, as the person accused had to do nothing to prove his citizenship whereas the complainant had to prove that someone was illegal. The IMDT Act failed to effectively identify and deport illegal migrants. The Foreigner's Act, 1946, in contrast, lays the responsibility on the accused, and not on the complainant, to

prove the citizenship status.For instance, in West Bengal the cases were initiated under Foreigners Act, and 4,89,046 persons were deported between 1983 and November 1998 (Ibid.).

In the Delhi robbery case, the Additional sessions court in Delhi terming illegal immigrants as 'parasites' draining the nation's economy and "depriving local residents from their meagre incomes by pumping in cheap labour," sentenced four illegal migrants to 13 years of imprisonment and deported them after they serve the sentence. But the Court was upset with the absence of a deportation policy. India also houses Illegal immigrants from Burma, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Times of India, 2013). Except Nepal, where India has an open border policy, migrants who enter without a valid document or overstay beyond the permitted time could be called an illegal migrant. A strong National Deportation Act needs to be framed to check illegal migrants, a population that is almost equal to a country of moderate size.

1.2.2. National Rehabilitation Policy:

The trade-off between openness and migrant rights make the position of Indian migrants in Gulf vulnerable to global economic slowdown[1] India witnesses return migration from Gulf, where seven million Indians live, due to indigenization programmes like 'Nidakat' in Saudi Arabia. Opportunities following oil boom saw massive migration to Gulf in the 1960s, giving jobs, for instance, to nearly 10% of Kerala's working population. The fear of unemployment back home may force the legal migrant to overstay and become illegal migrants. This makes them prone to more exploitation, lower salary and the possibility of Indians languishing in Gulf jails (King 2015).Further, the situation is likely to worsen in Kerala, for instance, as the wage differentials between Kerala and the Gulf is narrowing down considerably over the last few years (Zachariah and Rajan 2011).

A reverse situation and return migration could cause high level unemployment and poverty and make the state susceptible to communalism and social tensions. This necessitates a rehabilitation package (*The Hindu* 2016).The Government should also attempt to negotiate with Gulf nations for a prisoner exchange system, so that the pathetic migrants, mostly low skilled workers, arrested for illegal overstay could be transferred to Indian jails for completing their sentence. Indian prison facilities too need to be augmented. For instance, despite proximity to their kith and kin, only 10% of Indian prisoners sign up for swapping in UAE, the only nation having prisoner exchange system with India (*Gulf News* 2014; *The Indian Express* 2014).Nevertheless, the Union Government has created an institutional apparatus to oversee the administration of immigrants by creating a new government ministry, the Ministry of overseas Indian Affairs, in May 2004

pursuing one of the recommendations of High-level commission on India Diaspora 2001. Ministry, positioned as a 'Services' Ministry, has made several positive interventions for the reintegration of the returnees in India, for instance, the Indo-UAE Pilot Project, pension and life insurance fund scheme called Mahatma Gandhi Pravasi Suraksha Yojana (MGPSY), etc. But these activities seemed to have lost its tenor, as the ministry is now merged with the Ministry of External Affairs. National level policies and programmes in India that give priority to emigrants seldom address the issues of return migrants for are very scarce. India needs to author a National Rehabilitation Policy. As the return migrants are more from the low-skilled category employed in Gulf, where the less rigorous entry barriers attract the unemployed youth, perhaps the best model that could be emulated is from the state of Kerala that provides many schemes including welfare and pension schemes.

1.2.3. Dual Citizenship for Diaspora

Article 9 of Indian Constitution states that no person shall be a citizen of India if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of any foreign State. As per the provisions of Indian Passports Act, he has to surrender the Indian passport if he obtains another citizenship, failure could make it a punishable offence. However, the Government of India in 2005 introduced the Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) scheme to encourage Indians who have gained citizenships abroad to ease travel restrictions. The Scheme provides for registration as Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) of all Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) who were citizens of India on 26 January 1950 or thereafter or were eligible to become citizens of India on 26 January, 1950 except who is or had been a citizen of Pakistan, Bangladesh or such other country as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify.[2] The initiative was also to involve the participation of Indian Diaspora in India's national economic development and it should not be misconstrued as 'dual citizenship'. OCI does not confer political rights. The registered Overseas Citizens of India shall not be entitled to the rights conferred on a citizen of India under article 16 of the Constitution with regard to equality of opportunity in matters of public employment (see Government website www.mha.nic.in. The UN states that India has the largest diaspora in the world- 16 million in 2015 against 6.7 million in 1990 (UN 2015).To ensure brain gain, facilitate trade, commerce and investment and enhance inflows of foreign remittances, India should amend its constitution and grand dual citizenships to persons of Indian Origin.

1.3. Emigration

Three Policy recommendations are suggested vis-a-vis Emigration

1.3.1. Multilateral Dispute Resolution Policy

The IT industry body NASSCOM claims that Indian IT industry contributes $4,11,000 jobs, and more than $20 billion in taxes to the US treasury between 2011 and 2015; but Indian IT firms feel that Indian IT giants in USthat gives more opportunities to Indians are unnecessarily targeted (NASSCOM 2015). The United States' Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Public Law 114-113)requires applicants of non-immigrant visas in the L-1 and H-1B visa categories, to pay higher filing fees and fraud prevention and detection fees. The Act increases fee for admission and visa extension for applicants that "employ 50 or more employees in the United States, if more than 50 percent of the applicant's employees are non-immigrants". The US law also imposes quota to restrict labour inflows. On 3 March 2016, India initiated WTO dispute proceedings against this measure (WTO 2016). The dispute should also be seen in the light of the new indigenization process that happens across the world due to economic slow-downs and the forthcoming US elections, where Presidential candidates treatH-1B visas as threats to skilled jobs in USA. The US move will have negative consequences to Indian IT professionals who work in USA. India relied on the multilateral forum of WTO to counter this as small nations like India could challenge WTO-inconsistent measures of US at WTO more successfully. WTO is perceived as a forum that could put fetters on the sovereign power of nation-states to control and regulate the scale of migrant workers. The existence of a strong dispute settlement mechanism in WTO provides a platform for multilateral settlement of trade disputes and has successfully dismantled the trade barriers that exist worldwide facilitating more cross-border transportation of goods and services. WTO do have an agreement, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to liberalize labour migration. But the developed nations' insistence on wage parity requirement as a condition stalls labour migration from low income to high-income countries as cross border labour flows occurs due to endowment based cost differentials between countries (Ruhs 2013).

1.3.2. Receptiveness to Global Governance Regime

Despite the absence of a global governance regime on Migration, there exist several international treaties including the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW). India is not a member of CMW, even though it is a signatory to fourteen international treaties that addresses some of the core human rights of migrants. Two reasons could be attributed to the cold response of officialdom- India being home to migrants fear that it could be dragged for its own bad human rights record, especially in Kashmir; secondly, having a huge population with many unemployed

youth, India's apprehends that Indians may not be acceptable to employers in other nations, particularly Gulf.

As observed earlier, one of the major destinations for Indian labourers is the Gulf, where the human rights of migrants are scarcely respected. Poverty back home forces the helpless migrant labourers to work under appalling working conditions. The FIFA world cup to be held in Qatar in 2022, where there is a swelling flood of migrants needed for the construction sector ahead of FIFA World Cup 2022. Poor human rights record strained the relations between FIFA and Qatar further. FIFA has pledged to carry out "on-the-spot visits" to ensure that workers' rights were respected. Qatar's kafala employment system, in which workers are under the authority of their sponsors thereby restricting the workers rights and abilities to speak out against mistreatment, acts as a recipe for 'exploitation and forced labour' (Amnesty International 2013). In response to a Right to Information request filed, the Indian embassy in Qatar replied that there were 237 fatalities in 2012 and another 218 in 2013 up to December 5.died in 2012 and the first 11 months of 2013. The migrant labourers are ruthlessly exploited, but Indian government is silent on the human rights of its own citizens, apparently due to the fear of a backlash fro the host government that may put more entry barriers for labourers from India. (Al Akhbar, 2015).Normative and institutional frameworks on migration governance do exist across regional, sub-regional, and national levels. Very often they lack the constitutional and political impetus to coordinate the implementation of these frame works at the national and sub-national level. Effective governance of migration issues has continued to be undermined necessitating a multilateral forum for dispute resolution. This attitude needs to be changed. India, being a democratic nation with liberal ethos, should proactively participate in the global governance regimes that are premised upon core human rights. This will significantly enhance the acceptance of India as a responsible member in the global comity of nations.

1.3.3. New Soft Power Policy Options

Joseph Nye defines Soft power as the ability to seduce others 'to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment' (Nye 2008). To Nye, a country's soft power rests on three resources: "its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority)" (Nye 2011). India, a nation having rich cultural capital, democratic values, and democratic foreign policy need to encourage its soft power to further it National Interest. Soft power includes literature, art and education. India should promote its student community to move abroad as students, which is comparatively lesser controlled, so that new developments in the disciplines, and

values and ethos could be learned and transposed back to the homeland. Diaspora model is definitely emerging as a dominant paradigm (Bhagwati 2003).The sizeable Indian Diaspora abroad is emerging as one of the influential communities in other nations. The efforts of Indian Diaspora in the signing of Indo-US nuclear deal is a testimony to the growing financial and political clout of the affluent Asian Indian diaspora in developed nations.

Notes

1. The Gulf nations follow greater 'openness' to admitting migrant workers, whereas high-income countries like USA, UK, Germany, etc., follow rigid migration controls giving more rights to the migrants. See Ruhs (2013) for a discussion on the inverse relationship between openness and migrant rights.
2. The Central Government may, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, on an application made in this behalf, register as an overseas citizen of Indiaany person of full age and capacity who is citizen of another country, but was a citizen of India at the time of, or at any time after, the commencement of the Constitution who is citizen of another country, but was eligible to become a citizen of India at the time of the commencement of the Constitution who is citizen of another country, but belonged to a territory that become part of India after the 15th day of August, 1947 who is a child or a grand-child of such a citizen a person, who is a minor child of a person mentioned in clause (a): Provided that no person, who is or had been a citizen of Pakistan, Bangladesh or such other country as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, shall be eligible for registration as an overseas citizen of India.

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Understanding Social World of Religious Minorities in Pakistan The Politics of Everyday Life

Parvez Alam

Marginalization is closely synonymous with the term minority throughout the world. Some exceptional minorities in the world also prosper with the pace of development in their respective nation-state. But the conditionality in those states where they reside is that either they are Secular states or Multicultural states. Most of the postcolonial states in third world countries have the major problem of the 'minority question'. The debate arises that why have Indian minorities been assimilated constitutionally and socio-politically but in Pakistan, state has not been much effortful in addressing the grievances of minorities? The minority question in both countries remains the same but Indian minorities are better off because of discursive polity.

The regional disparities in Pakistan also trigger various movements and identity formation on the base of exclusion and marginalization from the mainstream politics and society. Though women are not considered as minority but the marginality and gender violence shows a grim picture.

The bourgeoning new social movements by these marginalized sections had attracted the intelligentsia to research about their problems. The liberals in Pakistan are not free enough to speak against the targeted killings of minorities including Christian leader and Minister for Minority Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti because of fear of radical Islamists. The civil society tries to pacify the angst and grievances by raising the voices of the marginalized through social activities like education, health care, inter-faith dialogue, so on and so forth.

The grave problem of minorities is the construction of the otherness in mainstream society. Due to their marginalized status, the minorities in Pakistan are not at all threat to the polity and society of Pakistan in distant imagination as portrayed by the majority in the media of non- Muslims being traitor. The problem in Pakistan is that the historical narratives have become the part and parcel of nation-building and state formation.

The marginalization of religious minorities in postcolonial states like Pakistan is not much debated. There are seven religious minorities in Pakistan who were promised equal rights and citizenship by the founding father of the State. The less than four percent of the Pakistani population live in imminent threat and state of fear. The trajectory of democratization of Pakistan has not yielded much fundamental rights to them. The construction of antagonism against these minorities in school textbooks to social public sphere has deprived them of living a dignified life. The overt symbolism, blasphemy laws, social alienation, menial jobs as employment option, and physical violence have resulted in ghettoization of these communities and withdrawal from public sphere. The absence of basic human rights to the individual is also violation of international law to which Pakistan is a party. Still these minorities have evolved strategies to survive and have coped up for seven decades.

The attitude of political parties and civil society has only done lip service to the cause of minorities. The assassinations of political leaders and civil society members have petrified the liberals of the society. The declaration of Ahamadis as non-Muslims in 1974 by the State and clerics declaring them as wajib-ul-qatl (JI 2011) in the 21st century has toughened the survivability. The incidents of Joseph Colony (2013) and Gojra Town (2009) in recent years and attack on churches have inscribed fear into the hearts and minds of the religious minorities specifically Christians. The Hindus of Sindh are facing problems of forced conversions and abduction of girls by the land lords.

It is very important to understand the social history of any society to analyse the contemporary settings in terms of politics, economy and culture of any state or nation. Pakistan (1947) was born as a result of overlapping, decolonization movement and demand for separate nationhood by the Muslims of British India. The boundary was delineated arbitrarily dividing humanities puncturing the social world of every community into two parts; West and East Pakistan. Because of the domination of West Pakistan over East, the demand for independence generated resulting in War, giving birth to another nation; Bangladesh (1971). This development also resulted into the demise of the so- called 'Two-Nation' theory, the ideology which fathers of Pakistan professed to justify the creation of separate nation for Muslims.

We are also aware about the fact and it is in the common knowledge domain that, Pakistan never saw peace after its birth internally or externally involved in direct war with neighbours or becoming frontline states of the great power. The Army of Pakistan assumed the role of guardian and custodian of the ideological state, intervened each and every time into the civil affairs of the state, becoming the great reason for destabilized polity. The Pakistan have rich cultural diversity

and multiple identities like India but have never projected it because of parochial religious nationalism, to justify the antagonism towards adversaries.

This paper is in a way attempt to understand the social world of religious minorities in Pakistan. It is difficult task because the ethnographic concept should be evaluated methodologically and the social world of Pakistani society doesn't allow any Indian to visit easily so that we can really involve ourselves in methodology. This is another aspect to understand social world in terms of *strangers* and *tourist* (Unruh 1980) categories of social types of social world, the other two are *regulars* and *insiders* (Ibid). These categories of sociology and anthropology have been marginalized in the Pakistan studies programs inside Pakistan and other academic world.

The discourse about Pakistan has mainly dominated by the narratives of State politics, security agencies and religious groups. The subaltern approaches and various other social sciences approaches have not come in the analysis of political and social life, in short everyday life of Pakistan. This paper will not go into the details of the social sciences debate but touches the complex issues of everything which makes the social life of religious minorities of Pakistan problematic.

Tracing Religious Minorities of Pakistan

In 1940s, caste was big factor in deciding the power relations in interior parts of the then British India (now Pakistan). The province of Punjab and Sindh was home to caste of cultivators (Jafferelot 2002: 154). The highest caste was that of Jats, who could be Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs. The Khatris (Hindus or Sikhs) stood out as the superior caste, usually in administration or business. 'Even if a Khatri puts ashes on his head, he makes a profit', says a Punjabi proverb (Jaffereolt 2002: 155). Partition ruptured the existing power relations on the line of caste as thousands of Hindus and Sikhs migrated to India, replaced by Muslim migrants from United Province, mainly *salariat* class (Alavi *sick;* Khan 2006).

Muhajirs dominated the administration same as Khatris in Sindh, which had Karachi as Pakistan's capital initially. There was initial rupture in the traditional power structure and social relations, which was guided by *biradari* (brotherhood), superseded by *qaum* (nation). This was also due to the fact that, the movement of Pakistan was for different *qaum*, that is Muslims. The *qaum* factor did not unite the tribal social structure and it was only used as the uniting factor against the alien forces such as India or western powers (Malik 2006, Qadeer 2006, Jafferelot 2002).

Pakistan is home of more than 6 percent (approx 7 million) of religious minorities. Founding fathers rhetoric of secular and democratic Pakistan died with two leaders Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan. The first target of Islamist forces who

wanted to purify the 'the land of pure' was Ahmadis in 1953 (JI 2011, Saigol 2013). Anti-Ahmadi riots broke up on the streets of Lahore pushing Ahmadis in ghettos of Rabwa, the barren land then, now the city of schools, colleges, hospitals and every modern facility without any support from Pakistani state. Ahamdis were dubbed as non-Muslims (Jafferelot 2002: 230) in 1974 constitutionally and now the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) have declared them Wajib-ul-Qatl; obligatory for Muslims to kill members of the Ahmadi sect (JI 2011: 36). Ahmadis are divided into the Lahori and Qadiani groups (Malik 1996). Both the leadership – London-based – and the elite of the movement are predominantly Punjabi, with smaller communities in other provinces. Ahmadis are low profile people involved in business of their own. Most Ahmadis are from central Punjab but are scattered across towns and cities (Malik 2006, 1996; JI 2011). The financial assistance, they mainly receive from the diasporic community settled abroad. It is important to note here that Ahmadis are still affluent and educated class and respected in diaspora, without any state support. They have to face discrimination and charges of blasphemy in public sphere. They are treated as outsiders within their own social world leading them in withdrawal of their 'self' from public sphere.

This is not only the case with Ahmadis, Christians too face similar attitude from Pakistani majority, by and large. Though Christians are second largest minorities after Hindus (census 1998, Pakistan Hindu council website), they face violent reactions after every incident of western intervention into the religious matters of Islam, or politics of Muslim countries. Interestingly, Christians are also posted in the menial jobs whereas they are the best education providers in Pakistan. Many political leaders are educated in these missionaries' schools (Malik 2006: 26).

Hindus are mainly concentrated in rural parts of Sindh and Tharparkar districts (Javaid 2013). The rural Hindus in Sindh face multiple kind of physical violence. They are also pushed back into the brick kiln bonded labour where they are under paid and face the wrath of feudal lords if absent because of health reasons (Jinnah Institute 2011). The Hindu girls and women are subjected to rape and abduction and conversion is rampant, facilitated by argumentative courts (Jinnah Institute 2011). In Sindh, Hindu girls are abducted and raped and forced for conversion. Mainly Hindus are also in traditional jobs like Christians are in sweeping and sanitation jobs. There are very few who own their own land and those few peasants are in Tharparkar districts.

The cases of Bahmani Wali (2009), Gojra (2009), Umerkot (2011), Joseph Colony (2013), are the recent manifestation of intolerance towards Christians in Punjab. The mob killing, burning of houses and churches, desecration of religious texts of these 'others' by the majority in Pakistan is not considered as blasphemous by the judiciary or the religious ideologues. As the above mentioned list of incidents

is recent manifestation, previous incidents include Shanti Nagar (2006), and Asif Town (2011) was based on 'imaginary' blasphemy charges on individuals. This is the never ending list of those cases which were based on the constructed ideology of identity and religiosity of the majority looking for adversary to embolden and strengthen their 'faith' (JI 2011, Javaid 2013, Saigol 2013).

A few hundred Parsis in Karachi and Lahore are the descendents of traditional Zoroastrian families of India and usually have been well placed on social economic ladder. Indeed, some Parsis such as Dorab Patel, A Kaikous, Ardsher, Cowasjee, Behram Avari, and Bapsi Sidhwa are national role models (Malik 1996, 2006). Parsis are the only religious minority who enjoy full patronage and protection of state mainly because of their historical linkages with Jinnah. They are also respected because of their commercial skills. They are very few less than fifty thousand (Ghufran 2002). There are a few thousand Sikhs in Punjab at the frontier, including some in the tribal belt who have not been threatened by any majoritarian backlash. The other community which has partial protection is Sikhs. They are mainly in Punjab province.

Defining Social World

According to David R. Unruh (1979), 'social world' refer to a form of social organization which cannot be accurately delineated by spatial, territorial, formal, or membership boundaries. Rather, boundaries of social worlds must be determined by interaction and communication which transcend and cross over the more formal and traditional delineators of organization. The term social world is used here to develop a common referent for a number of related concepts which refer to similar phenomena. Thus, social world phenomena encompass that which other sociologists have referred to as: occupational contact networks, invisible colleges, behavior systems, activity systems, and subculture (Unruh 1980: 271).

There should be examination of cultural forces, together with social factors, which influences, shapes and structure our everyday activities. Husserl (1970) 'life world' will be useful in understanding everyday circumstances. For Husserl 'life world' meant 'the always taken-forgranted…the world that is constantly pre-given… the world of which we are all conscious in life as the world of us all' (Inglis 2005: 8). Inglis (2005) explains 'life world' that human life can only function if the individual person has a certain sense of stability and certainty as to the world around them. We need routines and habits in order for us to function, because if everything in the world about us kept coming as a surprise to us, as totally novel and unprecedented, we would have no bearings in life, we would be totally dazed and confused. This gives an understanding that, the individual needs a certain sense of psychological

security, to the effect that the world around him or her is relatively predictable and understandable and is not just totally chaotic.

The construction of national memory by the nationalist historians chooses what to remember and what to forget, for the stability of political elite and Islamic ideology. This construction of the flawed knowledge, also manufacture the false consciousness of national identity of homogenous society by excluding "the other". According to Rubina Saigol (2010), the school textbooks contain lot of hatred and venom against the religious minorities such as that the 'Hindus are inherently evil, Christians are tricksters and cheat, Jews are greedy usurer, the Sikhs are knife-wielding butchers'.

The narrative about "the other" is not balanced, hence less tolerant, more discriminatory, exclusionary and Islamic in nature. There is no accommodation of the other narrative in society which leads to the marginalization and further alienation and seclusion from the society (Zia 2010). The majority always tends to search the demon or adversary around whom their politics revolve. The minorities in the nation-state have always become the victims of the clash between two major identities. And they also become the laboratory for testing their masculinity and valor. Abduction, rape and conversion become rampant to legitimize their political ideology.

The legal Islamization of the state and the radicalization of the section of society in Pakistan have led to the misuse of blasphemy laws against the religious minorities. Ahmadis are the most persecuted, declared non-Muslim, minority whom the majority frightens, terrorizes, and marginalizes. The state's policies have no clear distinction of any safeguard or affirmative action downgrading the minorities to the second class citizenship. To quote, Bangash (2012), "The twin menaces of suspicion and intolerance towards minorities has remained a permanent feature of Pakistan since its inception."

Qureshi (2005) argues that Islamic ideology needs some other ideology or enemy to be in function. The declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims and ill treatment of religious minorities became the ideological platform for it to function. He says that State fails because of the collapse of its fundamental institutions. Due to lack of strong fundamental institutions, Pakistan state is on the verge of failure. He gives priority to secular democracy over Islamic state.

Rubina Saigol (2010), in one of the article describes that how national identity has been constructed through the textbooks by injecting and indoctrinating youth with antagonism against 'the other' religious minorities. This also creates false consciousness among the youth and people, of superiority, of their religion and ethnicity. This resembles the creation of orients in Pakistan. The textbook of class sixth and seventh construct the images and symbols of antagonism in the minds

of youth. For example, the Hindus are inherently evil, the Christians are tricksters and cheat, the Jews are the greedy usurer, and the Sikhs are knife wielding butcher and the Bengalis are backstabbers. She says that these identities are manufactured by exclusions (forgetting, eliding, and overlooking) of those who do not belong to and inclusions (remembering, glorifying, claiming) of those who do belong to the nation as it is officially defined, agreed, stamped and approved (Saigol 2010).

Religion was used as an instrument of economic competition as Ahmadis, being generally more educated, were placed in high-ranking jobs and were economically well off. The riots against them in Punjab in the 1950s set the stage for catapulting them out of the pale of Islam. Administrative measures were used to reinforce this division as all those seeking passports and other state documents were forced to condemn the Ahmadis (Saigol 2013).

The Politics of Everyday Life

Till recently the scholarly work on Pakistan was preoccupied with the state and power and external influences in Pakistan. The role of military into the politics of state affairs is the favorite topics of scholars even today. The conspiracy theories are prevalent in the scholarly and journalistic writings to portray the perpetual threat to the existence of Pakistan. In this kind of security oriented research works, the everyday life of average Pakistani have not come into the discourse of academia.

Khan (2010) gives the sense of complexities and multiple subjectivities in these words;

Moreover, these *(individual)* [italics mine] lives are equally that of state institutions and artifacts, of political parties and religious traditions, as of average Pakistanis. It is not necessarily the case that the sheer existence of a 'daily-ness' negates crisis, that is, in self-perpetuating everyday life gives lie to the crises that inform Pakistan's past and present. Nor is it the case that a more organic order holds within everyday life that gives cause for hope in the face of the artificiality of the state, the fragility of national connectivity and the pervasiveness of foreign influence. Rather, the same forces exist within the dimension of the everyday as they do within the national scene, suggesting how crisis is lived. Attention to the detail of everyday life yields a differentiated milieu, a complex range of human subjectivities and activities and the continual possibility of an unexpected turn of events leading to different outcomes. In other words, it yields an existence that cannot be entirely contained within the category of crisis and its standard evaluations.

In this construction of meta-narratives of Islamic ideology and state power, the most marginalized fragments of society get excluded in the daily discourses of common lives. These marginalized communities in Pakistan are religious minorities, some ethnic and linguistic minorities.

There are some questions which are important to be asked in the context of everyday life. Peter Jacob (2002), one of the members of Christian community in Pakistan asks these questions which are tough to get an answer. The liberty and freedom to choose the kind of dress individuals want to wear and the food they want to eat gets hampered because of tight knit constructed identity. Some of the questions are as below:

- What type of dress should they wear; (western, national or ethnic)? What impact does their type of dress have on the attitudes of people towards them? Is it good to wear religious symbols, cross, icons etc. (as everybody does)?
- What types of names should they have: (indigenous, religious or names common among believers of different faiths)?
- What language should the use for communication: English, Urdu, or their mother tongue? Where does this place them culturally?
- Which locality should they live in: predominantly minority settlements or multi-religious settlements?
- In which restaurants should they eat? (Jacob 2002: 153)

These are the question which every individual come across in everyday life be it majority or minority. But majority grapples with these questions to satisfy their desire or for better alternatives. For minorities it's the matter of security/insecurity paradox. This also impacts the psyche of the minority of any kind.

Now most of the Christians in Pakistan wear dress very similar to any Muslim (Sunni or Shia). The Christians names are very identical to the names of the majority. It's really tough to identify the religion on the ground of name. For example, *Yaqoob Khan Bangash* (columnist and historian in *Forman Christian College,* Lahore) or *Maham Javaid* (Journalist in *Dawn*) (Javaid 2013) or *Yusuf Youhana* (famous Pakistani cricketer later converted as Muslim sporting his name as Mohammed Yusuf) etc. There are hundreds and thousands of names which can be counted, which suggests that the Christian community doesn't bear the biblical name because of the insecurity. Also, it can be said that, as the language of most of the Christians, majority of them concentrated in Punjab province are more familiar with the Punjabi and Urdu and the name they bear have certain meanings in their imagination and understanding.

Now this could be also seen as what Homi Bhabha calls *hybridity* (Emory 2013). The Christian minority's imagination as the cultural other and adoption of names similar to the dominant culture actually subverts the narratives of the hegemony of majority. The dominant culture gets contaminated by the linguistic and religious differences of native self. Now this should not be looked as negative

development but as the expression of 'the other' in ambivalent forms by inventing the strategies of survival in terrible circumstance.

Saigol (2013) describes the state of affairs of two biggest religious minorities in her words:

"The economic consequences of political exclusion are discernible in the case of two of the biggest 'minorities' in Pakistan — the Christians and the Hindus. A majority of the Christians are located in Punjab where they are engaged in sanitation and cleaning work. The Hindus are mainly concentrated in rural Sindh where a large number of them constitute bonded labour. They are mostly haris belonging to scheduled castes (Kohlis and Bheels among others) who work on the lands of waderas (feudal landlords). The majority of Hindus in interior Sindh live a life of virtual slavery".

Bangash (2011), dig out the history of the minority complex in the creation of Pakistan. He says that:

"Pakistan is the creation of a minority complex. The Muslims in India were fearful of the numerical majority of the Hindus, post the British departure, and therefore wanted a separate homeland for themselves so that they could safeguard their interests. So, in the words of the Muslim League, India was inhabited by only two communities: Muslim and Hindu, where both needed separation".

The plight of these two biggest minorities is because of the antagonism between two nations and also the anti-western feeling prevalent in the people because of the mischievous relations between Pakistan and United States (Bangash 2011, Qadeer 2006, Malik 2006). Bangash (2011) says that;

"When Pakistan was created, only people belonging to non-Muslim religions were considered minorities. Therefore, Christians and Hindus became easy targets for anti-western and anti-India attacks respectively. They were also clearly discriminated against in the constitution, the civil services, education and in general. Hence, when human rights groups focused on 'minority persecution', the gaze easily centered on these embattled communities".

Saroop Ijjaz (2013), rightly point out towards the most important ingredient of the progressive society that is social upward mobility of the marginalized sections of society. Pakistan lacks that ingredient of becoming progressive society. Ijaz (2013) says that;

"Try imagining a sewerage worker, whose father was also a sewerage worker and who now knows to a moral certainty that his newly born grandson will also be a sewerage worker. Yet, after every attack for a day or two we pretend that they are Pakistanis too (Ahmadis are denied this small consolation even). They are not".

As I have discussed above about the dress culture and names similar/alike to the majority there are various other thing which is also important to be discussed.

For maintaining religiosity/faith one has to perform certain rituals and traditions. Muslims offer *namaz* five times a day, Christians gather every Sunday for Holy Mass at Church, Sikhs go to Gurudwara, Hindus go to temples for *arti* and *pooja*. My focus here would be to show the adjustment process of the Christians not to irritate the majority; they keep the volumes of the loudspeaker very low every Sunday (Malik 2006).

The religious procession is one of the part of the religiosity and symbolic representation of the religions. Shia's *jusloos* during Moharram are very important procession which has been attacked recently by the extremist groups in Pakistan. Hindus take out processions during *Dussehra* and *Ganesh Chaturthi* and Christians take out procession during Christmas. The processions of Christians are not very crowded and they try to maintain their profile low on the streets.

The symbolism plays vital role in creating a bond between communities. When the national flag unfurl on Independence Day of particular country the citizens feel a kind of patriotism and nationalistic fervor boosting inside their heart and mind. The religious symbols like *flag, cross, trishool, kripan, turban, skull cap* are some of the manifestation of the religious people which creates affection for their community. The religious places also play essential part in expression of the faith in public sphere.

Conclusion: Vision and Strategies

Diplomacy is the means to achieve certain goals (material, political or social) through interaction among equals, unequal's, weak or powerful. Without certain basic information with whom one is interacting, could lead to stalemate of dialogue and leads to nowhere. What I am trying to argue in this paper could be not relevant much directly to the theme of new diplomacy but without understanding social world of any society it is impossible to predict, how that society of individuals behave resulting into the behavior of State. Another very important point which I want to raise here is the information and knowledge system should be transparent enough to share the tradition, culture and thoughts on the social issues and should not be curtailed to flow across the borders.

The freedom of representation of 'self' is very important for the stability of mind and soul. The everyday life of individuals should be predictable and they should have sense of psychological security so that they can contribute in the orderliness of society. The representation of the self in the postcolonial societies has been predicament because of the entrenched diversities. The memories and subjective knowledge of the victim speak more than the present because of the victimization in everyday life. The scar on the body parts of the minorities reminds the horrendous episodes they have gone through in their life.

The physical violence committed on 'the other' by majority with the exception of some liberals in Pakistan since its inception signifies that the epistemological and pedagogical attitude has not changed in the last six decades. The construction of 'Islamic Leviathan' (Nasr 2001), by reiterating on the Islamic ideology and two-nation theory has not yielded much benefit to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

The recent attacks on Joseph Colony in Lahore in March, 2013 and later on suicide bomb attack on the Peshawar Church was sudden manifestation and act of violence had detrimental effect on the everyday life of Christians. The Joseph Colony was burned to ground zero according to the reports in the media. The reason of the attack was the blasphemous act done by the young Christian boy while having conversation with his Muslim friend.

Diversity of cultures is exactly what is most distinctive about the human species. It flows from human freedom; it expresses human sociality (Novak 1974: 44).The society should be ruled by the norms and customs of the social world of groups and it should not be arbitrarily imposed by one section of society on 'the other'. The misuse and abuse of the anti-blasphemy laws are enormous. The anti-blasphemy has been derisively called as anti-Ahmadis law. Those who have spoken against anti-blasphemy law have been assassinated in the past including two federal ministers (Shahbaz Bhatti and Salman Taseer).

The issue of political accommodation has also come up in the discourses of religious minorities. The joint electorate or separate electorate conundrum of colonial era is still haunting Pakistan. There is no attempt of secularization and constitutionalism in Pakistan. The partition of Pakistan was the product of this lackadaisical approach. More than 25 percent of the population of then East Pakistan was non-Muslim and they were in persistent fear and alienation because of discrimination and intolerance towards them.

Not only religious minorities but various other sects within Islam feel insecure in Pakistan because of the physical violence and bigotry prevalent in the society. The various Sufi sects and traditions are very rich in countryside and they don't come to the national fore because of they are seen as heretics and hence they face self persecution from the public place.

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State - Building Process in Contemporary Afghanistan

Md. Rahat Hasan

The state building process in Afghanistan took off against the backdrop of American-led NATO intervention launched in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The purpose of America's war in Afghanistan was to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al- Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and to prevent re-establishment of terrorist bases in Afghanistan hostile to USA and international community. Just after toppling the Taliban regime, the United States and its allies realized that fighting terrorism required more than hunting down Al-Qaeda/Taliban and its allied organization. Thus, apart from military solution, state building has been an essential part of NATO's strategy to achieve that goal.

State-building is the process of creating or developing governmental institutions needed in order to stabilize and develop a nation-state. These institutions include political, economic, security, and democratic governmental agencies/institutions. On the other hand, nation-building is the process of creating or developing a national identity, national values, and national-traditions. These are established by the creation of a national anthem, flag, language, recognized ethnic and religious groups, and standardized public services designed to help address social and cultural issues in a nation-state. This process integrates the diverse sector and strata of society and produces a consensus and cooperation so vital to domestic peace and political effectiveness (Smith 1986: 226-31). Thus, for the purposes of broader analysis, the combined term nation-state building in recent years is being frequently used, due to the interconnected relationship between the two different theories.

The question of nation-State building is no doubt one of the most complex questions in the history of political science, but the case of a multicultural and diversified country like Afghanistan brings it into a yet deeper complexity. Social scientists from abroad have in most cases approached Afghanistan as a unified country with a nation called Afghans. However, according to many other scholars and western historians, notably Anthony Hyman, the theme of nationalism in

Afghanistan begs many questions. For, they believe that, "with the national or patriotic idea so weak and underdeveloped, it arguably makes more sense to analyze rival ideas of the nation held by country's different ethnic groups than some hypothetical all – emerging Afghan nationalism"(Hyman 2002: 229). Different ethnic groups in Afghanistan could not identify themselves with the term 'Afghan'. In the very beginning the term Afghan did not embrace all Afghan tribes either. "The term Afghan gradually became synonymous with Pashto speakers in general, while non-Pashtun inhabitants of Afghanistan, then as now, commonly used their respective identifying labels of race and language, i.e., Uzbek, Tajik, Farsiwan or of region, i.e., Herati, Panjsheri, Kohistani and Badakhshani (Ibid:302). Therefore, Afghanistan with its artificial borders remains as elusive as is its nation.

Afghanistan is historically a weak state. The scope and depth of central government authority has been limited, and its institutions have never succeeded in delivering the basic security needs of its citizens. With its war economy, Afghanistan has always been heavily reliant on bilateral and multilateral foreign aid for its modest development goals. A national leadership undertook little effort to bridge endemic social cleavages. In fact, the political history of Afghanistan is the successive story of the rise and fall of nation and state - building process.

Since the initial military intervention in 2001, NATO forces have remained in Afghanistan conducting counterinsurgency operations against Taliban and allied groups who have re-emerged and are against nation- building process. Effort to reconstruct Afghanistan's political, economic, social, and security related institutions and systems have been attempted by the U.S led coalition forces in order to stabilize the state. The framework of post-conflict reconstruction programme of Afghanistan was established in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 under the UN leadership. This document involved frameworks on political reform and security, which were planned to create conditions for the reconstruction process in Afghanistan (Suhrke 2007: 1298). Today, there is partnership between the Afghan government, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NATO-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in providing reconstruction (Karacasulu 2011: 190)

Progress was thereafter made in establishing an interim leadership, a transitional government framework, and democratic goals. These positive developments led to the return of millions of refugees to the homeland in Afghanistan. Ten million children have gone back to school. State Executive, Legislative and Judiciary pillars have been built, although the progress is uneven. A new Constitution with strong Presidential government and Parliamentary oversight has been adopted. Presidential and Parliamentary elections have been held. The Afghan National Army and National Police have been re-established.

Despite achievement in political, security and social sector, rebuilding of an Afghan state is a difficult task. Its impact was restricted almost entirely to the capital, Kabul, and even there mainly within the educated elite (Hyman 2002: 302). The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is clearly making progress. However, it still continues to be dependent on NATO's assistance for critical assets and aid. Meanwhile, the Taliban and its *jihadi* allies – *the Haqqanis* and *Hezb-i-Islami* -remain well-established and strong. Apart from security issues, issues relating to interethnic disharmony, warlordism, rampant corruption, and narcotic trafficking have widely being recognized as a key challenge for governance and as an obstacle for nation- state building (Gupta, Behuria, Chandra and Pattanaik 2012: 3-5). At the international level, there is a sense of fatigue, despite ongoing efforts to muster up financial support for sustaining the process of stabilization of the Afghan state.

In absence of arrangements to supplement the capabilities of the Afghan security forces, common Afghan and security analysts pretend that the proposed phase out withdrawal of NATO forces by the end 2014 forces will likely to create a security vacuum, particularly in the south-eastern provinces. To leave behind a stable government in 2014, the US and its allies need to push harder for electoral reforms, curbing corruption in the high political circles, and continue the pressure and other efforts to bring the insurgent groups to the negotiation table for long term peace and stability in Afghanistan. Finally, America must ensure that foreign financial support continues and armaments are available to the Afghanistan Security Forces as Afghanistan quite simply cannot maintain its forces on its own.

This paper seeks to analyze the following: (i) the evolution of nation- state building operations in contemporary Afghanistan; (ii) impact of the initiatives taken by international community led by USA since 2001, and (iii) challenges the Afghan government and International community are facing in stabilizing Afghanistan.

Evolution of Nation -State Building in Afghanistan

For clear understanding of Afghanistan nation –state building in the post Taliban period, a historical overview of at least the "contemporary" Afghanistan is necessary. By modern or contemporary Afghanistan is meant the emergence of Afghanistan from the very first efforts towards a centralized government, which went side by side with the rise and development of post- industrialism and nationalism elsewhere.

Concept like nation and state building are European and modern in origin. In Europe the evaluation of these ideas and their acceptance at conceptual and institutional level, was the outcome of a long drawn out historical process. During this process of evolution, the societies in the West had acquired a certain degree

of cultural and political uniformity. In the West the modern state was thus grafted on the culturally and fairly coherent ethno- religious or ethno – linguistic political entities called nations. Anthony Smith connects the rise of nationalism in Europe to 'the impact of the triple Western revolution. These were a revolution in the sphere of division of labour, a revolution in the control of administration, and the revolution in cultural co-ordination' (Smith.1986: 131). Karl Deutsch, much along the same line, saw the formation of nations as the result of the twin process of 'communication' and 'socialisation'. The idea of nations is thus firmly tied to the era and process of modernization and development, which in turn demands a population which can plausibly be regarded as homogenous and distinct by some criteria, be it race, language, or religion (Mohsin, 2002: 9). Benedict Anderson sees the nation as an 'imagined community' and defined this 'imagined' concept 'in an anthropological sprit'. This imagined community took shape following the development of print capitalism after the fifteenth century and also to an extent following the separation of state and church/religion and the dynastic powers in Europe. The development of the printing press and vernacular languages in Europe made people aware of the extent of their imagined communities (Anderson, 2006: 15-21). In sum, industrialism and modernization made the quest for the formation of homogeneous and universal culture necessary. Another element of industrialism is the urbanization and its quest for the formation of a homogeneous culture and a common language and means of communication.

Afghan nation – State building does not really fit into the European concept of nationalism. Because all the stages that other successful nation state has gone through, would have been and is still lacking. Nationalism defined as a watermark 'between older agrarian societies and modern industrial societies'. This view of nationalism has little bearing on the Afghanistan tribal, ethnically conscious nationalist movement. Afghanistan remained mostly tribal and was minimally affected by modern industrial process.

Anderson's techno – educated qualifications for nationalism are also not applicable to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan society where there is a predominantly inability to read and write, the question of the printing press and education does not add up to nationalism. The Afghanistan state, which came out of centuries of resistance against foreign domination, was not 'a literate high culture' or 'co-extensive with the entire political unit' or its total populations (Misdaq 2007: 26-28).

Another process that made national consciousness in Europe and elsewhere possible was the industrial age and the untiring desire for modernization and separation of state and religion. On the contrary in Afghanistan, religion was used in the first place to legitimatize monarchy and in the second as the force behind

the nationalist movement. "Islam, Afghan history, and Pashto together formed the mortar that would permit the country's ethnic mosaic to be moulded into a single nation" (Gregorian 1969: 176). Raja Anwar highlighted the characteristic of the Afghanistan state by saying that although 99% of Afghans are Muslims, in the field of politics, regional and tribal differences take precedence over religious and ideological beliefs (Roy 2002: 14-15).

In a country like Afghanistan with many different ethnic groups, there were no other binding elements upon which nationalism and national consciousness could have built its pillars, except for the Persian language and some shared historical past. Dari/Persian, not Pashto, always served as the *lingua franca* of the country as a whole. However, repeated attempts were made to foster the growth and spread of Pashto. Official patronage of Pashto was systematically attempted, but abjectly failed, during the Mohammad Daoud Khan period (Hyman 2002:300-301).

Last but not the least, the process of nation building in Afghanistan, was disturbed by the Pashtun tribal code - the *Pushtunwali*. As repeatedly mentioned, modernization has been the fuel of nationalism. It was due to Pushtunwali or the Afghan tribal code, feudal structure and the disability of the Afghan rulers to break it, that every effort towards modernization and thereby to the formation of a true and united nation was stuck.

The first state-building process in Afghanistan was started from the end of the 19th century. Prior to the arrival of European imperial powers, the territory today known as Afghanistan was a shifting frontier among the various empire of the region particularly Mughal and Safavid empires (Rubin 2006: 177)

In the late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer state in the "Great Game" between the British and Russian empires. Three Anglo- Afghanistan were crucial in the context of developing a sense of incipient nationalism, as well as serving indirectly to consolidate the Afghan state. As the Swiss ethnologist Pierre Centlivres explains, the wars produced a traumatic effect that can hardly be exaggerated:

> For many people in Afghanistan, if there is an embryo of national feeling ('conscience'), it is rooted in history and in the heroic imagery of the struggle against the English in the nineteenth century. It is also the source of popular political thought. (Hyman, 2002: 303)

The first Anglo-Afghan war (1839-42) was a misconceived attempt by the British to counter the exaggerated threat of Russian expansion. In the course of this war, Britain deported Afghanistan's ruler, Amir Dost Muhammad to India. British plans for a total domination of Afghanistan through the installation of a puppet Afghan ruler, Shah Shuja, however, did not come into fruition. On the contrary, the British lost almost all their troops in Afghanistan. Soon after the British left, the exiled Dost Muhammad returned as king and ruled for another 21 years.

Dost Muhammad was the first Afghan leader to explicitly adopt a modernizing approach regarding his rule though this effort was limited to military reform and administrative issues (Rubin, 2002: 47). He unified the disparate Afghan tribes by employing his own brand of tribal statesmanship. Rather than impose a highly centralized government, he employed the assistance of Afghan tribal chiefs and regional warlords who, gradually, implemented his reforms for him.

A second Anglo-Afghan war began in 1878, again sparked by revived British fears of Russian plans to gain control of Afghanistan and from there to go on to attack India. Behaving like two giant chess players ("The Great Game"), Russia and Britain decided to make Afghanistan a buffer state to keep their mighty empires apart. In the bargain the British gained control over Afghanistan's foreign relations. This also paved the way for drawing of the Durand Line between Afghanistan and British India in 1893(Misdaq 2007: 56-62). Internal autonomy allowed the Amir to proceed with his own strategy of state- and nation-building. With the help of the British, Abdul Rahman, also known as the "Iron Amir", waged internal wars against rebellious tribes, Pashtun and non-Pashtun alike, in order to consolidate territorial control. Many Pashtun were forcibly resettled in the non-Pashtun north while those supportive were co-opted. For the Amir, building the nation was a matter of unification and centralization, preferably by force. This led to his disrespect for traditionally established forms of indirect rule through local notables and an effort to establish a de-tribalzed state elite (Rubin 2006: 47)

Habibullah (1901-19) continued the drive for modernization by strengthening central authority in maintaining the efficacy of the army. He founded the country's first military college (Harbiah) and also the first high school (Habibiah), after his name, on the pattern of a French lycee (Misdaq 2007: 26-28). Furthermore, he established the country's first printing press. Habibullah also employed many Western technicians and built a hydro-electric power station to provide electricity to his palace and part of Kabul. Another important achievement was the readmission of most tribal and ethnic leaders, who had been exiled or had fled the country after wars with his father. Thus, most Hazarah Shi'a who had taken shelter in Iran or Baluchistan returned home (ibid: 61-62).

In 1919, the British gave up their control over Afghanistan's foreign policy and accepted Afghan independence. It was now King Amanullah's turn to lead an ambitious modernization project. With the end of British subsidies, Amanullah had to develop Afghanistan's economy. He regularized taxation and private ownership of land was legalized. Some nomads in the north were settled, and religious endowment in land (*waqf)* was abolished. Modern agriculture and industry were promoted. Under Amanullah's rule Afghanistan saw its first Constitution in 1923 that guaranteed formal equality for his subjects who became Afghan citizens.

The *Loya Jirga*, a representative assembly, was established. The cornerstone of Amanullah's social reforms was the elevation of the status of women whom he regarded as partners, companions, and friends of Afghan society. He believed, they should not be treated as second-class citizens. This reform could not be carried out without implementing a full-fledged overhaul of the educational system of the country. Elementary education became obligatory. In addition to the Habibia School, a number of other schools run by French, German and Afghan teachers were opened (Rubin 2006:55-56) Amanullah's other reforms included regulation of marriages and abolition of child marriages. Restrictions were placed on wedding expenses, including dowries. Women were given the right to appeal to courts for their rights against their husbands. But his reforms proved too ambitious. The tax reforms angered landowning khans (tribal leaders), the religious establishment was loath to endorse his social reforms and his rejection of recommendation made by the *Loya Jirga* alienated the tribes. With an army in disarray due to uncompleted reforms and having to cope with costly local uprisings, Amanullah faced a fast-growing tribal rebellion that forced him to flee the country (Ibid: 56-58). His successor, King Nadir Shah abandoned the reforms in favor of a more gradual approach to modernization.

Mohammad Zahir Shah ruled the country from 1933 to 1973. Zahir Shah recognized the need for the modernization of Afghanistan and recruited a number of foreign advisers to assist him for this process. Despite the factionalism and political infighting a new Constitution was introduced in 1964 which turned Afghanistan into a modern democratic state. Free elections, a Parliament, civil rights, women's rights and universal suffrage were introduced in the 1964 Constitution (ibid: 56-58).

In 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan overthrew the monarchy of his first cousin Mohammed Zahir Shah and declared himself as the first President of Afghanistan. The changing international environment after the Second World War put Afghanistan on the geo-political agenda of the United States and the Soviet Union. With the help of the superpowers Daoud sought to accelerate the country's modernization. Daoud Khan was known for his progressive policies, especially in relation to the infrastructures building like roads, highways, airport and for initiating two five-year modernization plans which increased the labor force by about 50 percent. However, the state remained something alien to Afghanistan's society, its capacity being restricted by the country's pre-modern social and political makeup (ibid: 58-59).

As a result of the Saur Revolution in 1978, the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal, came in to power and began to pursue its radical reforms more aggressively. Some of the reforms included, redistribution of land holding,

elimination of usury, discontinuation of the bride price, Removal of illiteracy, especially amongst women.

The PDPA government faced many difficulties in implementing the reforms. These new reforms were not well received by the majority of the Afghan population, particularly in rural areas. The party was not able to make a complete and accurate analysis of the Afghan society and culture before introducing land and other reforms. As many saw it was un-Islamic and was seen as a forced approach to Western culture in Afghan society.

In response to the Soviet intervention and support to the PDPA government, the U.S. and Pakistan helped arm local Islamic fundamentalist of various tribal backgrounds, known as the *Mujahedin*, to fight against Soviet. Faced with mounting international pressure and great number of casualties, the Soviets withdrew in 1989 but continued to support Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah until 1992. His government tried to solve the ongoing civil war without Soviet troops on the ground. He promoted National Reconciliation program in 1986 and promulgated quasi-parliamentary constitution in 1987, strengthened army and tribal militia forces. However, he was overthrown by mujahidin in 1992 and brutally killed in 1996.

After the fall of Najibullah's government in 1992, the Afghan political parties agreed on a peace and power-sharing agreement (the Peshawar Accords). The accords created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period to be followed by general elections. However, Afghanistan was plagued by different civil wars, which led to the federal government in Kabul to eventually be overthrown by the Taliban in 1996. The Taliban ended the various civil wars in Afghanistan, however instituted their radical Islamic ideology in the laws, politics, cultural, and economy throughout the Afghanistan. Throughout their five years rule the Taliban continued to be repressive denying Afghans essential rights in the name of security and religion. Physical punishments like amputation of hands of thieves, or stoning to death of adulterers, beheading of murderers became cornerstone for their kind of justice. The other important drawbacks of the regime was it incoherence with international system. The regime provides active support to the Islamic militants around the world (Rashid 2009:171). Nearly one million Afghans were displaced inside the country, and a new flow of refugees was arriving in Pakistan and Iran.

In sum, there is an inherent tension between the goals of nation-building according to international norms on one hand, and respect for local customs and practices. Between 1880 and 1992 Afghanistan's national government under various regimes attempted to make central government control over various provinces and other legal affairs and also to improve the status of women through

changes in the law and their own policies. However, opposition to these reforms came from conservative religious scholars and warlords, who rejected any form of outside interference. Governments that demanded rapid universal changes found that this undermined their political legitimacy because they were accused of abandoning true Afghan values.

Post Taliban Nation- State Building Process

After overthrow the Taliban regime, the United States and its allies realized that fighting terrorism required more than hunting down al-Qaeda and Taliban. The effort, which many experts described as "nation-building," was supported by the United Nations, international institutions, and international community in post-Taliban international meetings. The strategy consisted of a broad nation building efforts, which includes a strong Afghanistan security forces, governance, agricultural and infrastructural development. The importance of nation-building is codified in various high-level documents that promulgate American policy as well as all major international conferences on Afghanistan, including the NATO summit in Chicago during May 20-21, 2012, and the Tokyo donors' conference on July 8, 2012. The President Obama's National Security Strategy (NSS) specifically mentions Afghanistan:

"As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations . . . as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again . . . provide a haven for terrorists." (Dreyer 2006: 6).

James Dobbins, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in *'The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building',* organized around a proposed hierarchy of nation-building process, which may be prioritized as follows: (Dobbins 2007: xxiii)

- Security: peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security sector reforms
- Humanitarian relief: return of refugees and response to potential epidemics, hunger, and lack of shelter
- Governance: resuming public services and restoring public administration
- Economic stabilization: establishing a stable currency and providing a legal and regulatory framework in which local and international trade can resume
- Democratization: building political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal and constitutional framework for elections
- Development: fostering economic growth, poverty reduction, and infrastructure improvements.

The reconstruction process in Afghanistan started after Bonn Agreement in 2001 under the UN leadership. This document involved frameworks on political reform and security, which were planned to create conditions for the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Under the Bonn Agreement, Hamid Karzai was appointed chair of a new transitional government in Afghanistan and reaffirmed as leader by "emergency *loya jirga*" in June 2002. New Constitution was approved in January 2004 by "Constitutional *Loya Jirga*" (CLJ). The Constitutional *Loya Jirga* adopted the 162 articles of the Afghan Constitution. Under the Constitution a Presidential system with a bicameral Parliament was established. Presidential, Parliamentary and Provincial elections have been held twice so far and the next Presidential election is scheduled to be held in May 2014. People behind the drafting of the Constitution provided institutional mechanism for the representation of women in the power structure. They have attempted to ensure this by providing for equality of women under the Constitution and securing 25 percent of seat of the *Wolesi Jirga* for women. For the *Meshrano Jirga*, President's appointees shall have 50 percent women. The Constitution also established a regular pattern of court systems, including High Court, Appeals Court and Supreme Court (Malikyar and Rubin 2002: 41).

Today, there is partnership between the Afghan government, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NATO-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in providing reconstruction. UNAMA was established in March 2002 following the Bonn agreement. It is responsible for all UN relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. Its development programs continue in coordination with the Afghan government's development strategy, focusing mainly on five sectors in Afghanistan: agriculture, energy, private sector development, capacity building, and higher education and vocational training. In addition, while the political affairs division at UNAMA supports political outreach, conflict resolution, disarmament and regional cooperation, its human rights unit plays an important role in the promotion and protection of human rights in Afghanistan (Karacasulu 2011:191).

Besides UNAMA, other UN bodies as well have impact on Afghanistan's reconstruction, including the UN Development Program, the UN High Commission for Refugees and the UN Development Fund for Women. Likewise, non-governmental organizations, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have a significant place in the reconstruction efforts (ibid: 191).

Afghan-led governmental reform and institution-building programs are under way, all with U.S. and other donor assistance, that include training additional civil servants, instituting merit-based performance criteria, hiring on qualifications rather than kinship and ethnicity, and eliminating widespread

governmental corruption. The key institution for regulating public institution and their administration is the Afghan Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). Afghan ministries have greatly increasing their staffs and technological capabilities (many ministry offices now have modern computers and communications, for example). Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) acts as an oversight body over alleged human rights abuses. Since 2001, numerous television channels, newspapers, and other media firms were established (Pajhok, Arina, Tolo News, Daily Afghanistan Outlook etc.), giving Afghanistan some of the freest press (US Department of Defence, 2012: 72-73).

Apart from political transition, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference. 46 countries including 28 NATO members send their troops for ISAF task in Afghanistan. The main objective of ISAF is assisting the government of Afghanistan in providing security and stability, in order to create the conditions for reconstruction and development. There are five main security tasks of ISAF: conducting security and stability operations; disarming illegally armed groups; facilitating bullets depository managements; providing post-operation assistance development and training the Afghanistan's National Security Forces (ANSF) so that they can effectively take over the Afghanistan's security (Karacasulu 2011: 191). ANSF consist of three principle components: the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Air Force, and the Afghan National Police. The size of the Afghan army is roughly about 195,000 and they are trained by International Forces. The size of the Afghan Police is about 157,000. ANSF Salaries is about $1.6 billion per year, paid by donor countries (Chandra 2013: 11-17). Presently, training of the Afghan army is carried by nine states: the US, Great Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Romania, Mongolia, Canada and Estonia (Karacasulu, 2011: 190).

In addition to ISAF, sixteen NATO countries lead 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating across Afghanistan. Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), ISAF tries to help the Afghan authorities to strengthen the institutions required to establish good governance and rule of law, and to promote human rights. PRT is a joint, integrated military-civilian organization, staffed and supported by ISAF member countries, operating at the provincial level. The mission of the PRTs is to enhance security, extend the reach of the Afghan central government, and facilitate reconstruction. They are lead by civilian agencies, supported by military Reconstruction projects, UNAMA, and other provincial stakeholders (Katzman 2014: 36).

The framework for cooperation on reconstruction between the government of Afghanistan, the UN and the international community has been outlined and agreed

in a number of key documents and conferences including the Tokyo Conference of 2002 on reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, the Berlin Conference of 2004 on Afghanistan, the London Conference of 2006, the Afghan Compact of 2006, the Paris Declaration of 2008, the Afghan Conference in London of 2010, Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan in 2011 and recently 2012 Tokyo summit. (Karacasulu 2011:191-92) At the Tokyo Conference held in July 8, 2012, the United States and its partners pledged a total of US$16 billion in aid to Afghanistan up to 2015 for the socio-economic development of Afghanistan including: (Katzman 2012: 36)

- The holding of credible, inclusive, and transparent elections in 2014 and 2015.
- Improved access to justice, and respect for human rights, particularly for women and children.
- Improved integrity of public financial management and the commercial banking sector.
- Improved revenue systems and budget execution.

U.S. officials have also sought to enlist grater regional support for Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been slowly integrated into regional security and economic organizations. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and, in June 2012, Afghanistan was granted full observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security coordination body that includes Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

India has historically had friendly ties with Afghanistan and wishes to see a stable government in Kabul. Despite its own economy facing slow growth, India has invested heavily in Afghan reconstruction and development. India has contributed US$ 2 billion so far (Pattanaik, 2012: 572-74). India is the fifth largest donor to Afghanistan. In October 2011, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Karzai signed a strategic partnership Agreement, which formalized cooperation on governance, economics, commerce, education, public administration, and security/law enforcement. Despite this largely developmental role in Afghanistan, India's presence in Afghanistan remains a source of much misgiving within Pakistan and especially its military establishment. While Afghanistan looks towards India for greater cooperation, Pakistan appears determined not to allow such a scenario. It typically sees any Indian presence and influence in Afghanistan, even which acquired through legitimate means, as being disadvantageous to its interests. Pakistan still seeks 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and would prefer to have a pliable regime in Kabul when the NATO/ISAF mission ends in 2014.

Efforts to re-build Afghanistan are showing some results. Ten million children have gone back to school. However, setbacks have occurred because of Taliban attacks on schools, causing some to close. The health care sector has made considerable gains in reducing infant mortality and giving about 65% of the population at least some access to health professionals. There has been substantial new construction, particularly in Kabul, including luxury hotels; Coca Cola bottling factory; apartment and office buildings; and marriage halls and other structures. Transportations system has also given priority in the Afghanistan Rebuilding process. Among major projects completed are the Ring Road, Qandahar to Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan province and road linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul. A new bridge has opened over the Panj River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Three railway projects are under way. One out of it, a 45 mile line from Mazar-i-Sharif to the border with Uzbekistan, was completed in March 2011. Other areas of development are agriculture, electricity and telecommunication. (Katzman 2013: 62-74)

Afghanistan Transition and Challenges to State- Building

At the Lisbon summit in 2010, the NATO members agreed to a gradual phase-out of combat operations by 2014. After that date, NATO would continue to contribute to training and advising the Afghanistan National Army. This transfer of responsibility is taking place via so-called "Transition" process.

The strategic partnership agreement between United States and Afghanistan was signed in May 2012. It establishes the outlines of a long-term relationship and a framework for future cooperation. It notably leaves out details on the number of forces and funding the United States will commit to Afghanistan after 2014.

The US believes that Afghan security forces will be in a position to take over the responsibilities of maintaining law and order from 2014 onwards. However, those who understand Afghanistan fully know that such arrangements will never bring peace and stability to the country.

In similar circumstances, earlier in the 1990s, Najibullah's forces lasted for a few years but eventually fell. However, Najibullah was isolated and did not have any external support. This time around the situation is different. The international community is prepared to help the Afghan forces by providing money, equipment and training. But it is not known whether this help will be sustained over a longer period of time.

Although, the Afghanistan National Security Forces has achieved some successes, the effectiveness, professionalism, and state of readiness of this security forces is uneven. There is also a possibility of disintegrating the ANSF along ethnic lines, in case the Taliban, a predominantly Pashtun-majority entity,

successfully overruns Kabul after 2014. The way ANSF targeting their Western trainers, phenomenon commonly referred to "Green on Blue Attack or insider attack", questions are also being raised about their motivation and interest to take on the Taliban in the post-withdrawal situation. Meanwhile, the Taliban and its jihadi allies – the Haqqanis and Hezb-i-Islami - remain well-established and strong and actively involved in a nationwide insurgency which includes hundreds of assassinations and suicide attacks (Jones 2008: 27).

Apart from these security issue, corruption remains rampant, including at the highest levels. Transparency International's 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Afghanistan the third most corrupt country, out of 183 surveyed. Illegal opium production continues to pose a huge problem for the stability of Afghanistan. Since the Insurgent groups and Warlords are dependent on drugs money at the moment, they are unlikely to accept any international efforts to stop drugs production in the short term.

In recent days, both the Afghanistan and U.S are in favor of negotiating a peace with Taliban that would give the Taliban some role in future government. Such an approach also has been endorsed by NATO and most of Afghanistan's neighbors notably Pakistan. The recent talks in Chantilly, Paris (20-22 December, 2013) hosted by French think tank, Foundation for Strategic Research, have renewed hopes for some sort of reconciliation between the Taliban and Karzai's government. However, the reconciliation process with Taliban is yet to produce any result.

In absence of arrangements to supplement the capabilities of the Afghan security forces, common Afghan and security analysts pretend that the withdrawal of NATO forces will likely to create a security vacuum, particularly in the south-eastern provinces.

Conclusion

The political history of Afghanistan is the successive story of the rise and fall of nation and state - building process. The complexities and dynamics of the society and its power structure have acted as constraints on any efforts of modernization and centralization of the country. Subjugation and repression of the ethnic groups, as practicesd by Amir Abdur Rehman Khan or initiating reforms from the top, as King Amanullah and Zahir Shah did or the communist rulers attempted to, have not yielded much fruitful result or desired result. In fact, revolt against central authority had been a repeated phenomenon in Afghanistan.

There are so many reasons of the failure of nation- State building in Afghanistan. One of the reasons is its geopolitical position and foreign intervention. Because of its geo- strategic position, it has always been in the interest of the foreign

powers to keep Afghanistan subjugated. Secondly, the ethnic diversity, the lingual issues and the claims and desires of the Pashtun tribes for cultural and political supremacy still prevent Afghanistan from becoming a nation. The other reason for the failure of nationalism in Afghanistan is the Pashtunwali or the Afghan (Pashtun) tribal code. *Pashtunwali* of course not the only local custom, but it has been the only custom, which undermined every effort to reform the political, social and economical structure of the country.

Although, Taliban had brought about some peace and security in Afghanistan at a time when bitter factional fighting had ravaged the country bitterly, throughout their five years rule the Taliban continued to be repressive denying Afghans essential rights in the name of security. They seemed totally ignorant of the need to rebuild the state structures and made no concerted efforts towards it.

The progress in the post Taliban Afghanistan under the Bonn Agreement (2001) offers ground for hope. The Afghan nation has been able to build democratic structures over the years, and progress has been made in key areas such as governance, security, economy, health, education, transport, and agriculture. Girls are going to school, the security situation in northern and western parts is improving and some developmental activity has taken place thanks to the aid and assistance from the international community. Yet, an important dilemma that faces the international community in Afghanistan is how to better assist state-building while leaving more responsibility to the Afghans since the West has made up its mind to exit from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Although, the Afghanistan National Security Forces has achieved some successes, the effectiveness, professionalism, and state of readiness of this security forces is uneven. Meanwhile, the Taliban and its *jihadi* allies – the *Haqqanis* and *Hezb-i-Islami* - remain well-established and strong and actively involved in a nationwide insurgency.

To leave behind a stable government in 2014, the US and its allies need to push harder for addressing the issue of several institutional weakness of the government, electoral reforms, and curbing corruption in the high political circles. America must ensure that foreign financial support continues and armaments are available to the Afghanistan Security Forces as Afghanistan quite simply cannot maintain its forces on its own. If the Afghan security forces given solid and sustained support by the international community, they may be able to get the better of the Taliban. The Afghan security forces have also been able to put up a tough fight with the insurgent groups in several areas in recent years. Finally, the geo- strategic location of Afghanistan provides a linkage between South – West- and Central Asia. Using Afghanistan as bridge state, regional countries can improve their trade relations. Neighbour's engagement with Afghanistan should be constructive and not be competitive and threatening to any other state. Unless Afghanistan's key regional

neighbours, including India, Iran, Pakistan, China, Russia and Central Asian countries contribute meaningfully to the efforts to stabilise the country, instead of pursuing narrow national agendas, Afghanistan may plunge into a civil war. This will reverse the gains made in socio-economic development over the last more than a decade.

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Annexure 1: Comparative Social and Economic Statistics

GDP, and GDP Growth and Unemployment Rates	$33.55 billion purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2012. 109th in the world. Per capita: $1,000 purchasing power parity. 212th in the world. Growth has averaged about 9% per year every year since Taliban rule. GDP was about $10 billion (PPP) during last year of Taliban rule. Unemployment rate is about 8%, but underemployment rate may be nearly 50%.
Children in School/Schools Built since 2002	8 million, of which 40% are girls. Up from 900,000 boys in school during Taliban era. 4,000 schools built (all donors) and 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 17 universities, up from 2 in 2002. 75,000 Afghans in universities in Afghanistan (35% female); 5,000 when Taliban was in power.
Afghans With Access to Health Coverage	65% with basic health services access-compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant mortality down 22% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built.
Roads Built	About 2,500 miles paved post-Taliban, including repaving of "Ring Road" (78% complete) that circles the country. Kabul-Qandahar drive reduced to 6 hours.
Judges/Courts	Over 1,000 judges (including 200 women) trained since fall of Taliban.
Banks Operating	17, including branches in some rural areas, but about 90% of the population still use *hawalas (*informal money transfer services). No banks existed during Taliban era. Some limited credit card use. Some Afghan police now paid by cell phone (E-Paisa).
Access to Electricity	15%-20% of the population. Much of its electricity imported from neighboring states.
Government Revenues (excl. donor funds)	About $2 billion in 2012 compared to $200 million in 2002. Total Afghan budget is about $4.5 billion (including development funds)—shortfall covered by foreign donors, including through Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

Financial Reserves/ Debt	About $4.4 billion, up from $180 million in 2002. Includes amounts due Central Bank. $8 billion bilateral debt, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in debt in 2004, and $1.6 billion forgiven by other creditors in March 2010.
Airlines	Four Afghan airlines: Ariana (national) plus at least two privately owned: Safi and Kam. Turkish Air and India Air fly to Kabul.
Legal Exports/ Agriculture	80% of the population is involved in agriculture. Self-sufficiency in wheat production as of May 2009 (first time in 30 years). Exports: $400 million+ (2011): fruits, raisins, melons, pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets, lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber products (Kunar, Nuristan provinces).
Oil Proven Reserves	3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Current oil production negligible, but USAID funding project to revive oil and gas facilities in the north.
Cellphones/Tourism	About 18 million cellphone subscribers, up from negligible amounts during Taliban era. Tourism: National park opened in Bamiyan June 2009. Increasing tourist visits.

Sources: Kenneth Katzman, 2013: *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, March, p. 72

Regional Economic Integration in South Asia: a case of India-Sri Lanka free trade agreement

Antaryami Beriha

The formal process of regional economic integration in South Asia was started with the establishment of the institutional mechanism, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985. However, economic cooperation and integration became a part of the SAARC work agenda seven years later, when the council of ministers of the member's countries signed an agreement to form the South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in 1993. After the three round of negotiation in 1995, 1996 and 1998, it was suspended from 1999 onwards because laborious and time consuming negotiations have been restricted to products by products and sectoral approach and on the other hand the political situation between India and Pakistan became tense. In 1998 the military takeover in Pakistan and the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan were the major reasons for suspension of SAPTA. As a result it was followed by a slowdown in the process of economic integration in South Asia for the next few years.

After the normalization of India-Pakistan relations in the year 2003-04, the heads of SAARC member nations agreed to lunch the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) at the 2004 annual summit that was held in Islamabad and implemented in 2006. From the initially it has designed to trade in goods only and aimed at creating a free trade area in South Asia in a period of ten years. It has also aimed to gradual tariff liberalization, removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and introduction, or strengthening and modernizing of trade facilitating national infrastructure. The SAFTA Agreements provided for negative list specification and its periodic revision alongside a mechanism for dispute settlement. However, the ultimate aim of the SAFTA is to creation of free trade area but the agreement suffered from many design specific weakness, as well as problems of implementations. Like on the service sectors from liberalizations schedule, large negative list with no target specification for their eliminations.[1] Moreover, there are political tension between India and Pakistan big obstacle to enhance the trade relations in south Asia.

In the period in between there emerged bilateral Free trade agreement (FTA) in South Asia. For instance India-Sri Lanka bilateral FTA in 2000 and Pakistan-Sri Lanka bilateral FTA in 2005. Negotiations have been under way for a possible Bangladesh–India bilateral FTA also. The increased number of bilateral FTAs has provided more trade integration between these countries and has led the member countries to liberalise their own economy. The intra regional trade of South Asian countries as a share of total trade even after SAFTA was implemented in 2006 has remained low (at about 5 per cent of the region's total trade), but the bilateral trade between member countries has increased. However, India-Sri Lanka FTA is an economic rationality, which is assisting the peace process in between two nations.

2. Theoretical concept of Free Trade Agreement (FTA)

Before proceeding to discuss, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the concept of Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). The PTA is a trade arrangement between two or more member countries in which the goods trade between these countries is provided market access with lower trade barriers relative to non-member countries. A customs Union is an advanced stage of FTA, where preferential tariffs apply by the member countries for a common external tariff on a good imported from outside countries (Panagariya 1998).

The initiative of the FTA in the global or regional level has led to a debate about the merits of regional trading agreements. While some have argued that FTAs are a stepping stone towards worldwide free trade, other has feared that it will be stumbling blocs. The basic issue regarding preferential trading arrangement has however been in terms of their trade creation or trade diversion effects. Trade creation occurs when the lowering of tariff allows partner country imports to replace high-cost domestic production, this improves welfare or create environment for healthy trade. On the other hand trade diversion occurs when the removal of tariffs causes' trade to be diverted from third country to the partner country though the third country treated equally like the partner country and low cost source of imports. The net effect of trade creation or trade diversion is however difficult to assess a prior.

Broadly through the advantages from FTA formation are; advancing trade liberalization, establishing useful precedents for WTO talks, locking in domestic reforms and bolstering alliances among trading partners. On the other hand disadvantage may also be created by the negotiation and implementation of the regional trade agreements and these include; trade and investment diversion, overlapping, and conflicting trading rules of origin, attention and resource diversion from WTO and bad precedents for other trade accords (Schott 2004).

In South Asia region the SAPTA was the first economic instrument. which was suspended in 1998, due to Pakistan political change and tension with India. The South Asian countries were more serious to develop the bilateral FTA to expand their economics interaction. And the first bilateral FTA was signed in 1998 between India and Sri Lanka.

3. Conceptualization of India-Sri Lanka FTA

Both the countries agreed that the ISLFTA should be SAPTA plus. The SAPTA free trade agreement was formulated in the positive list approach where by each country catalogues the individual commodities for which it would grant preferences to the other. But the ISLFTA was formulated on the negative list approach where each country extending concession preferences to all commodities except those indicated in the negative list. And both countries agreed on adopting a time table for trade liberalisation, so that completely free trade should prevail between two countries subject to the negative list and further that negative list should be reduced during the negotiation from 1998 to 2010.[2]

In order to incorporate the asymmetry between the Indian and Sri Lankan economies into the free trade agreement, special and differential treatment to Sri Lanka was in cooperated in the Agreement. In the bilateral FTA as implemented in 2000, Sri Lanka was given larger negative list, a longer time for phasing out the tariff and more flexibility in rules of origin (Kelegama2006). Sri Lankan negative list enumerated 1180 items on tariffs lines which are mainly agriculture or livestock items, rubber products, iron and steel, machinery and electrical items. India's negative list contained 429 items on the tariffs line that includes garment, plastic and rubber products, and other items. Sri Lanka had been given longer period of eight years for phasing out of tariffs and was accorded the liberty to reduce its negative list at her comfort level. As a result on the Sri Lankan side 3,932 tariffs lines were to be required zero duty for Indian exporters over eight years. On the other hand India has 4,150 items on the tariff line to be reduced to zero duty over a period of three years.

Rules of origin (RoO) criteria also relaxed in Sri Lanka's favour. Under the ISLFTA in order to benefit from the duty concession on products, there is a need to fulfil the ROO criteria that specify a minimum local content. The products identify such as tea, fish, spices etc. products which are not completely produced have to fulfil with the Domestic Value Addition (DVA) or preferential treatment requires a minimum of 35 per cent of the Freight on Board (FOB)[3]. Further, if the raw material needed for products are obtained from each other than an exporter has to show a DVA of 25 percent on finished products. Furthermore, revenue compensation for loss of tariff income and anti-dumping rule and regulation was not included in the

ISLFTA. This agreement also included mechanisms for review and consultation, as well as settlement of dispute above and beyond the protection afforded to both countries under the safeguards clause.

The number of sensitive items preferential treatment is accorded with only partial lifting of quantitative restrictions.[4] India give permit to Sri Lanka to exports 15 million kg of tea per annum with fixed tariffs preference of 50 percent. On the same time India would permit to import of 8 million of pieces of garments per annum from Sri Lanka with fixed tariff preference of 50 percent. Out of this 6 million pieces fabric must be from Indian material and 2 million from Sri Lankan fabric. A maximum amount of 1.5 million pieces was prescribed for individual categories. In respect of textile items India offer is restricted to a maximum of 25 percent.

So far as the tea is concerned, Sri Lanka requested India to allow Indian ports for entry of the Sri Lankan tea in the Indian market. However, Indian side respond positively and offered two more ports.[5] Furthermore, in case of garments India responded to Sri Lanka's request for deepening specific duty concessions on 51 percent tariffs lines at 6 digit HS level. India agreed to increase the specific duty tariff concession wherever applicable on requested tariff lines from 50 percent to 75 percent. On the request of the Sri Lankan side India agreed to increase the unrestricted quota of 2 million pieces in respect of which fabric on non-Indian origin is used when Sri Lanka fully utilizes this quota. On utilization unrestricted quota India agreed to give additional quota of two million pieces out of total 8 million pieces. Further, India agreed to increase the level of quota per category per annum from 1.5 million to 2 million pieces. Sri Lanka also request to have more port to entry points for garments, and India agreed to provide Kolkata and JNPT ports of Mumbai (Upadhyay 2007:142-145).

4. Trade Relations between India and Sri Lanka

The trade relation between India and Sri Lanka has been improving since 1991 when India fully liberalized their economy. Before 1991, both the countries (India and Sri Lanka) were more concentred on the western countries, its means both the countries were deepened on the European countries to promote their economy. But the time was changed, when South Asia Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) was formulated in 1993 by the member of South Asia region. But the SAPTA was suspended from 1999 onwards, as the political situation between India and Pakistan became tense. South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was announced only in 2004 and implemented in 2006.

In the period in between there emerged bilateral Free trade agreement (FTA) in South Asia. For instance India-Sri Lanka bilateral FTA in 2000. The bilateral

FTAs have provided more trade integration between both countries and has led the member countries to liberalise their own economy. The intra regional trade of South Asian countries as a share of total trade even after SAFTA was implemented in 2006 has remained low, but the bilateral trade between member countries has increased.

India-Sri Lanka FTA was signed in December 1998 and came into operation in March 2000. The FTA marked an important milestone in India Sri Lanka relations. It concretized and paved the way for closer economic integration between the two South Asian countries. The SAPTA agreement was signed in 1995, and was only based on the 'positive list' but ISLFTA was formulated on the 'negative list' approach where each country extends preference concessions to all commodities except those indicated in its negative list. The ISLFTA follows the trade liberalization rule set by the (WTO). It has been considered as a relatively strong agreement with substantial product coverage, (about 80 percent of tariff lines coming under the product classification code at 6 digit level), significant tariff cuts, and simple rules of origin. From India's point of view the agreement countered its isolation in international arena from the economic sanctions as in 1998; India had lunched her second nuclear test. On the other hand from the Sri Lankan perspective there were political and economic objectives such as reducing prevailing political tensions between two countries and increase the benefit of economic liberalisation (Kelegama and Mukherji 2007).

5. Sri Lanka's Trade with India

5.1. Sri Lanka Exports to India

After the implementation of the India-Sri Lanka FTA there was a significant improvement in trade relation between the two economies. India and Sri Lanka shared a vibrant and growing economic and commercial partnership, with bilateral trade growing rapidly in the last decade. By the year 2007, Sri Lanka's export to India was only US$ 515 million that is 6.6 percent of total exports of Sri Lanka to India. But it changed in 2009 because of the global financial crisis. By 2010, Sri Lanka's exports to India stood at US$ 471.23 million compared to US$ 333.54 million in corresponding period in 2009, and registered a growth of about 30%**.** The bilateral trade in the first eleven months (Jan-November) of 2011 amounted to US$ 4.46 billion, which is 71.94 percent higher than the corresponding year of 2009[6]. Over the ten years following the FTA, bilateral trade multiplied nearly five-fold. Bilateral trade in 2010 reached US$ 3.04 billion, which was US$ 2.07 billion in 2009. Significantly, the rate of growth of exports has increased rapidly than the imports (De Mel 2008).

By year 2006, about 96 percent of Sri Lankan exports to India came under zero duty list of the ISLFTA and Sri Lanka's exports to India consisted of 94 products. The ISLFTA played an important role in enhancing the exports of Sri Lanka four times from the previous amount. The preferential exports under the FTA were not for direct final consumption but were intermediate products which are required by the Indian industries. The main Sri Lankan exports to India are metal products, electronic products, general machinery and electrical products, paper and paper products, pepper, chemical and plastic products, food, beverages and tobacco, wooden products, cloves and woven fabrics. The most important products which contributed to exports growth include copper ingots, wire bars and billets, tyres, furniture and Dual Inline Memory Modules (DIMMs). Export of these items to India rapidly increased from 2002. The FTA, thus, greatly enhanced trade between two countries, and specially beneficial for Sri Lanka. The trade creation is visible from the number of products entering into the Indian market from Sri Lanka through ISLFTA.

5.2. Imports of Sri Lanka from India

Sri Lanka became the main importer goods from India after implementation of the FTA. India's export to Sri Lanka stood at about 13.81 percent of total imports of Sri Lanka from India in 2002, which amounted to US$ 835 million. By the year 2007, it had reached US$ 2750 million of imports of Sri Lanka from India, which was 24.43 percent of total imports. By the year 2010, the import of Sri Lanka from India reached US$ 2571 million. During 2007-08, the amount of imports was high, but after the global financial crisis, Sri Lanka was more focused on the exports to India and other South Asian countries.

5.3. Provision of Quota for Readymade Garment and Tea

Under the ISLFTA, Sri Lanka had limited amount of tea exports to India. India allowed import of 15 million kilogram of tea per annum and 8 million pieces of garments from Sri Lanka. However, the utilization of quota for tea and readymade garments remained at a miserable level of below 5 percent of the quota. Therefore, exports of these items under the ILSFTA increased only marginally in 2001, and it reduced in 2002.

Especially the exports of tea reduce because the two main ports of India, Kolkata and Cochin have not been supportive of tea exports entering the Indian market. And also because these two ports are located in tea growing areas. But garments have been accessed through Mumbai, Chennai, and Kolkata. The Sri Lankan government was unable to fill the quota allocations for tea and garments under the ISLFTA. The main reason was because Sri Lanka was not able to compete

with developed countries in Indian market in textile exports as the developed countries had position to exports their products to the Indian market.[7] So, Sri Lanka failed, as a result of rigid competition in its traditional garment markets. Furthermore, it required Sri Lanka to negotiate with India's policy makers to remove non-tariff barriers and also increase exports of value added tea to Indian market.

The imports pattern of Sri Lanka shows that the Indian imports rapidly increased in the years since the FTA came into effect. The major imports of Sri Lanka from India are agricultural products, textiles, transports goods, machinery, and base metals. The new products entered as a result of the FTA.

Figure 1: Sri Lanka exports and imports to India (amount in US$ Million)



Source: Sri Lankan Customs www.customs.gov.lk.

6. India's trade with Sri Lanka

6.1. India exports to Sri Lanka

Since the ISLFTA there has been a drastic change in the trade pattern of both countries. India's exports to Sri Lanka rose from US$ 641 million in 2000-01 to US$ 2827 million in 2007-08. And by the year 2010, the amount of exports has reached to US$ 2170.35 million. Thus, the total trade between the two economies more than quadrupled from 2000-01 to 2007-08. The major products exported by India to Sri Lanka were petroleum and petroleum products, pharmaceutical products, two

wheelers vehicles, woven cotton products, vegetables including onion etc.

Figure 2: India's trade with Sri Lanka (amount in US$ Million)



Source: India Trades, CMIE cited (Nags 2011)

6.2. India Imports from Sri Lanka

India's imports from Sri Lanka were marginal, it was US$ 45 million in 2000-01 and it rose to the US$ 631 million in 2007-08. By the end of 2010, the total amount of imports of India rose to the US$ 390 million. After the year 2007, the imports of India decreased. The main reason was the financial crisis and the problem of quota utilization on tea and garments. Thus, the total trade taking place between the two economies increased more than four times during 2000 to 2008. However, India's import growth of 27 percent was much higher than exports growth 14.5 percent in 2000, on Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)[8] (Nag 2011). By 2006-07, India achieved a share of 17.33 percent from Sri Lanka imports and became the largest importer.

The main products in India's import basket are rubber products, spices (cloves, papper etc), animal feed, refrigerating equipment, electric wires etc. Imports of copper products like wire increased after the implementation of FTA. Refined copper (H.S heading 7403) and wire and cables of copper (H.S. heading 7413) accounted for 16 percent of total copper imports from Sri Lanka in 2008. But the copper imports from Sri Lanka slowed down in the next two years. Another product that witnessed a big surge in India's import was edible oils. In 2007, 26 percent of total imports were that of the animal/ vegetable fats and oil (H.S. 1516) but this decreased to 16 percent in 2009. Thus, the export of vegetable oil

and copper products from Sri Lanka have come down in recent time and the new products such as refrigerating machineries, tugs and pusher craft, glass product have taken higher share in 2009-10.

7. Investment

Indian investment into Sri Lanka has increased substantially because Sri Lanka served as a production and profit centre for Indian companies for seeking access to regional and global markets. Sri Lanka has long been a priority destination for direct investment from India. Over 60 percent of Indian joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries in the South Asian region are located in Sri Lanka. By the year 1998, Indian investment was Rs 165 million and it had increased to US$ 125.925 million[9] by the year 2008. The total investment of India by the year 2010 was US$ 600 million. The principle sector of investment were petroleum, retail, steel, cement, rubber products, tourism, computer software, IT training, textile and garments, food products, automobiles components, plaits products, construction, chemicals, electricity equipment, printing, shipping, financial and non financial services. India was the top investor in Sri Lanka by the year 2010. Out of total FDI of US$ 516.30 million, India's investment share stood at US$ 110.24 million, constituting about 21 percent of the total investment. The well-known Indian companies such as IOC, Tatas, Bharthi Airtel, Piramal Glass, LIC, Ashok Layland, L&T, and Taj Hotel are present in Sri Lanka.

From the last six or seven years, the leading Indian companies such as Gujrat Ambuja, Indian oil, Apollo Hospitals, Asian Paints, Larsen and Toubro, CEAT tyers, Taj Hotels, Mudra Communications, National Diary Development Board, Ashok Layland, Exide Inductries, Tata Tea, Cadile pharmaceuticals, Ansal Housing, Arvind Mill etc., have made much investments in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the operation of ISLFTA has forced Indian companies to set up their ventures in Sri Lanka with a view to buy back the duty free Indian market mainly in South India. So such investments encouraged the entry of Sri Lankan made products to the Indian market. Such products included copper, vanaspathi, and marble industries.

Table- 1 Top Ten Investor in Sri Lanka 2000-2003

2000		**2001**		**2001**		**2003**	
Country	**$Mn**	**Country**	**$mn**	**Country**	**$mn**	**Country**	**$mn**
Singapore	273	UK	290	UK	329	UK	354
UK	260	Singapore	253	Singapore	237	Singapore	283
Japan	244	Japan	209	Japan	204	Japan	205
Korea	190	Korea	165	Hong Kong	137	Hong Kong	193

Sweden	99	Australia	107	Australia	140	Korea	155
Australia	96	Sweden	83	USA	113	USA	135
Br. Virgin Is	55	USA	63	India	89	India	115
Netherland	52	India	53	Sweden	48	Netherland	68
Finland	52	Finland	45	Netherland	43	Sweden	53

Source: Board of Investment of Sri Lanka cited by (Kelegama and Mukherji 2007)

Table-1 shows the major investor that invested in Sri Lanka during 2000-03. But, much of the investment that came into Sri Lanka was associated with products such as vanaspati and copper industry. Taking advantage of the FTA, third party got an opportunity to break into Indian market in Sri Lanka (kelegama 2009). Therefore, 40 Indian manufacturing projects are currently operating in the Sri Lankan market and it was only made possible by the ISLFTA. Sri Lankan investment in India was small before implementation of FTA. For the last few years there was increase in Sri Lankan investment into India. For instance, Ceylon Biscuit (Munchee brand), Carsons, Cumber batch (Caresherg), Brandix (about US$ 1 billion to set up a garment city in Vishakhapatnam in south India), MAS holding John keels, Hayleys and Aitken Spance (Hotel) apart from other investment in the freight servicing and logistic sector.

Table- 2 Manufacturing project in Sri Lanka under ISLFTA

Products	**Country**	**No. In Operation**
Copper and Copper based Products	India/USE	10
Vanaspati	Singapore/Malaysia	9
Electricity and electronic Products	India/USA	7
Lead and Lead based products	India	2
Zinc Oxide	India	1
other Chemical and chemical based products	India/Sri Lanka/USA	3
Marbal Products	India	3
Pine resins	India	2
Rubber-Base milk Cream	India	1
Ghee from milk cream	India	1
Diamond cutting tips	India	1

Source: Board of Investment (BOI) Sri Lanka Cited by (Kelegama and Mukherji 2007)

8. Services

Unilateral services liberalization was adopted by Sri Lanka and India in 1977 and 1991 respectively, and Sri Lanka has gained much from this initiatives. Sri Lanka has opened FDI in various service sectors for India especially retailing sector, even though it is a sensitive area that neither India nor Sri Lanka liberalized under General Agreement of Trade in Service (GATS) during the Uruguay Round of WTO talks. Moreover, the service sector provides a positive component for the two countries mainly through franchise arrangements. Such franchise led retail services are Titan, Usha, Godrej, Bajaj, etc., from India. Initially, FDI from Sri Lanka was not allow in the Indian market because the Exports Development Board of Sri Lanka (EDB) with Reserve Bank of India (RBI) made way for Sri Lankan firms to engage in exhibition-cum retail sale.

The commercial service exchange between the two countries has increased. The largest number of tourist arrivals to Sri Lanka is from India. This was largely due to Sri Lanka's unilateral measure of issue of visa upon arrival of Indian citizens. Also, many Sri Lankan students and patients travel to India to purchase education and health services. Each year, approximately 70 percent of the Colombo ports income is from transhipment earning from India. Approximately 40 percent of the Sri Lankan airlines revenue is from Indian market. Indian airliners such as Jet wing, Sahara Airlines and Kingfisher have operations in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan information technology firms have provided technical solutions to Indian companies.

Sri Lanka is looking very closely into improving its professional service sector. The country is currently experiencing a shortage of English teachers, nurses in hospitals in the North and East and professional in geriatric care. Under the Comprehensive Economic partnership Agreement (CEPA) India has been given preference to provide these services. This agreement was planned between the professional body of Sri Lanka Medical Council and the Indian Medical Council for the inflows of nurses. In case of educational sector, there is also mutual recognition between the Sri Lanka University Grants commission and Indian University Grants Commission to fulfil the scarcities in Sri Lanka.

Table-3 Indian Service Suppliers in Sri Lanka

Sector	Service Suppliers
Health	Apollo Hospital, Escorts heath centre at Durban Hospital

Hotels and Restaurants	Taj Hotels, Barista (fast food/coffee outlet, Amaravathi(restaurant)
Air Traval	Jet Airways, Air Saharaa and Kingfisher
Retailing and Distribution	Indian oil company/ Titan Watchs, Usha (Electrical appliances, Godrej (consumer durables), Bajaj (Three wheelers/ scooter)

Source: Kelegama and Mukherji 2007

9. India-Sri Lanka FTA to Strengthen the SAARC

India-Sri Lanka FTA has been strengthening the South Asia region since 1991, even though the SAARC regional organisation was formulated by the years 1985. Since 1985 there has been lots of tension between the member countries of this region. The two major economic power India and Pakistan had always engaged on the political tension which impacts the economic development of the region. Apart of the two major actors, there was also the political tension between India and Sri Lanka[10] but both the countries has been more concerned on their economic development than the political issue.

India-Sri Lanka FTA is one of the most effective and successful FTA in the South Asia. The FTA which has been playing important role to economically integrated the South Asia region. The trade development between India and Sri Lanka has been reflected from the FTA, which has provided more stable economic development between both the economy and same time for South Asia region.

So far the South Asia is concerned the economic relations of India and Sri Lanka are more consistencies and it is visibly contributed in the intra regional trade of the region. But the trade amount between India and Pakistan is still low, although they are the large economy in the South Asia region. The main reason behind the low trade of both the countries are more concerned for their political conflict than the economic development which is impacted on the SAARC economic progress. But in the case of India and Sri Lanka it has not found to see because both the countries are more determined for the economic improvement and they economically more contribute to the South Asia region than the other countries.

Conclusion

The above discussion has shown that the economic relations between larger and small economy will have mutual benefits, as it has been found in the case of

India-Sri Lanka FTA. Both the countries seem to have forgotten their past political conflicts and are determined to strengthen their economic relations. Moreover, the FTA helps both the countries to accelerate their trade relations. As well as FTA is the trade creation and it's reflected the large number of new products of Sri Lanka has been entering into the Indian market. However, the amount of trade has been increasing rapidly between two countries, which have contributed efficiently to the intra region trade of the South Asia. Therefore, it is necessary for all the South Asian countries to actively participate in the regional development by integrated their respective economy with the member of the region, through which the economic situation will be more strengthened.

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2. Kelegama, Saman and Indra Nath Mukherji (2007), "India-Sri Lanka Bilateral Free Trade Agreement Six Years performance and Beyond,", *RIS discussion paper,* New Delhi: 2-4.
3. Goods are shipped on either free on board (FOB) terms or Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF). FOB refers to the cost of freight and insurance has not included by the exporters. The CIF value is the landing value of good, with insurance and freight already added on to the cost.
4. Explicit limits, or quotas, on the physical amounts of particular commodities that can be imported or exported during a specified time period, usually measured by volume but sometimes by value. The quota may be applied on a selective basis, with varying limits set according to the country of origin or destination, or on a quantitative global basis that only specifies the total limit and thus tends to benefit more efficient suppliers
5. In addition to exiting Cochin and Kolkata, immediately open Mumbai on the west coast and Vishakkpatnam on the East coast.
6. Sri Lanka Custom
7. It had mentions in the reports of Secretariat of Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
8. The compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) is the rate at which something (e.g., revenue, savings, and population) grows over a period of years, taking into account the effect of annual compounding. A compound is composed of two or more parts. In the case of compound growth, the two parts are principal and the amount of change in the principal over a certain time period, which is called "interest" in some circumstances. This is sometimes called "growth on growth" because it measures periodic growth of a value that is itself growing periodically. If we are calculating the annual compound growth rate, then each year the new basis is the previous basis plus the growth over the previous period. During this CAGR India's exports to world was around 17 percent and imports from the world was 19.66 percent.
9. Board of Investment (BOI) of Sri Lanka (2008)
10. The Tamil ethnic conflict and India Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka

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Nuclear Track-II Diplomacy and India-Pakistan Relations

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India-Pakistan relations have entered a dangerous phase of nuclear arms race. Both the states have failed to improve the level of mutual confidence and trust on nuclear fronts. The state policies and nuclear diplomacy seem to be more ambiguous and competitive in the region. The emerging scenario from Track-I diplomacy shows a gloomy picture. Therefore, strong track-II initiatives on outstanding nuclear issues are in order. This paper attempts to analyse the genesis, process and credibility of nuclear Track-II dialogues between India and Pakistan. It investigates how track-II diplomacy on various nuclear issues makes a difference in terms of conflict management, trust building, conflict transformation and conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. Are the states learning anything to resolve outstanding nuclear disputes via Track-II diplomacy? What is the degree of effectiveness of Track-II initiatives? The paper also analyses influence of the transnational epistemic communities on resolving the fundamental nuclear disputes. It is argued here that the effectiveness of Track-II diplomacy on nuclear issues depends on the receptiveness of foreign policy decision-making establishment in the respective states.

Introduction

India-Pakistan are highly susceptible to crises and arms race. Frequent violation of ceasefire at LOC, beheading of soldiers at international border, Keran crisis etc. are some cases that illustrate that these crises are very adverse to strategic stability. However, India-Pakistan are not only crisis-ridden, it is also unstable in terms of strategic balance due to increasing arms and missile race. Given the nature of geopolitical environment and history of the conflict between the states compels to consider that chances of a nuclear exchange between the states have high probability. It makes it imperative to analyse the escalation dynamics and nature of nuclear rivalry among the South Asian nuclear states that could be disastrous

for local, regional and global security. It also examines how nuclear Track-II can reduce the vulnerability level?

The paper consists of five sections. The first section deals with the state of India-Pakistan nuclear relations and how nuclear Track-II can help mitigate emerging threats. It establishes that the escalation dynamics are stimulated and conditioned by the perceptual dilemmas of nuclear posture and status. This perceptual dilemma can be resolved through constructive nuclear Track-II. However, strategic, political and military conditions make it more challenging rather than a credible strategy. Thus, the strategic environment has discouraged both the states to support de-nuclearisation. The burden on nuclear Track-II is to change the strategic environment in favour of de-nuclearization and regional nuclear restraint.

The second section of paper deals with the concept of Track-II diplomacy in general and nuclear Track-II in particular. This section critically analyses various aspects of Track-II diplomacy and its mechanism and effectiveness. The third section of the paper deals with the development of Track-II diplomacy initiatives between India and Pakistan. This section also attempts to measure effectiveness and influence the nuclear Track-II have over policymaking.

The fourth section analyses the level of progress and learning between India and Pakistan on nuclear issues, including the factors that make it more complex. Thereafter, some policy recommendations are illustrated to make nuclear Track-II more effective and relevant. This paper concludes that nuclear Track-II needs multiple level iterated games with multiple strategies to reduce nuclear vulnerability in the region. Ongoing nuclear Track-II area good beginning but it is limited and therefore not sufficient for de-valuation of nuclear weapons in public spheres. Thus, multiple dialogues among nuclear experts (scientific community, foreign policy establishment, academia, civil society, defence and strategic community, and political establishment) of different age group would be helpful to reduce level of tension and misunderstanding between India and Pakistan.

Indo-Pak Nuclear Relations: Nuclear Postures, Stability and Deterrence Dynamics

The role of nuclear weapons in security strategy of India and Pakistan is very complicated due to its close geographical proximities, history of protracted conflicts, and complex domestic politics. However, these complex nuclear relations have global implications. Therefore it needs dissection. Rajesh Rajagopalan has very well articulated the role and purpose of India's nuclear weapons. He argues that 'nuclear weapons play a vital but limited role in India's security policy' (Rajagopalan 2009: 188). He further states that 'the nuclear weapons have reduced

India's conventional military options, especially in dealing with Pakistan'. To resolve this problem 'India's military has sought to find ways to bring its superior conventional strength to bear on Pakistan without provoking nuclear escalation,' however, India has not succeeded in it (Rajagopalan 2009: 189). Hence, India has adopted a strategy of assured retaliation with flexibility. The component of flexibility in India's nuclear posture works as a nuclear coercion.

On the role of nuclear weapons in Pakistan's security policies is described as one of the most important tools to maintain and secure Pakistan's existence (Khan and Lavoy 2009). Despite many other factors that are threats to its existence, Pakistan perceives existential threat from India. Thus, political legitimacy to India's nuclear behaviour and up gradation of its status works as political and psychological nuclear coercion on Pakistan that compels Pakistan to go for a competitive [alternative] alliance building against India. This systemic variable makes relations worse. To add on this, severely crisis-ridden relationship is one of the hindrances in improvement of relations (Jacob 2013). Thus, India has adopted a nuclear posture not only to deter Pakistan's nuclear attack but also to limit Pakistan's strategic options. However, India's advanced version of nuclear strategy against Pakistan is not viable option. Because India's aggressive and coercive steps provoke Pakistan towards higher level of nuclear escalation.

As we know that one of the important variable that determines nuclear escalation is the nuclear postures of India and Pakistan. In conventional sense, the nuclear posture is defined as the nature and disposition of nuclear forces, deployment patterns, envisioned employment modes, and how a nuclear armed state operationalizes their nuclear capabilities. As it is argued that vary nature of operationalization and kind of signaling would havedifferential effects on dispute and deterrence dynamic in a region (Narang 2009/10: 38). Vipin Narang defines nuclear posture as 'the incorporation of some number and type of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles into a state's overall military structure and the rules and procedures governing how those weapons are deployed, when and under what conditions they might be used, against what targets, and who has the authority to make those decisions that broadly constitute a state's nuclear posture and that generate a specific deterrent effect' (Narang 2009/10: 41). However, emphasis in this conceptual analysis is on material dimensions of nuclear posture. Material dimension is in fact very important, however, this paper adds on it and argues that nuclear posture is very much perceptional, ideational and inter-subjective concept embedded in declarations, public speeches, agreements, CBMs, nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRs) and doctrines. Secondly, technological innovations and 'privileged' status of a nuclear state do constitute a significant aspect of a nuclear posture however it may not be a part of declaratory policies. The '(under)

privileged' status complicates dynamics of nuclear posture, which will be discussed in the following sections.

India's nuclear posture

On India's nuclear posture there are many authentic studies (Tellis 2001; Perkovich 1999; Basrur 2006; Karnad 2008; Rajagopalan 2009). India's nuclear posture is based on three core objectives: one, 'building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent'; two, its nuclear forces are under civilian control and in de-alerted/de-mated mode to maximize safety; three, India has policy of no-first-use. However, many studies pointed out that India's nuclear posture is ambiguous at best and this ambiguity has significant implications for safety, regional security, and crisis stability (Narang 2013; Kapur 2008). Vipin Narang has pointed out five myths associated with India's nuclear posture and its declaratory policies. He argues that India's nuclear posture have following characteristics at present: first, there is huge gap between India's declaratory doctrine of 'credible minimum deterrence' and its operational nuclear posture; second, India's nuclear force is not in a recessed state as it is claimed in its doctrines; three; India's NFU doctrine is diluted over the years; forth, India's nuclear command and control is under centralized civilian control, however dangerous path of nuclear arms race 'is still driven almost entirely by technical bureaucracies and scientists' (e.g. DRDO, etc.); fifth, very less is known in public domain about safety and security of India's nuclear arsenals.

Pakistan's Nuclear Posture

According to Vipin Narang's analysis Pakistan has 'a credible first-use nuclear posture that sacrifices a substantial degree of assertive and centralized control over its nuclear assets, especially in crisis situations' (Narang 2009-10: 39). Pakistan's nuclear posture and policies since 1980s are conditioned by India's nuclear policies (Chakma 2002). Similarly, P. R. Chari argues that Pakistan's nuclear and foreign policies are basically motivated 'to counter the perceived threat from India has hardly been unexpected' (Chari 1980: 1). In terms of command and control, as V. R. Raghvan argues that in practice nuclear button in Pakistan is in hands of military and will remain in foreseeable future (Raghvan 2001: 94). Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, force posture, and capability requirements are the direct outcomes of India's growing military, technological, and industrial advantages (Khan and Lavoy 2009: 216).

Implications of Nuclear Postures: An Analysis

From above description of the nuclear postures the important point to note is that changing nature of nuclear postures of India and Pakistan has made situation

more dangerous. These dynamics goes beyond differential effects of deterrence. India's posture works as nuclear coercion on Pakistan to some extent and *vice-versa*. However, Pakistan does not believe in this nuclear coercibility but India do. This has serious implications: one, this is really dangerous given the situation of weak command and control of nuclear forces in Pakistan and intensification of Chino-Pak ties sidelining the international nuclear norms. Two, India has higher level of readiness of nuclear forces against Pakistan. In this connection we know that Pakistan see nuclear weapons as the only reliable means of preventing India from any aggression. Because India's conventional superiority makes a nuclear exchange more likely. The main danger is that the state of higher level of readiness of Indian nuclear forces 'is largely unknown in the public domain' (Narang 2013: 150). Therefore, threat of nuclear catastrophe is underestimated.

India's nuclear posture and its implications are summarized as:

> The country has fundamentally changed its deployment patterns and procedures in ways that scholars and policymakers have generally overlooked. These changes, whether politically sanctioned or not, will force China and Pakistan to respond in ways that will likely prove detrimental to Indian and global security. Despite the attention paid to Pakistan, it may actually be India that triggers a South Asian arms race. It is therefore all the more disturbing that these posture developments seem to be the product of bureaucratic inertia and interests rather than of a well-/considered, centralized strategic direction (Narang 2013: 155).

Third, and most importantly, the international community has legitimized India's nuclear posture with a 'privileged status' – responsible nuclear state. This addition to India's nuclear posture has adverse strategic implications in terms of strategic stability and arms race. Status of a responsible nuclear state makes a psychological advantage for India. Thus, it creates new form of mistrust and animosity between India and Pakistan. Because Pakistan's nuclear posture is corollary to India's nuclear programmes.

The above analysis suggests: one, Pakistan's nuclear posture is pro-nuclear war (war provoking) and ambiguous against India that supports asymmetrical escalation towards nuclear Armageddon in the region. Two, India is following a strategy of nuclear coercion against Pakistan through a shift in its nuclear posturing and signaling. Because Pakistan's posture has undermined India's conventional superiority and pay-off of nuclear deterrence is also in favour of Pakistan. Hence, at worst the strategic partnership (Indo-US and Chino-Pak) and domestic politics in both the nations leads towards a highly unstable nuclear ladder – 'a precarious Indo-Pak nuclear balance' (Jacob 2012). As Happymon Jacob pointed out in his analysis that 'in last 12 years, nothing substantial has been achieved by them (India and Pakistan) to bring about nuclear stability in the subcontinent' (Jacob 2012). However, irony, is that the risks involved in potential to escalate into a nuclear

exchange between India and Pakistan over disputed issues 'at best inadequately understood, and at worst brushed aside as an unlikely possibility' (Raghavan 2001: 82).

In this vein, this paper argues that situation of nuclear stability got deteriorated due to evolution of India's coercive nuclear strategy and 'new' international nuclear engagement with India and Pakistan by the US and China respectively. Because in Indo-Pak relations symbols matters more than substance; emotions matters more than reasons. Therefore, the nuclear track II diplomacy would bring significant changes in nuclear policies and postures of both the nationsthat have failed to avert the adverse nuclear relationship through conventional nuclear diplomacy. The nuclear track II diplomacy would help to deconstruct the new roles of nuclear weapons; it would help to devalue nuclear weapons in security and foreign policies; it would also bring clear picture of nuclear postures to public domain; it would help to develop a risk management system between the countries. And most importantly, the nuclear track II diplomacy would help to insulate nuclear policies from frequent crises. It is because the Track I diplomacy's conflict resolution approaches are corrupt by power (Mapendere 2008: 67). The track I channels normally shuts down at the peak of crisis between states 'thereby reducing communication when it is needed most' (Ziegler 1984: 27). The track I diplomacy is also affected by electoral outcomes.

Track II Diplomacy: Concept, Strategies/Mechanisms and Effectiveness

Track II diplomacy is a form of diplomacy for conduct of international relations beyond official and formal mechanisms between conflicting parties. It is generally understood as informal networking of influential persons and associations to bring change in public perception, policy decisions and policymaking through sustained dialogue between conflicting parties. However, it is not outcome oriented, rather based on principles of substantial gains through process of the dialogue. The phrase 'track two diplomacy' was coined by Joseph Montville in 1981. Montville defines Track Two Diplomacy as, 'unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict' (Montville 1991: 162).Some of the classic definitions of the track II are as follows: 'Track II diplomacy is a process of active interaction between individuals of countries in dispute, who in their private capacities exchange innovative ideas and various plausible options with or without the prior knowledge of the official authorities and governments of their respective countries'. Dalia Dassa Kaye has defined track two as 'unofficial policy dialogue, focused on problem solving, in

which the participants have some form of access to official policymaking circles (Kaye 2007: 8).

Most important point to note is that track IIs are not officially authorized or mandated from either side. However, the track II diplomacy involves people who are influential and engaged in 'Policy-related, problem-solving dialogue' to discuss 'elements of the overall political relationship, solutions to arms control problems, resolution of regional conflicts, issues of trade policy, or other areas of competition' (Saunders 1991: 49).Mainly, a track II group can be formed by three ways: first, it might be a macro level initiative of an individual or an institution. Second, it might be formed by the efforts of interested outsiders. Third, it might be formed on the basis of age group and expertise: Young scholars or former officials or mix of both.

Conceptually, track II has three important variables: Authority; Networking; and Influence. [1] Lets take it one by one. Authority and legitimacy of various actors is under attack due to emergence of new forces in global politics. The exclusively state-centred political authority has failed to deliver on many international issues and it has been challenged by non-state actors for good and bad reasons – civil society for reforms and terrorists are best examples. Therefore, the official authorities(state representatives and diplomatic missions) are no longer sole authorities in the global politics. However, the recognition and legitimacy of the new actors in global politics has become complex issue but their significant roles and increasing number cannot be undermined. This emerging nature of actors and their authorities have been described as a "transformation, rather than replacement, of state sovereignty" (Biersteker and Hall 2002: 209). Hence, state and non-state and semi-state actors have created hybrid forms of authority (Sending, Pouliot and Neumann 2011). This changing nature of authority has supported necessities for track II diplomacy.

In conventional diplomacy the authority has been legitimized by two ways. The first form of authority has been exercised by the officials for being on a position. It is called as – "in authority". This is a kind of commanding authority and has coercion as one of the components. Whereas the other form of authority is called as "an authority" and thereby have the potential and capacity to act on the basis of recognition of a certain degree of expertise (Friedman 1990: 57).[2] In other words, these two different concepts of authority functions differently in terms of power differentials. The second, form of authority,i.e. authority by expertise and knowledge is the base of track II diplomacy. This is a positive change in a way, "from authority as coercion to authority by consent".[3]

Now, the important concern is how to operationalize this informal knowledge based authority: the simplistic answer is building a strong and sustainable network among influential officials and non-officials to feed inputs of knowledge based authorities into policymaking. It can be done through various strategies. For

example, through personal capacities, via media, by creating public pressure etc. The track II dialogues are also categorized as 'hard' and 'soft' Track II. Soft Track IIs are aimed at bridging socio-psychological barriers between conflicting parties, while hard Track IIs aremore focused on solutions and policy inputs to resolve the conflict (Jones 2008).

Therefore, the track-II's focus is not on how the peace will look like rather how to achieve peace. Hence,the track IIs are directly related to track I in terms of transferring the goals of track I into reality and at the same time the participants of Track II also tries to understand and explore rationales behind officially stated positions and policies.As Jones states that the defining characteristic of the Track Two is that the process is meant to influence events in some way. Further, he asserts that 'Track Two tends to stress interpersonal dynamics and social-psychological techniques' (Jones 2008: 4). Hence, the objectives of the Track II vary from 'a concrete policy proposal for state authorities, to an idea injected into public discourse, to even the transfer of people from track 2 into government positions' (Kaye 2007: 5-7). Moreover, the functions of track II are described as 'long-term socialization', 'the generation of new ideas', putting these new ideas into their regional contexts, policy adjustments through discussions and brings change in public perception of hostile communities through building strong transnational epistemic communities.

But the effectiveness of track II is debatable. Therefore, it is the thrust of this paper to measure the effectiveness of nuclear track II in conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. Inacademic debates the contribution of track II diplomacy has been projected as useful phenomenon in terms of norms localization. Constructivists and institutionalists argues that these networks play an important role in diffusing norms of cooperation and building trust among governments (Acharya 2004; Katsumata 2008). However, realist challenges these views and argues that track II networks are essentially irrelevant to regional security. They describe them as 'mere talkfests, simply echoing the idealistic verbiage of their academic supporters' (Jones and Smith 2007; Khoo 2004). In this context, Peter Jones has analysed how to measure success or impact of track II diplomacy on regional security (Jones 2008). The work of Ball, Miner and Taylor on regional security Track II in the Asia-Pacific region identified four kinds of criteria to measure the success or impact of Track II (as explained in Jones 2008: 7).[4]

- Track II dialogues can develop a mechanism for policy advice to regional governments on conflicting issues. In other words, Track II, if accepted by conflicting parties, 'can serve as a kind of reserve of intellectual capacity'.

- Track II dialogues provide space for debate on new concepts and specific proposals which has been put on halt due to lack of political will or lack of communication between conflicting parties.
- Track II can provide avenues and opportunities to discuss key security issues and sudden policy changes at the time of crisis or deadlock of official channels (Chaophraya dialogue is good example after 26/11).
- Track II helps to develop inter-subjective understandings through socialization.

However, this is not a linear or sequential process to judge the success or effectiveness of the Track II and it is subject of debate how a particular track II would influence (Kaye 2007; Jones 2008). As we have discussed above that the Track II is not policy or outcome oriented. However, Kaye (2007: 9) has defined the evolution of track two dialogues as follows: 'socialization, filtering, and policy adjustment'. Further, she analyses that 'most track two security dialogues play more modest roles, largely influencing the thinking of the elites who participate in such discussions and laying the groundwork for long-term policy adjustments' (Kaye 2007: 21). In her analysis she asserts that the track two influence process goes through three different stages, namely, 'Socialization of participating elites – Transmission to policy – Filtering to local environment'but this 'not necessarily sequential, and feedback from later stages to earlier ones is possible' (Kaye 2007: 21).In one of the handbook for conducting track II dialogues it is suggested that the goals of track II dialogue varies over the period of time. This is part of formative evaluation. And the success of the track II depends upon 'flexibility, creativity, and resilience' (Burgess and Guy 2010).

When we come on nuclear track IIs between India and Pakistan it becomes more tricky business. It is because Indo-Pak relations are more volatile and it is difficult to insulate nuclear issue from other complex issues. So, other issues of contestation create problems for success through nuclear track IIs. Nuclear track IIs are also tricky because it is difficult to get actual information, and highly insensitive to trust. Therefore, it is high priority track for dialogue process. In a way, nuclear track IIs are track II dialogue with specific objectives to resolve conflict on outstanding nuclear issues. It covers: nuclear CBMs; Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures (NRRM); Nuclear Security and Safety; Possibility of transparency on civil nuclear initiatives; strategic nuclear stability; and creates transnational network for nuclear disarmament.Thus, nuclear track IIs are not only risk reduction measures but also risk mitigation and conflict resolution. Nuclear track II is process of dialogue over nuclear issues at lower level, outside official establishment. It will be productive because nuclear track IIs are beyond instrumental rationality and

narrowly defined nationalinterests. It looks for constructive solutions; emancipated common interests; and areas of sustained convergence of interests and issues. So nuclear track IIs are attempts to turn issues of divergence into convergence through iterated interactions. Thus, it bypasses the logic of two-level game. But when it comes to Indo-Pak relations, track IIs in general, and nuclear track IIs in particularly becomes challenging.

Development and State of Track II between India and Pakistan

Between India and Pakistan there are number of track II initiatives have been taken. Some are on process and very effective and some have been the part of history now. Major track II are: Neemrana Process;Balusa Group; Kashmir Study Group (KSG); Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Delhi Dialogue by Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation (CDR); Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Workshops; Stimson Center Dialogues; CSIS Meetings on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs); Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories;Ottawa Dialogue;and The Chaophraya Dialogue.[5] Among these dialogues some are specifically nuclear track II and others have occasionally discussed nuclear issue in their interactions. For example, the 13th Chaophraya Dialogue[6] has discussed the nuclear relations between India and Pakistan in-depth. On the other hand the Ottawa Dialogue is explicitly a nuclear track II.[7]

Kaye has analysed the role and influence of the track II's in South Asia. Her major findings are that track II dialogues between India and Pakistan were initially focused more on economic and development issues, however later on these dialogues have explicitly focused on political and security issues such as nuclear proliferation and the status of Kashmir (Waslekar 1995; Kaye 2007: xvi).

As Kaye pointed out that:

> A number of confidence-building measures (CBMs) initially discussed in track two forums are now being officially implemented between India and Pakistan, such as the ballistic missile flight test notification agreement, military exercise notifications and constraint measures along international borders, and Kashmir-related CBMs. Similarly, ideas based on track two workshops promoting nuclear risk reduction measures have now surfaced as part of the official Indian- Pakistani dialogue (Kaye 2007: xvi).

However, the effectiveness of the track II in shaping the government policy is a subject of multiple interpretation. For example, one of the surveys of track II participants suggested that only 17.5 percent of participants believed that track II dialogues were effective in shaping government policy (Centre for Policy Research (CPR) 1994: 4). On the other hand, one group of scholar pointed out in their study that they 'almost universally convey that they (participants) have been affected by the experience' (Behera, Evans, and Rizvi 1997: 27). The Centre for Policy Research's

survey of South Asian dialogues revealed that 42 percent of participants responded that track II dialogues are 'very useful,' while 57.5 percent has found it 'useful,' and none has responded that such initiatives are 'not useful' (Centre for Policy Research (CPR) 1994: 2-3). From personal vantage point of the participants and observers, the track II dialogues have significantly influenced the official thinking and policy on hard-core security issues and helped in shaping the perception of key policy makers and the public of the conflicting parties. As one of the key nuclear security expert and observer of track II in South Asia suggests that 'Academics, bureaucrats, and even military personnel on both sides are in the process of forming an incipient 'epistemic community' (Ganguly 1996: 14).

One of the Pakistan's former National Security Advisers Major-General Muhmud Ali Durrani has pointed out in his book that while he 'grew up with the firm conviction that the only good Indian was a dead Indian,' four years of interaction and dialogue with Indians in track II diplomacy has made change in his perception that 'Pakistan and India can learn to live in peace with each other' (Durrani 2001: xvii-xix). This change in perception has significant implication and importance for official thinking and policy making because in Pakistan it is more difficult to exert influence by the nonofficial actors given the military's dominance in national security decisionmaking and virtual veto power on core security issues (arms acquisition, defense expenditure, Kashmir, and the nuclear issue) (Mattoo 1999: 311).Similarly, Sherry Rehman states that 'Track 2 is an important way of sustaining communications, conversation and informal dialogue when governments may not be speaking (as after 26/11) and a way (when governments are speaking) of trying out new ideas or out-of-the-box thinking which governments cannot risk doing at the official level.'[8]

In India some scholars argue that the influence of track II dialogues and inputs coming from strategic community, including on critical issues such as nuclear doctrine, is growing: 'Non-official thinking has a significant bearing on Indian strategic culture because nuclear weapons in an operational sense are little understood within Indian officialdom, and because the Indian state is in the process of becoming decentralized and more open to non-official inputs' (Basur 2001: 185). Further, it is argued that one of the track II initiatives the Delhi Policy Group – has focused on nuclear reduction and the concept of minimum nuclear deterrence and it has regularly briefed the foreign officers in both India and Pakistan about its activities (Behera 2002: 213). Similarly, the RCSS has regularly engaged in training the young minds of the region on key nuclear security issues through various Workshops. This is how the nuclear track II's have contributed towards the norms localization between India and Pakistan.

Major Challenges and Prospects of Nuclear Track II

Indo-Pak relationship in general is known for complexity, volatility and uncertainty. These variables put the nuclear track IIs also on risk. It is generally observed that some of the members of track II dialogues becomes hawkish and argues for stated official positions without understanding the problem of the opposition. Second, sometime participants fail to come out of historical hangover. This historical background of the event or decision has created problem to develop the environment for positive learning. Third, the government officials are often suspicious of track II dialogues, and 'there are no established mechanisms for transferring track two ideas to officials beyond informal and ad hoc contacts' at the same 'time the continued mistrust of the adversary also makes cooperative security ideas a difficult sell' (Kaye 2007: xvii). Forth, both in India and Pakistan, the domestic institutions, particularly, their intelligence services are hostile to transparency in nuclear doctrines and sharing of information that is essential for making track II more effective. Thus, 'the challenge of track two dialogues is to find a core group that includes the "right" type of individuals who also have influence and represent a broad spectrum of constituencies back home (Kaye 2007: 26).

On the other side the nuclear track II provides many prospects for future cooperation and conflict transformation and resolution among the hostile countries. It provides scope and opportunities to the track two participants who are often influential former policy makers, active or retired military personnel, think-tank specialists, journalists and academicians to inject the ideas discussed in the track II dialogues into official domain. Secondly, the track II venues 'allow participants to explain national positions and rationales for behavior that are not always transparent in official settings' (Kaye 2007). Third, the track II dialogues help in creating alternative discourses, as one scholar has pointed out in her intensive study on track II that these 'dialogues have made significant progress in shaping regional discourse and identity' (Kaye 2007: 104). Forth, and most importantly, track II dialogues provide avenues to devalue and deconstruct the perceived utility of nuclear weapons in the region.

Policy Recommendations

1. Multiple channels of dialogue are urgently required.
2. The existing Track-II dialogues demand more publicity and public domain, through op-ed etc. rather keeping it high profile.
3. Nuclear detonations and its impact on human lives must be dealt in detail in the forthcoming Track-II dialogues.

4. We need to create the SAARC level mechanism to deal with nuclear threats – in which non-nuclear South Asian States must put pressure for constructive resolve of Indo-Pak nuclear tensions.
5. We need to institutionalize the existing Track-II through various ways.

Notes

1. These variables were introduced by Poul-Erik Christiansen in a paper presented at the 8th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) conference, Istanbul on 29-30 October 2013.
2. Cited in a paper presented at the 8th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) conference, Istanbul on 29-30 October 2013 by Poul-Erik Christiansen.
3. This conceptualization has been taken from Poul-Erik Christiansen's presentation.
4. Ball et al., pp. 179–182. Ball et al. also pointed out that their analysis take off from B. Job, 2003, "Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asian Security Order", in M. Alagappa (ed.), *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features,* Stanford, Stanford University Press.
5. For more detail on some of these initiatives see Kaye (2009: 78-88)
6. See: http://chaophrayadialogue.net/dialouge-13.php accessed on 1 August 2014.
7. For more details, see: http://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/dialogue/eng/nuclear-dialogue.asp accessed on 30 July 2014.
8. Cited in: http://www.risingkashmir.com/diplomacy-between-india-and-pakistan/

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The South Asian "Environmental Regional Security Complex" Prospects for Environmental Cooperation in the Region

Dhanasree Jayaram

The confluence between environment, instability and conflict (arising from resource scarcity, drought, pandemics, migration or extreme weather events that affects the socio-economic and material well-being of the state and its machinery) along with the military's role in this triangular relationship is gaining prominence in both the academic as well as policy discourse in the developed world. Discussion on environmental security issues is yet to gain momentum in countries of South Asia including India to the extent it has in the industrialised world due to several other immediate concerns such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, malnutrition among others. What the establishments fail to realise is that these concerns are very much linked to environmental change and thus, without addressing the latter, the former cannot be tackled effectively and completely. At the same time, countries such as Bangladesh and Maldives are considered climate champions among the international community, as they have been raising the issue of climate change at every important international forum due to its direct security implications for them. The fact of the matter is that by tackling climate change alone, not all environmental problems can be resolved.

In terms of area, population, diversity (cultural and ecological) and economy, India is one of the most influential countries in the world, more so in South Asia. However, population rise, increased pressure on natural resources, deforestation, pollution, illegal wildlife trade, poverty, climate change, water availability, energy deficit are slowing down India's progress to a great extent. Development continues to be the biggest priority for India; and it has been reiterated by successive governments that development cannot be scuttled in the name of environmental protection and that poverty is indeed the biggest polluter. Therefore, in the coming years, with the environmental scenarios of the country looking grim and

with environmental security gaining more and more momentum at the policy and strategic levels across the globe, the decision-making bodies will forced to walk a tightrope.

India's environmental security scenario cannot be understood in isolation. A substantial amount of environmental security issues that India faces are transboundary. It is surrounded by countries that are equally or more vulnerable to various environmental security threats or risks. The situation along the Line of Control (LoC) due to glacial melt, deforestation, population pressure, decline in the water-levels of Indus River, migration/encroachments from Bangladesh and erratic dam construction on Brahmaputra River are just some of them. In this context, the 'Regional Security Complex' theory advocated by Barry Buzan (part of the English School) could be applied, as it is regionally focussed. It is based on the notion that different regions have different political and cultural conditions that shape their security behaviour and strategy. This theory can be used in the South Asian context to understand and explain the regional security implications of environmental change, especially for India. In this case, the interdependence is 'environmental' as some of the environmental security issues that countries in the region face are clearly region-specific and not just country-specific, which is reinforced by the ethnic, cultural and historical cords between the countries in the region. However, due to political divisions, there has been very little cooperation among the countries on the environmental security front despite the fact that there is ample scope for it. To put matters in context, one issue that should bring the South Asian nations on one platform for discussion and resolution is climate vulnerability. Dhaka, Mumbai and Kolkata are some of the most vulnerable cities in the world.

Therefore, the paper attempts at introducing a 'South Asian Environmental Regional Security Complex' using Buzan's regional security complex theory by describing some of the common threats that India and its neighbours face. Even though the paper covers the whole region of South Asia, it employs an Indian perspective to understand the security complex keeping India's national security at the core of analysis. It analyses prospects for regional cooperation through environmental diplomacy in South Asia (such as through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). It takes specific case studies pertaining to environmental security in the region and will essentially emphasise the need for South Asian countries to engage in environmental diplomacy that 'could' serve as a platform for cooperation at other levels in the future.

Conceptual Framework

Before going into the main theme of the paper, there is a need to define some of the important concepts that have been used in the paper, primarily 'environmental security', 'environmental cooperation' and 'South Asia'. The conceptual debate on 'environmental security began in the 1980s and continues till date, which questions its legitimacy at the conceptual level as some would say it still remains a debate and has not matured as a concept. To build the conceptual framework, the need to connect it to practical and empirical data was felt, which led to a few scholars to begin "process-tracing". The narrow and biased perspective based on the environment-conflict thesis that emerged from the process-tracing approach was discredited by many social scientists who strongly believed in incorporating socio-economic and political variables also in environmental security research (Rønnfeldt 1997). Three decades of environmental security research can be encapsulated as follows:

Table 1: The Three Generations Summarised *[Rønnfeldt 1997: 474]*

Starting	First generation	Second generation	Third generation
	Early 1980s	Early 1990s	Mid-1990s
Scholarly approach	Conceptual debate	Process tracing	A broad range of social science methodologies
Field of Analysis	Environment and security	Renewable resources and conflict	Environment and security
Level of Analysis	Global/State/ Individual	State/Sub-state	Global/Regional/State/ Sub-state

Environmental security has been defined in different ways. It can be explained mostly through the cause-effect matrix. One of the most oft-quoted definition states, "Environmental security (ecological security or a myriad of other terms) reflects the ability of a nation or a society to withstand environmental asset scarcity, environmental risks or adverse changes, or environment-related tensions or conflicts" (Chalecki 2002: 2). This definition describes the 'effect' side of the concept and is more tilted towards the environment-conflict thesis that claims that human-induced environmental change could potentially cause conflict – both regional and global. Importantly, it could cause detriment to the military's operational readiness. Another definition given by Cheremisinoff (2002: 2) reflects on the causes and scope of environmental security and it says that environmental security constitutes "those actions and policies that provide safety from environmental dangers caused by natural or human processes due to ignorance, accident, mismanagement or intentional design, and originating within or across national borders." These two definitions differ in other ways too. For instance, the former studies environmental

security at the national and (possibly) international levels mostly and the latter goes beyond national boundaries and takes a transnational point of view. Besides, the former solely takes a human-centric perspective at the causal level while the latter takes a broader perspective that does not differentiate between natural and human-made changes in environment.

In this paper, a combination of both the definitions is used as the reference point for describing the environmental security scenario of South Asia. As far as environmental change is concerned, no lines have been drawn between natural and human-made ones. In terms of the context or scope of the paper, the first definition would be more apt as the paper clearly does not overlook political boundaries between countries of the South Asian region and focuses mainly on India's national security.

The second concept – 'environmental cooperation' – began to be discussed in the light of increased criticism of the environment-conflict thesis that looked subjectively only at one side of the environmental security debate and completely ignored the possibility of cooperation on environmental issues between nation states. Elliott (2002) has identified four components of environmental cooperation at the regional level. First, confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy, which could be applied to environmental (in)security by "integrating environmental scarcity into the regional security architecture"; second, an environmental early warning system, which can provide information regarding possible environmental damage as well as assist the policy-makers in using this information for conflict avoidance; third, focus of the regional players on preventive strategies that could help them identify and manage the "causes of regional environmental degradation"; and fourth, addressing "the basic and underlying social and economic drivers of regional insecurities" to ensure that preventive action works in the long run. These tenets have been used in the paper extensively to reflecting on the need to find common solutions to common environmental threats. It essentially brings to fore the fact that peaceful or non-violent forms of resolution is indeed possible between nation states that are otherwise politically hostile to each other, especially in the case of environmental challenges.

It is equally imperative to define the context further by listing the countries that form a part of South Asia within the scope of the paper. According to the United Nations Statistics Division's classification of the region, which it has referred to as Southern Asia, it includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka ("Composition of"). However, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) excludes Iran although originally the organisation was founded by seven states, with Afghanistan joining it in 2006 ("South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation"). The World Bank considers

only the seven founding members of the SAARC as part of the region ("South Asia"). This paper takes the definition provided by the SAARC as the referent one. However, it covers Pakistan, Bangladesh and Maldives more holistically by taking case in studies as these countries are most significant when it comes to the debate on environmental security at the regional level.

The Regional Security Complex Theory with Reference to Environmental Security in South Asia

The 'Regional Security Complex' theory is based on the notion that threats tend to travel over shorter distances and that there is a clear distinction between global and regional dynamics with the latter having "a substantial degree of autonomy". In the post-Cold War world, with the collapse of bipolarity, instead of adopting a neorealist perspective that takes a state-centric view of the international system and that opens up only a narrow range of options – unipolarity and multipolarity – or globalist perspective, which is based on the centre-periphery model and thus deals with the hierarchical nature of the international system and the exploitative qualities of the centre (West), this theory espouses a regionalist perspective. The argument that Buzan and Wœver (2003: 3-11) have put forth is that contemporary security affairs are guided by regional constellations that stand on their own as "the locus of conflict and cooperation for states" based on two assumptions – first, with the end of the Cold War and the superpower rivalry, the "penetrative quality" of the great powers in different parts of the world would be reduced significantly; and second, the post-Cold War international system is dominated by "lite powers," which implies that great powers would interfere militarily, politically or strategically lesser and lesser in the "troubled spots of the world" due to domestic compulsions.

The 'Regional Security Complex' theory (RSCT) takes into consideration the changing contours of the international security scenario by focussing more on "less territorialised threats" such as economic and environmental. At one level, financial stability and global warming come from the global level but when the question of who is more vulnerable or who needs to be secured from these threats is posed, the analysis need not always be undertaken at the global level and could be studied at other levels including community, state and region (Buzan and Wœver 2003: 12-13). It is an acknowledged fact that different regions and countries of the world face different levels of environmental risk and vulnerability based on a myriad of factors – geophysical, socio-economic, political and even cultural. For instance, low-lying island nations such as Maldives are more vulnerable to sea-level rise while Himalayan states such as Nepal are more vulnerable to glacial melt. Countries such as Bangladesh and the Netherlands are equally vulnerable to the effects of climate change, yet due to the huge difference between the resources (financial and

technological) these countries possess to cope with them, the Netherlands is in a better position than Bangladesh.

Buzan and Wœver (2003) assert that the majority of states define their security in terms of their neighbours and that every regional security complex (RSC) comprises both strong and weak states. RSCT inserts a third level between the state and global levels. National security cannot be analysed without taking a regional perspective because "security dynamics are inherently relational" and "no nation's security is self-contained" while global security is nothing short of an "aspiration", far from reality. This is true in the case of South Asia, where every country including India has articulated its threat perception and built its threat matrix in such a way that the priority lies within the region. The immediate threats that India would have to assess is reducing water levels of River Indus or migration caused by environmental changes in Maldives and Bangladesh apart from environmental disruption that India itself is facing or is expected to face in the future.

The region refers to "the level where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other." The definition of the RSC, as given by Buzan and Wœver takes into account different actors (apart from state) and different sectors of security other than political and military ones. It is "a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan and Wœver 2003: 44). A RSC is guided primarily by security interaction between neighbours due to "physical adjacency" and "geographical proximity." What differentiates the regional level from the global level are "anarchy plus distance effect plus geographical diversity." The RSCT does not overlook the potency of the anarchical nature and balance of power politics of the international system, which have an effect on national security within a "global web of security interdependence" as evidenced by the economic interdependence created by globalisation, which renders financial stability within a nation state largely contingent on the global financial system. In terms of environmental security, the geography of a region matters most and a number of geographical features in the Southern Asian region are shared by two or more countries, which increases environmental security dependence among them. For instance, the Himalayas cross six countries – Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, China and Bhutan. In another case, the Sundarban ecosystem (mangroves) is shared by India and Bangladesh. The atolls of Maldives and the Lakshadweep islands of India have similar geophysical features. Therefore, the spill-over effects cannot be neglected. The fact that the Southern Asian region does not possess a global superpower (as of now) that is capable of entering any geopolitical arena

across the globe on its own also adds to its status of RSC. Even India, which is being seen as a rising power, does not have much say in matters outside the region to the extent even say, a country such as China now has owing to its growing economic clout as well as military capabilities and permanent position in the UN Security Council (UNSC).

Buzan and Wœver (2003) maintain that RSCs are also socially constructed as they are "contingent on the security practice of the actors." Each state defines and pursues its security interests and objectives, in ways it judges best. Each state also tends to "integrate and hierarchise" security issues. Power operates not only at the international level but also on a regional scale, which gives rise to regional balance of power as well as patterns of amity and enmity at the regional level. It has been seen that whichever state wields more power and influence within a region is feared most, which is the case in South Asia. The 'Big Brother' attitude of India has been blamed for failed attempts to integrate the region by its neighbours. India has faced criticism for interference in the internal matters of its neighbours. Politically, demographically, militarily, economically and in every other sector, India is far ahead of the other South Asian countries. Indian contribution to SAARC GDP is nearly 80 per cent; about 60 per cent of the armed forces in the region are in India; and nearly 75 per cent of the region's population resides in India (Sáez 2011). Even in terms of resource endowment, which forms an important part of a nation state's comprehensive national power, India leaves every other country in the region far behind.

Table 2: Energy Resource Endowments in South Asia [Singh, Parikh, Agarwal, Khare, Panda, and Mohla 2013: 7]

	Coal	**Oil**	**Natural Gas**	**Biomass**	**Hydro Power**
Country	**(million tons)**	**(million barrels)**	**(trillion cubic feet)**	**(million tons)**	**(Gigawatts)**
Afghanistan	440	NA	15	18–27	25
Bhutan	2	0	0	26.6	30
Bangladesh	884	12	8	0.08	0.33
India	90,085	5,700	39	139	150
Maldives	0	0	0	0.06	0
Nepal	NA	0	0	27.04	83
Pakistan	17,550	324	33	NA	59
Sri Lanka	NA	150	0	12	2
Total	**108,961**	**5,906**	**95**	**223**	**349.33**

However, it is not enough to look only at the distribution of power in the region; it is equally essential to analyse "historical hatreds and friendships." Security issues are very much moulded by "history, culture, religion and geography." River water sharing between India and Pakistan has always been a contentious issue with conflicts over construction of hydropower plants on both sides, which will be discussed later in the paper. One could also cite the case of militarisation of the Siachen, which is compounding the environmental security threats faced by both countries in the vulnerable Himalayan area. These have in turn been influenced by the political enmity between the two countries that has spilled over into every other domain.



Figure 1: Essential Structure of Regional Security Complex
[adapted from Buzan and Wœver (2003: 51)]

Buzan and Wœver (2003: 51) use four levels of analysis to describe the RSCT. The first level is the domestic one in which a particular state defines its security fears even with respect to external players based on its specific vulnerability whether or not the external players have any hostile intentions. If one takes the case of Pakistan in South Asia, its biggest vulnerability is over-dependence on River Indus for its survival and anything that restricts the flow of this river to the country is seen as nothing less than a security threat. Any activity on this river on the Indian side of the border is at times exaggerated by Pakistan as a threat to its existence. The second level operates in terms of state-to-state relations, which could be applied in the case of various agreements signed by countries of the region in the environmental sphere, including river water sharing ones. The third level is constituted by the region's interplay and interaction with the neighbouring regions. Again, if one takes the instance of river water sharing, the interdependence between South Asia and China cannot be overlooked as a majority of rivers in the former originate

in the latter (Tibet). Sometimes, China is also regarded as a part of the Southern Asian region due to its overwhelming presence in the region both economically and physically (ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka). The fourth level is defined by the role of global powers in the region. When it comes to climate change adaptation and mitigation aid/grants to countries in South Asia, the European Union (EU), the US and some of the other industrialised countries as well as international aid agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are known to be playing a leading role. For example, in 2013, the EU approved a grant aid of €4 million to Maldives to tackle climate change (Naafiz 2013). Australia has also been funding climate change adaptation and mitigation activities in South Asia. As per the 2013-2014 budget of the Australian Government, its estimated expenditure in the region in terms of official development assistance (ODA) stands at $427.7 million (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2013).



Figure 2: Four Levels of Analysis in the Regional Security Complex Theory
[adapted from Buzan and Wœver (2003: 51)]

The RSCT also takes a wider securitisation agenda to accommodate security threats that had previously been excluded from the securitisation literature. Environmental security is one of them. The questions – what constitutes the threat and what needs to be secured – is answered through the RSCT. The state has traditionally been the referent object in security studies/agenda but clearly, in the context of environmental security, attention should be given to not only securing the state from environmental threats, but also protecting the environment from destructive activities of the state as a large amount of environmental problems are human-made. The security of environment is also a component of environmental security. In this respect, synthesis of various sectors of security has also become the central discussion of the RSCT.

The securitisation of environment still remains a debate in the region. The constructivist model of RSCT is based on the process of securitisation and accepts the notion that the security agenda in every region is different due to various reasons – including differing actors and relative importance of different sectors in every region. For India, an issue such as climate change is an environmental or a development issue. However, for every other country in South Asia, climate change is a security issue now (King 2013). Securitisation is undoubtedly facilitated by the vulnerability of the particular nation state. Maldives and Bangladesh see themselves in grave danger in terms of effects of climate change. However, for these countries, it is as much a development issue as a security one in comparison to other regions, especially in the developed world. Depending on the manner in which regional actors define problems arising from climate change, they could produce a regional formation even though an issue like climate change is considered to arise from "outside systemic pressure" (Buzan and Wœver 2003).

Environmental Security in South Asia

Through the RSCT, it has adequately been proven that South Asia could be regarded as an environmental regional security complex. This section takes India's environmental security interdependence with three of its neighbours to further reinforce this argument. Climate change and water security will be taken as the primary source of instability in the region. First and foremost, Pakistan, with which India's relations have remained tense and hostile since 1947. This relationship has been heavily dominated by the discourse on the LoC. The border disputes cannot be addressed without taking into account their environmental aspects. A significant proportion of the literature on India-Pakistan border tensions talks about the strategic significance of Kashmir in terms of the Indus that flows through Jammu and Kashmir. The river is the lifeline of Pakistan and currently is affected by environmental stress – pollution, flooding, glacial melt and decreased water levels among many others. It is claimed that one of the chief motives behind Pakistan's demand for Kashmir is complete control of the waters of the Indus.

Several factors have complicated Indo-Pakistan water sharing relations in the past and will continue to do so in the future. Under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) brokered by the World Bank in 1960, India was granted exclusive rights over the waters of the Eastern Rivers – the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi – and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan, while Pakistan won the rights over the waters of the Western Rivers – the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab – and their tributaries. Pakistan's share of the total Indus system is over 80 per cent which makes India a beneficiary of less than 20 per cent (Chellaney 2012). In the past decade, there have been many disputes over India and Pakistan's shared

waters. The construction of Baglihar Dam on the Chenab by the Indian side was obstructed by Pakistan. When Pakistan had moved the World Bank for arbitration, the latter appointed a neutral expert, Richard Laffite who gave green light to the project in 2007, thwarting the objections raised by the former about the structure and design of the dam (PTI 2010). In 2013, the International Court of Arbitration issued a ruling partial award on the Kishanganga Dam dispute between India and Pakistan over the Indus River. This might succeed in bringing certain sense of closure to some of the differences that exist between India and Pakistan on the sharing of the waters of the Indus Basin – but the legal and political battles are far from over. The award will allow India to establish a hydro-electric dam on the Neelum, albeit under strict conditions that includes amendment to the design and operations of the dam (Grover 2014).

In Pakistan, there is increasing fear of water and food insecurity, a country that is entirely dependent on the waters of the Indus (and its tributaries). Pakistan fears that India has plans to construct 155 hydropower projects on the Indus, Jhelum (74) and Chenab (56) (Bhutta 2011) – the three rivers that were assigned to Pakistan under the IWT. This number has however not been confirmed by the Indian authorities. Studies show clearly that the per capita availability of water is declining in both countries due to diminishing river flows, over-exploitation of groundwater (causing salinity), low conveyance efficiency and pollution of rivers (Chellaney 2012). Climate change is also exacerbating the situation and it could only worsen in the future as the Indus is one of those rivers that have maximum dependence (151 per cent) on glacial meltwater (Friedman 2011). One study states, "Based on current projections, the Indus River system is expected to fall below 2000 flow levels between 2030 and 2050. The drop-off is estimated to be most serious between 2030 and 2040, with a new equilibrium flow of 20 per cent below that of 2000 reached after 2060" (Condon, Hillmann, King, Lang and Patz 2009).

On the political side of the debate, Pervez Musharraf, former President of Pakistan, has claimed in his dissertation that the Kashmir dispute was primarily based on the distribution of the waters of the Indus and its tributaries between India and Pakistan. Stressing on the fair distribution of waters, he asserts, "If one were resolved, the other would not exist" (Pai 2008). A few reports have also suggested that Pakistan would not hesitate to use its nuclear weapons against India if the latter chokes water supply to its territory as confirmed by a report prepared by nuclear physicists Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini of Landau Network, Italy on Pakistan's nuclear policy in which they quote Lieutenant-General (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, the founder director-general of the Strategic Plans Division of Pakistan (Iqbal 2011).

Environmental change is also altering the physical battlefields in the region. For instance, in the Siachen glacier, the world's highest battlefield in which soldiers of India and Pakistan are stationed in the most inhospitable conditions, soldiers have died in avalanches on both sides (Walsh 2012) (PTI 2012). Moreover, the glacier is reportedly melting at an accelerated pace, thus reflecting on the possible requirement of a realigned military strategy or the need for settlement of the dispute. The Siachen glacier is said to have receded by nearly 800 metres due to climate change during a course of twenty years. It has been found that the military presence in the region has resulted not only in the deterioration of the ecosystems but also pollution of the Indus River (Kulkarni 2009). Military posts in the Himalayas (shared by more than two countries in the region) could be affected by melting glaciers and other changes in environment. If the military infrastructure gets affected, this could drastically harm manoeuvrability of troops in some of the volatile regions.

The second case study that could explain the South Asian environmental RSC is the sharing of the River Ganges between India and Bangladesh. The proposal to construct the Farraka Barrage in the state of West Bengal in India across the Ganges had led the two countries to come to the negotiating table to discuss respective claims and justifications way back in the 1950s. The talks broke down in the seventies and the Barrage was operationalised by the Indian side unilaterally. The dam was built chiefly to divert the Ganges waters into the Hooghly River (a distributary of the Ganges) during the dry season in order to remove the silt that had been hindering operations at the Kolkata Port – one of the busiest in India. The 1996 Ganges Treaty (a thirty year comprehensive treaty) provides for the distribution of water from Farakka for the two countries between January 1 and May 31. It states that during any critical period, India would get an assured flow of 990 cubic metres/second (Nishat and Pasha 2001). The 1996 treaty came into existence despite hostilities and inconsistencies largely due to the efforts of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who is considered pro-India.

The fact that domestic politics plays a big role in river water sharing treaties is best explained by the Indo-Bangladesh water sharing arrangements. Every time the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Begum Khaleda Zia (supported by anti-India extremist groups) came to power virtually no dialogue had taken place between the two countries to enhance cooperation. The BNP has always opposed the Ganges Treaty and indicted India for excessive drawing of water, depriving Bangladesh of its rightful share. India has stressed that it has always abided by the terms and conditions of the treaty, at times at the expense of its own water requirements. It has claimed that the water allocated for India is not sufficient for the operation of the Kolkata Port and the power plant in Farakka. In addition, the

West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee's refusal to assent to Teesta river water sharing agreement (fully endorsed by the Central Government) in 2011 gave a big jolt to the two countries' water cooperation efforts. She argued that the proposed allocation scheme would harm agriculture in the north of West Bengal. This river caters to the demands of a major paddy growing region – greater Rangpur region of Bangladesh as well (Sahgal and Dasgupta 2011).

Another dispute on the Tipaimukh hydroelectric project in India on the Barak is yet to be settled. The dam is expected to control floods in Assam's Barak valley and generate electricity for states in Northeast India. Farmers in Bangladesh have cried foul fearing it would reduce the water flow to its land, thus damaging rice crops that depend on seasonal flooding of these transboundary rivers every monsoon. However, there has been a decision between the two countries on conducting joint Environmental Impact Assessment of the project (Hanghal 2013).

There have been discussions on augmenting the flow of the Ganges River by diverting waters of the Brahmaputra River, considering the two meet in central Bangladesh as well as the in-basin utilisation of the latter currently accounts for only 4 per cent of the available surface flow. India has proposed to construct a gravity link canal to divert 43 billion cubic metres (BCM) of water from the Brahmaputra River to the Ganges River (Bhaduri and Barbier 2008). This has also raised concerns in Bangladesh as this could mean that the entire flow of river water to Bangladesh would be controlled by India and it could also lead to reduction in the amount of water downstream, causing saltwater intrusion and other environmental damages.

On the issue of migration, there has been a debate on whether climate change is a direct cause or a threat multiplier. Migration from Bangladesh to India due to political and socio-economic reasons has already led to several security concerns in the latter including fundamentalism and terrorism. But this may or may not be directly linked to environmental change in Bangladesh. Environmental change is one of the many several causes that need to be put on the table while discussing prospective migration. Even intra-state migration has the potential to evolve into a humanitarian crisis as well if it is compounded by resource scarcity (especially food and water), which is expected to have transboundary spill-over effects. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has predicted that a 1.5 meter rise would submerge 15% of all the land area and about 20% of the farmland, with 20% less agricultural production and would displace about 20% of Bangladesh's total population (Gupta 2008).

In the context of India-Maldives relations, the major factor that could play a significant role in shaping them in the foreseeable future is climate change. As far as the impact of environmental change on Maldives is concerned, the country is already coping with a series of problems such as beach erosion, crunch in

freshwater resources, excessive waste, sea level rise, to name just a few. As far as the impact of 'climate change' on Maldives is concerned, the rising sea levels has been identified as the biggest threat that could result in beach erosion, more powerful storms, higher storm surges and threats to biodiversity. The country has around 1,200 islands and atolls having a landmass of 115 square miles. At its highest point, it is only 8 feet above sea level (Hoffmann 2007). It is also an acknowledged fact that coral growth could be stunted due to the phenomena of coral bleaching and increased sea erosion, rising water temperature and ocean acidification. This in turn could imperil the coral sea-defences that are responsible for the sustenance of staple crops, like salt-sensitive mango and taro as well as forests. If the sea level rise exceeds 1.2 metres, the airport located in Male would be submerged. Besides, Male is one of the most densely populated towns in the world. This would be the biggest setback for the Maldivian economy that depends heavily on its tourism industry. If the sea level rise exceeds 2 metres, nearly 50% of Maldives is expected to be inundated (Gupta 2008).

India will have to address many serious questions with regard to Maldives besides migration in a hypothetical scenario. Geographical alterations caused by the disappearance of Maldives could have serious geopolitical repercussions. Two primary factors – statehood and maritime boundaries – are expected to be most seriously affected as a result of this. The existing international laws and conventions have several loopholes especially since they do not take possible environmental change and geographical alterations into consideration. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) outlines four principles that mark the existence of a state – (a) a Government; (b) a defined territory; (c) a permanent population; and (d) a capacity to enter into relations with other states (Paskal 2010). The question is, if the island nations get submerged or become uninhabitable in the future, will they still be considered 'nation states?' For example, if the islands of Maldives disappear, it is not clear if it would still be given the status of a 'nation state' since it would be left with no territory. If the islands do not disappear but become uninhabitable due to various reasons such as the lack of freshwater resources, large-scale subsidence or frequent storm surges, even then the need for resettlement of its population becomes an international duty and responsibility. In such a case, Maldives would still have the territory (albeit uninhabited) but, in the process of resettlement, will the country still retain its political, economic and administrative structures if it is 'forced' to occupy other nation states' territories? If Maldives is left without a government, then its capacity to enter into relations with other states is questionable. Therefore, the 'statehood' of Maldives in such a situation would be under scrutiny. India will have to deal with such complex issues including the probability of institutionalisation of a Maldivian

Government within the Indian territorial limits in a quid pro quo arrangement, besides migration and shift in maritime boundary that it shares with Maldives.

Regional Environmental Cooperation in South Asia

The above-mentioned cases not only substantiate environmental security interdependence between the South Asian nations but also provide adequate rationale for environmental security cooperation in the region. Environmental security is seen as a "common security issue in which each person or state is secure only when all are secure" (Elliott 2011: 44). Therefore, cooperation should ideally form a bigger part of the environmental security discourse. On the contrary, one of the biggest drawbacks of environmental security studies is that it overwhelmingly focuses on environment-conflict thesis, overlooking ample scope for cooperation in the field. Considering neither environmental security nor environmental security of a particular nation state can be understood in isolation, it is sufficiently clear that environmental security is inter-linked with other security sectors and therefore, cooperation in this sector could have positive implications for other more problematic (in the realist paradigm) sectors including political and military. Apart from the common security agenda, the need to adopt preventive security measures is yet another raison d'être for regional environmental security cooperation. By acknowledging the importance of comprehensive security, a state or region would look into not just political and military but also social, economic and environmental aspects of security.

In this context, measures adopted by SAARC to secure the region from environmental threats require to be brought to light. Environment is one of the stated areas of cooperation among the members of the SAARC. Two of the earliest studies conducted by the SAARC include: *Regional Study on the Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of Environment* (completed in 1991) and *Regional Study Greenhouse Effect and its Impact on the Region* (completed in 1992). The study on natural disasters observes that South Asia remains "one of the most disaster-prone regions in the world," with floods, droughts, cyclones, landslides and other disasters affecting the region on a regular basis (SAARC 1991: 18). The unpredictability and variability in the patterns of monsoon that is common to the South Asian region has been forecast in the study on climate change. Except Nepal and Bhutan, every other country in the region has long coastlines and they are highly vulnerable to cyclones, storm surges and so on. It has also been highlighted that in all the SAARC countries, it is the energy sector that contributes most to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Very importantly, the report calls for cooperation in building adaptive capacity against the biggest threat posed by climate change to the SAARC region – sea

level rise; also, it also calls for the region to set up a robust monitoring system to keep the countries constantly updated on "atmospheric and ocean phenomena" – "the build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere, the rates of deforestation and the extent of forest cover, human-induced changes in ecosystems, land use, and ocean resources." It proposed a SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC) that was later established in Dhaka, dissemination and sharing of information on climate observations, development of technology and development of an "energy master plan" aimed at increasing the share of clean energy (SAARC 1992: viii-xiv).

In addition to numerous reports on environmental issues, SAARC Environment Ministers' meetings have been held regularly to enhance regional cooperation in tackling "environment, climate change and natural disasters." Since the Conference of Parties-15 (COP-15) at Copenhagen, the member countries of the SAARC have presented a common position at climate change negotiations. Under the 1997 Environment Action Plan, SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre (SCZMC), SAARC Forestry Centre (SFC) and South Asia Environment Outlook (SAEO) 2009 were set up. In addition, a SAARC Disaster Management Centre has been instituted in Delhi, India. The SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change (2008) specifies the areas of cooperation: "capacity building for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects; exchange of information on disaster preparedness and extreme events; exchange of meteorological data; capacity building and exchange of information on climate change impacts (e.g. sea level rise, glacial melting, biodiversity and forestry); and mutual consultation in international negotiation process as the Priority Action Plan" ("Area of Cooperation").

There are efforts being made in the region at the bilateral level as well. For instance, India is known to provide flood data on all the major rivers that flow into Bangladesh from India. In 2008, the two countries agreed to undertake joint dredging to facilitate river navigation along the Kolkata-Haldia and Karimganj river routes. An initiative to preserve the Sundarban ecosystem (of which 60 per cent lies in Bangladesh and 40 per cent in India) involving joint patrolling of waterways and replenishing freshwater supply to the area was also agreed upon in 2011 (Government of India 2011).

Conclusion: Prospects and Recommendations for Regional Environmental Security Cooperation

It is a misperception that environmental security threats can lead only to conflict and not cooperation. It is unfortunate that hyperboles such as the possibility of a border conflict between India and Bangladesh due to climate change induced migration is being given unwarranted attention while the potential for cooperation is being largely overlooked. Yet another misperception is that only inter-state

migration can be called a security threat. The reality is that every year a considerable number of people are being displaced by seasonal flooding in Bangladesh who do not necessarily cross the borders but move to other parts of the country, mostly cities such as Dhaka (highly vulnerable to climate change), which ultimately puts enormous amount of pressure on their available resources. Therefore, multiple levels of analysis are required to construct a regional environmental security community in South Asia.

Through SAARC (as already discussed), there are a few areas, particularly climate change, in which the South Asian countries are cooperating but there is still a long way in terms of actualising the goals identified by the organisation in the environmental security arena. There are various ways in which regional environmental security cooperation can be augmented. For instance, military-to-military cooperation in disaster management as well as in initiatives that would involve integrated collaborative and sustainable management of all shared rivers could go one step ahead and help reduce the trust deficit between the militaries of the countries within the region. The militaries would have to get involved more and more in exercises such as environmental information sharing, environmental risk assessment, environmental management and strengthening the regional security apparatus as environmental change does not recognise boundaries. Joint patrolling of water bodies to check illegal activities such as toxic dumping and forests to prevent poaching and deforestation (in the case of countries with which India shares land border) could be another avenue of cooperation.

Yet another issue that should bring the South Asian nations on one platform for discussion and resolution is climate vulnerability. Among the top ten cities that are most vulnerable to climate change and extreme weather events, Dhaka, Kolkata and Mumbai from South Asia figure, Dhaka being the most vulnerable city in the world (Maplecroft 2013). These are some of the biggest population and economic centres of the region as well, thus making them a crucial component of the particular country's national security. Countries in the region have realized after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake, the 2013 Uttarakhand floods in India and several other disasters that they need to put in place a fresh set of policies to deal with frequent disasters rather than adopting a reactive approach. Cyclone Aila, which hit the India-Bangladesh border in 2012, devastated southern parts of Bangladesh and West Bengal. Massive flooding, salt water intrusion and strong winds destroyed agricultural crops, contaminated fresh water resources and damaged several houses (McDonald 2009). Both India and Bangladesh have been and will be victims of cyclones in the Bay of Bengal region and therefore, there is a need for the two countries to have a joint integrated mechanism to deal with them in the long run.

Bangladesh has been very keen on establishing a tri-nation initiative on common basin management of the Ganges that would include India, Bangladesh and Nepal. If this materialises, it would be a landmark sub-regional water sharing arrangement. This could be integrated with the other two basins (Brahmaputra and Meghna) that would include Bhutan as well (Dikshit 2012). And later China could also be roped as a member or even as an observer or dialogue partner in the same vein as the Mekong River Commission of Southeast Asia. Having separate river commissions gives room to confusion, disharmony and disagreement. A Joint Rivers Commission should ideally comprise a provision for arbitration too in order to resolve all types of disputes. India however, has been focussing more on the actual deliverables in the form of bilateral arrangements. This could only subdue the enthusiasm for initiatives that have the potential to enhance hydro-cooperation with its neighbouring countries, especially Bangladesh. It would be better to adopt a more feasible approach that would be constituted by an integrated collaborative and sustainable management of all shared rivers.

In the case of hydro relations with Pakistan, The Indus (and its tributaries) is the lifeline of the country and the effects of environmental change are being felt on both sides of the border. Instead of revising the treaty and wrestling over riparian politics, India and Pakistan could work towards integrated basin management as water security is emerging as a critical issue in both countries. Water management negotiations are the biggest confidence-building measure between the two countries. The Indus Water Treaty needs to be amended to take environmental change into consideration; the focus needs to shift to Article VII that is entitled "Future Cooperation", which emphasises setting up of new hydrological and meteorological observation stations and implementing engineering works including drainage ones. Moreover, groundwater extraction close to the border areas of both countries is overlooked by the treaty (focussing on surface water recharge), an area in which India and Pakistan could cooperate. The treaty should not be treated as 'division' of waters as was the case during the Partition in 1947, when land was divided between the two countries. Water is an existential issue and both countries need to go beyond politics to cooperate on river water sharing.

On the flip side, it can also be argued that one cannot deny the fact that an existing political crisis can be aggravated by water scarcity. Also, with changing climate and environmental systems, water levels are increasingly becoming scarce across the globe. With less water to negotiate for, nation states would bargain more, creating a conflict. In the realist paradigm, the state-system runs on national interest and balance of power. Such a system indeed puts a lot of impediments in the path of cooperation. The question of whether it is too hypothetical to think of environmental security as a priority concern for the international community, this

can be answered by highlighting the argument that to assume that the impact of climate change on national and international security and the military in particular would be minimal is equally conjectural. Therefore preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures are the best way forward for the region to establish peace and stability.

When it comes to India, it has failed to a great extent to mobilise the support of the majority of developing countries on climate change, including its own neighbours. India's seemingly obstructionist attitude towards global environmental consensus and its refusal to consider climate change a security issue has alienated it to a large extent. This has weakened India's position in the global environmental order, resulting in some legitimate issues raised by it during negotiations – adaptation techniques, sustainable technology, and finance mechanisms – being overlooked by the international community. With Narendra Modi at the helm of affairs in India after decisively winning the 2014 general elections, expectations are that the status-quo would change. His gesture of inviting the SAARC leaders for his swearing-in ceremony has indeed brought hope to the entire region that India would now play a proactive role in enhancing relations between the South Asian nations. Along with trade and economic cooperation, environmental security would be a good starting point for such a cooperative framework.

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